1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Greece
GREECE, an ancient geographical area, and a modern kingdom more or less corresponding thereto, situated at the south-eastern extremity of Europe and forming the most southerly portion of the Balkan Peninsula. The modern kingdom is bounded on the N. by European Turkey and on the E., S. and W. by the Aegean, Mediterranean and Ionian seas. The name Graecia, which was more or less vaguely given to the ancient country by the Romans, seems not to have been employed by any native writer before Aristotle; it was apparently derived by the Romans from the Illyrians, who applied the name of an Epirote tribe (Γραικοί, Graeci) to all their southern neighbours. The names Hellas, Hellenes (Ἕλλας, Ἕλληνες), by which the ancient Greeks called their country and their race, and which are still employed by the modern Greeks, originally designated a small district in Phthiotis in Thessaly and its inhabitants, who gradually spread over the lands south of the Cambunian mountains. The name Hellenes was not universally applied to the Greek race until the post-Homeric epoch (Thucyd. i. 3).
1. Geography and Statistics
The ancient Greeks had a somewhat vague conception of the northern limits of Hellas. Thessaly was generally included and Epirus excluded; some writers included some of the southern cantons of Epirus, while others excluded not Extent of ancient Greece. only all that country but Aetolia and Acarnania. Generally speaking, the confines of Hellas in the age of its greatest distinction were represented by a line drawn from the northern shore of the Ambracian Gulf on the W. to the mouth of the Peneus on the E. Macedonia and Thrace were regarded as outside the pale of Hellenic civilization till 386 B.C., when after his conquest of Thessaly and Phocis, Philip of Macedon obtained a seat in the Amphictyonic Council. In another sense, however, the name Hellas expressed an ethnological rather than a geographical unity; it denoted every country inhabited by Hellenes. It thus embraced all the Greek settlements on the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean, on the shores of the Hellespont, the Bosporus and the Black Sea. Nevertheless, the Greek peninsula within the limits described above, together with the adjacent islands, was always regarded as Hellas par excellence. The continental area of Hellas proper was no greater than that of the modern Greek kingdom, which comprises but a small portion of the territories actually occupied by the Greek race. The Greeks have always been a maritime people, and the real centre of the national life is now, as in antiquity, the Aegean Sea or Archipelago. Thickly studded with islands and bordered by deeply indented coasts with sheltered creeks and harbours, the Aegean in the earliest days of navigation invited the enterprise of the mariner; its shores, both European and Asiatic, became covered with Greek settlements and its islands, together with Crete and Cyprus, became Greek. True to their maritime instincts, the Greeks rarely advanced inland to any distance from the sea; the coasts of Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor are still mainly Greek, but, except for some isolated colonies, the hinterland in each case lies outside the limits of the race. Continental Greece is divided by its mountain ranges into a number of natural cantons; the existence of physical barriers tended in the earliest times to the growth of isolated political communities, and in the epoch of its ancient independence the country was occupied by seventeen separate states, none of them larger than an ordinary English county. These states, which are noticed separately, were: Thessaly, in northern Greece; Acarnania, Aetolia, Locris, Doris, Phocis, Megaris, Boeotia and Attica in central Greece; and Corinthia, Sicyonia, Achaea, Elis, Messenia, Laconia, Argolis and Arcadia in the Peloponnesus.
Modern Greece, which (including the adjacent islands) extends from 35° 50′ to 39° 54′ N. and from 19° 20′ to 26° 15′ E., comprises all the area formerly occupied by these states. Under the arrangement concluded at Constantinople Extent of modern Greece. on the 21st of July 1832 between Great Britain, France, Russia and Turkey, the northern boundary of Greece was drawn from the Gulf of Arta (Sinus Ambracius) to the Gulf of Volo (S. Pagasaeus), the line keeping to the crest of the Othrys range. Thessaly and part of Acarnania were thus left to Turkey. The island of Euboea, the Cyclades and the northern Sporades were added to the new kingdom. In 1864 the Ionian Islands (q.v.) were ceded by Great Britain to Greece. In 1880 the Conference of Berlin proposed a new frontier, which transferred to Greece not only Thessaly but a considerable portion of southern Epirus, extending to the river Kalamas. This, however, was rejected by Turkey, and the existing boundary was traced in 1881. Starting from the Aegean coast at a point near Platamona, between Mount Olympus and the mouth of the Salambria (Peneus), the line passes over the heights of Kritiri and Zygos (Pindus) and descends the course of the river Arta to its mouth. After the war of 1897 Greece restored to Turkey some strategical points on the frontier possessing no geographical importance. The greatest length of Greece is about 250 m., the greatest breadth 180 m. The country is generally divided into five parts, which are indicated by its natural features:—(i.) Northern Greece, which extends northwards from Mount Othrys and the gulfs of Zeitun (Lamia) and Arta to the Cambunian Mountains, and comprises Thessaly and a small portion of Epirus; (ii.) Central Greece, extending from the southern limits of Northern Greece to the gulfs of Corinth and Aegina; (iii.) the peninsula of the Peloponnesus or Morea, attached to the mainland by the Isthmus of Corinth; (iv.) the Ionian Islands on the west coasts of Epirus and Greece; (v.) The islands of the Aegean Sea, including Euboea, the Cyclades and the northern Sporades.
In the complexity of its contour and the variety of its natural features Greece surpasses every country in Europe, as Europe surpasses every continent in the world. The broken character of its coast-line is unique; except a few districts in Thessaly Physical features. no part of the country is more than 50 m. from the sea. Although the area of Greece is considerably smaller than that of Portugal, its coast-line is greater than that of Spain and Portugal together. The mainland is penetrated by numerous gulfs and inlets, and the adjoining seas are studded with islands. Another characteristic is the number and complexity of the mountain chains, which traverse every part of the country and which, together with their ramifications, cover four-fifths of its surface. The mountain-chains interlace, the interstices forming small enclosed basins, such as the plain of Boeotia and the plateau of Arcadia; the only plain of any extent is that of Thessaly. The mountains project into the sea, forming peninsulas, and sometimes reappearing in rows or groups of islands; they descend abruptly to the coast or are separated from it by small alluvial plains. The portions of the country suitable for human colonization were thus isolated one from the other, but as a rule possessed easy access to the sea. The earliest settlements were generally situated on or around some rocky elevation, which dominated the surrounding plain and was suitable for fortification as a citadel or acropolis; owing to the danger of piratical attacks they were usually at some little distance from the sea, but in the vicinity of a natural harbour. The physical features of the country played an important part in moulding the character of its inhabitants. Protected against foreign invasion by the mountain barriers and to a great extent cut off from mutual intercourse except by sea, the ancient Greek communities developed a marked individuality and a strong sentiment of local patriotism; their inhabitants were both mountaineers and mariners; they possessed the love of country, the vigour and the courage which are always found in highlanders, together with the spirit of adventure, the versatility and the passion for freedom characteristic of a seafaring people. The great variety of natural products as well as the facility of maritime communication tended to the early growth of commercial enterprise, while the peculiar beauty of the scenery, though little dwelt upon in ancient literature, undoubtedly quickened the poetic and artistic instincts of the race. The effects of physical environment are no less noticeable among the modern Greeks. The rural populations of Attica and Boeotia, though descended from Albanian colonists in the middle ages, display the same contrast in character which marked the inhabitants of those regions in ancient times.
In its general aspect the country presents a series of striking and interesting contrasts. Fertile tracts covered with vineyards, olive groves, corn-fields or forests display themselves in close proximity with rugged heights and rocky precipices; the landscape is never, monotonous; its outlines are graceful, and its colouring, owing to the clearness of the air, is at once brilliant and delicate, while the sea, in most instances, adds a picturesque feature, enhancing the charm and variety of the scenery.
The ruling feature in the mountain system of northern Greece is the great chain of Pindus, which, extending southwards from the lofty Shar Dagh (Skardos) near Uskub, forms the backbone of the Balkan peninsula. Reaching the frontier Mountains. of Greece a little S. of lat. 40°, the Pindus range is intersected by the Cambunian Mountains running E. and W.; the eastern branch, which forms the northern boundary of Thessaly, extends to the Gulf of Salonica and culminates in Mount Olympus (9754 ft.) a little to the N. of the Greek frontier; then bending to the S.E. it follows the coast-line, forming a rampart between the Thessalian plain and the sea; the barrier is severed at one point only where the river Salambria (anc. Peneus) finds an exit through the narrow defile of Tempe. South of Tempe the mountain ridge, known as the Mavro Vouno, connects the pyramidal Kissovo (anc. Ossa, 6400 ft.) with Plessidi (anc. Pelion, 5310 ft.); it is prolonged in the Magnesian peninsula, which separates the Gulf of Volo from the Aegean, and is continued by the mountains of Euboea (highest summits, Dirphys, 5725 ft., and Ocha, 4830 ft.) and by the islands of Andros and Tenos. West of Pindus, the Cambunian Mountains are continued by several ridges which traverse Epirus from north to south, enclosing the plain and lake of Iannina; the most westerly of these, projecting into the Adriatic, forms the Acroceraunian promontory terminating in Cape Glossa. The principal pass through the Cambunian Mountains is that of Meluna, through which runs the carriage-road connecting the town of Elassona in Macedonia with Larissa, the capital of Thessaly; there are horse-paths at Reveni and elsewhere. The central chain of Pindus at the point where it is intersected by the Cambunian Mountains forms the mass of Zygos (anc. Lacmon, 7113 ft.) through which a horse-path connects the town of Metzovo with Kalabaka in Thessaly; on the declivity immediately N. of Kalabaka are a series of rocky pinnacles on which a number of monasteries are perched. Trending to the S., the Pindus chain terminates in the conical Mount Velouchi (anc. Tymphrestus, 7609 ft.) in the heart of the mountainous region of northern Greece. From this centre-point a number of mountains radiate in all directions. To the E. runs the chain of Helloro (anc. Othrys; highest summit, Hagios Elias, 5558 ft.) separating the plain of Thessaly from the valley of the Spercheios and traversed by the Phourka pass (2789 ft.); to the S.E. is Mount Katávothra (anc. Oeta, 7080 ft.) extending to the southern shore of the Gulf of Lamia at Thermopylae; to the S.E., S. and S.W. are the mountains of Aetolia and Acarnania. The Aetolian group, which may be regarded as the direct continuation of the Pindus range, includes Kiona (8240 ft.), the highest mountain in Greece, and Vardusi (anc. Korax, 8190 ft.). The mountains of Acarnania with Ὑψηλὴ κορυφή (5215 ft.) rise to the W. of the valley of the Aspropotamo (anc. Achelous). The Aetolian Mountains are prolonged to the S.E. by the double-crested Liakoura (anc. Parnassus; 8064 ft.) in Phocis; by Palaeo Vouno (anc. Helicon, 5738 ft.) and Elateas (anc. Cithaeron, 4626 ft.) respectively W. and S. of the Boeotian plain; and by the mountains of Attica,—Ozea (anc. Parnes, 4626 ft.), Mendeli (anc. Pentelicus or Brilessos, 3639 ft.), Trellovouno (anc. Hymettus, 3369 ft.), and Keratia (2136 ft.)—terminating in the promontory of Sunium, but reappearing in the islands of Ceos, Cythnos, Seriphos and Siphnos. South of Cithaeron are Patera in Megaris (3583 ft.) and Makri Plagi (anc. Geraneia, 4495 ft.) overlooking the Isthmus of Corinth.
The mountains of the Morea, grouped around the elevated central plateau of Arcadia, form an independent system with ramifications extending through the Argolid peninsula on the E. and the three southern promontories of Malea, Taenaron and Acritas. At the eastern end of the northern chain, separating Arcadia from the Gulf of Corinth, is Ziria (anc. Cyllene, 7789 ft.); it forms a counterpart to Parnassus on the opposite side of the gulf. A little to the W. is Chelmos (anc. Aroania, 7725 ft.); farther W., Olonos (anc. Erymanthus, 7297 ft.) and Voïdia (anc. Panachaïcon, 6322 ft.) overlooking the Gulf of Patras. The highest summit in the Argolid peninsula is Hagios Elias (anc. Arachnaeon, 3930 ft.). The series of heights forming the eastern rampart of Arcadia, including Artemision (5814 ft.) and Ktenia (5246 ft.) is continued to the S. by the Malevo range (anc. Parnon, highest summit 6365 ft.) which extends into the peninsula of Malea and reappears in the island of Cerigo. Separated from Parnon by the Eurotas valley to the W., the chain of Taygetus (mod. Pentedaktylon; highest summit Hagios Elias, 7874 ft., the culminating point of the Morea) forms a barrier between the plains of Laconia and Messenia; it is traversed by the Langáda pass leading from Sparta to Kalamata. The range is prolonged to the S. through the arid district of Maina and terminates in Cape Matapan (anc. Taenarum). The mountains of western Arcadia are less lofty and of a less marked type; they include Hagios Petros (4777 ft.) and Palaeócastro (anc. Pholoë, 2257 ft.) N. of the Alpheus valley, Diaphorti (anc. Lycaeus, 4660 ft.), the haunt of Pan, and Nomia (4554 ft.) W. of the plain of Megalopolis. Farther south, the mountains of western Messenia form a detached group (Varvara, 4003 ft.; Mathia, 3140 ft.) extending to Cape Gallo (anc. Acritas) and the Oenussae Islands. In central Arcadia are Apanokrapa (anc. Maenalus, also sacred to Pan) and Roudia (5072 ft.); the Taygetus chain forms the southern continuation of these mountains.
The more noteworthy fortified heights of ancient Greece were the Acrocorinthus, the citadel of Corinth (1885 ft.); Ithome (2631 ft.) at Messene; Larissa (950 ft.) at Argos; the Acropolis of Mycenae (910 ft.); Tiryns (60 ft.) near Nauplia, which also possessed its own citadel, the Palamidhi or Acro-nauplia (705 ft.); the Acropolis of Athens (300 ft. above the mean level of the city and 512 ft. above the sea), and the Cadmea of Thebes (715 ft.).
Greece has few rivers; most of these are small, rapid and turbid, as might be expected from the mountainous configuration of the country. They are either perennial rivers or torrents, the white beds of the latter being dry in summer, and only filled with water Rivers. after the autumn rains. The chief rivers (none of which is navigable) are the Salambria (Peneus) in Thessaly, the Mavropotamo (Cephisus) in Phocis, the Hellada (Spercheios) in Phthiotis, the Aspropotamo (Achelous) in Aetolia, and the Ruphia (Alpheus) and Vasiliko (Eurotas) in the Morea. Of the famous rivers of Athens, the one, the Ilissus, is only a chain of pools all summer, and the other, the Cephisus, though never absolutely dry, does not reach the sea, being drawn off in numerous artificial channels to irrigate the neighbouring olive groves. A frequent peculiarity of the Greek rivers is their sudden disappearance in subterranean chasms and reappearance on the surface again, such as gave rise to the fabled course of the Alpheus under the sea, and its emergence in the fountain of Arethusa in Syracuse. Some of these chasms—“Katavothras”—are merely sieves with herbage and gravel in the bottom, but others are large caverns through which the course of the river may sometimes be followed. Floods are frequent, especially in autumn, and natural fountains abound and gush out even from the tops of the hills. Aganippe rises high up among the peaks of Helicon, and Peirene flows from the summit of Acrocorinthus. The only noteworthy cascade, however, is that of the Styx in Arcadia, which has a fall of 500 ft. During part of the year it is lost in snow, and it is at all times almost inaccessible. Lakes are numerous, but few are of considerable size, and many merely marshes in summer. The largest are Karla (Boebeïs) in Thessaly, Trichonis in Aetolia, Copaïs in Boeotia, Pheneus and Stymphalus in Arcadia.
The valleys are generally narrow, and the plains small in extent, deep basins walled in among the hills or more free at the mouths of the rivers. The principal plains are those of Thessaly, Boeotia, Messenia, Argos, Elis and Marathon. The bottom Plains. of these plains consists of an alluvial soil, the most fertile in Greece. In some of the mountainous regions, especially in the Morea, are extensive table-lands. The plain of Mantinea is 2000 ft. high, and the upland district of Sciritis, between Sparta and Tegea, is in some parts 3000 ft.
Strabo said that the guiding thing in the geography of Greece was the sea, which presses in upon it at all parts with a thousand arms. From the Gulf of Arta on the one side to the Gulf of Volo on the other the coast is indented with a succession Coast. of natural bays and gulfs. The most important are the Gulfs of Aegina (Saronicus) and Lepanto (Corinthiacus), which separate the Morea from the northern mainland of Greece,—the first an inlet of the Aegean, the second of the Ionian Sea,—and are now connected by a canal cut through the high land of the narrow Isthmus of Corinth (3½ m. wide). The outer portion of the Gulf of Lepanto is called the Gulf of Patras, and the inner part the Bay of Corinth; a narrow inlet on the north side of the same gulf, called the Bay of Salona or Itea, penetrates northwards into Phocis so far that it is within 24 geographical miles of the Gulf of Zeitun on the north-east coast. The width of the entrance to the gulf of Lepanto is subject to singular changes, which are ascribed to the formation of alluvial deposits by certain marine currents, and their removal again by others. At the time of the Peloponnesian war this channel was 1200 yds. broad; in the time of Strabo it was only 850; and in our own day it has again increased to 2200. On the coast of the Morea there are several large gulfs, that of Arcadia (Cyparissius) on the west, Kalamata (Messeniacus) and Kolokythia (Laconicus) on the south and Nauplia (Argolicus) on the east. Between Euboea and the mainland lie the channels of Trikeri, Talanti (Euboicum Mare) and Egripo; the latter two are connected by the strait of Egripo (Euripus). This strait, which is spanned by a swing-bridge, is about 180 ft. wide, and is remarkable for the unexplained eccentricity of its tide, which has puzzled ancients and moderns alike. The current runs at the average speed of 5 m. an hour, but continues only for a short time in one direction, changing its course, it is said, ten or twelve times in a day; it is sometimes very violent.
There are no volcanoes on the mainland of Greece, but everywhere traces of volcanic action and frequently visitations of earthquakes, for it lies near a centre of volcanic: agency, the island of Santorin, which has been within recent years in Volcanic action. a state of eruption. There is an extinct crater at Mount Laphystium (Granitsa) in Boeotia. The mountain of Methane, on the coast of Argolis, was produced by a volcanic eruption in 282 B.C. Earthquakes laid Thebes in ruins in 1853, destroyed every house in Corinth in 1858, filled up the Castalian spring in 1870, devastated Zante in 1893 and the district of Atalanta in 1894. There are hot springs at Thermopylae and other places, which are used for sanitary purposes. Various parts of the coast exhibit indications of upheaval within historical times. On the coast of Elis four rocky islets are now joined to the land, which were separate from it in the days of ancient Greece. There are traces of earlier sea-beaches at Corinth, and on the coast of the Morea, and at the mouth of the Hellada. The land has gained so much that the pass of Thermopylae which was extremely narrow in the time of Leonidas and his three hundred, is now wide enough for the motions of a whole army. (J. D. B.)
Structurally, Greece may be divided into two regions, an eastern and a western. The former includes Thessaly, Boeotia, the island of Euboea, the isthmus of Corinth, and the peninsula of Argolis, and, throughout, the strike of the beds is nearly Geology. from west to east. The western region includes the Pindus and all the parallel ranges, and the whole of the Peloponnesus excepting Argolis. Here the folds which affect the Mesozoic and early Tertiary strata run approximately from N.N.W. to S.S.E.
Up to the close of the 19th century the greater part of Greece was believed to be formed of Cretaceous rocks, but later researches have shown that the supposed Cretaceous beds include a variety of geological horizons. The geological sequence begins with crystalline schists and limestones, followed by Palaeozoic, Triassic and Liassic rocks. The oldest beds which hitherto have yielded fossils belong to the Carboniferous System (Fusulina limestone of Euboea). Following upon these older beds are the great limestone masses which cover most of the eastern region, and which are now known to include Jurassic, Tithonian, Lower and Upper Cretaceous and Eocene beds. In the Pindus and the Peloponnesus these beds are overlaid by a series of shales and platy limestones (Olonos Limestone of the Peloponnesus), which were formerly supposed to be of Tertiary age. It has now been shown, however, that the upper series of limestones has been brought upon the top of the lower by a great overthrust. Triassic fossils have been found in the Olonos Limestone and it is almost certain that other Mesozoic horizons are represented.
The earth movements which produced the mountain chains of western Greece have folded the Eocene beds and must therefore be of post-Eocene date. The Neogene beds, on the other hand, are not affected by the folds, although by faulting without folding they have in some places been raised to a height of nearly 6000 ft. They lie, however, chiefly along the coast and in the valleys, and consist of marls, conglomerates and sands, sometimes with seams of lignite. The Pikermi deposits, of late Miocene age, are famous for their rich mammalian fauna.
Although the folding which formed the mountain chains appears to have ceased, Greece is still continually shaken by earthquakes, and these earthquakes are closely connected with the great lines of fracture to which the country owes its outline. Around the narrow gulf which separates the Peloponnesus from the mainland, earthquakes are particularly frequent, and another region which is often shaken is the south-western corner of Greece, the peninsula of Messene. (P. La.)
The vegetation of Greece in general resembles that of southern Italy while presenting many types common to that of Asia Minor. Owing to the geographical configuration of the peninsula and its mountainous surface the characteristic flora of the Flora. Mediterranean regions is often found in juxtaposition with that of central Europe. In respect to its vegetation the country may be regarded as divided into four zones. In the first, extending from the sea-level to the height of 1500 ft., oranges, olives, dates, almonds, pomegranates, figs and vines flourish, and cotton and tobacco are grown. In the neighbourhood of streams are found the laurel, myrtle, oleander and lentisk, together with the plane and white poplar; the cypress is often a picturesque feature in the landscape, and there is a variety of aromatic plants. The second zone, from 1500 to 3500 ft., is the region of the oak, chestnut and other British trees. In the third, from 3500 to 5500 ft., the beech is the characteristic forest tree; the Abies cephalonica and Pinus pinea now take the place of the Pinus halepensis, which grows everywhere in the lower regions. Above 5500 ft. is the Alpine region, marked by small plants, lichens and mosses. During the short period of spring anemones and other wild flowers enrich the hillsides with magnificent colouring; in June all verdure disappears except in the watered districts and elevated plateaus. The asphodel grows abundantly in the dry rocky soil; aloes, planted in rows, form impenetrable hedges. Medicinal plants are numerous, such as the Inula Helenium, the Mandragora Officinarum, the Colchicum napolitanum and the Helleborus orientalis, which still grows abundantly near Aspraspitia, the ancient Anticyra, at the foot of Parnassus.
The fauna is similar to that of the other Mediterranean peninsulas, and includes some species found in Asia Minor but not elsewhere in Europe. The lion existed in northern Greece in the time of Aristotle and at an earlier period in the Morea. The bear Fauna. is still found in the Pindus range. Wolves are common in all the mountainous regions and jackals are numerous in the Morea. Foxes are abundant in all parts of the country; the polecat is found in the woods of Attica and the Morea; the lynx is now rare. The wild boar is common in the mountains of northern Greece, but is almost extinct in the Peloponnesus. The badger, the marten and the weasel are found on the mainland and in the islands. The red deer, the fallow deer and the roe exist in northern Greece, but are becoming scarce. The otter is rare. Hares and rabbits are abundant in many parts of the country, especially in the Cyclades; the two species never occupy the same district, and in the Cyclades some islands (Naxos, Melos, Tenos, &c.) form the exclusive domain of the hares, others (Seriphos, Kimolos, Mykonos, &c.) of the rabbits. In Andros alone a demarcation has been arrived at, the hares retaining the northern and the rabbits the southern portion of the island. The chamois is found in the higher mountains, such as Pindus, Parnassus and Tymphrestus. The Cretan agrimi, or wild goat (Capra nubiana, C. aegagrus), found in Antimelos and said to exist in Taygetus, the jackal, the stellion, and the chameleon are among the Asiatic species not found westward of Greece. There is a great variety of birds; of 358 species catalogued two-thirds are migratory. Among the birds of prey, which are very numerous, are the golden and imperial eagle, the yellow vulture, the Gypaëtus barbatus, and several species of falcons. The celebrated owl of Athena (Athene noctua) is becoming rare at Athens, but still haunts the Acropolis and the royal garden; it is a small species, found everywhere in Greece. The wild goose and duck, the bustard, partridge, woodcock, snipe, wood-pigeon and turtle-dove are numerous. Immense flocks of quails visit the southern coast of the Morea, where they are captured in great numbers and exported alive. The stork, which was common in the Turkish epoch, has now become scarce. There is a great variety of reptiles, of which sixty-one species have been catalogued. The saurians are all harmless; among them the stellion (Stellio vulgaris), commonly called κροκόδειλος in Mykonos and Crete, is believed by Heldreich to have furnished a name to the crocodile of the Nile (Herod. ii. 69). There are five species of tortoise and nine of Amphibia. Of the serpents, which are numerous, there are only two dangerous species, the Vipera ammodytes and the Vipera aspis; the first-named is common. Among the marine fauna are the dolphins, familiar in the legends and sculpture of antiquity; in the clear water of the Aegean they often afford a beautiful spectacle as they play round ships; porpoises and whales are sometimes seen. Sea-fish, of which 246 species have been ascertained, are very abundant.
The climate of Greece, like that of the other countries of the Balkan peninsula, is liable to greater extremes of heat and cold than prevail in Spain and Italy; the difference is due to the general contour of the peninsula, which assimilates its climatic Climate. conditions to those of the European mainland. Another distinctive feature is the great variety of local contrasts; the rapid transitions are the natural effect of diversity in the geographical configuration of the country. Within a few hours it is possible to pass from winter to spring and from spring to summer. The spring is short; the sun is already powerful in March, but the increasing warmth is often checked by cold northerly winds; in many places the corn harvest is cut in May, when southerly winds prevail and the temperature rises rapidly. The great heat of summer is tempered throughout the whole region of the archipelago by the Etesian winds, which blow regularly from the N.E. for forty to fifty days in July and August. This current of cool dry air from the north is due to the vacuum resulting from intense heat in the region of the Sahara. The healthy Etesian winds are generally replaced towards the end of summer by the southerly Libas or sirocco, which, when blowing strongly, resembles the blast from a furnace and is most injurious to health. The sirocco affects, though in a less degree, the other countries of the Balkan peninsula and even Rumania. The mean summer temperature is about 79° Fahr. The autumn is the least healthy season of the year owing to the great increase of humidity, especially in October and November. At the end of October snow reappears on the higher mountains, remaining on the summits till June. The winter is mild, and even in January there are, as a rule, many warm clear days; but the recurrence of biting northerly winds and cold blasts from the mountains, as well as the rapid transitions from heat to cold and the difference in the temperature of sunshine and shade, render the climate somewhat treacherous and unsuitable for invalids. Snow seldom falls in the maritime and lowland districts and frost is rare. The mean winter temperature is from 48° to 55° Fahr. The rainfall varies greatly according to localities; it is greatest in the Ionian Islands (53.34 ins. at Corfu), in Arcadia and in the other mountainous districts, and least on the Aegean littoral and in the Cyclades; in Attica, the driest region in Greece, it is 16.1 ins. The wettest months are November, December and January; the driest July and August, when, except for a few thunder-storms, there is practically no rainfall. The rain generally accompanies southerly or south-westerly winds. In all the maritime districts the sea breeze greatly modifies the temperature; it begins about 9 A.M., attains its maximum force soon after noon, and ceases about an hour after sunset. Greece is renowned for the clearness of its climate; fogs and mists are almost unknown. In most years, however, only four or five days are recorded in which the sky is perfectly cloudless. The natural healthiness of the climate is counteracted in the towns, especially in Athens, by deficient sanitation and by stifling clouds of dust, which propagate infection and are peculiarly hurtful in cases of ophthalmia and pulmonary disease. Malarial fever is endemic in the marshy districts, especially in the autumn.
The area of the country was 18,341 sq. m. before the acquisition of the Ionian Islands in 1864, 19,381 sq. m. prior to the annexation of Thessaly and part of Epirus in 1881, and 24,552 sq. m. at the census in 1896. If we deduct 152 Area and population. sq. m., the extent of territory ceded to Turkey after the war of 1897, the area of Greece in 1908 would be 24,400 sq. m. Other authorities give 25,164 and 25,136 sq. m. as the area prior to the rectification of the frontier in 1898. The population in 1896 was 2,433,806, or 99.1 to the sq. m., the population of the territories annexed in 1881 being approximately 350,000; and 2,631,952 in 1907, or 107.8 to the sq. m. (according to the official estimate of the area), showing an increase of 198,146 or 0.81% per annum, as compared with 1.61% during the period between 1896 and 1889; the diminished increase is mainly due to emigration. The population by sex in 1907 is given as 1,324,942 males and 1,307,010 females (or 50.3% males to 49.6 females). The preponderance of males, which was 52% to 48% females in 1896, has also been reduced by emigration; it is most marked in the northern departments, especially in Larissa. Only in the departments of Arcadia, Eurytania, Corinth, Cephalonia, Lacedaemon, Laconia, Phocis, Argolis and in the Cyclades, is the female population in excess of the male.
Neither the census of 1896 nor that of 1889 gave any classification by professions, religion or language. The following figures, which are only approximate, were derived from unofficial sources in 1901:—agricultural and pastoral employments 444,000; industries 64,200; traders and their employés 118,000; labourers and servants 31,300; various professions 15,700; officials 12,000; clergy about 6000; lawyers 4000; physicians 2500. In 1879, 1,635,698 of the population were returned as Orthodox Christians, 14,677 as Catholics and Protestants, 2652 as Jews, and 740 as of other religions. The annexation of Thessaly and part of Epirus is stated to have added 24,165 Mahommedan subjects to the Hellenic kingdom. A considerable portion of these, however, emigrated immediately after the annexation, and, although a certain number subsequently returned, the total Mahommedan population in Greece was estimated to be under 5000 in 1908. A number of the Christian inhabitants of these regions, estimated at about 50,000, retained Turkish nationality with the object of escaping military service. The Albanian population, estimated at 200,000 by Finlay in 1851, still probably exceeds 120,000. It is gradually being absorbed in the Hellenic population. In 1870, 37,598 persons (an obviously untrustworthy figure) were returned as speaking Albanian only. In 1879 the number is given as 58,858. The Vlach population, which has been increased by the annexation of Thessaly, numbers about 60,000. The number of foreign residents is unknown. The Italians are the most numerous, numbering about 11,000. Some 1500 persons, mostly Maltese, possess British nationality.
By a law of 27 November 1899, Greece, which had hitherto been divided into sixteen departments (νόμοι) was redivided into twenty-six departments, as follows:—
|5||Aetolia and Acarnania||141,405|
|24||Leucas (with Ithaca)||41,186|
The population is densest in the Ionian Islands, exceeding 307 per sq. m. The departments of Acarnania, Phocis and Euboea are the most thinly inhabited (about 58, 61 and 66 per sq. m. respectively).
