112 STAT. 2172 PUBLIC LAW 105-261—OCT. 17, 1998 (b) CONTENTS OF REPORTS.—The reports required by subsection (a) shall include information reflecting the activities of forums established to consider issues relating to treaty implementation and treaty compliance. SEC. 1503. REPORT ON ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA. Not later than 3 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a report on the status and adequacy of current direct communications capabilities between the governments of the United States and Russia. The report shall identify each existing direct communications link between those governments and each such link that is designed to be used, or is available to be used, in an emergency situation. The Secretary shall describe in the report any shortcomings with the existing communications capabilities and shall include such proposals as the Secretary considers appropriate to improve those capabilities. In considering improvements to propose, the Secretary shall assess the feasibility and desirability of establishing a direct communications link between the commanders of appropriate United States unified and specified commands, including the United States Space Command and the United States Strategic Command, and their Russian counterparts. SEC, 1504. RUSSIAN NONSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. (a) FINDINGS. —The Congress makes the following findings: (1) The 7,000 to 12,000 or more nonstrategic (or "tactical") nuclear weapons estimated by the United States Strategic Command to be in the Russian arsenal may present the greatest threat of sale or theft of a nuclear warhead in the world today. (2) As the number of deployed strategic warheads in the Russian and United States arsenals declines to just a few thousand under the START accords, Russia's vast superiority in tactical nuclear warheads—many of which have yields equivalent to strategic nuclear weapons—could become strategically destabilizing. (3) While the United States has unilaterally reduced its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent since the end of the Cold War, Russia is behind schedule in implementing the steep tactical nuclear arms reductions pledged by former Soviet President Gorbachev in 1991 and Russian President Yeltsin in 1992, perpetuating the dangers from Russia's tactical nuclear stockpile. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.— I t is the sense of Congress that the President should call on Russia to expedite reduction of its tactical nuclear arsenal in accordance with the promises made in 1991 and 1992. (c) REPORT. —Not later than March 15, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons of Russia. The report shall include— (1) estimates regarding the current numbers, types, yields, viability, and locations of those weapons; (2) an assessment of the strategic implications of Russia's nonstrategic arsenal, including the potential use of those weapons in a strategic role or the use of their components in strategic
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