Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter (168 Ark. 22)

by the Arkansas Supreme Court

For works with similar titles, see Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Porter.

Supreme Court of Arkansas

168 Ark. 22

Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.  v.  Porter

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division
Decided February 16, 1925.

1. COMMERCE—EXCLUSIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS.—Congress has exclusive power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce, and its regulations in either field will supersede State statutes relating thereto.
2. CARRIERS—EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY FOR FIRE LOSS.—Carriers may, under laws applicable in federal tribunals, stipulate for exemption from liability for loss by fire, but not from the consequences of their own negligence.
3. COMMERCE—CONTROL OVER COMMERCE WITH NON-ADJACENT FOREIGN COUNTRIES.—Congress, by the Cummins Amendment to the Carmack Amendment (Comp. Stat. § 8604a) did not cover the subject of commerce with non-adjacent foreign counties, and hence a stipulation in a bill of lading covering a shipment to England, exempting the carrier from liability for loss by fire, is void under Crawford & Moses' Dig., § 843.
4. COMMERCE—CONSTRUCTION OF ACT OF CONGRESS.—Crawford & Moses' Dig., § 843, prohibiting carriers from limiting their statutory and common-law liability by contract, is not, as to inland carriers, superseded by Interstate Commerce Act § 25, ¶ 4, amended by Transportation Act of 1920, § 441 (U. S. Comp. St., 1923 Supp. § 8596a.), which relates only to carriers by water.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; Marvin Harris, Judge; affirmed.

E. B. Kinsworthy and R. E. Wiley, for appellant.

It is not denied that this shipment constituted foreign commerce The power to regulate commerce given to congress by the Constitution is exclusive, and a regulation of foreign commerce by the Congress under that power is exclusive and supersedes any State statute or rule. Cons. U.S. Art. 1, § 8. Where Congress has entered the 'field and assumed control of the subject, the the law applicable to every case within that subject is determined by Federal legislation, and the common law rules as applied in Federal tribunals, 241 U.S. 327, 60 L. Ed. 1022; 240 U.S. 612, 60 L. Ed. 827; 243 U.S. 592, 61 L. Ed. 921; 107 U.S. 102, 27 L. Ed. 325. If Congress has entered a certain field of regulation by passing legislation relative to the subject, the States are restrained from doing so, although Congress may not have covered the entire field or enacted anything inconsistent with the particular State regulation sought to be applied. 222 U.S. 370, 56 L. Ed. 237; 236 U.S. 439, 56 L. Ed. 661; 242 U.S. 255, 61 L. Ed. 276; 237 U.S. 597, 59 L. Ed. 1137, 1140; 162 Pac. 111; 212 Mo. 658; 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 326; 236 U.S. 439, 59 L. Ed. 661, 665; 244 U.S. 147, 61 L. Ed. 1045; 222 U.S. 424, 56 L. Ed. 257; 76 So. 505; Cummins Amendment, 4 Fed. Stat. Ann. (2nd Ed.) 506, 507.

The Federal law applicable here permits the carrier to stipulate for exemption from liability for loss by fire. 226 U.S. 491; 112 U.S. 331, 28 L. Ed. 717, 720; 194 U.S. 427, 48 L. Ed. 1053; 204 U.S. 505, 51 L. Ed. 590; 279 Fed. 929, 933

J. C. Marshall, for appellee.

If Crawford & Moses' Digest, § 843–844, controls, that ends the controversy, because it prohibits any contract or rule or regulation which limits the common law liability of a carrier. That statute, we contend, does apply to this shipment. 169 U.S. 133; 28 L.R.A. 718; 128 N.W. 663, 115 N.W. 230; 80 S.W. 488; 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 938; 64 S.W. 511; 22 L.R.A. 335; 3 L.R.A 129; 70 N.W. 508; 64 S.E. 38; Id. 35; 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 183; 94 Ark. 407; 101 Ark. 310; 111 Ark. 102.

The Carmack Amendment is confined by its terms to interstate shipments. The Cummins Amendment enlarged its scope by including shipments to adjacent foreign countries, saying nothing about export or import shipments which pass from or to nonadjacent foreign countries. Therefore, as held by the interstate commerce commission and by Federal and State courts, the Carmack and Cummins Amendments have no application to these last-named shipments. 212 Fed. 324; 281 Fed. (C.C.A.) 385; 114 Alt. (Md.) 905; 52 I.C. 671; Roberts, Fed. Liability of Carriers, §§ 322, 327. The statute has no application to interstate shipments, as was held of the Iowa statute (Ry. v. Cramer, 232 U.S. 490), but until counsel can point to a Federal statute which has done the like as to the inland haul of shipments to or from nonadjacent foreign countries we must maintain that our statute is still intact as to that. 61 Mass. 53; 46 S.E. (Va.) 911; Traffic Law, § 2005; Id. § 3037 A; 91 L.R.A. (Va.) 511; 150 Ark. 571; 209 U.S. 56; 101 Ark. 313; 244 U.S. 147; 169 U.S. 613; 234 U.S. 412; 236 U.S. 434; 187 U.S. 137; 219 U.S. 453; 234 U.S. 280; 128 U.S. 96; 165 U.S. 628. See also 254 U.S. 357. Where Congress has not spoken at all, but the State by taxation or other regulation has attempted to impose a burden upon commerce, the silence of Congress restrains the State from making the. regulation; but where the State's action is not a burden upon commerce, then it must stand, unless Congress has spoken to the contrary on the same matter of regulation. 265 U.S. 298.

[Opinion of the court by Justice THOMAS H. HUMPHREYS.]