Very little information is obtainable with regard to the movement of the population; no register of births, deaths and marriages is kept in Greece. The only official statistics are found in the periodical returns of the mortality in the twelve principal towns, according to which the yearly average of deaths in these towns for the five years 1903-1907 was approximately 10,253, or 23.8 per 1000; of these more than a quarter are ascribed to pulmonary consumption, due in the main to defective sanitation. Both the birth-rate and death-rate are low, being 27.6 and 20.7 per 1000 respectively. Infant mortality is slight, and in point of longevity Greece compares favourably with most other European countries. The number of illegitimate births is 12.25 per 1000; these are almost exclusively in the towns.
Of the total population 28.5% are stated to live in towns. The population of the principal towns is:—
No trustworthy information is obtainable with regard to immigration and emigration, of which no statistics have ever been kept. Emigration, which was formerly in the main to Egypt and Rumania, is now almost exclusively to the United States of America. The principal exodus is from Arcadia, Laconia and Maina; the emigrants from these districts, estimated at about 14,000 annually, are for the most part young men approaching the age of military service. According to American statistics 12,431 Greeks arrived in the United States from Greece during the period 1869-1898 and 130,154 in 1899-1907; a considerable number, however, have returned to Greece, and those remaining in the United States at the end of 1907 were estimated at between 136,000 and 138,000; this number was considerably reduced in 1908 by remigration. Since 1896 the tendency to emigration has received a notable and somewhat alarming impulse. There is an increasing immigration into the towns from the rural districts, which are gradually becoming depopulated. Both movements are due in part to the preference of the Greeks for a town life and in part to distaste for military service, but in the main to the poverty of the peasant population, whose condition and interests have been neglected by the government.
Greece is inhabited by three races—the Greeks, the Albanians and the Vlachs. The Greeks who are by far the most numerous, have to a large extent absorbed the other races; the process of assimilation has been especially rapid since Ethnology. the foundation of the Greek kingdom. Like most European nations, the modern Greeks are a mixed race. The question of their origin has been the subject of much learned controversy; their presumed descent from the Greeks of the classical epoch has proved a national asset of great value; during the period of their struggle for independence it won them the devoted zeal of the Philhellenes, it inspired the enthusiasm of Byron, Victor Hugo, and a host of minor poets, and it has furnished a pleasing illusion to generations of scholarly tourists who delight to discover in the present inhabitants of the country the mental and physical characteristics with which they have been familiarized by the literature and art of antiquity. This amiable tendency is encouraged by the modern Greeks, who possess an implicit faith in their illustrious ancestry. The discussion of the question entered a very acrimonious stage with the appearance in 1830 of Fallmerayer’s History of the Morea during the Middle Ages. Fallmerayer maintained that after the great Slavonic immigration at the close of the 8th century the original population of northern Greece and the Morea, which had already been much reduced during the Roman period, was practically supplanted by the Slavonic element and that the Greeks of modern times are in fact Byzantinized Slavs. This theory was subjected to exhaustive criticism by Ross, Hopf, Finlay and other scholars, and although many of Fallmerayer’s conclusions remain unshaken, the view is now generally held that the base of the population both in the mainland and the Morea is Hellenic, not Slavonic. During the 5th and 6th centuries Greece had been subjected to Slavonic incursions which resulted in no permanent settlements. After the great plague of 746-747, however, large tracts of depopulated country were colonized by Slavonic immigrants; the towns remained in the hands of the Greeks, many of whom emigrated to Constantinople. In the Morea the Slavs established themselves principally in Arcadia and the region of Taygetus, extending their settlements into Achaia, Elis, Laconia and the promontory of Taenaron; on the mainland they occupied portions of Acarnania, Aetolia, Doris and Phocis. Slavonic place-names occurring in all these districts confirm the evidence of history with regard to this immigration. The Slavs, who were not a maritime race, did not colonize the Aegean Islands, but a few Slavonic place-names in Crete seem to indicate that some of the invaders reached that island. The Slavonic settlements in the Morea proved more permanent than those in northern Greece, which were attacked by the armies of the Byzantine emperors. But even in the Morea the Greeks, or “Romans” as they called themselves (Ῥωμαῖοι), who had been left undisturbed on the eastern side of the peninsula, eventually absorbed the alien element, which disappeared after the 15th century. In addition to the place-names the only remaining traces of the Slav immigration are the Slavonic type of features, which occasionally recurs, especially among the Arcadian peasants, and a few customs and traditions. Even when allowance is made for the remarkable power of assimilation which the Greeks possessed in virtue of their superior civilization, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Hellenic element must always have been the most numerous in order to effect so complete an absorption. This element has apparently undergone no essential change since the epoch of Roman domination. The destructive invasions of the Goths in A.D. 267 and 395 introduced no new ethnic feature; the various races which during the middle ages obtained partial or complete mastery in Greece—the Franks, the Venetians, the Turks—contributed no appreciable ingredient to the mass of the population. The modern Greeks may therefore be regarded as in the main the descendants of the population which inhabited Greece in the earlier centuries of Byzantine rule. Owing to the operation of various causes, historical, social and economic, that population was composed of many heterogeneous elements and represented in a very limited degree the race which repulsed the Persians and built the Parthenon. The internecine conflicts of the Greek communities, wars with foreign powers and the deadly struggles of factions in the various cities, had to a large extent obliterated the old race of free citizens by the beginning of the Roman period. The extermination of the Plataeans by the Spartans and of the Melians by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war, the proscription of Athenian citizens after the war, the massacre of the Corcyraean oligarchs by the democratic party, the slaughter of the Thebans by Alexander and of the Corinthians by Mummius, are among the more familiar instances of the catastrophes which overtook the civic element in the Greek cities; the void can only have been filled from the ranks of the metics or resident aliens and of the descendants of the far more numerous slave population. Of the latter a portion was of Hellenic origin; when a city was taken the males of military age were frequently put to the sword, but the women and children were sold as slaves; in Laconia and Thessaly there was a serf population of indigenous descent. In the classical period four-fifths of the population of Attica were slaves and of the remainder half were metics. In the Roman period the number of slaves enormously increased, the supply being maintained from the regions on the borders of the empire; the same influences which in Italy extinguished the small landed proprietors and created the latifundia prevailed also in Greece. The purely Hellenic population, now greatly diminished, congregated in the towns; the large estates which replaced the small freeholds were cultivated by slaves and managed or farmed by slaves or freedmen, and wide tracts of country were wholly depopulated. How greatly the free citizen element had diminished by the close of the 1st century A.D. may be judged from the estimate of Plutarch that all Greece could not furnish more than 3000 hoplites. The composite population which replaced the ancient Hellenic stock became completely Hellenized. According to craniologists the modern Greeks are brachycephalous while the ancient race is stated to have been dolichocephalous, but it seems doubtful whether any such generalization with regard to the ancients can be conclusively established. The Aegean islanders are more brachycephalous than the inhabitants of the mainland, though apparently of purer Greek descent. No general conception of the facial type of the ancient race can be derived from the highly-idealized statues of deities, heroes and athletes; so far as can be judged from portrait statues it was very varied. Among the modern Greeks the same variety of features prevails; the face is usually oval, the nose generally long and somewhat aquiline, the teeth regular, and the eyes remarkably bright and full of animation. The country-folk are, as a rule, tall and well-made, though slightly built and rather meagre; their form is graceful and supple in movement. The urban population, as elsewhere, is physically very inferior. The women often display a refined and delicate beauty which disappears at an early age. The best physical types of the race are found in Arcadia, in the Aegean Islands and in Crete.
The Albanian population extends over all Attica and Megaris (except the towns of Athens, Peiraeus and Megara), the greater part of Boeotia, the eastern districts of Locris, the southern half of Euboea and the northern side of Andros, the whole of the islands of Salamis, Hydra, Spetsae and Poros, and part of Aegina, the whole of Corinthia and Argolis, the northern districts of Arcadia and the eastern portion of Achaea. There are also small Albanian groups in Laconia and Messenia (see Albania). The Albanians, who call themselves Shkyipetar, and are called by the Greeks Arvanitae (Ἀρβανῖται), belong to the Tosk or southern branch of the race; their immigration took place in the latter half of the 14th century. Their first settlements in the Morea were made in 1347-1355. The Albanian colonization was first checked by the Turks; in 1454 an Albanian insurrection in the Morea against Byzantine rule was crushed by the Turkish general Tura Khan, whose aid had been invoked by the Palaeologi. With a few exceptions, the Albanians in Greece retained their Christian faith after the Turkish conquest. The failure of the insurrection of 1770 was followed by a settlement of Moslem Albanians, who had been employed by the Turks to suppress the revolt. The Christian Albanians have long lived on good terms with the Greeks while retaining their own customs and language and rarely intermarrying with their neighbours. They played a brilliant part during the War of Independence, and furnished the Greeks with many of their most distinguished leaders. The process of their Hellenization, which scarcely began till after the establishment of the kingdom, has been somewhat slow; most of the men can now speak Greek, but Albanian is still the language of the household. The Albanians, who are mainly occupied with agriculture, are less quick-witted, less versatile, and less addicted to politics than the Greeks, who regard them as intellectually their inferiors. A vigorous and manly race, they furnish the best soldiers in the Greek army, and also make excellent sailors.
The Vlachs, who call themselves Aromâni, i.e. Romans, form another important foreign element in the population of Greece. They are found principally in Pindus (the Agrapha district), the mountainous parts of Thessaly, Othrys, Oeta, the mountains of Boeotia, Aetolia and Acarnania; they have a few settlements in Euboea. They are for the most part either nomad shepherds and herdsmen or carriers (kiradjis). They apparently descend from the Latinized provincials of the Roman epoch who took refuge in the higher mountains from the incursions of the barbarians and Slavs (see Vlachs and Macedonia). In the 13th century the Vlach principality of “Great Walachia” (Μεγάλη Βλαχία) included Thessaly and southern Macedonia as far as Castoria; its capital was at Hypati near Lamia. Acarnania and Aetolia were known as “Lesser Walachia.” The urban element among the Vlachs has been almost completely Hellenized; it has always displayed great aptitude for commerce, and Athens owes many of its handsomest buildings to the benefactions of wealthy Vlach merchants. The nomad population in the mountains has retained its distinctive nationality and customs together with its Latin language, though most of the men can speak Greek. Like the Albanians, the pastoral Vlachs seldom intermarry with the Greeks; they occasionally take Greek wives, but never give their daughters to Greeks; many of them are illiterate, and their children rarely attend the schools. Owing to their deficient intellectual culture they are regarded with disdain by the Greeks, who employ the term βλάχος to denote not only a shepherd but an ignorant rustic.
A considerable Italian element was introduced into the Ionian Islands during the middle ages owing to their prolonged subjection to Latin princes and subsequently (till 1797) to the Venetian republic. The Italians intermarried with the Greeks; Italian became the language of the upper classes, and Roman Catholicism was declared the state religion. The peasantry, however, retained the Greek language and remained faithful to the Eastern Church; during the past century the Italian element was completely absorbed by the Greek population.
The Turkish population in Greece, which numbered about 70,000 before the war of liberation, disappeared in the course of the struggle or emigrated at its conclusion. The Turks in Thessaly are mainly descended either from colonists established in the country by the Byzantine emperors or from immigrants from Asia Minor, who arrived at the end of the 14th century; they derive their name Konariots from Iconium (Konia). Many of the beys or land-owning class are the lineal representatives of the Seljuk nobles who obtained fiefs under the feudal system introduced here and in Macedonia by the Sultan Bayezid I.
Notwithstanding their composite origin, their wide geographical distribution and their cosmopolitan instincts, the modern Greeks are a remarkably homogeneous people, differing markedly in character from neighbouring National character. races, united by a common enthusiasm in the pursuit of their national aims, and profoundly convinced of their superiority to other nations. Their distinctive character, combined with their traditional tendency to regard non-Hellenic peoples as barbarous, has, indeed, to some extent counteracted the results of their great energy and zeal in the assimilation of other races; the advantageous position which they attained at an early period under Turkish rule owing to their superior civilization, their versatility, their wealth, and their monopoly of the ecclesiastical power would probably have enabled them to Hellenize permanently the greater part of the Balkan peninsula had their attitude towards other Christian races been more sympathetic. Always the most civilized race in the East, they have successively influenced their Macedonian, Roman and Turkish conquerors, and their remarkable intellectual endowments bid fair to secure them a brilliant position in the future. The intense patriotic zeal of the Greeks may be compared with that of the Hungarians; it is liable to degenerate into arrogance and intolerance; it sometimes blinds their judgment and involves them in ill-considered enterprises, but it nevertheless offers the best guarantee for the ultimate attainment of their national aims. All Greeks, in whatever country they may reside, work together for the realization of the Great Idea (ἡ Μεγάλη Ἰδέα)—the supremacy of Hellenism in the East—and to this object they freely devote their time, their wealth and their talents; the large fortunes which they amass abroad are often bequeathed for the foundation of various institutions in Greece or Turkey, for the increase of the national fleet and army, or for the spread of Hellenic influence in the Levant. This patriotic sentiment is unfortunately much exploited by self-seeking demagogues and publicists, who rival each other in exaggerating the national pretensions and in pandering to the national vanity. In no other country is the passion for politics so intense; “keen political discussions are constantly going on at the cafés; the newspapers, which are extraordinarily numerous and generally of little value, are literally devoured, and every measure of the government is violently criticized and ascribed to interested motives.” The influence of the journals is enormous; even the waiters in the cafés and domestic servants have their favourite newspaper, and discourse fluently on the political problems of the day. Much of the national energy is wasted by this continued political fever; it is diverted from practical aims, and may be said to evaporate in words. The practice of independent criticism tends to indiscipline in the organized public services; it has been remarked that every Greek soldier is a general and every sailor an admiral. During the war of 1897 a young naval lieutenant telegraphed to the minister of war condemning the measures taken by his admiral, and his action was applauded by several journals. There is also little discipline in the ranks of political parties, which are held together, not by any definite principle, but by the personal influence of the leaders; defections are frequent, and as a rule each deputy in the Chamber makes his terms with his chief. On the other hand, the independent character of the Greeks is favourably illustrated by the circumstance that Greece is the only country in the Balkan peninsula in which the government cannot count on securing a majority by official pressure at the elections. Few scruples are observed in political warfare, but attacks on private life are rare. The love of free discussion is inherent in the strongly-rooted democratic instinct of the Greeks. They are in spirit the most democratic of European peoples; no trace of Latin feudalism survives, and aristocratic pretensions are ridiculed. In social life there is no artificial distinction of classes; all titles of nobility are forbidden; a few families descended from the chiefs in the War of Independence enjoy a certain pre-eminence, but wealth and, still more, political or literary notoriety constitute the principal claim to social consideration. The Greeks display great intellectual vivacity; they are clever, inquisitive, quick-witted and ingenious, but not profound; sustained mental industry and careful accuracy are distasteful to them, and their aversion to manual labour is still more marked. Even the agricultural class is but moderately industrious; abundant opportunities for relaxation are provided by the numerous church festivals. The desire for instruction is intense even in the lowest ranks of the community; rhetorical and literary accomplishments possess a greater attraction for the majority than the fields of modern science. The number of persons who seek to qualify for the learned professions is excessive; they form a superfluous element in the community, an educated proletariat, attaching themselves to the various political parties in the hope of obtaining state employment and spending an idle existence in the cafés and the streets when their party is out of power. In disposition the Greeks are lively, cheerful, plausible, tactful, sympathetic; very affable with strangers, hospitable, kind to their servants and dependants, remarkably temperate and frugal in their habits, amiable and united in family life. Drunkenness is almost unknown, thrift is universally practised; the standard of sexual morality is high, especially in the rural districts, where illegitimacy is extremely rare. The faults of the Greeks must in a large degree be attributed to their prolonged subjection to alien races; their cleverness often degenerates into cunning, their ready invention into mendacity, their thrift into avarice, their fertility of resource into trickery and fraud. Dishonesty is not a national vice, but many who would scorn to steal will not hesitate to compass illicit gains by duplicity and misrepresentation; deceit, indeed, is often practised gratuitously for the mere intellectual satisfaction which it affords. In the astuteness of their monetary dealings the Greeks proverbially surpass the Jews, but fall short of the Armenians; their remarkable aptitude for business is sometimes marred by a certain short-sightedness which pursues immediate profits at the cost of ulterior advantages. Their vanity and egoism, which are admitted by even the most favourable observers, render them jealous, exacting, and peculiarly susceptible to flattery. In common with other southern European peoples the Greeks are extremely excitable; their passionate disposition is prone to take offence at slight provocation, and trivial quarrels not infrequently result in homicide. They are religious, but by no means fanatical, except in regard to politico-religious questions affecting their national aims. In general the Greeks may be described as a clever, ambitious and versatile people, capable of great effort and sacrifice, but deficient in some of the more solid qualities which make for national greatness.
The customs and habits of the Greek peasantry, in which the observances of the classical age may often be traced, together with their legends and traditions, have furnished an interesting subject of investigation to many writers Customs. (see Bibliography below). In the towns the more cosmopolitan population has largely adopted the “European” mode of life, and the upper classes show a marked preference for French manners and usages. In both town and country, however, the influence of oriental ideas is still apparent, due in part to the long period of Turkish domination, in part to the contact of the Greeks with Asiatic races at all epochs of their history. In the rural districts, especially, the women lead a somewhat secluded life and occupy a subject position; they wait at table, and only partake of the meal when the men of the family have been served. In most parts of continental Greece the women work in the fields, but in the Aegean Islands and Crete they rarely leave the house. Like the Turks, the Greeks have a great partiality for coffee, which can always be procured even in the remotest hamlets; the Turkish practice of carrying a string of beads or rosary (comboloio), which provides an occupation for the hands, is very common. Many of the observances in connexion with births, christenings, weddings and funerals are very interesting and in some cases are evidently derived from remote antiquity. Nuptial ceremonies are elaborate and protracted; in some of the islands of the archipelago they continue for three weeks. In the preliminary negotiations for a marriage the question of the bride’s dowry plays a very important part; a girl without a dowry often remains unmarried, notwithstanding the considerable excess of the male over the female population. Immediately after the christening of a female child her parents begin to lay up her portion, and young men often refrain from marrying until their sisters have been settled in life. The dead are carried to the tomb in an open coffin; in the country districts professional mourners are engaged to chant dirges; the body is washed with wine and crowned with a wreath of flowers. A valedictory oration is pronounced at the grave. Many superstitions still prevail among the peasantry; the belief in the vampire and the evil eye is almost universal. At Athens and in the larger towns many handsome dwelling-houses may be seen, but the upper classes have no predilection for rural life, and their country houses are usually mere farmsteads, which they rarely visit. In the more fertile districts two-storeyed houses of the modern type are common, but in the mountainous regions the habitations of the country-folk are extremely primitive; the small stone-built hut, almost destitute of furniture, shelters not only the family but its cattle and domestic animals. In Attica the peasants’ houses are usually built of cob. In Maina the villagers live in fortified towers of three or more storeys; the animals occupy the ground floor, the family the topmost storey; the intermediate space serves as a granary or hay-loft. The walls are loop-holed for purposes of defence in view of the traditional vendetta and feuds, which in some instances have been handed down from remote generations and are maintained by occasional sharp-shooting from these primitive fortresses. In general cleanliness and sanitation are much neglected; the traveller in the country districts is doomed to sleepless nights unless he has provided himself with bedding and a hammock. Even Athens, though enriched by many munificent benefactions, is still without a drainage system or an adequate water supply; the sewers of many houses open into the streets, in which rubbish is allowed to accumulate. The effects of insanitary conditions are, however, counteracted in some degree by the excellent climate. The Aegean islanders contrast favourably with the continentals in point of personal cleanliness and the neatness of their dwellings; their houses are generally covered with the flat roof, familiar in Asia, on which the family sleep in summer. The habits and customs of the islanders afford an interesting study. Propitiatory rites are still practised by the mariners and fishermen, and thank-offerings for preservation at sea are hung up in the churches. Among the popular amusements of the Greeks dancing holds a prominent place; the dance is of various kinds; the most usual is the somewhat inanimate round dance (συρτό or τράτα), in which a number of persons, usually of the same sex, take part holding hands; it seems indentical with the Slavonic kolo (“circle”). The more lively Albanian fling is generally danced by three or four persons, one of whom executes a series of leaps and pirouettes. The national music is primitive and monotonous. All classes are passionately addicted to card-playing, which is forbidden by law in places of public resort. The picturesque national costume, which is derived from the Albanian Tosks, has unfortunately been abandoned by the upper classes and the urban population since the abdication of King Otho, who always wore it; it is maintained as the uniform of the euzones (highland regiments). It consists of a red cap with dark blue tassel, a white shirt with wide sleeves, a vest and jacket, sometimes of velvet, handsomely adorned with gold or black braid, a belt in which various weapons are carried, a white kilt or fustanella of many folds, white hose tied with garters, and red leather shoes with pointed ends, from which a tassel depends. Over all is worn the shaggy white capote. The islanders wear a dark blue costume with a crimson waistband, loose trousers descending to the knee, stockings and pumps or long boots. The women’s costume is very varied; the loose red fez is sometimes worn and a short velvet jacket with rich gold embroidery. The more elderly women are generally attired in black. In the Megara district and elsewhere peasant girls wear on festive occasions a headdress composed of strings of coins which formerly represented the dowry.
Greece is a constitutional monarchy; hereditary in the male line, or, in case of its extinction, in the female. The sovereign, by decision of the conference of London (August 1863), is styled “king of the Hellenes”; the title “king Government. of Greece” was borne by King Otho. The heir apparent is styled ὁ διάδοχος, “the successor”; the title “duke of Sparta,” which has been accorded to the crown prince, is not generally employed in Greece. The king and the heir apparent must belong to the Orthodox Greek Church; a special exception has been made for King George, who is a Lutheran. The king attains his majority on completing his eighteenth year; before ascending the throne he must take the oath to the constitution in presence of the principal ecclesiastical and lay dignitaries of the kingdom, and must convoke the Chamber within two months after his accession. The civil list amounts to 1,125,000 dr., in addition to which it was provided that King George should receive £4000 annually as a personal allowance from each of the three protecting powers, Great Britain, France and Russia. The heir apparent receives from the state an annuity of 200,000 dr. The king has a palace at Athens and other residences at Corfu, Tatoi (on the slopes of Mt Parnes) and Larissa. The present constitution dates from the 29th of October 1864. The legislative power is shared by the king with a single chamber (βουλή) elected by manhood suffrage for a period of four years. The election is by ballot; candidates must have completed their thirtieth year and electors their twenty-first. The deputies (βουλευταί), according to the constitution, receive only their travelling expenses, but they vote themselves a payment of 1800 dr. each for the session and a further allowance in case of an extraordinary session. The Chamber sits for a term of not less than three or more than six months. No law can be passed except by an absolute majority of the house, and one-half of the members must be present to form a quorum; these arrangements have greatly facilitated the practice of obstruction, and often enable individual deputies to impose terms on the government for their attendance. In 1898 the number of deputies was 234. Some years previously a law diminishing the national representation and enlarging the constituencies was passed by Trikoupis with the object of checking the local influence of electors upon deputies, but the measure was subsequently repealed. The number of deputies, however, who had hitherto been elected in the proportion of one to twelve thousand of the population, was reduced in 1905, when the proportion of one to sixteen thousand was substituted; the Chamber of 1906, elected under the new system, consisted of 177 deputies. In 1906 the electoral districts were diminished in number and enlarged so as to coincide with the twenty-six administrative departments (νόμοι); the reduction of these departments to their former number of sixteen, which is in contemplation, will bring about some further diminution in parliamentary representation. It is hoped that recent legislation will tend to check the pernicious practice of bartering personal favours, known as Template:Polytonick, which still prevails to the great detriment of public morality, paralysing all branches of the administration and wasting the resources of the state. Political parties are formed not for the furtherance of any principle or cause, but with the object of obtaining the spoils of office, and the various groups, possessing no party watchword or programme, frankly designate themselves by the names of their leaders. Even the strongest government is compelled to bargain with its supporters in regard to the distribution of patronage and other favours. The consequent instability of successive ministries has retarded useful legislation and seriously checked the national progress. In 1906 a law was passed disqualifying junior officers of the army and navy for membership of the Chamber; great numbers of these had hitherto been candidates at every election. This much-needed measure had previously been passed by Trikoupis, but had been repealed by his rival Delyannes. The executive is vested in the king, who is personally irresponsible, and governs through ministers chosen by himself and responsible to the Chamber, of which they are ex-officio members. He appoints all public officials, sanctions and proclaims laws, convokes, prorogues and dissolves the Chamber, grants pardon or amnesty, coins money and confers decorations. There are seven ministries which respectively control the departments of foreign affairs, the interior, justice, finance, education and worship, the army and the navy.
The 26 departments or νομοί, into which the country is divided for administrative purposes, are each under a prefect or nomarch (νόμαρχος); they are subdivided into 69 districts or eparchies, and into 445 communes or demes (δῆμοι) Local Administration. under mayors or demarchs (δήμαρχοι). The prefects and sub-prefects are nominated by the government; the mayors are elected by the communes for a period of four years. The prefects are assisted by a departmental council, elected by the population, which manages local business and assesses rates; there are also communal councils under the presidency of the mayors. There are altogether some 12,000 state-paid officials in the country, most of them inadequately remunerated and liable to removal or transferral upon a change of government. A host of office-seekers has thus been created, and large numbers of educated persons spend many years in idleness or in political agitation. A law passed in 1905 secures tenure of office to civil servants of fifteen years’ standing, and some restrictions have been placed on the dismissal and transferral of schoolmasters.
Under the Turks the Greeks retained, together with their ecclesiastical institutions, a certain measure of local self-government and judicial independence. The Byzantine code, based on the Roman, as embodied in the Ἑξάβιβλος Justice. of Armenopoulos (1345), was sanctioned by royal decree in 1835 with some modifications as the civil law of Greece. Further modifications and new enactments were subsequently introduced, derived from the old French and Bavarian systems. The penal code is Bavarian, the commercial French. Liberty of person and domicile is inviolate; no arrest can be made, no house entered, and no letter opened without a judicial warrant. Trial by jury is established for criminal, political and press offences. A new civil code, based on Saxon and Italian law, has been drawn up by a commission of jurists, but it has not yet been considered by the Chamber. A separate civil code, partly French, partly Italian, is in force in the Ionian Islands. The law is administered by 1 court of cassation (styled the “Areopagus”), 5 courts of appeal, 26 courts of first instance, 233 justices of the peace and 19 correctional tribunals.
The judges, who are appointed by the Crown, are liable to removal by the minister of justice, whose exercise of this right is often invoked by political partisans. The administration of justice suffers in consequence, more especially in the country districts, where the judges must reckon with the influential politicians and their adherents. The pardon or release of a convicted criminal is not infrequently due to pressure on the part of some powerful patron. The lamentable effects of this system have long been recognized, and in 1906 a law was introduced securing tenure of office for two or four years to judges of the courts of first instance and of the inferior tribunals. In the circumstances crime is less rife than might be expected; the temperate habits of the Greeks have conduced to this result. A serious feature is the great prevalence of homicide, due in part to the passionate character of the people, but still more to the almost universal practice of carrying weapons. The traditions of the vendetta are almost extinct in the Ionian Islands, but still linger in Maina, where family feuds are transmitted from generation to generation. The brigand of the old-fashioned type (λῃστής, κλέφτης) has almost disappeared, except in the remoter country districts, and piracy, once so prevalent in the Aegean, has been practically suppressed, but numbers of outlaws or absconding criminals (φυγόδικοι) still haunt the mountains, and the efforts of the police to bring them to justice are far from successful. Their ranks were considerably increased after the war of 1897, when many deserters from the army and adventurers who came to Greece as volunteers betook themselves to a predatory life. On the other hand, there is no habitually criminal class in Greece, such as exists in the large centres of civilization, and professional mendicancy is still rare.
Police duties, for which officers and, in some cases, soldiers of the regular army were formerly employed, are since 1906 carried out by a reorganized gendarmerie force of 194 officers and 6344 non-commissioned officers and men, distributed in the twenty-six departments and commanded by an inspector-general resident at Athens, who is aided by a consultative commission. There are male and female prisons at all the departmental centres; the number of prisoners in 1906 was 5705. Except in the Ionian Islands, the general condition of the prisons is deplorable; discipline and sanitation are very deficient, and conflicts among the prisoners are sometimes reported in which knives and even revolvers are employed. A good prison has been built near Athens by Andreas Syngros, and a reformatory for juvenile offenders (ἐφηβεῖον) has been founded by George Averoff, another national benefactor. Capital sentences are usually commuted to penal servitude for life; executions, for which the guillotine is employed, are for the most part carried out on the island of Bourzi near Nauplia; they are often postponed for months or even for years. There is no enactment resembling the Habeas Corpus Act, and accused persons may be detained indefinitely before trial. The Greeks, like the other nations liberated from Turkish rule, are somewhat litigious, and numbers of lawyers find occupation even in the smaller country towns.
The Greeks, an intelligent people, have always shown a remarkable zeal for learning, and popular education has made great strides. So eager is the desire for instruction that schools are often founded in the rural districts on the Education. initiative of the villagers, and the sons of peasants, artisans and small shopkeepers come in numbers to Athens, where they support themselves by domestic service or other humble occupations in order to study at the university during their spare hours. Almost immediately after the accession of King Otho steps were taken to establish elementary schools in all the communes, and education was made obligatory. The law is not very rigorously applied in the remoter districts, but its enforcement is scarcely necessary. In 1898 there were 2914 “demotic” or primary schools, with 3465 teachers, attended by 129,210 boys (5.38% of the population) and 29,119 girls (1.19% of the population). By a law passed in 1905 the primary schools, which had reached the number of 3359 in that year, were reduced to 2604. The expenditure on primary schools is nominally sustained by the communes, but in reality by the government in the form of advances to the communes, which are not repaid; it was reduced in 1905 from upwards of 7,000,000 dr. to under 6,000,000 dr. In 1905 there were 306 “Hellenic” or secondary schools, with 819 teachers and 21,575 pupils (boys only) maintained by the state at a cost of 1,720,096 dr.; and 39 higher schools, or gymnasia, with 261 masters and 6485 pupils, partly maintained by the state (expenditure 615,600 dr.) and partly by benefactions and other means. Besides these public schools there are several private educational institutions, of which there are eight at Athens with 650 pupils. The Polytechnic Institute of Athens affords technical instruction in the departments of art and science to 221 students. Scientific agricultural instruction has been much neglected; there is an agricultural school at Aïdinion in Thessaly with 40 pupils; there are eight agricultural stations (σταθμοί) in various parts of the country. There are two theological seminaries—the Rizari School at Athens (120 pupils) and a preparatory school at Arta; three other seminaries have been suppressed. The Commercial and Industrial Academy at Athens (about 225 pupils), a private institution, has proved highly useful to the country; there are four commercial schools, each in one of the country towns. A large school for females at Athens, the Arsakíon, is attended by 1500 girls. There are several military and naval schools, including the military college of the Euelpides at Athens and the school of naval cadets (τῶν δοκίμων). The university of Athens in 1905 numbered 57 professors and 2598 students, of whom 557 were from abroad. Of the six faculties, theology numbered 79 students, law 1467, medicine 567, arts 206, physics and mathematics 192, and pharmacy 87. The university receives a subvention from the state, which in 1905 amounted to 563,960 dr.; it possesses a library of over 150,000 volumes and geological, zoological and botanical museums. A small tax on university education was imposed in 1903; the total cost to the student for the four years’ course at the university is about £25. Higher education is practically gratuitous in Greece, and there is a somewhat ominous increase in the number of educated persons who disdain agricultural pursuits and manual labour. The intellectual culture acquired is too often of a superficial character owing to the tendency to sacrifice scientific thoroughness and accuracy, to neglect the more useful branches of knowledge, and to aim at a showy dialectic and literary proficiency. (For the native and foreign archaeological institutions see Athens.)
