We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved.
THE WHOLE MASS OF NATIONAL POWER IN RELATION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS.
The new constitution not dangerous to the state governments—Tendency in confederation is to weaken the central power—State governments will have more influence among the people—State governments are essential parts of the federal government—Officers of the United States are less numerous than those of the states—Reserved powers are relatively greater than those delegated—Proposed change consists less in giving new than in strengthening old powers.
To the People of the State of New York:
Having shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.
The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be essen-
