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Tokyo's Despatch No. 806,
November 19, 1949.
-2-
All other considerations, we feel, are of secondary importance and should formally be provided for in the treaty itself only if useful in reaching and achieving these three United States objectives.
My idea of a workable treaty with Japan is that it should be a ringing declaration of peace; it should be a document of historic stature reflective of the high concepts of the Atlantic Charter; it should be broad and general in scope and dignified with an enduring philosophical approach, sublimating to the greatest extent possible the harsh and temporary realities of property settlements, commercial arrangements, and all the legal technicalities which can only clutter and obscure the principal objectives. So far as realities permit, I believe the treaty should be a simple but inspiring document. I feel it is important, too, that we bear in mind the crucial fact that we are dealing with Orientals with whom the proper psychological approach and manner of procedure are of cardinal importance. I would accordingly suggest that, since property settlements and commercial and legal arrangements must admittedly have a place, consideration be given to removing them as completely as possible from the broad, dignified framework of the treaty and relegating them to the annexes thereto or to supplementary conventions. In this manner, at least some of the psychological hazards involved in putting materialistic and legalistic considerations in the forefront could be avoided. National as well as individual "face" is a very real and controlling factor to the Oriental, even to a defeated nation, and must be considered.
We here are inclined to feel that the November 2 draft offers the Japanese too little tangible advantage in being admitted to the family of nations as a democratic state committed to peace and unqualified disarmament. The Japanese feel that the progress they have made in rebuilding their country under the Occupation deserves recognition, the country's past transgressions, ultimate defeat and unconditional surrender notwithstanding. We feel that the almost casual reference in paragraph 3 of Article 1 to Japan's post-war accomplishments constitutes scant recognition for a degree of cooperation and constructive achievement under the Occupation which is without parallel, and provides inadequate balance for the subsequent recital of the stern realities which a defeated nation must face. It may perhaps be reasonable also to suggest that there be included in the treaty some recognition of the economic and social problems Japan must solve in the future if its democratic development is to withstand the inevitable temptation to seek more expedient totalitarian solutions. Even a modicum of recognition for meritorious achievement and some sympathetic mention of the acute problems this nation must hereafter face would, it is believed, not be misplaced in a treaty which we hope may be instrumental in giving Japan maximum usefulness in the family of nations. Omission of such recognition in a document which of necessity must have some severe provisions could well sow the seeds of a resentment which might eventually make itself manifest in the pattern of future Pacific wars. In putting forth these suggestions we have no interest in making the treaty "soft", or merely palatable for the Japanese; we are looking at it from the cold practical viewpoint of American interest in a treaty which will draw out of the Japanese willing cooperation and support in achieving American ends.
SECRET