The Greek branch of the Orthodox Eastern Church is practically independent, like those of Servia, Montenegro and Rumania, though nominally subject to the patriarchate of Constantinople. The jurisdiction of the patriarch Religion. was in fact repudiated in 1833, when the king was declared the supreme head of the church, and the severance was completed in 1850. Ecclesiastical affairs are under the control of the Ministry of Education. Church government is vested in the Holy Synod, a council of five ecclesiastics under the presidency of the metropolitan of Athens; its sittings are attended by a royal commissioner. The church can invoke the aid of the civil authorities for the punishment of heresy and the suppression of unorthodox literature, pictures, &c. There were formerly 21 archbishoprics and 29 bishoprics in Greece, but a law passed in 1899 suppressed the archbishoprics (except the metropolitan see of Athens) on the death of the existing prelates, and fixed the total number of sees at 32. The prelates derive their incomes partly from the state and partly from the church lands. There are about 5500 priests, who belong for the most part to the poorest classes. The parochial clergy have no fixed stipends, and often resort to agriculture or small trading in order to supplement the scanty fees earned by their ministrations. Owing to their lack of education their personal influence over their parishioners is seldom considerable. In addition to the parochial clergy there are 19 preachers (ἱεροκήρυκες) salaried by the state. There are 170 monasteries and 4 nunneries in Greece, with about 1600 monks and 250 nuns. In regard to their constitution the monasteries are either “idiorrhythmic” or “coenobian” (see Athos); the monks (καλόγεροι) are in some cases assisted by lay brothers (κοσμικοί). More than 300 of the smaller monasteries were suppressed in 1829 and their revenues secularized. Among the more important and interesting monasteries are those of Megaspelaeon and Lavra (where the standard of insurrection, unfurled in 1821, is preserved) near Kalavryta, St Luke of Stiris near Arachova, Daphne and Penteli near Athens, and the Meteora group in northern Thessaly. The bishops, who must be unmarried, are as a rule selected from the monastic order and are nominated by the king; the parish priests are allowed to marry, but the remarriage of widowers is forbidden. The bulk of the population, about 2,000,000, belongs to the Orthodox Church; other Christian confessions number about 15,000, the great majority being Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholics (principally in Naxos and the Cyclades) have three archbishoprics (Athens, Naxos and Corfu), five bishoprics and about 60 churches. The Jews, who are regarded with much hostility, have almost disappeared from the Greek mainland; they now number about 5000, and are found principally at Corfu. The Mahommedans are confined to Thessaly except a few at Chalcis. National sentiment is a more powerful factor than personal religious conviction in the attachment of the Greeks to the Orthodox Church; a Greek without the pale of the church is more or less an alien. The Catholic Greeks of Syros sided with the Turks at the time of the revolution; the Mahommedans of Crete, though of pure Greek descent, have always been hostile to their Christian fellow-countrymen and are commonly called Turks. On the other hand, that portion of the Macedonian population which acknowledges the patriarch of Constantinople is regarded as Greek, while that which adheres to the Bulgarian exarchate, though differing in no point of doctrine, has been declared schismatic. The constitution of 1864 guarantees toleration to all creeds in Greece and imposes no civil disabilities on account of religion.
Greece is essentially an agricultural country; its prosperity depends on its agricultural products, and more than half the population is occupied in the cultivation of the soil and kindred pursuits. The land in the plains and Agriculture. valleys is exceedingly rich, and, wherever there is a sufficiency of water, produces magnificent crops. Cereals nevertheless furnish the principal figure in the list of imports, the annual value being about 30,000,000 fr. The country, especially since the acquisition of the fertile province of Thessaly, might under a well-developed agricultural system provide a food-supply for all its inhabitants and an abundant surplus for exportation. Thessaly alone, indeed, could furnish cereals for the whole of Greece. Unfortunately, however, agriculture is still in a primitive state, and the condition of the rural population has received very inadequate attention from successive governments. The wooden plough of the Hesiodic type is still in use, especially in Thessaly; modern implements, however, are being gradually introduced. The employment of manure and the rotation of crops are almost unknown; the fields are generally allowed to lie fallow in alternate years. As a rule, countries dependent on agriculture are liable to sudden fluctuations in prosperity, but in Greece the diversity of products is so great that a failure in one class of crops is usually compensated by exceptional abundance in another. Among the causes which have hitherto retarded agricultural progress are the ignorance and conservatism of the peasantry, antiquated methods of cultivation, want of capital, absentee proprietorship, sparsity of population, bad roads, the prevalence of usury, the uncertainty of boundaries and the land tax, which, in the absence of a survey, is levied on ploughing oxen; to these may be added the insecurity hitherto prevailing in many of the country districts and the growing distaste for rural life which has accompanied the spread of education. Large estates are managed under the metayer system; the cultivator paying the proprietor from one-third to half of the gross produce; the landlords, who prefer to live in the larger towns, see little of their tenants, and rarely interest themselves in their welfare. A great proportion of the best arable land in Thessaly is owned by persons who reside permanently out of the country. The great estates in this province extend over some 1,500,000 acres, of which about 500,000 are cultivated. In the Peloponnesus peasant proprietorship is almost universal; elsewhere it is gradually supplanting the metayer system; the small properties vary from 2 or 3 to 50 acres. The extensive state lands, about one-third of the area of Greece, were formerly the property of Mahommedan religious communities (vakoufs); they are for the most part farmed out annually by auction. They have been much encroached upon by neighbouring owners; a considerable portion has also been sold to the peasants. The rich plain of Thessaly suffers from alternate droughts and inundations, and from the ravages of field mice; with improved cultivation, drainage and irrigation it might be rendered enormously productive. A commission has been occupied for some years in preparing a scheme of hydraulic works. Usury is, perhaps, a greater scourge to the rural population than any visitation of nature; the institution of agricultural banks, lending money at a fair rate of interest on the security of their land, would do much to rescue the peasants from the clutches of local Shylocks. There is a difficulty, however, in establishing any system of land credit owing to the lack of a survey. Since 1897 a law passed in 1882 limiting the rate of interest to 8% (to 9% in the case of commercial debts) has to some extent been enforced by the tribunals. In the Ionian Islands the rate of 10% still prevails.
The following figures give approximately the acreage in 1906 and the average annual yield of agricultural produce, no official statistics being available:—
|Fields sown or lying fallow||3,000,000|
|Olives (10,000,000 trees)||250,000|
|Fruit trees (fig, mulberry, &c.)||125,000|
|Meadows and pastures||7,500,000|
The average annual yield is as follows:—
|Beans, lentils, &c||25,000,000||”|
|Figs (exported only)||12,000,000||”|
|Vegetables and fresh fruits||20,000,000||”|
|Hesperidiums (exported only)||4,000,000||”|
|Carobs (exported only)||10,000,000||”|
Rice is grown in the marshy plains of Elis, Boeotia, Marathon and Missolonghi; beet in Thessaly. The cultivation of vegetables is increasing; beans, peas and lentils are the most common. Potatoes are grown in the upland districts, but are not a general article of diet. Of late years market-gardening has been taken up as a new industry in the neighbourhood of Athens. There is a great variety of fruits. Olive plantations are found everywhere; in 1860 they occupied about 90,000 acres; in 1887, 433,701 acres. The trees are sometimes of immense age and form a picturesque feature in the landscape. In latter years the groves in many parts of the western Morea and Zante have been cut down to make room for currant plantations; the destruction has been deplorable in its consequences, for, as the tree requires twenty years to come into full bearing, replanting is seldom resorted to. Preserved olives, eaten with bread, are a common article of food. Excellent olive oil is produced in Attica and elsewhere. The value of the oil and fruit exported varies from five to ten million francs. Figs are also abundant, especially in Messenia and in the Cyclades. Mulberry trees are planted for the purposes of sericulture; they have been cut down in great numbers in the currant-growing districts. Other fruit trees are the orange, citron, lemon, pomegranate and almond. Peaches, apricots, pears, cherries, &c., abound, but are seldom scientifically cultivated; the fruit is generally gathered while unripe. Cotton in 1906 occupied about 12,500 acres, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Livadia. Tobacco plantations in 1893 covered 16,320 acres, yielding about 3,500,000 kilograms; the yield in 1906 was 9,000,000 kilograms. About 40% of the produce is exported, principally to Egypt and Turkey. More important are the vineyards, which occupied in 1887 an area of 306,421 acres. The best wine is made at Patras, on the royal estate at Decelea, and on other estates in Attica; a peculiar flavour is imparted to the wine of the country by the addition of resin. The wine of Santorin, the modern representative of the famous “malmsey,” is mainly exported to Russia. The foreign demand for Greek wines is rapidly increasing; 3,770,257 gallons were exported in 1890, 4,974,196 gallons in 1894, There is also a growing demand for Greek cognac. The export of wine in 1905 was 20,850,941 okes, value 5,848,544 fr.; of cognac, 363,720 okes, value 1,091,160 fr.
The currant, by far the most important of Greek exports, is cultivated in a limited area extending along the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth and the seaboard of the Western Peloponnesus, in Zante, Cephalonia and Leucas, and in certain districts of Currants. Acarnania and Aetolia; attempts to cultivate it elsewhere have generally proved unsuccessful. The history of the currant industry has been a record of extraordinary vicissitudes. Previously to 1877 the currant was exported solely for eating purposes, the amounts for the years 1872 to 1877 being 70,766 tons, 71,222 tons, 76,210 tons, 72,916 tons, 86,947 tons, and 82,181 tons respectively. In 1877, however, the French vineyards began to suffer seriously from the phylloxera, and French wine producers were obliged to have recourse to dried currants, which make an excellent wine for blending purposes. The importation of currants into France at once rose from 881 tons in 1877 to 20,999 tons in 1880, and to 70,401 tons in 1889, or about 20,000 tons more than were imported into England in that year. Meanwhile the total amount of currants produced in Greece had nearly doubled in these thirteen years. The country was seized with a mania for currant planting; every other industry was neglected, and olive, orange and lemon groves were cut down to make room for the more lucrative growth. The currant growers, in order to increase their production as rapidly as possible, had recourse to loans at a high rate of interest, and the great profits which they made were devoted to further planting, while the loans remained unpaid. A crisis followed rapidly. By 1891 the French vineyards had to a great extent recovered from the disease, and wine producers in France began to clamour against the competition of foreign wines and wine-producing raisins and currants. The import duty on these was thereupon raised from 6 francs to 15 francs per 100 kilos, and was further increased in 1894 to 25 francs. The currant trade with France was thus extinguished; of a crop averaging 160,000 tons, only some 110,000 now found a market. Although a fresh opening for exportation was found in Russia, the value of the fruit dropped from £15 to £5 per ton, a price scarcely covering the cost of cultivation. In July 1895 the government introduced a measure, since known as the Retention (παρακράτησις) Law, by which it was enacted that every shipper should deliver into depots provided by the government a weight of currants equivalent to 15% of the amount which he intended to export. A later law fixed the quantity to be retained by the state at 10%, which might be increased to 20%, should a representative committee, meeting every summer at Athens, so advise the government. The currants thus taken over by the government cannot be exported unless they are reduced to pulp, syrup or otherwise rendered unsuitable for eating purposes; they may be sold locally for wine-making or distilling, due precautions being taken that they are not used in any other way. The price of exported currants is thus maintained at an artificial figure. The Retention Law, which after 1895 was voted annually, was passed for a period of ten years in 1899. This pernicious measure, which is in defiance of all economic laws, perpetuates a superfluous production, retards the development of other branches of agriculture and burdens the government with vast accumulations of an unmarketable commodity. It might excusably be adopted as a temporary expedient to meet a pressing crisis, but as a permanent system it can only prove detrimental to the country and the currant growers themselves.
In 1899 a "Bank of Viticulture" was established at Patras for the purpose of assisting the growers, to whom it was bound to make advances at a low rate of interest; it undertook the storage and the sale of the retained fruit, from which its capital was derived. The bank soon found itself burdened with an enormous unsaleable stock, while its loans for the most part remained unpaid; meantime over-production, the cause of the trouble, continued to increase, and prices further diminished. In 1903 a syndicate of English and other foreign capitalists made proposals for a monopoly of the export, guaranteeing fixed prices to the growers. The scheme, which conflicted with Anglo-Greek commercial conventions, was rejected by the Theotokis ministry; serious disturbances followed in the currant-growing districts, and M. Theotokis resigned. His successor, M. Rallis, in order to appease the cultivators, arranged that the Currant Bank should offer them fixed minimum prices for the various growths, and guaranteed it a loan of 6,000,000 dr. The resources of the bank, however, gave out before the end of the season, and prices pursued their downward course. Another experiment was then tried; the export duty (15%) was made payable in kind, the retention quota being thus practically raised from 20 to 35%. The only result of this measure was a diminution of the export; in the spring of 1905 prices fell very low and the growers began to despair. A syndicate of banks and capitalists then came forward, which introduced the system now in operation. A privileged company was formed which obtained a charter from the government for twenty years, during which period the retention and export duties are maintained at the fixed rates of 20 and 15% respectively. The company aims at keeping up the prices of the marketable qualities by employing profitably for industrial purposes the unexported surplus and retained inferior qualities; it pays to the state 4,000,000 dr. annually under the head of export duty; offers all growers at the beginning of each agricultural year a fixed price of 115 dr. per 1000 Venetian ℔ irrespective of quality, and pays a price varying from 115 dr. to 145 dr. according to quality at the end of the year for the unexported surplus. In return for these advantages to the growers the company is entitled to receive 7 dr. on every 1000 ℔ of currants produced and to dispose of the whole retained amount. A special company has been formed for the conversion of the superfluous product into spirit, wine, &c. The system may perhaps prove commercially remunerative, but it penalizes the producers of the better growths in order to provide a livelihood for the growers of inferior and unmarketable kinds and protracts an abnormal situation. The following table gives the annual currant crop from 1877 to 1905:—
|Year.|| Total crop
| Exported to
| Exported to |
The "peronospora," a species of white blight, first caused considerable damage in the Greek vineyards in 1892, recurring in 1897 and 1900.
More than half the cultivable area of Greece is devoted to pasturage. Cattle-rearing, as a rule, is a distinct occupation from agricultural farming; the herds are sent to pasture on the mountains in the summer, and return to the plains at the Stock-farming. beginning of winter. The larger cattle are comparatively rare, being kept almost exclusively for agricultural labour; the smaller are very abundant. Beef is scarcely eaten in Greece, the milk of cows is rarely drunk and butter is almost unknown. Cheese, a staple article of diet, is made from the milk of sheep and goats. The number of larger cattle has declined in recent years; that of the smaller has increased. The native breed of oxen is small; buffaloes are seldom seen except in north-western Thessaly; a few camels are used in the neighbourhood of Parnassus. The Thessalian breed of horses, small but sturdy and enduring, can hardly be taken to represent the celebrated chargers of antiquity. Mules are much employed in the mountainous districts; the best type of these animals is found in the islands. The flocks of long-horned sheep and goats add a picturesque feature to Greek rural scenery. The goats are more numerous in proportion to the population than in any other European country (137 per 100 inhabitants). The shepherds’ dogs rival those of Bulgaria in ferocity. According to an unofficial estimate published in 1905 the numbers of the various domestic animals in 1899 were as follows: Oxen and buffaloes, 408,744; horses, 157,068; mules, 88,869; donkeys, 141,174; camels, 51; sheep, 4,568,151; goats, 3,339,439; pigs, 79,716. During the four years 1899-1902 the annual average value of imported cattle was 4,218,015 dr., of exported cattle 209,321 dr.
The forest area (about 2,500,000 acres or one-fifth of the surface of the mainland) is for the most part state property. The value of the forests has been estimated at 200,000,000 fr.; the most productive are in the district extending from the Forests. Pindus range to the Gulf of Corinth. The principal trees are the oak (about 30 varieties), the various coniferae, the chestnut, maple, elm, beech, alder, cornel and arbutus. In Greece, as in other lands formerly subject to Turkish rule, the forests are not only neglected, but often deliberately destroyed; this great source of national wealth is thus continually diminishing. Every year immense forest fires may be seen raging in the mountains, and many of the most picturesque districts in the country are converted into desolate wildernesses. These conflagrations are mainly the work of shepherds eager to provide increased pasturage for their flocks; they are sometimes, however, due to the carelessness of smokers, and occasionally, it is said, to spontaneous ignition in hot weather. Great damage is also done by the goats, which browse on the young saplings; the pine trees are much injured by the practice of scoring their bark for resin. With the disappearance of the trees the soil of the mountain slopes, deprived of its natural protection, is soon washed away by the rain; the rapid descent of the water causes inundations in the plains, while the uplands become sterile and lose their vegetation. The climate has been affected by the change; rain falls less frequently but with greater violence, and the process of denudation is accelerated. The government has from time to time made efforts for the protection of the forests, but with little success till recently. A staff of inspectors and forest guards was first organized in 1877. The administration of the forests has since 1893 been entrusted to a department of the Ministry of Finance, which controls a staff of 4 inspectors (ἐπιθεωρῆται), 31 superintendents (δασαρχοί), 52 head foresters (ἀρχιφύλακες) and 298 foresters (δασυφύλακες). The foresters are aided during the summer months, when fires are most frequent, by about 500 soldiers and gendarmes. About a third of these functionaries have received instruction in the school of forestry at Vythine in the Morea, open since 1898. Owing to the measures now taken, which include excommunication by the parish priests of incendiaries and their accomplices, the conflagrations have considerably diminished. The total annual value of the products of the Greek forests averages 15,000,000 drachmae. The revenue to the government in 1905 was 1,418,158 dr., as compared with 583,991 dr. in 1883. The increase is mainly due to improved administration. The supply of timber for house-construction, ship-building, furniture-making, railway sleepers, &c., is insufficient, and is supplemented by importation (annual value about 12,000,000 francs); transport is rendered difficult by the lack of roads and navigable streams. The principal secondary products are valonea (annual exportation about 1,250,000 fr.) and resin, which is locally employed as a preservative ingredient in the fabrication of wine. The administration of the forests is still defective, and measures for the augmentation and better instruction of the staff of foresters have been designed by the government. In 1900 a society for the re-afforesting of the country districts and environs of the large towns was founded at Athens under the patronage of the crown princess.
|Lead (argentiferous pig) ore||13,729||6,811,792|
The chief minerals are silver, lead, zinc, copper manganese, magnesia, iron, sulphur and coal. Emery, salt, millstone and gypsum, which are found in considerable quantities, are worked by the government. The important mines Mines. at Laurium, a source of great wealth to ancient Athens, were reopened in 1864 by a Franco-Italian company, but were declared to be state property in 1871; they are now worked by a Greek and a French company. The output of marketable ore in 1899 amounted to 486,760 tons, besides 289,292 tons of dressed lead ore. In 1905 the output was as follows: Raw and roasted manganese iron ore, 113,636 tons; hematite iron ore, 94,734 tons; calamine or zinc ore, 22,612 tons; arsenic and argentiferous lead, 1875 tons; zinc blende and galena, 443 tons; total, 233,300 tons, together with 164,857 tons of dressed lead, producing 13,822 tons of silver pig lead containing 1657 to 1910 grams of silver per ton. It has been found profitable to resmelt the scoriae of the ancient workings. The total value of the exports from the Laurium mines, which in 1875 amounted to only £150,513, had in 1899 increased to £827,209, but fell in 1905 to £499,882. The revenue accruing to the government from all mines and quarries, including those worked by the state, was estimated in the budget for 1906 at 1,332,000 dr. The emery of Naxos, which is a state monopoly, is excellent in quality and very abundant. Mines of iron ore have latterly been opened at Larimna in Locris. Magnesite mines are worked by an Anglo-Greek company in Euboea. There are sulphur and manganese mines in the island of Melos, and the volcanic island of Santorin produces pozzolana, a kind of cement, which is exported in considerable quantities. The great abundance of marble in Greece has latterly attracted the attention of foreign capitalists. New quarries have been opened since 1897 by an English company on the north slope of Mount Pentelicus, and are now connected by rail with Athens and the Peiraeus. The marble on this side of the mountain is harder than that on the south, which alone was worked by the ancients. The output in 1905 was 1573 tons. Mount Pentelicus furnished material for most of the celebrated buildings of ancient Athens; the marble, which is white, blue-veined, and somewhat transparent, assumes a rich yellow hue after long exposure to the air. The famous Parian quarries are still worked; white marble is also found at Scyros, Tenos and Naxos; grey at Stoura and Karystos; variegated at Valaxa and Karystos; green on Taygetus and in Thessaly; black at Tenos; and red (porphyry) in Maina.
The official statistics of the output and value of minerals produced in 1905 were as in the preceding table.
The number of persons employed in mining operations in 1905 was 9934.
Owing to the natural aptitude of the Greeks for commerce and their predilection for a seafaring life a great portion of the trade of the Levant has fallen into their hands. Important Greek mercantile colonies exist in all the Commerce and industry. larger ports of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and many of them possess great wealth. In some of the islands of the archipelago almost every householder is the owner or joint owner of a ship. The Greek mercantile marine, which in 1888 consisted of 1352 vessels (70 steamers) with a total tonnage of 219,415 tons, numbered in 1906, according to official returns, 1364 vessels (275 steamers) with a total tonnage of 427,291 tons. This figure is apparently too low, as the ship-owners are prone to understate the tonnage in order to diminish the payment of dues. Almost the whole corn trade of Turkey is in Greek hands. A large number of the sailing ships, especially the smaller vessels engaged in the coasting trade, belong to the islanders. A considerable portion of the shipping on the Danube and Pruth is owned by the inhabitants of Ithaca and Cephalonia; a certain number of their sleps (σλέπια) have latterly been acquired by Rumanian Jews, but the Greek flag is still predominant. There are seven principal Greek steamship companies owning 40 liners with a total tonnage of 21,972 tons. In 1847 there was but one lighthouse in Greek waters; in 1906 there were 70 lighthouses and 68 port lanterns. Hermoupolis (Syra) is the chief seat of the carrying trade, but as a commercial port it yields to Peiraeus, which is the principal centre of distribution for imports. Other important ports are Patras, Volo, Corfu, Kalamata and Laurium.
The following table gives the total value (in francs) of special Greek commerce for the given years:—
The marked fluctuations in the returns are mainly attributable to variations in the price and quantity of imported cereals and in the sale of currants. The great excess of imports, caused by the large importation of food-stuffs and manufactured articles, is due to the neglect of agriculture and the undeveloped condition of local industries.
The imports and exports for 1905 were distributed as follows:—
An enumeration of the chief articles of importation and exportation, together with their value, will be found in tabular form overleaf.
Greece does not possess any manufacturing industries on a large scale; the absence of a native coal supply is an obstacle to their development. In 1889 there were 145 establishments employing steam of 5568 indicated horse-power; in 1892 the total horse-power employed was estimated at 10,000. In addition to the smelting-works at Laurium, at which some 5000 hands are employed by Greek and French companies and local proprietors, there are flour mills, cloth, cotton and silk spinning mills, ship-building and engineering works, oil-presses, tanneries, powder and dynamite mills, soap mills (about 40), and some manufactures of paper, glass, matches, turpentine, white lead, hats, gloves, candles, &c. About 100 factories are established in the neighbourhood of Athens and Peiraeus. The wine industry (10 factories) is of considerable importance, and the manufacture of cognac has latterly made great progress; there are 10 large and numerous small cognac distilleries. Ship-building is carried on actively at all the ports on the mainland and islands; about 200 ships, mostly of low tonnage, are launched annually.
|Principal Articles of Importation.|
| Total value
| Imported from
| Total value
| Imported from |
|Coals and pit-coal||6,522,086||6,087,068||5,073,841||4,308,357|
|Yarn and tissues||4,739,819||2,504,667||8,021,523||6,838,079|
|Paper, books, &c.||3,327,144||157,017||3,319,700||76,454|
|Chief Articles of Exportation.|
| Total value
| Exported to
| Total value
| Exported to |
|Minerals and raw metals||19,134,185||5,161,898||15,125,072||5,438,698|
|Minerals and metals (worked)||2,754,245||7,750||2,607,580||900|
Public Works.—The important drainage-works at Lake Copais were taken over by an English company in 1890. The lake covered an area of 58,080 acres, the greater part of which is now rendered fit for cultivation. The drainage works consist of a canal, 28 kilometres in length, and a tunnel of 600 metres descending through the mountain to a lower lake, which is connected by a second tunnel with the sea. The reclaimed land is highly fertile. The area under crops amounted in 1906 to 27,414 acres, of which 20,744 were let to tenants and the remainder farmed by the company. The uncultivated portion affords excellent grazing. The canal through the Isthmus of Corinth was opened to navigation in November 1893. The total cost of the works, which were begun by a company in 1882, was 70,000,000 francs. The narrowness of the canal, which is only 24.60 metres broad at the surface, and the strength of the current which passes through it, seriously detract from its utility. The high charges imposed on foreign vessels have proved almost prohibitive. There are reduced rates for ships sailing in Greek waters. Up to the 31st of July 1906, 37,214 vessels, with a tonnage of 4,971,922, had passed through the canal. The receipts up to that date were 3,207,835 drachmae (mainly from Greek ships) and 415,976 francs (mainly from foreign ships). In 1905, 2930 vessels (2735 Greek) passed through, the receipts being 281,935 drachmae and 34,142 francs. The total liabilities of the company in 1906 were about 40,000,000 fr. The canal would be more frequented by foreign shipping if the harbours at its entrances were improved, and its sides, which are of masonry, lined with beams; efforts are being made to raise funds for these purposes. The widening of the Euripus Channel at Chalcis to the extent of 21.56 metres was accomplished in 1894. The operations involved the destruction of the picturesque Venetian tower which guarded the strait. A canal was completed in 1903 rendering navigable the shallow channel between Leucas (Santa Maura) and the mainland (breadth 15 metres, depth 5 metres). Large careening docks were undertaken in 1909 at Peiraeus at an estimated cost of 4,750,000 drachmae.
Communications.—Internal communication by roads is improving, though much remains to be done, especially as regards the quality of the roads. A considerable impetus was given to road-making under the Trikoupis administration. In 1878 there were only 555 m. of roads; in 1898 there were 2398 m.; in 1906, 3275 m. Electric trams have been introduced at Patras. Railways were open to traffic in 1900 for a length of 598 m.; in 1906 for a length of 867 m. The circuit of the Morea railways (462 m.) was completed in 1902; from Diakophto, on the north coast, a cogwheel railway, finished in 1894, ascends to Kalavryta. A very important undertaking is the completion of a line from Peiraeus to the frontier, the contract for which was signed in 1900 between the Greek government and the Eastern Railway Extension Syndicate (subsequently converted into the Société des Chemins de Fer helléniques). A line Connecting Peiraeus with Larissa was begun in 1890, but in 1894 the English company which had undertaken the contract went into liquidation. Under the contract of 1900 the line was drawn through Demerli, in the south of Thessaly, to Larissa, a distance of 217 m., and continued through the vale of Tempe to the Turkish frontier (about 246 m. in all). Branch lines have been constructed to Lamia and Chalcis. The establishment of a connexion with the continental railway system, by a junction with the line from Belgrade to Salonica, would be of immense advantage to Greece, and the Peiraeus would become an important place of embarkation for Egypt, India and the Far East.
In 1905 the number of post offices was 640. Of these 320 were also telegraph and 89 telephone stations, with 664 clerks; the remaining post offices possess no special staff, but are served by persons who also pursue other occupations. The Posts and telegraphs. number of postmen and other employees was 889. During the year there passed through the post 6,897,899 ordinary letters for the interior, 2,980,958 for foreign destinations, 2,788,477 from abroad; 540,411 registered letters or parcels for the interior, 309,907 for foreign countries, and 300,150 from abroad; 880,673 post-cards for the interior, 504,785 from abroad, and 187,975 sent abroad; 100,680 samples; 7,068,125 printed papers for the interior, 5,278,405 to or from foreign countries. Telegraph lines in 1905 extended over 4222 m. with 6836 m. of wires; 841,913 inland telegrams, 221,188 service telegrams and 129,036 telegrams to foreign destinations were despatched, and 169,519 received from abroad. Receipts amounted to 4,589,601 drachmae (postal service 2,744,212, telegraph and telephone services 1,845,389 drachmae) and expenditure to 3,954,742 drachmae.
The Greek army has recently been in a state of transition. Its condition has never been satisfactory, partly owing to the absence of systematic effort in the work of organization, partly owing to the pernicious influence of political Army. parties, and in times of national emergency it has never been in a condition of readiness. The experience of the war of 1897 proved the need of far-reaching administrative changes and disciplinary reforms. A scheme of complete reorganization was subsequently elaborated under the auspices of the crown prince Constantine, the commander-in-chief, and received the assent of the Chamber in June 1904. During the war of 1897 about 65,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry, and 24 batteries were put into the field, and after great efforts another 15,000 men were mobilized. Under the new scheme it is proposed to maintain on a peace footing 1887 officers, 25,140 non-commissioned officers and men, and 4059 horses and mules; in time of war the active army will consist of at least 120,000 men and the territorial army of at least 60,000 men. The heavy expenditure entailed by the project has been an obstacle to its immediate realization. In order to meet this expenditure a special fund has been instituted in addition to the ordinary military budget, and certain revenues have been assigned to it amounting to about 5,500,000 drachmae annually. In 1906, however, it was decided to suspend partially for five years the operation of the law of 1904 and to devote the resources thus economized together with other funds to the immediate purchase of new armaments and equipment. Under this temporary arrangement the peace strength of the army in 1908 consisted of 1939 officers and civilians, 19,416 non-commissioned officers and men and 2661 horses and mules; it is calculated that the reserves will furnish about 77,000 men and the territorial army about 37,000 men in time of war.
Military service is obligatory, and liability to serve begins from the twenty-first year. The term of service comprises two years in the active army, ten years in the active army reserve (for cavalry eight years), eight years in the territorial army (for cavalry ten years) and ten years for all branches in the territorial army reserve. As a rule, however, the period of service in the active army has hitherto been considerably shortened; with a view to economy, the men, under the law of 1904, receive furlough after eighteen months with the colours. Exemptions from military service, which were previously very numerous, are also restricted considerably by the law of 1904, which will secure a yearly contingent of about 13,000 men in time of peace. The conscripts in excess of the yearly contingent are withdrawn by lot; they are required to receive six months’ training in the ranks as supernumeraries before passing into the reserve, in which they form a special category of “liability” men. Under the temporary system of 1906 the contingent is reduced to about 10,000 men by postponing the abrogation of several exemptions, and the period of service is fixed at fourteen months for all the conscripts alike. The field army as constituted by the law of 1904 consists of 3 divisions, each division comprising 2 brigades of infantry, each of 2 regiments of 3 battalions and other units. There are thus 36 battalions of infantry (of which 12 are cadres); also 6 battalions of evzones (highlanders), 18 squadrons of cavalry (6 cadres), 33 batteries of artillery (6 cadres), 3 battalions of engineers and telegraphists, 3 companies of ambulance, 3 of train, &c. The artillery is composed of 24 field batteries, 3 heavy and 6 mountain batteries; it is mainly provided with Krupp 7.5 cm. guns dating from 1870 or earlier. After a series of trials in 1907 it was decided to order 36 field batteries of 7.5 cm. quick-firing guns and 6 mountain batteries, in all 168 guns, with 1500 projectiles for each battery from the Creuzot factory. The infantry, which was hitherto armed with the obsolete Gras rifle (.433 in.), was furnished in 1907 with the Mannlicher-Schönauer (model 1903) of which 100,000 had been delivered in May 1908. Hitherto the gendarmerie, which replaced the police, have formed a corps drawn from the army, which in 1908 consisted of 194 officers and 6344 non-commissioned officers and men, but a law passed in 1907 provided for these forces being thenceforth recruited separately by voluntary enlistment in annual contingents of 700 men. The participation of the officers in politics, which has proved very injurious to discipline, has been checked by a law forbidding officers below the rank of colonel to stand for the Chamber. In the elections of 1905 115 officers were candidates. The three divisional headquarters are at Larissa, Athens and Missolonghi; the six headquarters of brigades are at Trikkala, Larissa, Athens, Chalcis, Missolonghi and Nauplia. In 1907 annual manœuvres were instituted.
The Greek fleet consisted in 1907 of 3 armoured barbette ships of 4885 tons (built in France in 1890, reconstructed 1899), carrying each three 10.8-in. guns, five 6-in., thirteen quick-firing and smaller guns, and three torpedo tubes; Navy. 1 cruiser of 1770 tons (built in 1879), with two 6.7-in. and six light quick-firing guns; 1 armoured central battery ship of 1774 tons (built 1867, reconstructed 1897) with two 8.4 in. and nine small quick-firing guns; 2 coast-defence gunboats with one 10.6-in. gun each; 4 corvettes; 1 torpedo depôt ship; 8 destroyers, each with six guns (ordered in 1905); 3 transport steamers; 7 small gunboats; 3 mining boats; 5 torpedo boats; 1 royal yacht; 2 school ships and various minor vessels. The personnel of the navy was composed in 1907 of 437 officers, 26 cadets, 1118 petty officers, 2372 seamen and stokers, 60 boys and 99 civilians, together with 386 artisans employed at the arsenal. The navy is manned chiefly by conscription; the period of service is two years, with four years in the reserve. The headquarters of the fleet and arsenal are in the island of Salamis, where there is a dockyard with naval stores, a floating dock and a torpedo school. Most of the vessels of the Greek fleet were in 1907 obsolete; in 1904 a commission under the presidency of Prince George proposed the rearmament of the existing ironclads and the purchase of three new ironclads and other vessels. A different scheme of reorganization, providing almost exclusively for submarines and scout vessels, was suggested to the government by the French admiral Fournier in 1908, but was opposed by the Greek naval officers. With a view to the augmentation and better equipment of the fleet a special fund was instituted in 1900 to which certain revenues have been assigned; it has been increased by various donations and bequests and by the proceeds of a state lottery. The fleet is not exercised methodically either in navigation or gunnery practice; a long voyage, however, was undertaken by the ironclad vessels in 1904. The Greeks, especially the islanders of the Aegean, make better sailors than soldiers; the personnel of the navy, if trained by foreign officers, might be brought to a high state of efficiency.
The financial history of Greece has been unsatisfactory from the outset. Excessive military and naval expenditure (mainly due to repeated and hasty mobilizations), a lax and improvident system of administration, the corruption of political parties Finance. and the instability of the government, which has rendered impossible the continuous application of any scheme of fiscal reform—all alike have contributed to the economic ruin of the country. For a long series of years preceding the declaration of national insolvency in 1893 successive budgets presented a deficit, which in years of political excitement and military activity assumed enormous proportions: the shortcomings of the budget were supplied by the proceeds of foreign loans, or by means of advances obtained in the country at a high rate of interest. The two loans which had been contracted during the war of independence were extinguished by means of a conversion in 1889. Of the existing foreign loans the earliest is that of 60,000,000 frs., guaranteed by the three protecting powers in 1832; owing to the payment of interest and amortization by the powers, the capital amounted in 1871 to 100,392,833 fr.; on this Greece pays an annual sum of 900,000 fr., of which 300,000 have been granted by the powers as a yearly subvention to King George. The only other existing foreign obligation of early date is the debt to the heirs of King Otho (4,500,000 dr.) contracted in 1868. A large amount of internal debt was incurred between 1848 and 1880, but a considerable proportion of this was redeemed with the proceeds of the foreign loans negotiated after this period. At the end of 1880 the entire national debt, external and internal, stood at 252,652,481 dr. In 1881 the era of great foreign loans began. In that year a 5% loan of 120,000,000 fr. was raised to defray the expenses of the mobilization of 1880. This was followed in 1884 by a 5% loan of 170,000,000 fr., of which 100,000,000 was actually issued. The service of these loans was guaranteed by various State revenues. A “patriotic loan” of 30,000,000 dr. without interest, issued during the war excitement of 1885, proved a failure, only 2,723,860 dr. being subscribed. In 1888 a 4% loan of 135,000,000 fr. was contracted, secured on the receipts of the five State monopolies, the management of which was entrusted to a privileged company. In the following year (1889) two 4% loans of 30,000,000 fr. and 125,000,000 fr. respectively were issued without guarantee or sinking fund; Greek credit had now apparently attained an established position in the foreign money market, but a decline of public confidence soon became evident. In 1890, of a 5% loan of 80,000,000 fr. effective, authorized for the construction of the Peiraeus-Larissa railway, only 40,050,000 fr. was taken up abroad and 12,900,000 fr. at home; large portions of the proceeds were devoted to other purposes. In 1892 the government was compelled to make large additions to the internal floating debt, and to borrow 16,500,000 fr. from the National Bank on onerous terms. In 1893 an effort to obtain a foreign loan for the reduction of the forced currency proved unsuccessful. (For the events leading up to the declaration of national bankruptcy in that year see under Recent History.) A funding convention was concluded in the summer, under which the creditors accepted scrip instead of cash payments of interest. A few months later this arrangement was reversed by the Chamber, and on the 13th December a law was passed assigning provisionally to all the foreign loans alike 30% of the stipulated interest; the reduced coupons were made payable in paper instead of gold, the sinking funds were suspended, and the sums encashed by the monopoly company were confiscated. The causes of the financial catastrophe may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) The military preparations of 1885-1886, with the attendant disorganization of the country; the extraordinary expenditure of these years amounted to 130,987,772 dr. (2) Excessive borrowing abroad, involving a charge for the service of foreign loans altogether disproportionate to the revenue. (3) Remissness in the collection of taxation: the total loss through arrears in a period of ten years (1882-1891) was 36,549,202 dr., being in the main attributable to non-payment of direct taxes. (4) The adverse balance of trade, largely due to the neglected condition of agriculture; in the five years preceding the crisis (1888-1892) the exports were stated to amount to £19,578,973, while the imports reached £24,890,146; foreign live stock and cereals being imported to the amount of £6,193,579. The proximate cause of the crisis was the rise in the exchange owing to the excessive amount of paper money in circulation. Forced currency was first introduced in 1868, when 15,000,000 dr. in paper money was issued; it was abolished in the following year, but reintroduced in 1877 with a paper issue of 44,000,000 dr. It was abolished a second time in 1884, but again put into circulation in 1885, when paper loans to the amount of 45,000,000 dr. were authorized. In 1893 the total authorized forced currency was 146,000,000 dr., of which 88,000,000 (including 14,000,000 dr. in small notes) was on account of the government. The gold and silver coinage had practically disappeared from circulation. The rate of exchange, as a rule, varies directly with the amount of paper money in circulation, but, owing to speculation, it is liable to violent fluctuations whenever there is an exceptional demand for gold in the market. In 1893 the gold franc stood at the ratio of 1.60 to the paper drachma; the service of the foreign loans required upwards of 31,000,000 dr. in gold, and any attempt to realize this sum in the market would have involved an outlay equivalent to at least half the budget. With the failure of the projected loan for the withdrawal of the forced currency repudiation became inevitable. The law of the 13th of December was not recognized by the national creditors: prolonged negotiations followed, but no arrangement was arrived at till 1897, when the intervention of the powers after the war with Turkey furnished the opportunity for a definite settlement. It was stipulated that Turkey should receive an indemnity of £T4,000,000 contingent on the evacuation of Thessaly; in order to secure the payment of this sum by Greece without prejudice to the interests of her creditors, and to enable the country to recover from the economic consequences of the war, Great Britain, France and Russia undertook to guarantee a 2½% loan of 170,000,000 fr., of which 150,000,000 fr. has been issued. By the preliminary treaty of peace (18th of September 1897) an International Financial Commission, composed of six representatives of the powers, was charged with the payment of the indemnity to Turkey, and with “absolute control” over the collection and employment of revenues sufficient for the service of the foreign debt. A law defining the powers of the Commission was passed by the Chamber, 26th of February 1898 (o.s.). The revenues assigned to its supervision were the five government monopolies, the tobacco and stamp duties, and the import duties of Peiraeus (total annual value estimated at 39,600,000 dr.): the collection was entrusted to a Greek society, which is under the absolute control of the Commission. The returns of Peiraeus customs (estimated at 10,700,000 dr.) are regarded as an extra guarantee, and are handed over to the Greek government; when the produce of the other revenues exceeds 28,900,000 dr. the “plus value” or surplus is divided in the proportion of 50.8% to the Greek government and 49.2% to the creditors. The plus values amounted to 3,301,481 dr. in 1898, 3,533,755 dr. in 1899, and 3,442,713 dr. in 1900. Simultaneously with the establishment of the control the interest for the Monopoly Loan was fixed at 43%, for the Funding Loan at 40%, and for the other loans at 32% of the original interest. With the revenues at its disposal the International Commission has already been enabled to make certain augmentations in the service of the foreign debt; since 1900 it has begun to take measures for the reduction of the forced currency, of which 2,000,000 dr. will be annually bought up and destroyed till the amount in circulation is reduced to 40,000,000 dr. On the 1st of January 1901 the authorized paper issue was 164,000,000 dr., of which 92,000,000 (including 18,000,000 in fractional currency) was on account of the government; the amount in actual circulation was 148,619,618 dr. On the 31st of July 1906 the paper issue had been reduced to 152,775,975 dr., and the amount in circulation was 124,668,057 dr. The financial commission retains its powers until the extinction of all the foreign loans contracted since 1881. Though its activity is mainly limited to the administration of the assigned revenues, it has exercised a beneficial influence over the whole domain of Greek finance; the effect may be observed in the greatly enhanced value of Greek securities since its institution, averaging 25.76% in 1906. No change can be made in its composition or working without the consent of the six powers, and none of the officials employed in the collection of the revenues subject to its control can be dismissed or transferred without its consent. It thus constitutes an element of stability and order which cannot fail to react on the general administration. It is unable, however, to control the expenditure or to assert any direct influence over the government, with which the responsibility still rests for an improved system of collection, a more efficient staff of functionaries and the repression of smuggling. The country has shown a remarkable vitality in recovering from the disasters of 1897, and should it in future obtain a respite from paroxysms of military and political excitement, its financial regeneration will be assured.
The following table gives the actual expenditure and receipts for the period 1889-1906 inclusive:
The steady increase of receipts since 1898 attests the growing prosperity of the country, but expenditure has been allowed to outstrip revenue, and, notwithstanding the official figures which represent a series of surpluses, the accumulated deficit in 1905 amounted to about 14,000,000, dr. in addition to treasury bonds for 8,000,000 dr. A remarkable feature has been the rapid fall in the exchange since 1903; the gold franc, which stood at 1.63 dr. in 1902, had fallen to 1.08 in October 1906. The decline, a favourable symptom if resulting from normal economic factors, is apparently due to a combination of exceptional circumstances, and consequently may not be maintained; it has imposed a considerable strain on the financial and commercial situation. The purchasing power of the drachma remains almost stationary and the price of imported commodities continues high; import dues, which since 1904 are payable in drachmae at the fixed rate of 1.45 to the franc, have been practically increased by more than 30%. In April 1900 a 4% loan of 43,750,000 francs for the completion of the railway from Peiraeus to the Turkish frontier, and another loan of 11,750,000 drachmae for the construction of a line from Pyrgos to Meligala, linking up the Morea railway system, were sanctioned by the Chamber; the first-named, the “Greek Railways Loan,” was taken up at 80 by the syndicate contracting for the works and was placed on the market in 1902. The service of both loans is provided by the International Commission from the surplus funds of the assigned revenues. On the 1st of January 1906 the external debt amounted to 725,939,500 francs and the internal (including the paper circulation) to 171,629,436 drachmae.
The budget estimates for 1906 were as follows: Civil list, 1,325,000 dr.; pensions, payment of deputies, &c., 7,706,676 dr.; public debt, 34,253,471 dr.; foreign affairs, 3,563,994 dr.; justice, 6,240,271 dr.; interior, 13,890,927 dr.; religion and education, 7,143,924 dr.; army, 20,618,563 dr.; navy, 7,583,369 dr.; finance, 2,362,143 dr.; collection of revenue, 10,650,487 dr.; various expenditure, 9,122,752 dr.; total, 124,461,577 dr.
The two privileged banks in Greece are the National Bank, founded in 1841; capital 20,000,000 drachmae in 20,000 shares of 1000 dr. each, fully paid up; reserve fund 13,500,000 dr.; notes in circulation (September 1906) 126,721,887 dr., of which 76,360,905 dr. on account of the government; and the Ionian Bank, incorporated in 1839; capital paid up £315,500 in 63,102 shares, of £5 each; notes in circulation, 10,200,000 drachmae, of which 3,500,000 (in fractional notes of 1 and 2 dr.) on account of the government. The notes issued by these two banks constitute the forced paper currency circulating throughout the kingdom. In the case of the Ionian Bank the privilege of issuing notes, originally limited to the Ionian Islands, will expire in 1920. The National Bank is a private institution under supervision of the government, which is represented by a royal commissioner on the board of administration; the central establishment is at Athens with forty-two branches throughout the country. The headquarters of the Ionian Bank, which is a British institution, are in London; the bank has a central office at Athens and five branches in Greece. The privileged Epiro-Thessalian Bank ceased to exist from the 4th of January 1900, when it was amalgamated with the National Bank. There are several other banking companies, as well as private banks, at Athens. The most important is the Bank of Athens (capital 40,000,000 dr.), founded in 1893; it possesses five branches in Greece and six abroad.
Greece entered the Latin Monetary Union in 1868. The monetary unit is the new drachma, equivalent to the franc, and divided into 100 lepta or centimes. There are nickel coins of 20, 10 and 5 lepta, copper coins of 10 and 5 lepta. Gold and silver coins were minted Currency, weights and measures. in Paris between 1868 and 1884, but have since practically disappeared from the country. The paper currency consists of notes for 1000 dr., 500 dr., 100 dr., 25 dr., 10 dr. and 5 dr., and of fractional notes for 2 dr. and 1 dr. The decimal system of weights and measures was adopted in 1876, but some of the old Turkish standards are still in general use. The dram = 1 oz. avoirdupois approximately; the oke = 400 drams or 2.8 ℔; the kilo = 22 okes or 0.114 of an imperial quarter; the cantar or quintal = 44 okes or 123.2 ℔. Liquids are measured by weight. The punta = 15 in.; the ruppa, 31 in.; the pik, 26 in.; the stadion = 1 kilometre or 10931 yds. The stremma (square measure) is nearly one-third of an acre.
Authorities.—W. Leake, Researches in Greece (1814), Travels in the Morea (3 vols., 1830), Travels in Northern Greece (4 vols., 1834), Peloponnesiaca (1846); Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland (2 vols., Leipzig, 1862-1873); Lolling, “Hellenische Landeskunde und Topographie” in Ivan Müller’s Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft; C. Wordsworth, Greece; Pictorial, Descriptive and Historical (new ed., revised by H. F. Tozer, London, 1882); K. Stephanos, La Grèce (Paris, 1884); C. Neumann and J. Partsch, Physikalische Geographie von Griechenland (Breslau, 1885); K. Krumbacher, Griechische Reise (Berlin, 1886); J. P. Mahaffy, Rambles and Studies in Greece (London, 1887); R. A. H. Bickford-Smith, Greece under King George (London, 1893); Ch. Diehl, Excursions archéologiques en Grèce (Paris, 1893); Perrot and Chipiez, Histoire de l’art, tome vi., “La Grèce primitive” (Paris, 1894); tome vii., “La Grèce archaïque” (Paris, 1898); A. Philippson, Griechenland und seine Stellung im Orient (Leipzig, 1897); L. Sergeant, Greece in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1897); J. G. Frazer, Pausanias’s Description of Greece (6 vols., London, 1898); Pausanias and other Greek Sketches (London, 1900); Greco-Turkish War of 1897, from official sources, by a German staff officer (Eng. trans., London, 1898); J. A. Symonds, Studies, and Sketches in Italy and Greece (3 vols., 2nd ed., London, 1898); V. Bérard, La Turquie et l’hellénisme contemporaine (Paris, 1900).
For the climate: D. Aeginetes, Τὸ κλῖμα τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Athens, 1908).
For the fauna: Th. de Heldreich, La Fauna de la Grèce (Athens, 1878).
For special topography: A. Meliarakes, Κυκλαδικὰ ἤτοι γεωγραφία καί ἱστορία τῶν Κυκλαδικῶν νήσων (Athens, 1874); Ὑπομνήματα περιγραφικὰ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων Ἄνδρου καὶ Κέω (Athens, 1880);
Γεωγραφία πολιτικὴ νέα καὶ ἀρχαία τοῦ νομοῦ Ἀργολίδος καὶ Κορινθίας (Athens,
1886); Γεωγραφία πολιτικὴ νέα καὶ ἀρχαία τοῦ νομοῦ Κεφαλληνίας
(Athens, 1890); Th. Bent, The Cyclades (London, 1885); A.
Bötticher, Olympia (2nd ed., Berlin, 1886); J. Partsch, Die Insel
Corfu: eine geographische Monographie (Gotha, 1887); Die Insel
Leukas (Gotha, 1889); Kephallenia und Ithaka (Gotha, 1890);
Die Insel Zante (Gotha, 1891); A. Philippson, Der Peloponnes.
(Versuch einer Landeskunde auf geologischer Grundlage.) (Berlin,
1892); “Thessalien und Epirus” (Reisen und Forschungen im
nördlichen Griechenland) (Berlin, 1897); Die griechischen Inseln
des ägäischen Meeres (Berlin, 1897); W. J. Woodhouse, Aetolia
(Oxford, 1897); Schultz and Barnsley, The Monastery of St Luke of
Stiris (London, 1901); M. Lamprinides, Ἡ Ναυπλία (Athens, 1898);
Monuments de l’art byzantin, publiés par le Ministère de l’Instruction,
tome i.; G. Millet, “Le Monastère de Daphni” (Paris, 1900). For
the life, customs and habits of the modern Greeks: C. Wachsmuth,
Das alte Griechenland im neuen (Bonn, 1864); C. K. Tuckerman,
The Greeks of to-day (London, 1873); B. Schmidt, Volksleben der
Neugriechen und das hellenische Altertum (Leipzig, 1871); Estournelle
de Constant, La Vie de province en Grèce (Paris, 1878); E.
About, La Grèce contemporaine (Paris, 1855; 8th ed., 1883); J. T.
Bent, Modern Life and Thought among the Greeks (London, 1891);
J. Rennell Rodd, The Customs and Lore of Modern Greece (London,
1892). Guide-books, Baedeker’s Greece (3rd ed., Leipzig, 1905);
Murray’s Handbook for Greece (7th ed., London, 1905); Macmillan’s
Guide to the Eastern Mediterranean (London, 1901). (J. D. B.)
a. Ancient; to 146 B.C.
1. Introductory.—It is necessary to indicate at the outset the scope and object of the present article. The reader must not expect to find in it a compendious summary of the chief events in the history of ancient Greece. It is not intended to supply an “Outlines of Greek History.” It may be questioned whether such a sketch of the history, within the limits of space which are necessarily imposed in a work of reference, would be of utility to any class of readers. At any rate, the plan of the present work, in which the subject of Greek history is treated of in a large number of separate articles, allows of the narrative of events being given in a more satisfactory form under the more general of the headings (e.g. Athens, Sparta, Peloponnesian War). The character of the history itself suggests a further reason why a general article upon Greek history should not be confined to, or even attempt, a narrative of events. A sketch of Greek history is not possible in the sense in which a sketch of Roman history, or even of English history, is possible. Greek history is not the history of a single state. When Aristotle composed his work upon the constitutions of the Greek states, he found it necessary to extend his survey to no less that 158 states. Greek history is thus concerned with more than 150 separate and independent political communities. Nor is it even the history of a single country. The area occupied by the Greek race extended from the Pyrenees to the Caucasus, and from southern Russia to northern Africa. It is inevitable, therefore, that the impression conveyed by a sketch of Greek history should be a misleading one. A mere narrative can hardly fail to give a false perspective. Experience shows that such a sketch is apt to resolve itself into the history of a few great movements and of a few leading states. What is still worse, it is apt to confine itself, at any rate for the greater part of the period dealt with, to the history of Greece in the narrower sense, i.e. of the Greek peninsula. For the identification of Greece with Greece proper there may be some degree of excuse when we come to the 5th and 4th centuries. In the period that lies behind the year 500 B.C. Greece proper forms but a small part of the Greek world. In the 7th and 6th centuries it is outside Greece itself that we must look for the most active life of the Greek people and the most brilliant manifestations of the Greek spirit. The present article, therefore, will be concerned with the causes and conditions of events, rather than with the events themselves; it will attempt analysis rather than narrative. Its object will be to indicate problems and to criticize views; to suggest lessons and parallels, and to estimate the importance of the Hellenic factor in the development of civilization.
2. The Minoan and Mycenaean Ages.—When does Greek history begin? Whatever may be the answer that is given to this question, it will be widely different from any that could have been proposed a generation ago. Then the question was, How late does Greek history begin? To-day the question is, How early does it begin? The suggestion made by Grote that the first Olympiad (776 B.C.) should be taken as the starting-point of the history of Greece, in the proper sense of the term “history,” seemed likely, not so many years ago, to win general acceptance. At the present moment the tendency would seem to be to go back as far as the 3rd or 4th millennium B.C. in order to reach a starting-point. It is to the results of archaeological research during the last thirty years that we must attribute so startling a change in the attitude of historical science towards this problem. In the days when Grote published the first volumes of his History of Greece archaeology was in its infancy. Its results, so far as they affected the earlier periods of Greek history, were scanty; its methods were unscientific. The methods have been gradually perfected by numerous workers in the field; but the results, which have so profoundly modified our conceptions of the early history of the Aegean area, are principally due to the discoveries of two men, Heinrich Schliemann and A. J. Evans. A full account of these discoveries will be found elsewhere (see Aegean Civilization and Crete). It will be sufficient to mention here that Schliemann’s labours began with the excavations on the site of Troy in the years 1870-1873; that he passed on to the excavations at Mycenae in 1876 and to those at Tiryns in 1884. It was the discoveries of these years that revealed to us the Mycenaean age, and carried back the history to the middle of the 2nd millennium. The discoveries of Dr A. J. Evans in the island of Crete belong to a later period. The work of excavation was begun in 1900, and was carried on in subsequent years. It has revealed to us the Minoan age, and enabled us to trace back the development and origins of the civilization for a further period of 1000 or 1500 years. The dates assigned by archaeologists to the different periods of Mycenaean and Minoan art must be regarded as merely approximate. Even the relation of the two civilizations is still, to some extent, a matter of conjecture. The general chronological scheme, however, in the sense of the relative order of the various periods and the approximate intervals between them, is too firmly established, both by internal evidence, such as the development of the styles of pottery, and of the art in general, and by external evidence, such as the points of contact with Egyptian art and history, to admit of its being any longer seriously called in question.
If, then, by “Greek history” is to be understood the history of the lands occupied in later times by the Greek race (i.e. the Greek peninsula and the Aegean basin), the beginnings of the history must be carried back some 2000 years before Grote’s proposed starting-point. If, however, “Greek history” is taken to mean the history of the Greek people, the determination of the starting-point is far from easy. For the question to which archaeology does not as yet supply any certain answer is the question of race. Were the creators of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilization Greeks or were they not? In some degree the Minoan evidence has modified the answer suggested by the Mycenaean. Although wide differences of opinion as to the origin of the Mycenaean civilization existed among scholars when the results of Schliemann’s labours were first given to the world, a general agreement had gradually been arrived at in favour of the view which would identify Mycenaean with Achaean or Homeric. In presence of the Cretan evidence it is no longer possible to maintain this view with the same confidence. The two chief difficulties in the way of attributing either the Minoan or the Mycenaean civilization to an Hellenic people are connected respectively with the script and the religion. The excavations at Cnossus have yielded thousands of tablets written in the linear script. There is evidence that this script was in use among the Mycenaeans as well. If Greek was the language spoken at Cnossus and Mycenae, how is it that all attempts to decipher the script have hitherto failed? The Cretan excavations, again, have taught us a great deal as to the religion of the Minoan age; they have, at the same time, thrown a new light upon the evidence supplied by Mycenaean sites. It is no longer possible to ignore the contrast between the cults of the Minoan and Mycenaean ages, and the religious conceptions which they imply, and the cults and religious conceptions prevalent in the historical period. On the other hand, it may safely be asserted that the argument derived from the Mycenaean art, in which we seem to trace a freedom of treatment which is akin to the spirit of the later Greek art, and is in complete contrast to the spirit of Oriental art, has received striking confirmation from the remains of Minoan art. The decipherment of the script would at once solve the problem. We should at least know whether the dominant race in Crete in the Minoan age spoke an Hellenic or a non-Hellenic dialect. And what could be inferred with regard to Crete in the Minoan age could almost certainly be inferred with regard to the mainland in the Mycenaean age. In the meanwhile, possibly until the tablets are read, at any rate until further evidence is forthcoming, any answer that can be given to the question must necessarily be tentative and provisional. (See Aegean Civilization.)
It has already been implied that this period of the history of Greece may be subdivided into a Minoan and a Mycenaean age. Whether these terms are appropriate is a question of comparatively little importance. They at least serve to remind us of the part played by the discoveries at Mycenae and Cnossus in the reconstruction of the history. The term “Mycenaean,” it is true, has other associations than those of locality. It may seem to imply that the civilization disclosed in the excavations at Mycenae is Achaean in character, and that it is to be connected with the Pelopid dynasty to which Agamemnon belonged. In its scientific use, the term must be cleared of all such associations. Further, as opposed to “Minoan” it must be understood in a more definite sense than that in which it has often been employed. It has come to be generally recognized that two different periods are to be distinguished in Schliemann’s discoveries at Mycenae itself. There is an earlier period, to which belong the objects found in the shaft-graves, and there is a later period, to which belong the beehive tombs and the remains of the palaces. It is the latter period which is “Mycenaean” in the strict sense; i.e. it is “Mycenaean” as opposed to “Minoan.” To this period belong also the palace at Tiryns, the beehive-tombs discovered elsewhere on the mainland of Greece and one of the cities on the site of Troy (Schliemann’s sixth). The pottery of this period is as characteristic of it, both in its forms (e.g. the “stirrup” or “false-necked” form of vase) and in its peculiar glaze, as is the architecture of the palaces and the beehive-tombs. Although the chief remains have been found on the mainland of Greece itself, the art of this period is found to have extended as far north as Troy and as far east as Cyprus. On the other hand, hardly any traces of it have been discovered on the west coast of Asia Minor, south of the Troad. The Mycenaean age, in this sense, may be regarded as extending from 1600 to 1200 B.C. The Minoan age is of far wider extent. Its latest period includes both the earlier and the later periods of the remains found at Mycenae. This is the period called by Dr Evans “Late Minoan.” To this period belong the Great Palace at Cnossus and the linear system of writing. The “Middle Minoan” period, to which the earlier palace belongs, is characterized by the pictographic system of writing and by polychrome pottery of a peculiarly beautiful kind. Dr Evans proposes to carry back this period as far as 2500 B.C. Even behind it there are traces of a still earlier civilization. Thus the Minoan age, even if limited to the middle and later periods, will cover at least a thousand years. Perhaps the most surprising result of the excavations in Crete is the discovery that Minoan art is on a higher level than Mycenaean art. To the scholars of a generation ago it seemed a thing incredible that the art of the shaft-graves, and the architecture of the beehive-tombs and the palaces, could belong to the age before the Dorian invasion. The most recent discoveries seem to indicate that the art of Mycenae is a decadent art; they certainly prove that an art, hardly inferior in its way to the art of the classical period, and a civilization which implies the command of great material resources, were flourishing in the Aegean perhaps a thousand years before the siege of Troy.
To the question, “What is the origin of this civilization? Is it of foreign derivation or of native growth?” it is not possible to give a direct answer. It is clear, on the one hand that it was developed, by a gradual process of Oriental influence. differentiation, from a culture which was common to the whole Aegean basin and extended as far to the west as Sicily. It is equally clear, on the other hand, that foreign influences contributed largely to the process of development. Egyptian influences, in particular, can be traced throughout the “Minoan” and “Mycenaean” periods. The developed art, however, both in Crete and on the mainland, displays characteristics which are the very opposite of those which are commonly associated with the term “oriental.” Egyptian work, even of the best period, is stiff and conventional; in the best Cretan work, and, in a less degree, in Mycenaean work, we find an originality and a freedom of treatment which remind one of the spirit of the Greek artists. The civilization is, in many respects, of an advanced type. The Cretan architects could design on a grand scale, and could carry out their designs with no small degree of mechanical skill. At Cnossus we find a system of drainage in use, which is far in advance of anything known in the modern world before the 19th century. If the art of the Minoan age falls short of the art of the Periclean age, it is hardly inferior to that of the age of Peisistratus. It is a civilization, too, which has long been familiar with the art of writing. But it is one that belongs entirely to the Bronze Age. Iron is not found until the very end of the Mycenaean period, and then only in small quantities. Nor is this the only point of contrast between the culture of the earliest age and that of the historical period in Greece. The chief seats of the early culture are to be found either in the island of Crete, or, on the mainland, at Tiryns and Mycenae. In the later history Crete plays no part, and Tiryns and Mycenae are obscure. With the great names of a later age, Argos, Sparta and Athens, no great discoveries are connected. In northern Greece, Orchomenos rather than Thebes is the centre of influence. Further points of contrast readily suggest themselves. The so-called Phoenician alphabet, in use amongst the later Greeks, is unknown in the earliest age. Its systems of writing, both the earlier and the later one, are syllabic in character, and analogous to those in vogue in Asia Minor and Cyprus. In the art of war, the chariot is of more importance than the foot-soldier, and the latter, unlike the Greek hoplite, is lightly clad, and trusts to a shield large enough to cover the whole body, rather than to the metal helmet, breastplate and greaves of later times (see Arms and Armour: Greek). The political system appears to have been a despotic monarchy, and the realm of the monarch to have extended to far wider limits than those of the “city-states” of historical Greece. It is, perhaps, in the religious practices of the age, and in the ideas implied in them, that the contrast is most apparent. Neither in Crete nor on the mainland is there any trace of the worship of the “Olympian” deities. The cults in vogue remind us rather of Asia than of Greece. The worship of pillars and of trees carries us back to Canaan, while the double-headed axe, so prominent in the ritual of Cnossus, survives in later times as the symbol of the national deity of the Carians. The beehive-tombs, found on many sites on the mainland besides Mycenae, are evidence both of a method of sepulture and of ideas of the future state, which are alien to the practice and the thought of the Greeks of history. It is only in one region—in the island of Cyprus—that the culture of the Mycenaean age is found surviving into the historical period. As late as the beginning of the 5th century B.C. Cyprus is still ruled by kings, the alphabet has not yet displaced a syllabary, the characteristic forms of Mycenaean vases still linger on, and the chief deity of the island is the goddess with attendant doves whose images are among the common objects of Mycenaean finds.
3. The Homeric Age.—Alike in Crete and on the mainland the civilization disclosed by excavation comes abruptly to an end. In Crete we can trace it back from c. 1200 B.C. to the Neolithic period. From the Stone Age to the end of the Minoan Age the development is continuous and uninterrupted. But between the culture of the Early Age and the culture of the Dorians, who occupied the island in historical times, no connexion whatever can be established. Between the two there is a great gulf fixed. It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast than that presented by the rude life of the Dorian communities in Crete when it is compared with the political power, the material resources and the extensive commerce of the earlier period. The same gap between the archaeological age and the historical exists on the mainland also. It is true that the solution of continuity is here less complete. Mycenaean art continues, here and there, in a debased form down to the 9th century, a date to which we can trace back the beginnings of the later Greek art. On one or two lines (e.g. architecture) it is even possible to establish some sort of connexion between them. But Greek art as a whole cannot be evolved from Mycenaean art. We cannot bridge over the interval that separates the latter art, even in its decline, from the former. It is sufficient to compare the “dipylon” ware (with which the process of development begins, which culminates in the pottery of the Great Age) with the Mycenaean vases, to satisfy oneself that the gulf exists. What then is the relation of the Heroic or Homeric Age (i.e. the age whose life is portrayed for us in the poems of Homer) to the Earliest Age? It too presents many contrasts to the later periods. On the other hand, it presents contrasts to the Minoan Age, which, in their way, are not less striking. Is it then to be identified with the Mycenaean Age? Schliemann, the discoverer of the Mycenaean culture, unhesitatingly identified Mycenaean with Homeric. He even identified the shaft-graves of Mycenae with the tombs of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. Later inquirers, while refusing to discover so literal a correspondence between things Homeric and things Mycenaean, have not hesitated to accept a general correspondence between the Homeric Age and the Mycenaean. Where it is a case of comparing literary evidence with archaeological, an exact coincidence is not of course to be demanded. The most that can be asked is that a general correspondence should be established. It may be conceded that the case for such a correspondence appears prima facie a strong one. There is much in Homer that seems to find confirmation or explanation in Schliemann’s finds. Mycenae is Agamemnon’s city; the plan of the Homeric house agrees fairly well with the palaces at Tiryns and Mycenae; the forms and the technique of Mycenaean art serve to illustrate passages in the poems; such are only a few of the arguments that have been urged. It is the great merit of Professor Ridgeway’s work (The Early Age of Greece) that it has demonstrated, once and for all, that Mycenaean is not Homeric pure and simple. He insists upon differences as great as the resemblances. Iron is in common use in Homer; it is practically unknown to the Mycenaeans. In place of the round shield and the metal armour of the Homeric soldier, we find at Mycenae that the warrior is lightly clad in linen, and that he fights behind an oblong shield, which covers the whole body; nor are the chariots the same in form. The Homeric dead are cremated; the Mycenaean are buried. The gods of Homer are the deities of Olympus, of whose cult no traces are to be found in the Mycenaean Age. The novelty of Professor Ridgeway’s theory is that for the accepted equation, Homeric = Achaean = Mycenaean, he proposes to substitute the equations, Homeric = Achaean = post-Mycenaean, and Mycenaean = pre-Achaean = Pelasgian. The Mycenaean civilization he attributes to the Pelasgians, whom he regards as the indigenous population of Greece, the ancestors of the later Greeks, and themselves Greek both in speech and blood. The Homeric heroes are Achaeans, a fair-haired Celtic race, whose home was in the Danube valley, where they had learned the use of iron. In Greece they are newcomers, a conquering class comparable to the Norman invaders of England or Ireland, and like them they have acquired the language of their subjects in the course of a few generations. The Homeric civilization is thus Achaean, i.e. it is Pelasgian (Mycenaean) civilization, appropriated by a ruder race; but the Homeric culture is far inferior to the Mycenaean. Here, at any rate, the Norman analogy breaks down. Norman art in England is far in advance of Saxon. Even in Normandy (as in Sicily), where the Norman appropriated rather than introduced, he not only assimilated but developed. In Greece the process must have been reversed.
The theory thus outlined is probably stronger on its destructive side than on its constructive. To treat the Achaeans as an immigrant race is to run counter to the tradition of the Greeks themselves, by whom the Achaeans were regarded as indigenous (cf. Herod. viii. 73). Nor is the Pelasgian part of the theory easy to reconcile with the Homeric evidence. If the Achaeans were a conquering class ruling over a Pelasgian population, we should expect to find this difference of race a prominent feature in Homeric society. We should, at least, expect to find a Pelasgian background to the Homeric picture. As a matter of fact, we find nothing of the sort. There is no consciousness in the Homeric poems of a distinction of race between the governing and the subject classes. There are, indeed, Pelasgians in Homer, but the references either to the people or the name are extraordinarily few. They appear as a people, presumably in Asia Minor, in alliance with the Trojans; they appear also, in a single passage, as one of the tribes inhabiting Crete. The name survives in “Pelasgicon Argos,” which is probably to be identified with the valley of the Spercheius, and as an epithet of Zeus of Dodona. The population, however, of Pelasgicon Argos and of Dodona is no longer Pelasgian. Thus, in the age of Homer, the Pelasgians belong, so far as Greece proper is concerned, to a past that is already remote. It is inadmissible to appeal to Herodotus against Homer. For the conditions of the Homeric age Homer is the sole authoritative witness. If, however, Professor Ridgeway has failed to prove that “Mycenaean” equals “Pelasgian,” he has certainly proved that much that is Homeric is post-Mycenaean. It is possible that different strata are to be distinguished in the Homeric poems. There are passages which seem to assume the conditions of the Mycenaean age; there are others which presuppose the conditions of a later age. It may be that the latter passages reflect the circumstances of the poet’s own times, while the former ones reproduce those of an earlier period. If so, the substitution of iron for bronze must have been effected in the interval between the earlier and the later periods.
It has already been pointed out that the question whether the makers of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations were Greeks must still be regarded as an open one. No such question can be raised as to the Homeric Age. The Homeric state. The Achaeans may or may not have been Greek in blood. What is certain is that the Achaean Age forms an integral part of Greek history. Alike on the linguistic, the religious and the political sides, Homer is the starting-point of subsequent developments. In the Greek dialects the great distinction is that between the Doric and the rest. Of the non-Doric dialects the two main groups are the Aeolic and Ionic, both of which have been developed, by a gradual process of differentiation, from the language of the Homeric poems. With regard to religion it is sufficient to refer to the judgment of Herodotus, that it was Homer and Hesiod who were the authors of the Greek theogony (ii. 53 οὗτοί εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἔλλησι). It is a commonplace that Homer was the Bible of the Greeks. On the political side, Greek constitutional development would be unintelligible without Homer. When Greek history, in the proper sense, begins, oligarchy is almost universal. Everywhere, however, an antecedent stage of monarchy has to be presupposed. In the Homeric system monarchy is the sole form of government; but it is monarchy already well on the way to being transformed into oligarchy. In the person of the king are united the functions of priest, of judge and of leader in war. He belongs to a family which claims divine descent and his office is hereditary. He is, however, no despotic monarch. He is compelled by custom to consult the council (boulē) of the elders, or chiefs. He must ask their opinion, and, if he fails to obtain their consent, he has no power to enforce his will. Even when he has obtained the consent of the council, the proposal still awaits the approval of the assembly (agora), of the people.
Thus in the Homeric state we find the germs not only of the oligarchy and democracy of later Greece, but also of all the various forms of constitution known to the Western world. And a monarchy such as is depicted in the Homeric society. Homeric poems is clearly ripe for transmutation into oligarchy. The chiefs are addressed as kings (βασιλῆες), and claim, equally with the monarch, descent from the gods. In Homer, again, we can trace the later organization into tribe (φυλή), clan (γένος), and phratry, which is characteristic of Greek society in the historical period, and meets us in analogous forms in other Aryan societies. The γένος corresponds to the Roman gens, the φυλή to the Roman tribe, and the phratry to the curia. The importance of the phratry in Homeric society is illustrated by the well-known passage (Iliad ix. 63) in which the outcast is described as “one who belongs to no phratry” (ἀφρήτωρ). It is a society that is, of course, based upon slavery, but it is slavery in its least repulsive aspect. The treatment which Eumaeus and Eurycleia receive at the hands of the poet of the Odyssey is highly creditable to the humanity of the age. A society which regarded the slave as a mere chattel would have been impatient of the interest shown in a swineherd and a nurse. It is a society, too, that exhibits many of the distinguishing traits of later Greek life. Feasting and quarrels, it is true, are of more moment to the heroes than to the contemporaries of Pericles or Plato; but “music” and “gymnastic” (though the terms must be understood in a more restricted sense) are as distinctive of the age of Homer as of that of Pindar. In one respect there is retrogression in the historical period. Woman in Homeric society enjoys a greater freedom, and receives greater respect, than in the Athens of Sophocles and Pericles.
4. The Growth of the Greek States.—The Greek world at the beginning of the 6th century B.C. presents a picture in many respects different from that of the Homeric Age. The Greek race is no longer confined to the Greek peninsula. It occupies the islands of the Aegean, the western seaboard of Asia Minor, the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace, of southern Italy and Sicily. Scattered settlements are found as far apart as the mouth of the Rhone, the north of Africa, the Crimea and the eastern end of the Black Sea. The Greeks are called by a national name, Hellenes, the symbol of a fully-developed national self-consciousness. They are divided into three great branches, the Dorian, the Ionian and the Aeolian, names almost, or entirely, unknown to Homer. The heroic monarchy has nearly everywhere disappeared. In Greece proper, south of Thermopylae, it survives, but in a peculiar form, in the Spartan state alone. What is the significance and the explanation of contrasts so profound?
It is probable that the explanation is to be found, directly or indirectly, in a single cause, the Dorian invasion. In Homer the Dorians are mentioned in one passage only (Odyssey xix. 177). They there appear as one of the races which Dorian invasion. inhabit Crete. In the historical period the whole Peloponnese, with the exception of Arcadia, Elis and Achaea, is Dorian. In northern Greece the Dorians occupy the little state of Doris, and in the Aegean they form the population of Crete, Rhodes and some smaller islands. Thus the chief centres of Minoan and Mycenaean culture have passed into Dorian hands, and the chief seats of Achaean power are included in Dorian states. Greek tradition explained the overthrow of the Achaean system by an invasion of the Peloponnese by the Dorians, a northern tribe, which had found a temporary home in Doris. The story ran that, after an unsuccessful attempt to force an entrance by the Isthmus of Corinth, they had crossed from Naupactus, at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, landed on the opposite shore, and made their way into the heart of the Peloponnese, where a single victory gave them possession of the Achaean states. Their conquests were divided among the invaders into three shares, for which lots were cast, and thus the three states of Argos, Sparta and Messenia were created. There is much in this tradition that is impossible or improbable. It is impossible, e.g. for the tiny state of Doris, with its three or four “small, sad villages” (πολεις μικραὶ καὶ λυπρόχωροι, Strabo, p. 427), to have furnished a force of invaders sufficient to conquer and re-people the greater part of the Peloponnese. It is improbable that the conquest should have been either as sudden, or as complete, as the legend represents. On the contrary, there are indications that the conquest was gradual, and that the displacement of the older population was incomplete. The improbability of the details affords, however, no ground for questioning the reality of the invasion. The tradition can be traced back at Sparta to the 7th century B.C. (Tyrtaeus, quoted by Strabo, p. 362), and there is abundant evidence, other than that of legend, to corroborate it. There is the Dorian name, to begin with. If, as Beloch supposes, it originated on the coast of Asia Minor, where it served to distinguish the settlers in Rhodes and the neighbouring islands from the Ionians and Aeolians to the north of them, how came the great and famous states of the Peloponnese to adopt a name in use among the petty colonies planted by their kinsmen across the sea? Or, if Dorian is simply Old Peloponnesian, how are we to account for the Doric dialect or the Dorian pride of race?
It is true that there are great differences between the literary Doric, the dialect of Corinth and Argos, and the dialects of Laconia and Crete, and that there are affinities between the dialect of Laconia and the non-Dorian dialects of Arcadia and Elis. It is equally true, however, and of far more consequence, that all the Doric dialects are distinguished from all other Greek dialects by certain common characteristics. Perhaps the strongest sentiment in the Dorian nature is the pride of race. Indeed, it looks as if the Dorians claimed to be the sole genuine Hellenes. How can we account for an indigenous population, first imagining itself to be immigrant, and then developing a contempt for the rest of the race, equally indigenous with itself, on account of a fictitious difference in origin? Finally, there is the archaeological evidence. The older civilization comes to an abrupt end, and it does so, on the mainland at least, at the very period to which tradition assigns the Dorian migration. Its development is greatest, and its overthrow most complete, precisely in the regions occupied by the Dorians and the other tribes, whose migrations were traditionally connected with theirs. It is hardly too much to say that the archaeologist would have been compelled to postulate an inroad into central and southern Greece of tribes from the north, at a lower level of culture, in the course of the 12th and 11th centuries B.C., if the historian had not been able to direct him to the traditions of the great migrations (μεταναστάσεις), of which the Dorian invasion was the chief. With the Dorian migration Greek tradition connected the expansion of the Greek race eastwards across the Aegean. In the historical period the Greek settlements on the western coast of Asia Minor fall into three clearly defined groups. To the north is the Aeolic group, consisting of the island of Lesbos and twelve towns, mostly insignificant, on the opposite mainland. To the south is the Dorian hexapolis, consisting of Cnidus and Halicarnassus on the mainland, and the islands of Rhodes and Cos. In the centre comes the Ionian dodecapolis, a group consisting of ten towns on the mainland, together with the islands of Samos and Chios. Of these three groups, the Ionian is incomparably the most important. The Ionians also occupy Euboea and the Cyclades. Although it would appear that Cyprus (and possibly Pamphylia) had been occupied by settlers from Greece in the Mycenaean age, Greek tradition is probably correct in putting the colonization of Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean after the Dorian migration. Both the Homeric and the archaeological evidence seem to point to the same conclusion. Between Rhodes on the south and the Troad on the north scarcely any Mycenaean remains have been found. Homer is ignorant of any Greeks east of Euboea. If the poems are earlier than the Dorian Invasion, his silence is conclusive. If the poems are some centuries later than the Invasion, they at least prove that, within a few generations of that event, it was the belief of the Greeks of Asia Minor that their ancestors had crossed the seas after the close of the Heroic Age. It is probable, too, that the names Ionian and Aeolian, the former of which is found once in Homer, and the latter not at all, originated among the colonists in Asia Minor, and served to designate, in the first instance, the members of the Ionic and Aeolic dodecapoleis. As Curtius pointed out, the only Ionia known to history is in Asia Minor. It does not follow that Ionia is the original home of the Ionian race, as Curtius argued. It almost certainly follows, however, that it is the original home of the Ionian name.
It is less easy to account for the name Hellenes. The Greeks were profoundly conscious of their common nationality, and of the gulf that separated them from the rest of mankind. They themselves recognized a common race and language, and a common type of religion and culture, as the chief factors in this sentiment of nationality (see Herod. viii. 144 Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα). “Hellenes” was the name of their common race, and “Hellas” of their common country. In Homer there is no distinct consciousness of a common nationality, and consequently no antithesis of Greek and Barbarian (see Thuc. i. 3). Nor is there a true collective name. There are indeed Hellenes (though the name occurs in one passage only, Iliad ii. 684), and there is a Hellas; but his Hellas, whatever its precise signification may be, is, at any rate, not equivalent either to Greece proper or to the land of the Greeks, and his Hellenes are the inhabitants of a small district to the south of Thessaly. It is possible that the diffusion of the Hellenic name was due to the Dorian invaders. Its use can be traced back to the first half of the 7th century. Not less obscure are the causes of the fall of monarchy. It cannot have been the immediate effect of the Dorian conquest, for the states founded by the Dorians were at first monarchically governed. It may, however, have been an indirect effect of it. We have already seen that the power of the Government. Homeric king is more limited than that of the rulers of Cnossus, Tiryns or Mycenae. In other words, monarchy is already in decay at the epoch of the Invasion. The Invasion, in its effects on wealth, commerce and civilization, is almost comparable to the irruption of the barbarians into the Roman empire. The monarch of the Minoan and Mycenaean age has extensive revenues at his command; the monarch of the early Dorian states is little better than a petty chief. Thus the interval, once a wide one, that separates him from the nobles tends to disappear. The decay of monarchy was gradual; much more gradual than is generally recognized. There were parts of the Greek world in which it still survived in the 6th century, e.g. Sparta, Cyrene, Cyprus, and possibly Argos and Tarentum. Both Herodotus and Thucydides apply the title “king” (βασιλεύς) to the rulers of Thessaly in the 5th century. The date at which monarchy gave place to a republican form of government must have differed, and differed widely, in different cases. The traditions relating to the foundation of Cyrene assume the existence of monarchy in Thera and in Crete in the middle of the 7th century (Herodotus iv. 150 and 154), and the reign of Amphicrates at Samos (Herod, iii. 59) can hardly be placed more than a generation earlier. In view of our general ignorance of the history of the 7th and 8th centuries, it is hazardous to pronounce these instances exceptional. On the other hand, the change from monarchy to oligarchy was completed at Athens before the end of the 8th century, and at a still earlier date in some of the other states. The process, again, by which the change was effected was, in all probability, less uniform than is generally assumed. There are extremely few cases in which we have any trustworthy evidence, and the instances about which we are informed refuse to be reduced to any common type. In Greece proper our information is fullest in the case of Athens and Argos. In the former case, the king is gradually stripped of his powers by a process of devolution. An hereditary king, ruling for life, is replaced by three annual and elective magistrates, between whom are divided the executive, military and religious functions of the monarch (see Archon). At Argos the fall of the monarchy is preceded by an aggrandisement of the royal prerogatives. There is nothing in common between these two cases, and there is no reason to suppose that the process elsewhere was analogous to that at Athens. Everywhere, however, oligarchy is the form of government which succeeds to monarchy. Political power is monopolized by a class of nobles, whose claim to govern is based upon birth and the possession of land, the most valuable form of property in an early society. Sometimes power is confined to a single clan (e.g. the Bacchiadae at Corinth); more commonly, as at Athens, all houses that are noble are equally privileged. In every case there is found, as the adviser of the executive, a Boulē, or council, representative of the privileged class. Without such a council a Greek oligarchy is inconceivable. The relations of the executive to the council doubtless varied. At Athens it is clear that the real authority was exercised by the archons; in many states the magistrates were probably subordinate to the council (cf. the relation of the consuls to the senate at Rome). And it is clear that the way in which the oligarchies used their power varied also. The cases in which the power was abused are naturally the ones of which we hear; for an abuse of power gave rise to discontent and was the ultimate cause of revolution. We hear little or nothing of the cases in which power was exercised wisely. Happy is the constitution which has no annals! We know, however, that oligarchy held its ground for generations, or even for centuries, in a large proportion of the Greek states; and a government which, like the oligarchies of Elis, Thebes or Aegina, could maintain itself for three or four centuries cannot have been merely oppressive.
The period of the transition from monarchy to oligarchy is the period in which commerce begins to develop, and trade-routes to be organized. Greece had been the centre of an active trade in the Minoan and Mycenaean epochs. Trade. The products of Crete and of the Peloponnese had found their way to Egypt and Asia Minor. The overthrow of the older civilization put an end to commerce. The seas became insecure and intercourse with the East was interrupted. Our earliest glimpses of the Aegean after the period of the migrations disclose the raids of the pirate and the activity of the Phoenician trader. It is not till the 8th century has dawned that trade begins to revive, and the Phoenician has to retire before his Greek competitor. For some time to come, however, no clear distinction is drawn between the trader and the pirate. The pioneers of Greek trade in the West are the pirates of Cumae (Thucyd. vi. 4). The expansion of Greek commerce, unlike that of the commerce of the modern world, was not connected with any great scientific discoveries. There is nothing in the history of ancient navigation that is analogous to the invention of the mariner’s compass or of the steam-engine. In spite of this, the development of Greek commerce in the 7th and 6th centuries was rapid. It must have been assisted by the great discovery of the early part of the former century, the invention of coined money. To the Lydians, rather than the Greeks, belongs the credit of the discovery; but it was the genius of the latter race that divined the importance of the invention and spread its use. The coinage of the Ionian towns goes back to the reign of Gyges (c. 675 B.C.). And it is in Ionia that commercial development is earliest and greatest. In the most distant regions the Ionian is first in the field. Egypt and the Black Sea are both opened up to Greek trade by Miletus, the Adriatic and the Western Mediterranean by Phocaea and Samos. It is significant that of the twelve states engaged in the Egyptian trade in the 6th century all, with the exception of Aegina, are from the eastern side of the Aegean (Herod. ii. 178). On the western side the chief centres of trade during these centuries were the islands of Euboea and Aegina and the town of Corinth. The Aeginetan are the earliest coins of Greece proper (c. 650 B.C.); and the two rival scales of weights and measures, in use amongst the Greeks of every age, are the Aeginetan and the Euboic. Commerce naturally gave rise to commercial leagues, and commercial relations tended to bring about political alliances. Foreign policy even at this early epoch seems to have been largely determined by considerations of commerce. Two leagues, the members of which were connected by political as well as commercial ties, can be recognized. At the head of each stood one of the two rival powers in the island of Euboea, Chalcis and Eretria. Their primary object was doubtless protection from the pirate and the foreigner. Competing routes were organized at an early date under their influence, and their trading connexions can be traced from the heart of Asia Minor to the north of Italy. Miletus, Sybaris and Etruria were members of the Eretrian league; Samos, Corinth, Rhegium and Zancle (commanding the Straits of Messina), and Cumae, on the Bay of Naples, of the Chalcidian. The wool of the Phrygian uplands, woven in the looms of Miletus, reached the Etruscan markets by way of Sybaris; through Cumae, Rome and the rest of Latium obtained the elements of Greek culture. Greek trade, however, was confined to the Mediterranean area. The Phoenician and the Carthaginian navigators penetrated to Britain; they discovered the passage round the Cape two thousand years before Vasco da Gama’s time. The Greek sailor dared not adventure himself outside the Black Sea, the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Greek trade, too, was essentially maritime. Ports visited by Greek vessels were often the starting points of trade-routes into the interior; the traffic along those routes was left in the hands of the natives (see e.g. Herod. iv. 24). One service, the importance of which can hardly be overestimated, was rendered to civilization by the Greek traders—the invention of geography. The science of geography is the invention of the Greeks. The first maps were made by them (in the 6th century); and it was the discoveries and surveys of their sailors that made map-making possible.
Closely connected with the history of Greek trade is the history of Greek colonization. The period of colonization, in its narrower sense, extends from the middle of the 8th to the middle of the 6th century. Greek colonization Colonization. is, however, merely a continuation of the process which at an earlier epoch had led to the settlement, first of Cyprus, and then of the islands and coasts of the Aegean. From the earlier settlements the colonization of the historical period is distinguished by three characteristics. The later colony acknowledges a definite metropolis (“mother-city”); it is planted by a definite oecist (οἰκιστής); it has a definite date assigned to its foundation. It would be a mistake to regard Greek colonization as commercial in origin, in the sense that the colonies were in all cases established as trading-posts. This was the case with the Phoenician and Carthaginian settlements, most of which remained mere factories; and some of the Greek colonies (e.g. many of those planted by Miletus on the shores of the Black Sea) bore this character. The typical Greek colony, however, was neither in origin nor in development a mere trading-post. It was, or it became, a polis, a city-state, in which was reproduced the life of the parent state. Nor was Greek colonization, like the emigration from Europe to America and Australia in the 19th century, simply the result of over-population. The causes were as various as those which can be traced in the history of modern colonization. Those which were established for the purposes of trade may be compared to the factories of the Portuguese and Dutch in Africa and the Far East. Others were the result of political discontent, in some form or shape; these may be compared to the Puritan settlements in New England. Others again were due to ambition or the mere love of adventure (see Herod. v. 42 ff., the career of Dorieus). But however various the causes, two conditions must always be presupposed—an expansion of commerce and a growth of population. Within the narrow limits of the city-state there was a constant tendency for population to become redundant, until, as in the later centuries of Greek life, its growth was artificially restricted. Alike from the Roman colonies, and from those founded by the European nations in the course of the last few centuries, the Greek colonies are distinguished by a fundamental contrast. It is significant that the contrast is a political one. The Roman colony was in a position of entire subordination to the Roman state, of which it formed a part. The modern colony was, in varying degrees, in political subjection to the home government. The Greek colony was completely independent; and it was independent from the first. The ties that united a colony to its metropolis were those of sentiment and interest; the political tie did not exist. There were, it is true, exceptions. The colonies established by imperial Athens closely resembled the colonies of imperial Rome. The cleruchy (q.v.) formed part of the Athenian state; the cleruchs kept their status as citizens of Athens and acted as a military garrison. And if the political tie, in the proper sense, was wanting, it was inevitable that political relations should spring out of commercial or sentimental ones. Thus we find Corinth interfering twice to save her colony Syracuse from destruction, and Megara bringing about the revolt of Byzantium, her colony, from Athens. Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish political relations from a political tie (e.g. the relations of Corinth, both in the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, to Ambracia and the neighbouring group of colonies). When we compare the development of the Greek and the modern colonies we shall find that the development of the former was even more rapid than that of the latter. In at least three respects the Greek settler was at an advantage as compared with the colonist of modern times. The differences of race, of colour and of climate, with which the chief problems of modern colonization are connected, played no part in the history of the Greek settlements. The races amongst whom the Greeks planted themselves were in some cases on a similar level of culture. Where the natives were still backward or barbarous, they came of a stock either closely related to the Greek, or at least separated from it by no great physical differences. We need only contrast the Carian, the Sicel, the Thracian or even the Scythian, with the native Australian, the Hottentot, the Red Indian or the Maori, to apprehend the advantage of the Greek. Amalgamation with the native races was easy, and it involved neither physical nor intellectual degeneracy as its consequence. Of the races with which the Greeks came in contact the Thracian was far from the highest in the scale of culture; yet three of the greatest names in the Great Age of Athens are those of men who had Thracian blood in their veins, viz. Themistocles, Cimon and the historian Thucydides. In the absence of any distinction of colour, no insuperable barrier existed between the Greek and the hellenized native. The demos of the colonial cities was largely recruited from the native population, nor was there anything in the Greek world analogous to the “mean whites” or the “black belt.” Of hardly less importance were the climatic conditions. In this respect the Mediterranean area is unique. There is no other region of the world of equal extent in which these conditions are at once so uniform and so favourable. Nowhere had the Greek settler to encounter a climate which was either unsuited to his labour or subversive of his vigour. That in spite of these advantages so little, comparatively speaking, was effected in the work of Hellenization before the epoch of Alexander and the Diadochi, was the effect of a single counteracting cause. The Greek colonist, like the Greek trader, clung to the shore. He penetrated no farther inland than the sea-breeze. Hence it was only in islands, such as Sicily or Cyprus, that the process of Hellenization was complete. Elsewhere the Greek settlements formed a mere fringe along the coast.
To the 7th century there belongs another movement of high importance in its bearing upon the economic, religious and literary development of Greece, as well as upon its constitutional history. This movement is the rise of The tyrants. the tyrannis. In the political writers of a later age the word possesses a clear-cut connotation. From other forms of monarchy it is distinguished by a twofold differentiation. The tyrannus is an unconstitutional ruler, and his authority is exercised over unwilling subjects. In the 7th and 6th centuries the line was not drawn so distinctly between the tyrant and the legitimate monarch. Even Herodotus uses the words “tyrant” and “king” interchangeably (e.g. the princes of Cyprus are called “kings” in v. 110 and “tyrants” in v. 109), so that it is sometimes difficult to decide whether a legitimate monarch or a tyrant is meant (e.g. Aristophilides of Tarentum, iii. 136, or Telys of Sybaris, v. 44). But the distinction between the tyrant and the king of the Heroic Age is a valid one. It is not true that his rule was always exercised over unwilling subjects; it is true that his position was always unconstitutional. The Homeric king is a legitimate monarch; his authority is invested with the sanctions of religion and immemorial custom. The tyrant is an illegitimate ruler; his authority is not recognized, either by customary usage or by express enactment. But the word “tyrant” was originally a neutral team; it did not necessarily imply a misuse of power. The origin of the tyrannis is obscure. The word tyrannus has been thought, with some reason, to be a Lydian one. Probably both the name and the thing originated in the Greek colonies of Asia Minor, though the earliest tyrants of whom we hear in Asia Minor (at Ephesus and Miletus) are a generation later than the earliest in Greece itself, where, both at Sicyon and at Corinth, tyranny appears to date back to the second quarter of the 7th century. It is not unusual to regard tyranny as a universal stage in the constitutional development of the Greek states, and as a stage that occurs everywhere at one and the same period. In reality, tyranny is confined to certain regions, and it is a phenomenon that is peculiar to no one age or century. In Greece proper, before the 4th century B.C., it is confined to a small group of states round the Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs. The greater part of the Peloponnese was exempt from it, and there is no good evidence for its existence north of the Isthmus, except at Megara and Athens. It plays no part in the history of the Greek cities in Chalcidice and Thrace. It appears to have been rare in the Cyclades. The regions in which it finds a congenial soil are two, Asia Minor and Sicily. Thus it is incorrect to say that most Greek states passed through this stage. It is still wider of the mark to assume that they passed through it at the same time. There is no “Age of the Tyrants.” Tyranny began in the Peloponnese a hundred years before it appears in Sicily, and it has disappeared in the Peloponnese almost before it begins in Sicily. In the latter the great age of tyranny comes at the beginning of the 5th century; in the former it is at the end of the 7th and the beginning of the 6th. At Athens the history of tyranny begins after it has ended both at Sicyon and Corinth. There is, indeed, a period in which tyranny is non-existent in the Greek states; roughly speaking, the last sixty years of the 5th century. But with this exception, there is no period in which the tyrant is not to be found. The greatest of all the tyrannies, that of Dionysius at Syracuse, belongs to the 4th century. Nor must it be assumed that tyranny always comes at the same stage in the history of a constitution; that it is always a stage between oligarchy and democracy. At Corinth it is followed, not by democracy but by oligarchy, and it is an oligarchy that lasts, with a brief interruption, for two hundred and fifty years. At Athens it is not immediately preceded by oligarchy. Between the Eupatrid oligarchy and the rule of Peisistratus there comes the timocracy of Solon. These exceptions do not stand alone. The cause of tyranny is, in one sense, uniform. In the earlier centuries, at any rate, tyranny is always the expression of discontent; the tyrant is always the champion of a cause. But it would be a mistake to suppose that the discontent is necessarily political, or that the cause which he champions is always a constitutional one. At Sicyon it is a racial one; Cleisthenes is the champion of the older population against their Dorian oppressors (see Herod. v. 67, 68). At Athens the discontent is economic rather than political; Peisistratus is the champion of the Diacrii, the inhabitants of the poorest region of Attica. The party-strifes of which we hear in the early history of Miletus, which doubtless gave the tyrant his opportunity, are concerned with the claims of rival industrial classes. In Sicily the tyrant is the ally of the rich and the foe of the demos, and the cause which he champions, both in the 5th century and the 4th, is a national one, that of the Greek against the Carthaginian. We may suspect that in Greece itself the tyrannies of the 7th century are the expression of an anti-Dorian reaction. It can hardly be an accident that the states in which the tyrannis is found at this epoch, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Epidaurus, are all of them states in which a Dorian upper class ruled over a subject population. In Asia Minor the tyrannis assumes a peculiar character after the Persian conquest. The tyrant rules as the deputy of the Persian satrap. Thus in the East the tyrant is the enemy of the national cause; in the West, in Sicily, he is its champion.
Tyranny is not a phenomenon peculiar to Greek history. It is possible to find analogies to it in Roman history, in the power of Caesar, or of the Caesars; in the despotisms of medieval Italy; or even in the Napoleonic empire. Between the tyrant and the Italian despot there is indeed a real analogy; but between the Roman principate and the Greek tyrannis there are two essential differences. In the first place, the principate was expressed in constitutional forms, or veiled under constitutional fictions; the tyrant stood altogether outside the constitution. And, secondly, at Rome both Julius and Augustus owed their position to the power of the sword. The power of the sword, it is true, plays a large part in the history of the later tyrants (e.g. Dionysius of Syracuse); the earlier ones, however, had no mercenary armies at their command. We can hardly compare the bodyguard of Peisistratus to the legions of the first or the second Caesar.
The view taken of the tyrannis in Greek literature is almost uniformly unfavourable. In this respect there is no difference between Plato and Aristotle, or between Herodotus and the later historians. His policy is represented as purely selfish, and his rule as oppressive. Herodotus is influenced partly by the traditions current among the oligarchs, who had been the chief sufferers, and partly by the odious associations which had gathered round tyranny in Asia Minor. The philosophers write under their impressions of the later tyrannis, and their account is largely an a priori one. It is seldom that we find any attempt, either in the philosophers or the historians, to do justice to the real services rendered by the tyrants. Their first service was a constitutional one. They helped to break down the power of the old aristocratic houses, and thus to create the social and political conditions indispensable to democracy. The tyrannis involved the sacrifice of liberty in the cause of equality. When tyranny falls, it is never succeeded by the aristocracies which it had overthrown. It is frequently succeeded by an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy in which the claim to exclusive power is based, not upon mere birth, but upon wealth, or the possession of land. It would be unfair to treat this service as one that was rendered unconsciously and unwillingly. Where the tyrant asserted the claims of an oppressed class, he consciously aimed at the destruction of privilege and the effacement of class distinctions. Hence it is unjust to treat his power as resting upon mere force. A government which can last eighty or a hundred years, as was the case with the tyrannies at Corinth and Sicyon, must have a moral force behind it. It must rest upon the consent of its subjects. The second service which the tyrants rendered to Greece was a political one. Their policy tended to break down the barriers which isolated each petty state from its neighbours. In their history we can trace a system of widespread alliances, which are often cemented by matrimonial connexions. The Cypselid tyrants of Corinth appear to have been allied with the royal families of Egypt, Lydia and Phrygia, as well as with the tyrants of Miletus and Epidaurus, and with some of the great Athenian families. In Sicily we find a league of the northern tyrants opposed to a league of the southern; and in each ease there is a corresponding matrimonial alliance. Anaxilaus of Rhegium is the son-in-law and ally of Terillus of Himera; Gelo of Syracuse stands in the same relation to Theron of Agrigentum. Royal marriages have played a great part in the politics of Europe. In the comparison of Greek and modern history it has been too often forgotten how great a difference it makes, and how great a disadvantage it involves, to a republic that it has neither sons nor daughters to give in marriage. In commerce and colonization the tyrants were only continuing the work of the oligarchies to which they succeeded. Greek trade owed its expansion to the intelligent efforts of the oligarchs who ruled at Miletus and Corinth, in Samos, Aegina and Euboea; but in particular cases, such as Miletus, Corinth, Sicyon and Athens, there was a further development, and a still more rapid growth, under the tyrants. In the same way, the foundation of the colonies was in most cases due to the policy of the oligarchical governments. They can claim credit for the colonies of Chalcis and Eretria, of Megara, Phocaea and Samos, as well as for the great Achaean settlements in southern Italy. The Cypselids at Corinth, and Thrasybulus at Miletus, are instances of tyrants who colonized on a great scale.
In their religious policy the tyrants went far to democratize
Greek religion. The functions of monarchy had been largely
religious; but, while the king was necessarily a
priest, he was not the only priest in the community.
Religion under the “tyrants.”
There were special priesthoods, hereditary in particular
families, even in the monarchical period; and
upon the fall of the monarchy, while the priestly functions of
the kings passed to republican magistrates, the priesthoods
which were in the exclusive possession of the great families
tended to become the important ones. Thus, before the rise of
tyranny, Greek religion is aristocratic. The cults recognized
by the state are the sacra of noble clans. The religious prerogatives
of the nobles helped to confirm their political ones,
and, as long as religion retained its aristocratic character, it was
impossible for democracy to take root. The policy of the tyrants
aimed at fostering popular cults which had no associations with
the old families, and at establishing new festivals. The cult
of the wine-god, Dionysus, was thus fostered at Sicyon by
Cleisthenes, and at Corinth by the Cypselids; while at Athens
a new festival of this deity, which so completely overshadowed
the older festival that it became known as the Great Dionysia,
probably owed its institution to Peisistratus. Another festival,
the Panathenaea, which had been instituted only a few years
before his rise to power, became under his rule, and thanks to his
policy, the chief national festival of the Athenian state. Everywhere,
again, we find the tyrants the patrons of literature.
Pindar and Bacchylides, Aeschylus and Simonides found a
welcome at the court of Hiero. Polycrates was the patron of
Anacreon, Periander of Arion. To Peisistratus has been attributed,
possibly not without reason, the first critical edition of
the text of Homer, a work as important in the literary history
of Greece as was the issue of the Authorized Version of the Bible
in English history. I
t we would judge fairly of tyranny, and of
what it contributed to the development of Greece, we must
remember how many states there were in whose history the
period of greatest power coincides with the rule of a tyrant.
This is unquestionably true of Corinth and Sicyon, as well as of
Syracuse in the 5th, and again in the 4th century; it is probably
true of Samos and Miletus. In the case of Athens it is only the
splendour of the Great Age that blinds us to the greatness of
the results achieved by the policy of the Peisistratids.
With the overthrow of this dynasty tyranny disappears from Greece proper for more than a century. During the century and a half which had elapsed since its first appearance the whole aspect of Greek life, and of the Greek world, had changed. The development was as yet incomplete, but the lines on which it was to proceed had been clearly marked out. Political power was no longer the monopoly of a class. The struggle between the “few” and the “many” had begun; in one state at least (Athens) the victory of the “many” was assured. The first chapter in the history of democracy was already written. In the art of war the two innovations which were ultimately to establish the military supremacy of Greece, hoplite tactics and the trireme, had already been introduced. Greek literature was The arts. no longer synonymous with epic poetry. Some of its most distinctive forms had not yet been evolved; indeed, it is only quite at the end of the period that prose-writing begins; but both lyric and elegiac poetry had been brought to perfection. In art, statuary was still comparatively stiff and crude; but in other branches, in architecture, in vase-painting and in coin-types, the aesthetic genius of the race had asserted its pre-eminence. Philosophy, the supreme gift of Greece to the modern world, had become a living power. Some of her most original thinkers belong to the 6th century. Criticism had been applied to everything in turn: to the gods, to conduct, and to the conception of the universe. Before the Great Age begins, the claims of intellectual as well as of political freedom had been vindicated. It was not, however, in Greece proper that progress had been greatest. In the next century the centre of gravity of Greek civilization shifts to the western side of the Aegean; in the 6th century it must be looked for at Miletus, rather than at Athens. In order to estimate how far the development of Greece had advanced, or to appreciate the distinctive features of Greek life at this period, we must study Ionia, rather than Attica or the Peloponnese. Almost all that is greatest and most characteristic is to be found on the eastern side of the Aegean. The great names in the history of science and philosophy before the beginning of the 5th century—Thales, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaximander, Hecataeus; names which are representative of mathematics, astronomy, geography and metaphysics, are all, without exception, Ionian. In poetry, too, the most famous names, if not so exclusively Ionian, are connected either with the Asiatic coast or with the Cyclades. Against Archilochus and Anacreon, Sappho and Alcaeus, Greece has nothing better to set, after the age of Hesiod, than Tyrtaeus and Theognis. Reference has already been made to the greatness of the Ionians as navigators, as colonizers and as traders. In wealth and in population, Miletus, at the epoch of the Persian conquest, must have been far ahead of any city of European Greece. Sybaris, in Magna Graecia, can have been its only rival outside Ionia. There were two respects, however, in which the comparison was in favour of the mother-country. In warfare, the superiority of the Spartan infantry was unquestioned; in politics, the Greek states showed a greater power of combination than the Ionian.
Finally, Ionia was the scene of the first conflicts with the Persian. Here were decided the first stages of a struggle which was to determine the place of Greece in the history of the world. The rise of Persia under Cyrus was, as External relations. Herodotus saw, the turning-point of Greek history. Hitherto the Greek had proved himself indispensable to the oriental monarchies with which he had been brought into contact. In Egypt the power of the Saite kings rested upon the support of their Greek mercenaries. Amasis (569-525 B.C.), who is raised to the throne as the leader of a reaction against the influence of the foreign garrison, ends by showing greater favour to the Greek soldiery and the Greek traders than all that were before him. With Lydia the relations were originally hostile; the conquest of the Greek fringe is the constant aim of Lydian policy. Greek influences, however, seem to have quickly permeated Lydia, and to have penetrated to the court. Alyattes (610-560 B.C.) marries an Ionian wife, and the succession is disputed between the son of this marriage and Croesus, whose mother was a Carian. Croesus (560-546 B.C.) secures the throne, only to become the lavish patron of Greek sanctuaries and the ally of a Greek state. The history of Hellenism had begun. It was the rise of Cyrus that closed the East to Greek enterprise and Greek influences. In Persia we find the antithesis of all that is characteristic of Greece—autocracy as opposed to liberty; a military society organized on an aristocratic basis, to an industrial society, animated by a democratic spirit; an army, whose strength lay in its cavalry, to an army, in which the foot-soldier alone counted; a morality, which assigned the chief place to veracity, to a morality which subordinated it to other virtues; a religion, which ranks among the great religions of the world, to a religion, which appeared to the most spiritual minds among the Greeks themselves both immoral and absurd. Between two such races there could be neither sympathy nor mutual understanding. In the Great Age the Greek had learned Persian wars. to despise the Persian, and the Persian to fear the Greek. In the 6th century it was the Persian who despised, and the Greek who feared. The history of the conflicts between the Ionian Greeks and the Persian empire affords a striking example of the combination of intellectual strength and political weakness in the character of a people. The causes of the failure of the Ionians to offer a successful resistance to Persia, both at the time of the conquest by Harpagus (546-545 B.C.) and in the Ionic revolt (499-494 B.C.), are not far to seek. The centrifugal forces always tended to prove the stronger in the Greek system, and nowhere were they stronger than in Ionia. The tie of their tribal union proved weaker, every time it was put to the test, than the political and commercial interests of the individual states. A league of jealous commercial rivals is certain not to stand the strain of a protracted struggle against great odds. Against the advancing power of Lydia a common resistance had not so much as been attempted. Miletus, the greatest of the Ionian towns, had received aid from Chios alone. Against Persia a common resistance was attempted. The Panionium, the centre of a religious amphictyony, became for the moment the centre of a political league. At the time of the Persian conquest Miletus held aloof. She secured favourable terms for herself, and left the rest of Ionia to its fate. In the later conflict, on the contrary, Miletus is the leader in the revolt. The issue was determined, not as Herodotus represents it, by the inherent indolence of the Ionian nature, but by the selfish policy of the leading states. In the sea-fight at Lade (494 B.C.) the decisive battle of the war, the Milesians and Chians fought with desperate courage. The day was lost thanks to the treachery of the Samian and Lesbian contingents.
The causes of the successful resistance of the Greeks to the invasions of their country, first by Datis and Artaphernes (490 B.C.), in the reign of Darius, and then by Xerxes in person (480-479 B.C.), are more complex. Their success was partly due to a moral cause. And this was realized by the Greeks themselves. They felt (see Herod. vii. 104) that the subjects of a despot are no match for the citizens of a free state, who yield obedience to a law which is self-imposed. But the cause was not solely a moral one. Nor was the result due to the numbers and efficiency of the Athenian fleet, in the degree that the Athenians claimed (see Herod. vii. 139). The truth is that the conditions, both political and military, were far more favourable to the Greek defence in Europe than they had been in Asia. At this crisis the centripetal forces proved stronger than the centrifugal. The moral ascendancy of Sparta was the determining factor. In Sparta the Greeks had a leader whom all were ready to obey (Herod. viii. 2). But for her influence the forces of disintegration would have made themselves felt as quickly as in Ionia. Sparta was confronted with immense difficulties in conducting the defence against Xerxes. The two chief naval powers, Athens and Aegina, had to be reconciled after a long and exasperating warfare (see Aegina). After Thermopylae, the whole of northern Greece, with the exception of Athens and a few minor states, was lost to the Greek cause. The supposed interests of the Peloponnesians, who formed the greater part of the national forces, conflicted with the supposed interests of the Athenians. A more impartial view than was possible to the generation for which Herodotus wrote suggests that Sparta performed her task with intelligence and patriotism. The claims of Athens and Sparta were about equally balanced. And in spite of her great superiority in numbers, the military conditions were far from favourable to Persia. A land so mountainous as Greece is was unsuited to the operations of cavalry, the most efficient arm of the service in the Persian Army, as in most oriental ones. Ignorance of local conditions, combined with the dangerous nature of the Greek coast, exposed their ships to the risk of destruction; while the composite character of the fleet, and the jealousies of its various contingents, tended to neutralize the advantage of numbers. In courage and discipline, the flower of the Persian infantry was probably little inferior to the Greek; in equipment, they were no match for the Greek panoply. Lastly, Xerxes laboured under a disadvantage, which may be illustrated by the experience of the British army in the South African War—distance from his base.
5. The Great Age (480-338 B.C.).—The effects of the repulse of Persia were momentous in their influence upon Greece. The effects upon Elizabethan England of the defeat of the Spanish armada would afford quite an inadequate parallel. It gave the Greeks a heightened sense, both of their own national unity and of their superiority to the barbarian, while at the same time it helped to create the material conditions requisite alike for the artistic and political development of the 5th century. Other cities besides Athens were adorned with the proceeds of the spoils won from Persia, and Greek trade benefited both from the reunion of Ionia with Greece, and from the suppression of piracy in the Aegean and the Hellespont. Do these developments justify us in giving to the period, which begins with the repulse of Xerxes, and ends with the victory of Philip, the title of “the Great Age”? If the title is justified in the case of the 5th century, should the 4th century be excluded from the period? At first sight, the difference between the 4th century and the 5th may seem greater than that which exists between the 5th and the 6th. On the political side, the 5th century is an age of growth, the 4th an age of decay; on the literary side, the former is an age of poetry, the latter an age of prose. In spite of these contrasts, there is a real unity in the period which begins with the repulse of Xerxes and ends with the death of Alexander, as compared with any preceding one. It is an age of maturity in politics, in literature, and in art; and this is true of no earlier age. Nor can we say that the 5th century is, in all these aspects of Greek life, immature as compared with the 4th, or, on the other hand, that the 4th is decadent as compared with the 5th. On the political side, maturity is, in one sense, reached in the earlier century. There is nothing in the later century so great as the Athenian empire. In another sense, maturity is not reached till the 4th century. It is only in the later century that the tendency of the Greek constitutions to conform to a common type, democracy, is (at least approximately) realized, and it is only in this century that the principles upon which democracy is based are carried to their logical conclusion. In literature, if we confine our attention to poetry, we must pronounce the 5th century the age of completed development; but in prose the case is different. The style even of Thucydides is immature, as compared with that of Isocrates and Plato. In philosophy, however high may be the estimate that is formed of the genius of the earlier thinkers, it cannot be disputed that in Plato and Aristotle we find a more mature stage of thought. In art, architecture may perhaps be said to reach its zenith in the 5th, sculpture in the 4th century. In its political aspect, the history of the Great Age resolves itself into the history of two movements, the imperial and the democratic. Hitherto Greece had meant, politically, an aggregate of independent states, very numerous, and, as a rule, very small. The principle Systems of government. of autonomy was to the Greek the most sacred of all political principles; the passion for autonomy the most potent of political factors. In the latter half of the 6th century Sparta had succeeded in combining the majority of the Peloponnesian states into a loose federal union; so loose, however, that it appears to have been dormant in the intervals of peace. In the crisis of the Persian invasion the Peloponnesian League was extended so as to include all the states which had espoused the national cause. It looked on the morrow of Plataea and Mycale (the two victories, won simultaneously, in 479 B.C., by Spartan commanders, by which the danger from Persia was finally averted) as if a permanent basis for union might be found in the hegemony of Sparta. The sense of a common peril and a common triumph brought with it the need of a common union; it was Athens, however, instead of Sparta, by whom the first conscious effort was made to transcend the isolation of the Greek political system and to bring the units into combination. The league thus founded (the Delian League, established in 477 B.C.) was under the presidency of Athens, but it included hardly any other state besides those that had conducted the defence of Greece. It was formed, almost entirely, of the states which had been liberated from Persian rule by the great victories of the war. The Delian League, even in the form in which it was first established, as a confederation of autonomous allies, marks an advance in political conceptions upon the Peloponnesian League. Provision is made for an annual revenue, for periodical meetings of the council, and for a permanent executive. It is a real federation, though an imperfect one. There were defects in its constitution which rendered it inevitable that it should be transformed into an empire. Athens was from the first “the predominant partner.” The fleet was mainly Athenian, the commanders entirely so; the assessment of the tribute was in Athenian hands; there was no federal court appointed to determine questions at issue between Athens and the other members; and, worst omission of all, the right of secession was left undecided. By the middle of the century the Delian League has become the Athenian empire. Henceforward the imperial idea, in one form or another, dominates Greek politics. Athens failed to extend her authority over the whole of Greece. Her empire was overthrown; but the triumph of autonomy proved the triumph of imperialism. The Spartan empire succeeds to the Athenian, and, when it is finally shattered at Leuctra (371 B.C.), the hegemony of Thebes, which is established on its ruins, is an empire in all but name. The decay of Theban power paves the way for the rise of Macedon.
Thus throughout this period we can trace two forces contending for mastery in the Greek political system. Two causes divide the allegiance of the Greek world, the cause of empire and the cause of autonomy. The formation of the confederacy of Delos did not involve the dissolution of the alliance between Athens and Sparta. For seventeen years more Athens retained her place in the league, “which had been established against the Mede” under the presidency of Sparta in 480 B.C. (Thuc. i. 102). The ascendancy of Cimon and the Philolaconian party at Athens was favourable to a good understanding between the two states, and at Sparta in normal times the balance inclined in favour of the party whose policy is best described by the motto “quieta non movere.”
In the end, however, the opposition of the two contending forces proved too strong for Spartan neutrality. The fall of Cimon (461 B.C.) was followed by the so-called “First Peloponnesian War,” a conflict between Athens and The Peloponnesian Wars. her maritime rivals, Corinth and Aegina, into which Sparta was ultimately drawn. Thucydides regards the hostilities of these years (460-454 B.C.), which were resumed for a few months in 446 B.C., on the expiration of the Five Years’ Truce, as preliminary to those of the great Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.). The real question at issue was in both cases the same. The tie that united the opponents of Athens was found in a common hostility to the imperial idea. It is a complete misapprehension to regard the Peloponnesian War as a mere duel between two rival claimants for empire. The ultimatum presented by Sparta on the eve of the war demanded the restoration of autonomy to the subjects of Athens. There is no reason for doubting her sincerity in presenting it in this form. It would, however, be an equal misapprehension to regard the war as merely a struggle between the cause of empire and the cause of autonomy. Corresponding to this fundamental contrast there are other contrasts, constitutional, racial and military. The military interest of the war is largely due to the fact that Athens was a sea power and Sparta a land one. As the war went on, the constitutional aspect tended to become more marked. At first there were democracies on the side of Sparta, and oligarchies on the side of Athens. In the last stage of the war, when Lysander’s influence was supreme, we see the forces of oligarchy everywhere united and organized for the destruction of democracy. In its origin the war was certainly not due to the rivalry of Dorian and Ionian. This racial, or tribal, contrast counted for more in the politics of Sicily than of Greece; and, though the two great branches of the Greek race were represented respectively by the leaders of the two sides, the allies on neither side belonged exclusively to the one branch or the other. Still, it remains true that the Dorian states were, as a rule, on the Spartan side, and the Ionian states, as a rule, on the Athenian—a division of sentiment which must have helped to widen the breach, and to intensify the animosities.
As a political experiment the Athenian empire possesses a unique interest. It represents the first attempt to fuse the principles of imperialism and democracy. It is at once the first empire in history possessed and administered The Athenian empire. by a sovereign people, and the first which sought to establish a common system of democratic institutions amongst its subjects. It was an experiment that failed, partly owing to the inherent strength of the oligarchic cause, partly owing to the exclusive character of ancient citizenship. The Athenians themselves recognized that their empire depended for its existence upon the solidarity of democratic interests (see Thuc. iii. 47; Pseudo-Xenophon, de Rep. Ath. i. 14, iii. 10). An understanding existed between the democratic leaders in the subject-states and the democratic party at Athens. Charges were easily trumped up against obnoxious oligarchs, and conviction as easily obtained in the Athenian courts of law. Such a system forced the oligarchs into an attitude of opposition. How much this opposition counted for was realized when the Sicilian disaster (413 B.C.) gave the subjects their chance to revolt. The organization of the oligarchical party throughout the empire, which was effected by Lysander in the last stage of the war, contributed to the overthrow of Athenian ascendancy hardly less than the subsidies of Persia. Had Athens aimed at establishing a community of interest between herself and her subjects, based upon a common citizenship, her empire might have endured. It would have been a policy akin to that which secured the permanence of the Roman empire. And it was a policy which found advocates when the day for it was past (see Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 574 ff.; cf. the grant of citizenship to the Samians after Aegospotami, C.I.A. iv. 2, 1b). But the policy pursued by Athens in the plenitude of her power was the reverse of the policy pursued by Rome in her treatment of the franchise. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the fate of the empire was sealed by the law of Pericles (451 B.C.), by which the franchise was restricted to those who could establish Athenian descent on both sides. It was not merely that the process of amalgamation through intermarriage was abruptly checked; what was more serious was that a hard and fast line was drawn, once and for all, between the small body of privileged rulers and the great mass of unprivileged subjects. Maine (Early Institutions, lecture 13) has classed the Athenian empire with those of the familiar Oriental type, which attempt nothing beyond the raising of taxes and the levying of troops. The Athenian empire cannot, indeed, be classed with the Roman, or with the British rule in India; it does not, therefore, deserve to be classed with the empires of Cyrus or of Jenghiz Khan. Though the basis of its organization, like that of the Persian empire under Darius, was financial, it attempted, and secured, objects beyond the mere payment of tribute and the supply of ships. If Athens did not introduce a common religion, or a common system of education, or a common citizenship, she did introduce a common type of political institutions, and a common jurisdiction. She went some way, too, in the direction of establishing a common system of coins, and of weights and measures. A common language was there already. In a word, the Athenian empire marks a definite stage of political evolution.
The other great political movement of the age was the progress of democracy. Before the Persian invasion democracy was a rare phenomenon in Greek politics. Where it was found it existed in an undeveloped form, and its tenure The mature democracy. of power was precarious. By the beginning of the Peloponnesian War it had become the prevalent form of government. The great majority of Greek states had adopted democratic constitutions. Both in the Athenian sphere of influence and in the colonial world outside that sphere, democracy was all but the only form of constitution known. It was only in Greece proper that oligarchy held its own. In the Peloponnese it could count a majority of the states; in northern Greece at least a half of them. The spread of democratic institutions was arrested by the victory of Sparta in the East, and the rise of Dionysius in the West. There was a moment at the end of the 5th century when it looked as if democracy was a lost cause. Even Athens was for a brief period under the rule of the Thirty (404-403 B.C.). In the regions which had formed the empire of Athens the decarchies set up by Lysander were soon overthrown, and democracies restored in most cases, but oligarchy continued to be the prevalent form in Greece proper until Leuctra (371 B.C.), and in Sicily tyranny had a still longer tenure of power. By the end of the Great Age oligarchy has almost disappeared from the Greek world, except in the sphere of Persian influence. The Spartan monarchy still survives; a few Peloponnesian states still maintain the rule of the few; here and there in Greece itself we meet with a revival of the tyrannis; but, with these exceptions, democracy is everywhere the only type of constitution. And democracy has developed as well as spread. At the end of the 5th century the constitution of Cleisthenes, which was a democracy in the view of his contemporaries, had come to be regarded as an aristocracy (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 29. 3). We can trace a similar change of sentiment in Sicily. As compared with the extreme form of constitution adopted at Syracuse after the defeat of the Athenian expedition, the democracies established two generations earlier, on the fall of the tyrannis, appeared oligarchical. The changes by which the character of the Greek democracies was revolutionized were four in number: the substitution of sortition for election, the abolition of a property qualification, the payment of officials and the rise of a class of professional politicians. In the democracy of Cleisthenes no payment was given for service, whether as a magistrate, a juror or a member of the Boulē. The higher magistracies were filled by election, and they were held almost exclusively by the members of the great Athenian families. For the highest office of all, the archonship, none but Pentacosiomedimni (the first of the four Solonian classes) were eligible. The introduction of pay and the removal of the property qualification formed part of the reforms of Pericles. Sortition had been instituted for election a generation earlier (487 B.C.). What is perhaps the most important of all these changes, the rise of the demagogues, belongs to the era of the Peloponnesian War. From the time of Cleisthenes to the outbreak of the war every statesman of note at Athens, with the exception of Themistocles (and, perhaps, of Ephialtes), is of aristocratic birth. Down to the fall of Cimon the course of Athenian politics is to a great extent determined by the alliances and antipathies of the great clans. With the Peloponnesian War a new epoch begins. The chief office, the strategia, is still, as a rule, held by men of rank. But leadership in the Ecclesia has passed to men of a different class. The demagogues were not necessarily poor men. Cleon was a wealthy man; Eucrates, Lysicles and Hyperbolus were, at any rate, tradesmen rather than artisans. The first “labour member” proper is Cleophon (411-404 B.C.), a lyre-maker. They belonged, however, not to the land-owning, but to the industrial classes; they were distinguished from the older race of party-leaders by a vulgar accent, and by a violence of gesture in public speaking, and they found their supporters among the population of the city and its port, the Peiraeus, rather than among the farmers of the country districts. In the 4th century the demagogues, though under another name, that of orators, have acquired entire control of the Ecclesia. It is an age of professionalism, and the professional soldier has his counterpart in the professional politician. Down to the death of Pericles the party-leader had always held office as Strategus. His rival, Thucydides, son of Melesias, forms a solitary exception to this statement. In the 4th century the divorce between the general and the statesman is complete. The generals are professional soldiers, who aspire to no political influence in the state, and the statesmen devote themselves exclusively to politics, a career for which they have prepared themselves by a professional training in oratory or administrative work. The ruin of agriculture during the war had reduced the old families to insignificance. Birth counts for less than nothing as a political asset in the age of Demosthenes.
But great as are the contrasts which have been pointed out between the earlier and the later democracy, those that distinguish the ancient conception of democracy from the modern are of a still more essential nature. The The city-state. differences that distinguish the democracies of ancient Greece from those of the modern world have their origin, to a great extent, in the difference between a city-state and a nation-state. Many of the most famous Greek states had an area of a few square miles; the largest of them was no larger than an English county. Political theory put the limit of the citizen-body at 10,000. Though this number was exceeded in a few cases, it is doubtful if any state, except Athens, ever counted more than 20,000 citizens. In the nation-states of modern times, democratic government is possible only under the form of a representative system; in the city-state representative government was unnecessary, and therefore unknown. In the ancient type of democracy a popular chamber has no existence. The Ecclesia is not a chamber in any sense of the term; it is an assembly of the whole people, which every citizen is entitled to attend, and in which every one is equally entitled to vote and speak. The question raised in modern political science, as to whether sovereignty resides in the electors or their representatives, has thus neither place nor meaning in ancient theory. In the same way, one of the most familiar results of modern analysis, the distinction between the executive and the legislative, finds no recognition in the Greek writers. In a direct system of government there can be no executive in the proper sense. Executive functions are discharged by the ecclesia, to whose decision the details of administration may be referred. The position of the strategi, the chief officials in the Athenian democracy of the 5th century, was in no sense comparable to that of a modern cabinet. Hence the individual citizen in an ancient democracy was concerned in, and responsible for, the actual work of government to a degree that is inconceivable in a modern state. Thus participation in the administrative and judicial business of the state is made by Aristotle the differentia of the citizen (πολίτης ἐστὶν ὁ μετέχων κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς, Aristot. Politics, p. 1275 a 20). A large proportion of the citizens of Athens, in addition to frequent service in the courts of law, must in the course of their lives have held a magistracy, great or small, or have acted for a year or two as members of the Boulē. It must be remembered that there was nothing corresponding to a permanent civil service in the ancient state. Much of the work of a government office would have been transacted by the Athenian Boulē. It must be remembered, too, that political and administrative questions of great importance came before the popular courts of law. Hence it follows that the ordinary citizen of an ancient democracy, in the course of his service in the Boulē or the law-courts, acquired an interest in political questions, and a grasp of administrative work, which none but a select few can hope to acquire under the conditions of the modern system. Where there existed neither a popular chamber nor a distinct executive, there was no opportunity for the growth of a party-system. There were, of course, political parties at Athens and elsewhere—oligarchs and democrats, conservatives and radicals, a peace-party and a war-party, according to the burning question of the day. There was, however, nothing equivalent to a general election, to a cabinet (or to that collective responsibility which is of the essence of a cabinet), or to the government and the opposition. Party organization, therefore, and a party system, in the proper sense, were never developed. Whatever may have been the evils incident to the ancient form of democracy, the “boss,” the caucus and the spoils-system were not among them.
Besides these differences, which, directly or indirectly, result from the difference of scale, there are others, hardly less profound, which are not connected with the size of the city-state. Perhaps the most striking contrast between the democracies of ancient and of modern times is to be found in their attitude towards privilege. Ancient democracy implies privilege; modern democracy implies its destruction. In the more fully developed democracies of the modern world (e.g. in the United States, or in Australia), the privilege of class is unknown; in some of them (e.g. New Zealand, Australia, Norway) even the privilege of sex has been abolished. Ancient democracy was bound up with privilege as much as oligarchy was. The transition from the latter to the former was effected by enlarging the area of privilege and by altering its basis. In an oligarchical state citizenship might be confined to 10% of the free population; under a democracy 50% might enjoy it. In the former case the qualification might be wealth or land; in the latter case it might be, as it was at Athens, birth, i.e. descent, on both sides, from a citizen family. But, in both cases alike, the distinction between a privileged and an unprivileged body of free-born residents is fundamental. To the unprivileged class belonged, not only foreigners temporarily resident (ξένοι) and aliens permanently domiciled (μέτοικοι), but also those native-born inhabitants of the state who were of foreign extraction, on one side or the other. The privileges attaching to citizenship included, in addition to eligibility for office and a vote in the assembly, such private rights as that of owning land or a house, or of contracting a marriage with one of citizen status. The citizen, too, was alone the recipient of all the various forms of pay (e.g. for attendance in the assembly, for service in the Boulē or the law-courts, or for the celebration of the great festivals) which are so conspicuous a feature in the developed democracy of the 4th century. The metoeci could not even plead in a court of law in person, but only through a patron (προστάτης). It is intelligible that privileges so great should be jealously guarded. In the democracies of the modern world naturalization is easy; in those of ancient Greece admission to the franchise was rarely accorded. In modern times, again, we are accustomed to connect democracy Position of women. with the emancipation of women. It is true that only a few democratic constitutions grant them the suffrage; but though, as a rule, they are denied public rights, the growth of popular government has been almost everywhere accompanied by an extension of their private rights, and by the removal of the restrictions imposed by law, custom or public opinion upon their freedom of action. In ancient Greece the democracies were as illiberal in their policy as the oligarchies. Women of the respectable class were condemned to comparative seclusion. They enjoyed far less freedom in 4th-century Athens than in the Homeric Age. It is not in any of the democracies, but in conservative Sparta, that they possess privilege and exercise influence.
The most fundamental of all the contrasts between democracy in its ancient and in its modern form remains to be stated. The ancient state was inseparable from slavery. In this respect there was no difference between democracy Slavery. and the other forms of government. No inconsistency was felt, therefore, between this institution and the democratic principle. Modern political theory has been profoundly affected by the conception of the dignity of labour; ancient political theory tended to regard labour as a disqualification for the exercise of political rights. Where slavery exists, the taint of it will inevitably cling to all labour that can be performed by the slave. In ancient Athens (which may be taken as typical of the Greek democracies) unskilled labour was almost entirely slave-labour, and skilled labour was largely so. The arts and crafts were, to some extent, exercised by citizens, but to a less extent in the 4th than in the 6th century. They were, however, chiefly left to aliens or slaves. The citizen-body of Athens in the age of Demosthenes has been stigmatized as consisting in great measure of salaried paupers. There is, doubtless, an exaggeration in this. It is, however, true, both that the system of state-pay went a long way towards supplying the simple wants of a southern population, and that a large proportion of the citizens had time to spare for the service of the state. Had the life of the lower class of citizens been absorbed in a round of mechanical labours, as fully as is the life of our industrial classes, the working of an ancient democracy would have been impossible. In justice to the ancient democracies it must be conceded that, while popular government carried with it neither the enfranchisement of the alien nor the emancipation of the slave, the rights secured to both classes were more considerable in the democratic states than elsewhere. The lot of the slave, as well as that of the alien, was a peculiarly favourable one at Athens. The pseudo-Xenophon in the 5th century (De rep. Ath. 1. 10-12) and Plato in the 4th (Republic, p. 563 B), prove that the spirit of liberty, with which Athenian life was permeated, was not without its influence upon the position of these classes. When we read that critics complained of the opulence of slaves, and of the liberties they took, and when we are told that the slave could not be distinguished from the poorer class of citizens either by his dress or his look, we begin to realize the difference between the slavery of ancient Athens and the system as it was worked on the Roman latifundia or the plantations of the New World.
It had been anticipated that the fall of Athens would mean the triumph of the principle of autonomy. If Athens had surrendered within a year or so of the Sicilian catastrophe, this anticipation would probably have been The Spartan empire. fulfilled. It was the last phase of the struggle (412-404 B.C.) that rendered a Spartan empire inevitable. The oligarchical governments established by Lysander recognized that their tenure of power was dependent upon Spartan support, while Lysander himself, to whose genius, as a political organizer not less than as a commander, the triumph of Sparta was due, was unwilling to see his work undone. The Athenian empire had never included the greater part of Greece proper; since the Thirty Years’ Peace its possessions on the mainland, outside the boundaries of Attica, were limited to Naupactus and Plataea. Sparta, on the other hand, attempted the control of the entire Greek world east of the Adriatic. Athens had been compelled to acknowledge a dual system; Sparta sought to establish uniformity. The attempt failed from the first. Within a year of the surrender of Athens, Thebes and Corinth had drifted into an attitude of opposition, while Argos remained hostile. It was not long before the policy of Lysander succeeded in uniting against Sparta the very forces upon which she had relied when she entered on the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthian War (394-387 B.C.) was brought about by the alliance of all the second-class powers—Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Argos—against the one first-class power, Sparta. Though Sparta emerged successful from the war, it was with the loss of her maritime empire, and at the cost of recognizing the principle of autonomy as the basis of the Greek political system. It was already evident, thus early in the century, that the centrifugal forces were to prove stronger than the centripetal. Two further causes may be indicated which help to explain the failure of the Spartan empire. In the first place Spartan sea-power was an artificial creation. History seems to show that it is idle for a state to aspire to naval supremacy unless it possesses a great commercial marine. Athens had possessed such a marine; her naval supremacy was due not to the mere size of her fleet, but to the numbers and skill of her seafaring population. Sparta had no commerce. She could build fleets more easily than she could man them. A single defeat (at Cnidus, 391 B.C.) sufficed for the ruin of her sea-power. The second cause is to be found in the financial weakness of the Spartan state. The Spartan treasury had been temporarily enriched by the spoils of the Peloponnesian War, but neither during that war, nor afterwards, did Sparta succeed in developing any scientific financial system. Athens was the only state which either possessed a large annual revenue or accumulated a considerable reserve. Under the conditions of Greek warfare, fleets were more expensive than armies. Not only was money needed for the building and maintenance of the ships, but the sailor must be paid, while the soldier served for nothing. Hence the power with the longest purse could both build the largest fleet and attract the most skilful seamen.
The battle of Leuctra transferred the hegemony from Sparta to Thebes, but the attempt to unite Greece under the leadership of Thebes was from the first doomed to failure. The conditions were less favourable to Thebes than they Theban hegemony. had been to Athens or Sparta. Thebes was even more exclusively a land-power than Sparta. She had no revenue comparable to that of Athens in the preceding century. Unlike Athens and Sparta, she had not the advantage of being identified with a political cause. As the enemy of Athens in the 5th century, she was on the side of oligarchy; as the rival of Sparta in the 4th, she was on the side of democracy; but in her bid for primacy she could not appeal, as Athens and Sparta could, to a great political tradition, nor had she behind her, as they had, the moral force of a great political principle. Her position, too, in Boeotia itself was insecure. The rise of Athens was in great measure the result of the synoecism (συνοικισμός) of Attica. All inhabitants of Attica were Athenians. But “Boeotian” and “Theban” were not synonymous terms. The Boeotian league was an imperfect form of union, as compared with the Athenian state, and the claim of Thebes to the presidency of the league was, at best, sullenly acquiesced in by the other towns. The destruction of some of the most famous of the Boeotian cities, however necessary it may have been in order to unite the country, was a measure which at once impaired the resources of Thebes and outraged Greek sentiment. It has been often held that the failure of Theban policy was due to the death of Epaminondas (at the battle of Mantinea, 362 B.C.). For this view there is no justification. His policy had proved a failure before his death. Where it harmonized with the spirit of the age, the spirit of dissidence, it succeeded; where it attempted to run counter to it, it failed. It succeeded in destroying the supremacy of Sparta in the Peloponnese; it failed to unite the Peloponnese on a new basis. It failed still more signally to unite Greece north of the Isthmus. It left Greece weaker and more divided than it found it (see the concluding words of Xenophon’s Hellenics). It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of his policy as a destructive force; as a constructive force it effected nothing. The Peloponnesian system which Epaminondas overthrew had lasted two hundred years. Under Spartan leadership the Peloponnese had enjoyed almost complete immunity from invasion and comparative immunity from stasis (faction). The claim that Isocrates makes for Sparta is probably well-founded (Archidamus, 64-69; during the period of Spartan ascendency the Peloponnesians were εὐδαιμονέστατοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων). Peloponnesian sentiment had been one of the chief factors in Greek politics; to it, indeed, in no small degree was due the victory over Persia. The Theban victory at Leuctra destroyed the unity, and with it the peace and the prosperity, of the Peloponnese. It inaugurated a period of misery, the natural result of stasis and invasion, to which no parallel can be found in the earlier history (See Isocrates, Archidamus, 65, 66; the Peloponnesians were ὡμαλισμένοι ταῖς συμφοραῖς). It destroyed, too, the Peloponnesian sentiment of hostility to the invader. The bulk of the army that defeated Mardonius at Plataea came from the Peloponnese; at Chaeronea no Peloponnesian state was represented.
The question remains, Why did the city-state fail to save Greece from conquest by Macedon? Was this result due to the inherent weakness either of the city-state itself, or of one particular form of it, democracy? It is clear, in The rise of Macedon. any case, that the triumph of Macedon was the effect of causes which had long been at work. If neither Philip nor Alexander had appeared on the scene, Greece might have maintained her independence for another generation or two; but, when invasion came, it would have found her weaker and more distracted, and the conquerors might easily have been less imbued with the Greek spirit, and less sympathetic towards Greek ideals, than the great Macedonian and his son. These causes are to be found in the tendencies of the age, political, economic and moral. Of the two movements which characterized the Great Age in its political aspect, the imperial and the democratic, the one failed and the other succeeded. The failure and the success were equally fatal to the chances of Greece in the conflict with Macedon. By the middle of the 4th century Greek politics had come to be dominated by the theory of the balance of power. This theory, enunciated in its coarsest form by Demosthenes (Pro Megalopolit. 4 συμφέρει τῇ πόλει καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ Θηβαίους; cf. in Aristocrat. 102, 103), had shaped the foreign policy of Athens since the end of the Peloponnesian War. As long as Sparta was the stronger, Athens inclined to a Theban alliance; after Leuctra she tended in the direction of a Spartan one. At the epoch of Philip’s accession the forces were everywhere nicely balanced. The Peloponnese was fairly equally divided between the Theban and the Spartan interests, and central Greece was similarly divided between the Theban and the Athenian. Farther north we get an Athenian party opposed to an Olynthian in Chalcidice, and a republican party, dependent upon the support of Thebes, opposed to that of the tyrants in Thessaly. It is easy to see that the political conditions of Greece, both in the north and in the south, invited interference from without. And the triumph of democracy in its extreme form was ruinous to the military efficiency of Greece. On the one side there was a monarchical state, in which all powers, civil as well as military, were concentrated in the hands of a single ruler; on the other, a constitutional system, in which a complete separation had been effected between the responsibility of the statesman and that of the commander.
It could not be doubtful with which side victory would rest. Meanwhile, the economic conditions were steadily growing worse. The cause which Aristotle assigns for the decay of the Spartan state—a declining population (see Politics, p. 1270 a ἀπώλετο ἡ πόλις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν)—might be extended to the Greek world generally. The loss of population was partly the result of war and stasis—Isocrates speaks of the number of political exiles from the various states as enormous—but it was also due to a declining birth-rate, and to the exposure of infants. Aristotle, while condemning exposure, sanctions the procuring of abortion (Politics, 1335 b). It is probable that both ante-natal and post-natal infanticide were rife everywhere, except among the more backward communities. A people which has condemned itself to racial suicide can have little chance when pitted against a nation in which healthier instincts prevail. The materials for forming a trustworthy estimate of the population of Greece at any given epoch are not available; there is enough evidence, however, to prove that the military population of the leading Greek states at the era of the battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.) fell far short of what it had been at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The decline in population had been accompanied by a decline in wealth, both public and private; and while revenues had shrunk, expenditure had grown. It was a century of warfare; and warfare had become enormously more expensive, partly through the increased employment of mercenaries, partly through the enhanced cost of material. The power of the purse had made itself felt even in the 5th century; Persian gold had helped to decide the issue of the great war. In the politics of the 4th century the power of the purse becomes the determining factor. The public finance of the ancient world was singularly simple in character, and the expedients for raising a revenue were comparatively few. The distinction between direct and indirect taxation was recognized in practice, but states as a rule were reluctant to submit to the former system. The revenue of Athens in the 5th century was mainly derived from the tribute paid by her subjects; it was only in time of war that a direct tax was levied upon the citizen-body. In the age of Demosthenes the revenue derived from the Athenian Confederacy was insignificant. The whole burden of the expenses of a war fell upon the 1200 richest citizens, who were subject to direct taxation in the dual form of the Trierarchy and the Eisphora (property-tax). The revenue thus raised was wholly insufficient for an effort on a great scale; yet the revenues of Athens at this period must have exceeded those of any other state.
It is to moral causes, however, rather than to political or economic ones, that the failure of Greece in the conflict with Macedon is attributed by the most famous Greek statesmen of that age. Demosthenes is never weary of insisting upon the decay of patriotism among the citizens and upon the decay of probity among their leaders. Venality had always been the besetting sin of Greek statesmen. Pericles’ boast as to his own incorruptibility (Thuc. ii. 60) is significant as to the reputation of his contemporaries. In the age of Demosthenes the level of public life in this respect had sunk at least as low as that which prevails in many states of the modern world (see Demosth. On the Crown, 61 παρὰ τοῖς Ἔλλησιν, οὐ τισὶν ἀλλ᾽ ἅπασιν ὁμοίως φορὰ προδοτῶν καὶ δωροδόκων συνέβη; cf. §§ 295, 296). Corruption was certainly not confined to the Macedonian party. The best that can be said in defence of the patriots, as well as of their opponents, is that they honestly believed that the policy which they were bribed to advocate was the best for their country’s interests. The evidence for the general decay of patriotism among the mass of the citizens is less conclusive. The battle of Megalopolis (331 B.C.), in which the Spartan soldiery “went down in a blaze of glory,” proves that the spirit of the Lacedemonian state remained unchanged. But at Athens it seemed to contemporary observers—to Isocrates equally with Demosthenes—that the spirit of the great days was extinct (see Isocr. On the Peace, 47, 48). It cannot, of course, be denied that public opinion was obstinately opposed to the diversion of the Theoric Fund to the purposes of the war with Philip. It was not till the year before Chaeronea that Demosthenes succeeded in persuading the assembly to devote the entire surplus to the expenses of the war. Nor can it be denied that mercenaries were far more largely employed in the 4th century than in the 5th. In justice, however, to the Athenians of the Demosthenic era, it should be remembered that the burden of direct taxation was rarely imposed, and was reluctantly endured, in the previous century. It must also be remembered that, even in the 4th century, the Athenian citizen was ready to take the field, provided that it was not a question of a distant expedition or of prolonged service. For distant expeditions, or for prolonged service, a citizen-militia is unsuited. The substitution of a professional force for an unprofessional one is to be explained, partly by the change in the character of Greek warfare, and partly by the operation of the laws of supply and demand. There had been a time when warfare meant a brief campaign in the summer months against a neighbouring state. It had come to mean prolonged operations against a distant enemy. Athens was at war, e.g. with Philip, for eleven years continuously (357-346 B.C.). If winter campaigns in Thrace were unpopular at this epoch, they had been hardly less unpopular in the epoch of the Peloponnesian War. In the days of her greatness, too, Athens had freely employed mercenaries, but it was in the navy rather than the army. In the age of Pericles the supply of mercenary rowers was abundant, the supply of mercenary troops inconsiderable. In the age of Demosthenes incessant warfare and ceaseless revolution had filled Greece with crowds of homeless adventurers. The supply helped to create the demand. The mercenary was as cheap as the citizen-soldier, and much more effective. On the whole, then, it may be inferred that it is a mistake to regard the prevalence of the mercenary system as the expression of a declining patriotism. It would be nearer the mark to treat the transition from the voluntary to the professional system as cause rather than effect: as one among the causes which contributed to the decay of public spirit in the Greek world.
6. From Alexander to the Roman Conquest (336-146 B.C.).—In the history of Greece proper during this period the interest is mainly constitutional. It may be called the age of federation. Federation, indeed, was no novelty in Federal government. Greece. Federal unions had existed in Thessaly, in Boeotia and elsewhere, and the Boeotian league can be traced back at least to the 6th century. Two newly-founded federations, the Chalcidian and the Arcadian, play no inconsiderable part in the politics of the 4th century. But it is not till the 3rd century that federation attains to its full development in Greece, and becomes the normal type of polity. The two great leagues of this period are the Aetolian and the Achaean. Both had existed in the 4th century, but the latter, which had been dissolved shortly before the beginning of the 3rd century, becomes important only after its restoration in 280 B.C., about which date the former, too, first begins to attract notice. The interest of federalism lies in the fact that it marks an advance beyond the conception of the city-state. It is an attempt to solve the problem which the Athenian empire failed to solve, the reconciliation of the claims of local autonomy with those of national union. The federal leagues of the 3rd century possess a further interest for the modern world, in that there can be traced in their constitutions a nearer approach to a representative system than is found elsewhere in Greek experience. A genuine representative system, it is true, was never developed in any Greek polity. What we find in the leagues is a sort of compromise between the principle of a primary assembly and the principle of a representative chamber. In both leagues the nominal sovereign was a primary assembly, in which every individual citizen had the right to vote. In both of them, however, the real power lay with a council (βουλή) composed of members representative of each of the component states.
The real interest of this period, however, is to be looked for elsewhere than in Greece itself. Alexander’s career is one of the turning-points in history. He is one of the few to whom it has been given to modify the whole future Alexander’s empire. of the human race. He originated two forces which have profoundly affected the development of civilization. He created Hellenism, and he created for the western world the monarchical ideal. Greece had produced personal rulers of ability, or even of genius; but to the greatest of these, to Peisistratus, to Dionysius, even to Jason of Pherae, there clung the fatal taint of illegitimacy. As yet no ruler had succeeded in making the person of the monarch respectable. Alexander made it sacred. From him is derived, for the West, that “divinity that doth hedge a king.” And in creating Hellenism he created, for the first time, a common type of civilization, with a common language, literature and art, as well as a common form of political organization. In Asia Minor he was content to reinforce the existing Hellenic elements (cf. the case of Side, Arrian, Anabasis, i. 26. 4). In the rest of the East his instrument of hellenization was the polis. He is said to have founded no less than seventy cities, destined to become centres of Greek influence; and the great majority of these were in lands in which city-life was almost unknown. In this respect his example was emulated by his successors. The eastern provinces were soon lost, though Greek influences lingered on even in Bactria and across the Indus. It was only the regions lying to the west of the Euphrates that were effectively hellenized, and the permanence of this result was largely due to the policy of Rome. But after all deductions have been made, the great fact remains that for many centuries after Alexander’s death Greek was the language of literature and religion, of commerce and of administration throughout the Nearer East. Alexander had created a universal empire as well as a universal culture. His empire perished at his death, but its central idea survived—that of the municipal freedom of the Greek polis within the framework of an imperial system. Hellenistic civilization may appear degenerate when compared with Hellenic; when compared with the civilizations which it superseded in non-Hellenic lands, it marks an unquestionable advance. (For the history of Greek civilization in the East, see Hellenism.) Greece left her mark upon the civilization of the West as well as upon that of the East, but the process by which her influence was diffused was essentially different. In the East Hellenism came in the train of the conqueror, and Rome was content to build upon the foundations laid by Alexander. In the West Greek influences were diffused by the Roman conquest of Greece. It was through the ascendancy which Greek literature, philosophy and art acquired over the Roman mind that Greek culture penetrated to the nations of western Europe. The civilization of the East remained Greek. The civilization of the West became and remained Latin, but it was a Latin civilization that was saturated with Greek influences. The ultimate division, both of the empire and the church, into two halves, finds its explanation in this original difference of culture.
Ancient Authorities.—(I.) For the earliest periods of Greek history, the so-called Minoan and Mycenaean, the evidence is purely archaeological. It is sufficient here to refer to the article Aegean Civilization. For the next period, the Heroic or Homeric Age, the evidence is derived from the poems of Homer. In any estimate of the value of these poems as historical evidence, much will depend upon the view taken of the authorship, age and unity of the poems. For a full discussion of these questions see Homer. It cannot be questioned that the poems are evidence for the existence of a period in the history of the Greek race, which differed from later periods in political and social, military and economic conditions. But here agreement ends. If, as is generally held by German critics, the poems are not earlier than the 9th century, if they contain large interpolations of considerably later date and if they are Ionian in origin, the authority of the poems becomes comparatively slight. The existence of different strata in the poems will imply the existence of inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence; nor will the evidence be that of a contemporary. It will also follow that the picture of the heroic age contained in the poems is an idealized one. The more extreme critics, e.g. Beloch, deny that the poems are evidence even for the existence of a pre-Dorian epoch. If, on the other hand, the poems are assigned to the 11th or 12th century, to a Peloponnesian writer, and to a period anterior to the Dorian Invasion and the colonization of Asia Minor (this is the view of the late Dr D. B. Munro), the evidence becomes that of a contemporary, and the authority of the poems for the distribution of races and tribes in the Heroic Age, as well as for the social and political conditions of the poet’s time, would be conclusive. Homer recognizes no Dorians in Greece, except in Crete (see Odyssey, xix. 177), and no Greek colonies in Asia Minor. Only two explanations are possible. Either there is deliberate archaism in the poems, or else they are earlier in date than the Dorian Invasion and the colonization of Asia Minor.
II. For the period that extends from the end of the Heroic Age to the end of the Peloponnesian War the two principal authorities are Herodotus and Thucydides. Not only have the other historical works which treated of this Herodotus. period perished (those at least whose date is earlier than the Christian era), but their authority was secondary and their material chiefly derived from these two writers. In one respect then this period of Greek history stands alone. Indeed, it might be said, with hardly an exaggeration, that there is nothing like it elsewhere in history. Almost our sole authorities are two writers of unique genius, and they are writers whose works have come down to us intact. For the period which ends with the repulse of the Persian invasion our authority is Herodotus. For the period which extends from 478 to 411 we are dependent upon Thucydides’. In each case, however, a distinction must be drawn. The Persian Wars form the proper subject of Herodotus’s work; the Peloponnesian War is the subject of Thucydides. The interval between the two wars is merely sketched by Thucydides; while of the period anterior to the conflicts of the Greek with the Persian, Herodotus does not attempt either a complete or a continuous narrative. His references to it are episodical and accidental. Hence our knowledge of the Persian Wars and of the Peloponnesian War is widely different in character from our knowledge of the rest of this period. In the history of these wars the lacunae are few; in the rest of the history they are alike frequent and serious. In the history, therefore, of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars little is to be learnt from the secondary sources. Elsewhere, especially in the interval between the two wars, they become relatively important.
In estimating the authority of Herodotus (q.v.) we must be careful to distinguish between the invasion of Xerxes and all that is earlier. Herodotus’s work was published soon after 430 B.C., i.e. about half a century after the invasion. Much of his information was gathered in the course of the preceding twenty years. Although his evidence is not that of an eye-witness, he had had opportunities of meeting those who had themselves played a part in the war, on one side or the other (e.g. Thersander of Orchomenos, ix. 16). In any case, we are dealing with a tradition which is little more than a generation old, and the events to which the tradition relates, the incidents of the struggle against Xerxes, were of a nature to impress themselves indelibly upon the minds of contemporaries. Where, on the other hand, he is treating of the period anterior to the invasion of Xerxes, he is dependent upon a tradition which is never less than two generations old, and is sometimes centuries old. His informants were, at best, the sons or grandsons of the actors in the wars (e.g. Archias the Spartan, iii. 55). Moreover, the invasion of Xerxes, entailing, as it did, the destruction of cities and sanctuaries, especially of Athens and its temples, marks a dividing line in Greek history. It was not merely that evidence perished and records were destroyed. What in reference to tradition is even more important, a new consciousness of power was awakened, new interests were aroused, and new questions and problems came to the front. The former things had passed away; all things were become new. A generation that is occupied with making history on a great scale is not likely to busy itself with the history of the past. Consequently, the earlier traditions became faint and obscured, and the history difficult to reconstruct. As we trace back the conflict between Greece and Persia to its beginnings and antecedents, we are conscious that the tradition becomes less trustworthy as we pass back from one stage to another. The tradition of the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes is less credible in its details than that of the expedition of Xerxes, but it is at once fuller and more credible than the tradition of the Ionian revolt. When we get back to the Scythian expedition, we can discover but few grains of historical truth.
Much recent criticism of Herodotus has been directed against his veracity as a traveller. With this we are not here concerned. The criticism of him as an historian begins with Thucydides. Among the references of the latter writer to his predecessor are the following passages: i. 21; i. 22 ad fin.; i. 20 ad fin. (cf. Herod. ix. 53, and vi. 57 ad fin.); iii. 62 § 4 (cf. Herod. ix. 87); ii. 2 §§ 1 and 3 (cf. Herod. vii. 233); ii. 8 § 3 (cf. Herod. vi. 98). Perhaps the two clearest examples of this criticism are to be found in Thucydides’ correction of Herodotus’s account of the Cylonian conspiracy (Thuc. i. 126, cf. Herod. v. 71) and in his appreciation of the character of Themistocles—a veiled protest against the slanderous tales accepted by Herodotus (i. 138). In Plutarch’s tract “On the Malignity of Herodotus” there is much that is suggestive, although his general standpoint, viz. that Herodotus was in duty bound to suppress all that was discreditable to the valour or patriotism of the Greeks, is not that of the modern critic. It must be conceded to Plutarch that he makes good his charge of bias in Herodotus’s attitude towards certain of the Greek states. The question, however, may fairly be asked, how far this bias is personal to the author, or how far it is due to the character of the sources from which his information was derived. He cannot, indeed, altogether be acquitted of personal bias. His work is, to some extent, intended as an apologia for the Athenian empire. In answer to the charge that Athens was guilty of robbing other Greek states of their freedom, Herodotus seeks to show, firstly, that it was to Athens that the Greek world, as a whole, owed its freedom from Persia, and secondly, that the subjects of Athens, the Ionian Greeks, were unworthy to be free. This leads him to be unjust both to the services of Sparta and to the qualities of the Ionian race. For his estimate of the debt due to Athens see vii. 139. For bias against the Ionians see especially iv. 142 (cf. Thuc. vi. 77); cf. also i. 143 and 146, vi. 12-14 (Ladë), vi. 112 ad fin. A striking example of his prejudice in favour of Athens is furnished by vi. 91. At a moment when Greece rang with the crime of Athens in expelling the Aeginetans from their Island, he ventures to trace in their expulsion the vengeance of heaven for an act of sacrilege nearly sixty years earlier (see Aegina). As a rule, however, the bias apparent in his narrative is due to the sources from which it is derived. Writing at Athens, in the first years of the Peloponnesian War, he can hardly help seeing the past through an Athenian medium. It was inevitable that much of what he heard should come to him from Athenian informants, and should be coloured by Athenian prejudices. We may thus explain the leniency which he shows towards Argos and Thessaly, the old allies of Athens, in marked contrast to his treatment of Thebes, Corinth and Aegina, her deadliest foes. For Argos cf. vii. 152; Thessaly, vii. 172-174; Thebes, vii. 132, vii. 233, ix. 87; Corinth (especially the Corinthian general Adeimantus, whose son Aristeus was the most active enemy of Athens at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War), vii. 5, vii. 21, viii. 29 and 61, vii. 94; Aegina, ix. 78-80 and 85. In his intimacy with members of the great Alcmaeonid house we probably have the explanation of his depreciation of the services of Themistocles, as well as of his defence of the family from the charges brought against it in connexion with Cylon and with the incident of the shield shown on Pentelicus at the time of Marathon (v. 71, vi. 121-124). His failure to do justice to the Cypselid tyrants of Corinth (v. 92), and to the Spartan king Cleomenes, is to be accounted for by the nature of his sources—in the former case, the tradition of the Corinthian oligarchy; in the latter, accounts, partly derived from the family of the exiled king Demaratus and partly representative of the view of the ephorate. Much of the earlier history is cast in a religious mould, e.g. the story of the Mermnad kings of Lydia in book i., or of the fortunes of the colony of Cyrene (iv. 145-167). In such cases we cannot fail to recognize the influence of the Delphic priesthood. Grote has pointed out that the moralizing tendency observable in Herodotus is partly to be explained by the fact that much of his information was gathered from priests and at temples, and that it was given in explanation of votive offerings, or of the fulfilment of oracles. Hence the determination of the sources of his narrative has become one of the principal tasks of Herodotean criticism. In addition to the current tradition of Athens, the family tradition of the Alcmaeonidae, and the stories to be heard at Delphi and other sanctuaries, there may be indicated the Spartan tradition, in the form in which it existed in the middle of the 5th century; that of his native Halicarnassus, to which is due the prominence of its queen Artemisia; the traditions of the Ionian cities, especially of Samos and Miletus (important both for the history of the Mermnadae and for the Ionian Revolt); and those current in Sicily and Magna Graecia, which were learned during his residence at Thurii (Sybaris and Croton, v. 44, 45; Syracuse and Gela, vii. 153-167). Among his more special sources we can point to the descendants of Demaratus, who still held, at the beginning of the 4th century, the principality in the Troad which had been granted to their ancestor by Darius (Xen. Hell. iii. i. 6), and to the family of the Persian general Artabazus, in which the satrapy of Dascylium (Phrygia) was hereditary in the 5th century. His use of written material is more difficult to determine. It is generally agreed that the list of Persian satrapies, with their respective assessments of tribute (iii. 89-97), the description of the royal road from Sardis to Susa (v. 52-54), and of the march of Xerxes, together with the list of the contingents that took part in the expedition (vii. 26-131), are all derived from documentary and authoritative sources. From previous writers (e.g. Dionysius of Miletus, Hecataeus, Charon of Lampsacus and Xanthus the Lydian) it is probable that he has borrowed little, though the fragments are too scanty to permit of adequate comparison. His references to monuments, dedicatory offerings, inscriptions and oracles are frequent.
The chief defects of Herodotus are his failure to
o grasp the
principles of historical criticism, to understand the nature of
military operations, and to appreciate the importance of chronology. In place of historical criticism we find a crude
rationalism (e.g. ii. 45, vii. 129, viii. 8). Having no conception of
the distinction between occasion and cause, he is content to find
the explanation of great historical movements in trivial incidents
or personal motives. An example of this is furnished by his
account of the Ionian revolt, in which he fails to discover the
real causes either of the movement or of its result. Indeed, it
is clear that he regarded criticism as no part of his task as an
historian. In vii. 152 he states the principles which have guided
him—ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασι ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον.
In obedience to this principle he again and again gives two or
more versions of a story. We are thus frequently enabled to
arrive at the truth by a comparison of the discrepant traditions.
It would have been fortunate if all ancient writers who lacked
the critical genius of Thucydides had been content to adopt the
practice of Herodotus. His accounts of battles are always
unsatisfactory. The great battles, Marathon, Thermopylae,
Salamis and Plataea, present a series of problems. This result
is partly due to the character of the traditions which he follows—traditions
which were to some extent inconsistent or contradictory,
and were derived from different sources; it is, however,
in great measure due to his inability to think out a strategical
combination or a tactical movement. It is not too much to say
that the battle of Plataea, as described by Herodotus, is wholly
unintelligible. Most serious of all his deficiencies is his careless
chronology. Even in the case of the 5th century, the data
which he affords are inadequate or ambiguous. The interval
between the Scythian expedition and the Ionian revolt is
described by so vague an expression as μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν ἦν (v. 28). In the history of the revolt itself,
though he gives us the interval between its outbreak and the
fall of Miletus (ἔκτῳ ἔτεῒ, vi. 18), he does not give us the interval
between this and the battle of Ladē, nor does he indicate with
sufficient precision the years to which the successive phases of
the movement belong. Throughout the work professed synchronisms
too often prove to be mere literary devices for facilitating
a transition from one subject to another (cf. e.g. v. 81 with
89, 90; or vi. 51 with 87 and 94). In the 6th century, as Grote
pointed out, a whole generation, or more, disappears in his
historical perspective (cf. i. 30, vi. 125, v. 94, iii. 47, 48,
v. 113 contrasted with v. 104 and iv. 162). The attempts to
reconstruct the chronology of this century upon the basis of the
data afforded by Herodotus (e.g. by Beloch, Rheinisches Museum,
xlv., 1890, pp. 465-473) have completely failed.
In spite of all such defects Herodotus is an author, not only of unrivalled literary charm, but of the utmost value to the historian. If much remains uncertain or obscure, even in the history of the Persian Wars, it is chiefly to motives or policy, to topography or strategy, to dates or numbers, that uncertainty attaches. It is to these that a sober criticism will confine itself.
Thucydides is at once the father of contemporary history and the father of historical criticism. From a comparison of i. 1, i. 22 and v. 26, we may gather both the principles to which he adhered in the composition of his work and Thucydides. the conditions under which it was composed. It is seldom that the circumstances of an historical writer have been so favourable for the accomplishment of his task. Thucydides was a contemporary of the Twenty-Seven Years’ War in the fullest sense of the term. He had reached manhood at its outbreak, and he survived its close by at least half-a-dozen years. And he was more than a mere contemporary. As a man of high birth, a member of the Periclean circle, and the holder of the chief political office in the Athenian state, the strategia, he was not only familiar with the business of administration and the conduct of military operations, but he possessed in addition a personal knowledge of those who played the principal part in the political life of the age. His exile in the year 424 afforded him opportunities of visiting the scenes of distant operations (e.g. Sicily) and of coming in contact with the actors on the other side. He himself tells us that he spared no pains to obtain the best information available in each case. He also tells us that he began collecting materials for his work from the very beginning of the war. Indeed, it is probable that much of books i.-v. 24 was written soon after the Peace of Nicias (421), just as it is possible that the history of the Sicilian Expedition (books vi. and vii.) was originally intended to form a separate work. To the view, however, which has obtained wide support in recent years, that books i.-v. 22 and books vi. and vii. were separately published, the rest of book v. and book viii. being little more than a rough draught, composed after the author had adopted the theory of a single war of twenty-seven years’ duration, of which the Sicilian Expedition and the operations of the years 431-421 formed integral parts, there seem to the present writer to be insuperable objections. The work, as a whole, appears to have been composed in the first years of the 4th century, after his return from exile in 404, when the material already in existence must have been revised and largely recast. There are exceedingly few passages, such as iv. 48. 5, which appear to have been overlooked in the process of revision. It can hardly be questioned that the impression left upon the reader’s mind is that the point of view of the author, in all the books alike, is that of one writing after the fall of Athens.
The task of historical criticism in the case of the Peloponnesian War is widely different from its task in the case of the Persian Wars. It has to deal, not with facts as they appear in the traditions of an imaginative race, but with facts as they appeared to a scientific observer. Facts, indeed, are seldom in dispute. The question is rather whether facts of importance are omitted, whether the explanation of causes is correct, or whether the judgment of men and measures is just. Such inaccuracies as have been brought home to Thucydides on the strength, e.g. of epigraphic evidence, are, as a rule, trivial. His most serious errors relate to topographical details, in cases where he was dependent on the information of others. Sphacteria (see Pylos) (see G. B. Grundy, Journal of Hellenic Studies, xvi., 1896, p. 1) is a case in point. Nor have the difficulties connected with the siege of Plataea been cleared up either by Grundy or by others (see Grundy, Topography of the Battle of Plataea, &c., 1894). Where, on the contrary, he is writing at first hand his descriptions of sites are surprisingly correct. The most serious charge as yet brought against his authority as to matters of fact relates to his account of the Revolution of the Four Hundred, which appears, at first sight, to be inconsistent with the documentary evidence supplied by Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens (q.v.). It may be questioned, however, whether the documents have been correctly interpreted by Aristotle. On the whole, it is probable that the general course of events was such as Thucydides describes (see E. Meyer, Forschungen, ii. 406-436), though he failed to appreciate the position of Theramenes and the Moderate party, and was clearly misinformed on some important points of detail. With regard to the omission of facts, it is unquestionable that much is omitted that would not be omitted by a modern writer. Such omissions are generally due to the author’s conception of his task. Thus the internal history of Athens is passed over as forming no part of the history of the war. It is only where the course of the war is directly affected by the course of political events (e.g. by the Revolution of the Four Hundred) that the internal history is referred to. However much it may be regretted that the relations of political parties are not more fully described, especially in book v., it cannot be denied that from his standpoint there is logical justification even for the omission of the ostracism of Hyperbolus. There are omissions, however, which are not so easily explained. Perhaps the most notable instance is that of the raising of the tribute in 425 B.C. (see Delian League).
Nowhere is the contrast between the historical methods of Herodotus and Thucydides more apparent than in the treatment of the causes of events. The distinction between the occasion and the cause is constantly present to the mind of Thucydides, and it is his tendency to make too little rather than too much of the personal factor. Sometimes, however, it may be doubted whether his explanation of the causes of an event is adequate or correct. In tracing the causes of the Peloponnesian War itself, modern writers are disposed to allow more weight to the commercial rivalry of Corinth; while in the case of the Sicilian expedition, they would actually reverse his judgment (ii. 65 ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν). To us it seems that the very idea of the expedition implied a gigantic miscalculation of the resources of Athens and of the difficulty of the task. His judgments of men and of measures have been criticized by writers of different schools and from different points of view. Grote criticized his verdict upon Cleon, while he accepted his estimate of the policy of Pericles. More recent writers, on the other hand, have accepted his view of Cleon, while they have selected for attack his appreciation alike of the policy and the strategy of Pericles. He has been charged, too, with failure to do justice to the statesmanship of Alcibiades. There are cases, undoubtedly, in which the balance of recent opinion will be adverse to the view of Thucydides. There are many more in which the result of criticism has been to establish his view. That he should occasionally have been mistaken in his judgment and his views is certainly no detraction from his claim to greatness.
On the whole, it may be said that while the criticism of Herodotus, since Grote wrote, has tended seriously to modify our view of the Persian Wars, as well as of the earlier history, the criticism of Thucydides, in spite of its imposing bulk, has affected but slightly our view of the course of the Peloponnesian War. The labours of recent workers in this field have borne most fruit where they have been directed to subjects neglected by Thucydides, such as the history of political parties, or the organization of the empire (G. Gilbert’s Innere Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des pel. Krieges is a good example of such work).
In regard to Thucydides’ treatment of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars (the so-called Pentecontaëteris) it should be remembered that he does not profess to give, even in outline, the history of this period as a whole. The period is regarded simply as a prelude to the Peloponnesian War. There is no attempt to sketch the history of the Greek world or of Greece proper during this period. There is, indeed, no attempt to give a complete sketch of Athenian history. His object is to trace the growth of the Athenian Empire, and the causes that made the war inevitable. Much is therefore omitted not only in the history of the other Greek states, especially the Peloponnesian, but even in the history of Athens. Nor does Thucydides attempt an exact chronology. He gives us a few dates (e.g. surrender of Ithome, in the tenth year, i. 103; of Thasos, in the third year, i. 101; duration of the Egyptian expedition six years, i. 110; interval between Tanagra and Oenophyta 61 days, i. 108; revolt of Samos, in the sixth year after the Thirty Years’ Truce, i. 115), but from these data alone it would be impossible to reconstruct the chronology of the period. In spite of all that can be gleaned from our other authorities, our knowledge of this, the true period of Athenian greatness, must remain slight and imperfect as compared with our knowledge of the next thirty years.
Of the secondary authorities for this period the two principal ones are Diodorus (xi. 38 to xii. 37) and Plutarch. Diodorus is of value chiefly in relation to Sicilian affairs, to which he devotes about a third of this section of his work Diodorus. and for which he is almost our sole authority. His source for Sicilian history is the Sicilian writer Timaeus (q.v.), an author of the 3rd century B.C. For the history of Greece Proper during the Pentecontaetia Diodorus contributes comparatively little of importance. Isolated notices of particular events (e.g. the Synoecism of Elis, 471 B.C., or the foundation of Amphipolis, 437 B.C.), which appear to be derived from a chronological writer, may generally be trusted. The greater part of his narrative is, however, derived from Ephorus, who appears to have had before him little authentic information for this period of Greek history other than that afforded by Thucydides’ work. Four of Plutarch’s Lives are concerned with this period, viz. Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon and Pericles. From the Aristides little can be gained. Plutarch, in this biography, appears to be mainly dependent upon Idomeneus of Lampsacus, an excessively untrustworthy Plutarch. writer of the 3rd century B.C., who is probably to be credited with the invention of the oligarchical conspiracy at the time of the battle of Plataea (ch. 13), and of the decree of Aristides, rendering all four classes of citizens eligible for the archonship (ch. 22). The Cimon, on the other hand, contains much that is valuable; such as, e.g. the account of the battle of the Eurymedon (chs. 12 and 13). To the Pericles we owe several quotations from the Old Comedy. Two other of the Lives, Lycurgus and Solon, are amongst our most important sources for the early history of Sparta and Athens respectively. Of the two (besides Pericles) which relate to the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades adds little to what can be gained from Thucydides and Xenophon; the Nicias, on the other hand, supplements Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian expedition with many valuable details, which, it may safely be assumed, are derived from the contemporary historian, Philistus of Syracuse. Amongst the most valuable material afforded by Plutarch are the quotations, which occur in almost all the Lives, from the collection of Athenian decrees (ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή) formed by the Macedonian writer Craterus, in the 3rd century B.C. Two other works may be mentioned in connexion with the history of Athens. For the history of the Athenian Constitution The constitutions. down to the end of the 5th century B.C. Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens (q.v.) is our chief authority. The other Constitution of Athens, erroneously attributed to Xenophon, a tract of singular interest both on literary and historical grounds, throws a good deal of light on the internal condition of Athens, and on the system of government, both of the state and of the empire, in the age of the Peloponnesian War, during the earlier years of which it was composed.
To the literary sources for the history of Greece, especially of Athens, in the 5th century B.C. must be added the epigraphic. Few inscriptions have been discovered which date back beyond the Persian Wars. For the latter half Inscriptions. of the 5th century they are both numerous and important. Of especial value are the series of Quota-lists, from which can be calculated the amount of tribute paid by the subject-allies of Athens from the year 454 B.C. onwards. The great majority of the inscriptions of this period are of Athenian origin. Their value is enhanced by the fact that they relate, as a rule, to questions of organization, finance and administration, as to which little information is to be gained from the literary sources.
For the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars Busolt, Griechische Geschichte, iii. 1, is indispensable. Hill’s Sources of Greek History, B.C. 478-431 (Oxford, 1897) is excellent. It gives the most important inscriptions in a convenient form.
III. The 4th Century to the Death of Alexander.—Of the historians who flourished in the 4th century the sole writer whose works have come down to us is Xenophon. It is a singular accident of fortune that neither of the two authors, Xenophon. who at once were most representative of their age and did most to determine the views of Greek history current in subsequent generations, Ephorus (q.v.) and Theopompus (q.v.), should be extant. It was from them, rather than from Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon that the Roman world obtained its knowledge of the history of Greece in the past, and its conception of its significance. Both were pupils of Isocrates, and both, therefore, bred up in an atmosphere of rhetoric. Hence their popularity and their influence. The scientific spirit of Thucydides was alien to the temper of the 4th century, and hardly more congenial to the age of Cicero or Tacitus. To the rhetorical spirit, which is common to both, each added defects peculiar to himself. Theopompus is a strong partisan, a sworn foe to Athens and to Democracy. Ephorus, though a military historian, is ignorant of the art of war. He is also incredibly careless and uncritical. It is enough to point to his description of the battle of the Eurymedon (Diodorus xi. 60-62), in which, misled by an epigram, which he supposed to relate to this engagement (it really refers to the Athenian victory off Salamis in Cyprus, 449 B.C.), he makes the coast of Cyprus the scene of Cimon’s naval victory, and finds no difficulty in putting it on the same day as the victory on shore on the banks of the Eurymedon, in Pamphylia. Only a few fragments remain of either writer, but Theopompus (q.v.) was largely used by Plutarch in several of the Lives, while Ephorus continues to be the main source of Diodorus’ history, as far as the outbreak of the Sacred War (Fragments of Ephorus in Müller’s Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum, vol.i.; of Theopompus in Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, cum Theopompi et Cratippi fragmentis, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, 1909).
It may be at least claimed for Xenophon (q.v.) that he is free from all taint of the rhetorical spirit. It may also be claimed for him that, as a witness, he is both honest and well-informed. But, if there is no justification for the charge of deliberate falsification, it cannot be denied that he had strong political prejudices, and that his narrative has suffered from them. His historical writings are the Anabasis, an account of the expedition of the Ten Thousand, the Hellenica and the Agesilaus, a eulogy of the Spartan king. Of these the Hellenica is far the most important for the student of history. It consists of two distinct parts (though there is no ground for the theory that the two parts were separately written and published), books i. and ii., and books iii. to vii. The first two books are intended as a continuation of Thucydides’ work. They begin, quite abruptly, in the middle of the Attic year 411/10, and they carry the history down to the fall of the Thirty, in 403. Books iii. to vii., the Hellenica proper, cover the period from 401 to 362, and give the histories of the Spartan and Theban hegemonies down to the death of Epaminondas. There is thus a gap of two years between the point at which the first part ends and that at which the second part begins. The two parts differ widely, both in their aim and in the arrangement of the material. In the first part Xenophon attempts, though not with complete success, to follow the chronological method of Thucydides, and to make each successive spring, when military and naval operations were resumed after the winter’s interruption, the starting-point of a fresh section. The resemblance between the two writers ends, however, with the outward form of the narrative. All that is characteristic of Thucydides is absent in Xenophon. The latter writer shows neither skill in portraiture, nor insight into motives. He is deficient in the sense of proportion and of the distinction between occasion and cause. Perhaps his worst fault is a lack of imagination. To make a story intelligible it is necessary sometimes to put oneself in the reader’s place, and to appreciate his ignorance of circumstances and events which would be perfectly familiar to the actors in the scene or to contemporaries. It was not given to Xenophon, as it was to Thucydides, to discriminate between the circumstances that are essential and those that are not essential to the comprehension of the story. In spite, therefore, of its wealth of detail, his narrative is frequently obscure. It is quite clear that in the trial of the generals, e.g., something is omitted. It may be supplied as Diodorus has supplied it (xiii. 101), or it may be supplied otherwise. It is probable that, when under cross-examination before the council, the generals, or some of them, disclosed the commission given to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. The important point is that Xenophon himself has omitted to supply it. As it stands his narrative is unintelligible. In the first two books, though there are omissions (e.g. the loss of Nisaea, 409 B.C.), they are not so serious as in the last five, nor is the bias so evident. It is true that if the account of the rule of the Thirty given in Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens be accepted, Xenophon must have deliberately misrepresented the course of events to the prejudice of Theramenes. But it is at least doubtful whether Aristotle’s version can be sustained against Xenophon’s, though it may be admitted, not only that there are mistakes as to details in the latter writer’s narrative, but that less than justice is done to the policy and motives of the “Buskin.” The Hellenica was written, it should be remembered, at Corinth, after 362. More than forty years had thus elapsed since the events recorded in the first two books, and after so long an interval accuracy of detail, even where the detail is of importance, is not always to be expected. In the second part the chronological method is abandoned. A subject once begun is followed out to its natural ending, so that sections of the narrative which are consecutive in order are frequently parallel in point of date. A good example of this will be found in book iv. In chapters 2 to 7 the history of the Corinthian war is carried down to the end of 390, so far as the operations on land are concerned, while chapter 8 contains an account of the naval operations from 394 to 388. In this second part of the Hellenica the author’s disqualifications for his task are more apparent than in the first two books. The more he is acquitted of bias in his selection of events and in his omissions, the more clearly does he stand convicted of lacking all sense of the proportion of things. Down to Leuctra (371 B.C.) Sparta is the centre of interest, and it is of the Spartan state alone that a complete or continuous history is given. After Leuctra, if the point of view is no longer exclusively Spartan, the narrative of events is hardly less incomplete. Throughout the second part of the Hellenica omissions abound which it is difficult either to explain or justify. The formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy of 377 B.C., the foundation of Megalopolis and the restoration of the Messenian state are all left unrecorded. Yet the writer who passes them over without mention thinks it worth while to devote more than one-sixth of an entire book to a chronicle of the unimportant feats of the citizens of the petty state of Phlius. Nor is any attempt made to appraise the policy of the great Theban leaders, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The former, indeed, is mentioned only in a single passage, relating to the embassy to Susa in 368; the latter does not appear on the scene till a year later, and receives mention but twice before the battle of Mantinea. An author who omits from his narrative some of the most important events of his period, and elaborates the portraiture of an Agesilaus while not attempting the bare outline of an Epaminondas, may be honest; he may even write without a consciousness of bias; he certainly cannot rank among the great writers of history.
For the history of the 4th century Diodorus assumes a higher degree of importance than belongs to him in the earlier periods. This is partly to be explained by the deficiencies of Xenophon’s Hellenica, partly by the fact that for the Diodorus. interval between the death of Epaminondas and the accession of Alexander we have in Diodorus alone a continuous narrative of events. Books xiv. and xv. of his history include the period covered by the Hellenica. More than half of book xiv. is devoted to the history of Sicily and the reign of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse. For this period of Sicilian history he is, practically, our sole authority. In the rest of the book, as well as in book xv., there is much of value, especially in the notices of Macedonian history. Thanks to Diodorus we are enabled to supply many of the omissions of the Hellenica. Diodorus is, e.g., our sole literary authority for the Athenian naval confederation of 377. Book xvi. must rank, with the Hellenica and Arrian’s Anabasis, as one of the three principal authorities for this century, so far, at least, as works of an historical character are concerned. It is our authority for the Social and the Sacred Wars, as well as for the reign of Philip. It is a curious irony of fate that, for what is perhaps the most momentous epoch in the history of Greece, we should have to turn to a writer of such inferior capacity. For this period his material is better and his importance greater: his intelligence is as limited as ever. Who but Diodorus would be capable of narrating the siege and capture of Methone twice over, once under the year 354, and again under the year 352 (xvi. 31 and 34; cf. xii. 35 and 42; Archidamus (q.v.) dies in 434, commands Peloponnesian army in 431); or of giving three different numbers of years (eleven, ten and nine) in three different passages (chs. 14, 23 and 59) for the length of the Sacred War; or of asserting the conclusion of peace between Athens and Philip in 340, after the failure of his attack on Perinthus and Byzantium? Amongst the subjects which are omitted is the Peace of Philocrates. For the earlier chapters, which bring the narrative down to the outbreak of the Sacred War, Ephorus, as in the previous book, is Diodorus’ main source. His source for the rest of the book, i.e. for the greater part of Philip’s reign, cannot be determined. It is generally agreed that it is not the Philippica of Theopompus.
For the reign of Alexander our earliest extant authority is Diodorus, who belongs to the age of Augustus. Of the others, Q. Curtius Rufus, who wrote in Latin, lived in the reign of the emperor Claudius, Arrian and Plutarch Historians of Alexander’s reign. in the 2nd century A.D. Yet Alexander’s reign is one of the best known periods of ancient history. The Peloponnesian War and the twenty years of Roman history which begin with 63 B.C. are the only two periods which we can be said to know more fully or for which we have more trustworthy evidence. For there is no period of ancient history which was recorded by a larger number of contemporary writers, or for which better or more abundant materials were available. Of the writers actually contemporary with Alexander there were five of importance—Ptolemy, Aristobulus, Callisthenes, Onesicritus and Nearchus; and all of them occupied positions which afforded exceptional opportunities of ascertaining the facts. Four of them were officers in Alexander’s service. Ptolemy, the future king of Egypt, was one of the somatophylaces (we may, perhaps, regard them as corresponding to Napoleon’s marshals); Aristobulus was also an officer of high rank (see Arrian, Anab. vi. 29. 10); Nearchus was admiral of the fleet which surveyed the Indus and the Persian Gulf, and Onesicritus was one of his subordinates. The fifth, Callisthenes, a pupil of Aristotle, accompanied Alexander on his march down to his death in 327 and was admitted to the circle of his intimate friends. A sixth historian, Cleitarchus, was possibly also a contemporary; at any rate he is not more than a generation later. These writers had at their command a mass of official documents, such as the βασίλειοι ἐφημερίδες—the Gazette and Court Circular combined—edited and published after Alexander’s death by his secretary, Eumenes of Cardia; the σταθμοί, or records of the marches of the armies, which were carefully measured at the time; and the official reports on the conquered provinces. That these documents were made use of by the historians is proved by the references to them which are to be found in Arrian, Plutarch and Strabo; e.g. Arrian, Anab. vii. 25 and 26, and Plutarch, Alexander 76 (quotation from the βασίλειοι ἐφημερίδες); Strabo xv. 723 (reference to the σταθμοί), ii. 69 (reports drawn up on the various provinces). We have, in addition, in Plutarch numerous quotations from Alexander’s correspondence with his mother, Olympias, and with his officers. The contemporary historians may be roughly divided into two groups. On the one hand there are Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who, except in a single instance, are free from all suspicion of deliberate invention. On the other hand, there are Callisthenes, Onesicritus and Cleitarchus, whose tendency is rhetorical. Nearchus appears to have allowed full scope to his imagination in dealing with the wonders of India, but to have been otherwise veracious. Of the extant writers Arrian (q.v.) is incomparably the most valuable. His merits are twofold. As the commander of Roman legions and the author of a work on tactics, he combined a practical with a theoretical knowledge of the military art, while the writers whom he follows in the Anabasis are the two most worthy of credit, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. We may well hesitate to call in question the authority of writers who exhibit an agreement which it would be difficult to parallel elsewhere in the case of two independent historians. It may be inferred from Arrian’s references to them that there were only eleven cases in all in which he found discrepancies between them. The most serious drawback which can be alleged against them is an inevitable bias in Alexander’s favour. It would be only natural that they should pass over in silence the worst blots on their great commander’s fame. Next in value to the Anabasis comes Plutarch’s Life of Alexander, the merits of which, however, are not to be gauged by the influence which it has exercised upon literature. The Life is a valuable supplement to the Anabasis, partly because Plutarch, as he is writing biography rather than history (for his conception of the difference between the two see the famous preface, Life of Alexander, ch. i.), is concerned to record all that will throw light upon Alexander’s character (e.g. his epigrammatic sayings and quotations from his letters); partly because he tells us much about his early life, before he became king, while Arrian tells us nothing. It is unfortunate that Plutarch writes in an uncritical spirit; it is hardly less unfortunate that he should have formed no clear conception and drawn no consistent picture of Alexander’s character. Book xvii. of Diodorus and the Historiae Alexandri of Curtius Rufus are thoroughly rhetorical in spirit. It is probable that in both cases the ultimate source is the work of Clitarchus.
It is towards the end of the 5th century that a fresh source of information becomes available in the speeches of the orators, the earliest of whom is Antiphon (d. 411 B.C.). Lysias is of great importance for the history of the Thirty The orators. (see the speeches against Eratosthenes and Agoratus), and a good deal may be gathered from Andocides with regard to the last years of the 5th and the opening years of the next century. At the other end of this period Lycurgus, Hyperides and Dinarchus throw light upon the time of Philip and Alexander. The three, however, who are of most importance to the historian are Isocrates, Aeschines and Demosthenes. Isocrates (q.v.), whose long life (436-338) more than spans the interval Isocrates. between the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of Macedon at Chaeronea, is one of the most characteristic figures in the Greek world of his day. To comprehend that world the study of Isocrates is indispensable; for in an age dominated by rhetoric he is the prince of rhetoricians. It is difficult for a modern reader to do him justice, so alien is his spirit and the spirit of his age from ours. It must be allowed that he is frequently monotonous and prolix; at the same time it must not be forgotten that, as the most famous representative of rhetoric, he was read from one end of the Greek world to the other. He was the friend of Evagoras and Archidamus, of Dionysius and Philip; he was the master of Aeschines and Lycurgus amongst orators and of Ephorus and Theopompus amongst historians. No other contemporary writer has left so indelible a stamp upon the style and the sentiment of his generation. It is a commonplace that Isocrates is the apostle of Panhellenism. It is not so generally recognized that he is the prophet of Hellenism. A passage in the Panegyricus (§ 50 ὥστε τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα μήκετι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς ἡμετέρας ἤ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας) is the key to the history of the next three centuries. Doubtless he had no conception of the extent to which the East was to be hellenized. He was, however, the first to recognize that it would be hellenized by the diffusion of Greek culture rather than of Greek blood. His Panhellenism was the outcome of his recognition of the new forces and tendencies which were at work in the midst of a new generation. When Greek culture was becoming more and more international, the exaggeration of the principle of autonomy in the Greek political system was becoming more and more absurd. He had sufficient insight to be aware that the price paid for this autonomy was the domination of Persia; a domination which meant the servitude of the Greek states across the Aegean and the demoralization of Greek political life at home. His Panhellenism led him to a more liberal view of the distinction between what was Greek and what was not than was possible to the intenser patriotism of a Demosthenes. In his later orations he has the courage not only to pronounce that the day of Athens as a first-rate power is past, but to see in Philip the needful leader in the crusade against Persia. The earliest and greatest of his political orations is the Panegyricus, published in 380 B.C., midway between the peace of Antalcidas and Leuctra. It is his apologia for Panhellenism. To the period of the Social War belong the De pace (355 B.C.) and the Areopagiticus (354 B.C.), both of great value as evidence for the internal conditions of Athens at the beginning of the struggle with Macedon. The Plataicus (373 B.C.) and the Archidamus (366 B.C.) throw light upon the politics of Boeotia and the Peloponnese respectively. The Panathenaicus (339 B.C.), the child of his old age, contains little that may not be found in the earlier orations. The Philippus (346 B.C.) is of peculiar interest, as giving the views of the Macedonian party.
Not the least remarkable feature in recent historical criticism is the reaction against the view which was at one time almost universally accepted of the character, statesmanship and authority of the orator Demosthenes (q.v.). Demosthenes. During the last quarter of a century his character and statesmanship have been attacked, and his authority impugned, by a series of writers of whom Holm and Beloch are the best known. With the estimate of his character and statesmanship we are not here concerned. With regard to his value as an authority for the history of the period, it is to his speeches, and to those of his contemporaries, Aeschines, Hypereides, Dinarchus and Lycurgus, that we owe our intimate knowledge, both of the working of the constitutional and legal systems, and of the life of the people, at this period of Athenian history. From this point of view his value can hardly be overestimated. As a witness, however, to matters of fact, his authority can no longer be rated as highly as it once was, e.g. by Schaefer and by Grote. The orator’s attitude towards events, both in the past and in the present, is inevitably a different one from the historian’s. The object of a Thucydides is to ascertain a fact, or to exhibit it in its true relations. The object of a Demosthenes is to make a point, or to win his case. In their dealings with the past the orators exhibit a levity which is almost inconceivable to a modern reader. Andocides, in a passage of his speech On the Mysteries (§ 107), speaks of Marathon as the crowning victory of Xerxes’ campaign; in his speech On the Peace (§ 3) he confuses Miltiades with Cimon, and the Five Years’ Peace with the Thirty Years’ Truce. Though the latter passage is a mass of absurdities and confusions, it was so generally admired that it was incorporated by Aeschines in his speech On the Embassy (§§ 172-176). If such was their attitude towards the past; if, in order to make a point, they do not hesitate to pervert history, is it likely that they would conform to a higher standard of veracity in their statements as to the present—as to their contemporaries, their rivals or their own actions? When we compare different speeches of Demosthenes, separated by an interval of years, we cannot fail to observe a marked difference in his statements. The farther he is from the events, the bolder are his mis-statements. It is only necessary to compare the speech On the Crown with that On the Embassy, and this latter speech with the Philippics and Olynthiacs, to find illustrations. It has come to be recognized that no statement as to a matter of fact is to be accepted, unless it receives independent corroboration, or unless it is admitted by both sides. The speeches of Demosthenes may be conveniently divided into four classes according to their dates. To the pre-Philippic period belong the speeches On the Symmories (354 B.C.), On Megalopolis (352 B.C.), Against Aristocrates (351 B.C.), and, perhaps, the speech On Rhodes (? 351 B.C.). These speeches betray no consciousness of the danger threatened by Philip’s ambition. The policy recommended is one based upon the principle of the balance of power. To the succeeding period, which ends with the peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.), belong the First Philippic and the three Olynthiacs. To the period between the peace of Philocrates and Chaeronea belong the speech On the Peace (346 B.C.), the Second Philippic (344 B.C.), the speeches On the Embassy (344 B.C.) and On the Chersonese (341 B.C.), and the Third Philippic. The masterpiece of his genius, the speech On the Crown, was delivered in 330 B.C., in the reign of Alexander. Of the three extant speeches of Aeschines (q.v.) that On the Embassy is of great value, as enabling us to correct the mis-statements of Demosthenes. For the period from the death of Alexander to the fall of Corinth (323-146 B.C.) our literary authorities are singularly defective. For the Diadochi Diodorus (books xviii.-xx.) is our chief source. These books form the most valuable part of Diodorus’ work. They are mainly based upon the work of Hieronymus of Cardia, a writer who combined exceptional opportunities for ascertaining the truth (he was in the service first of Eumenes, and then of Antigonus) with an exceptional sense of its importance. Hieronymus ended his history at the death of Pyrrhus (272 B.C.), but, unfortunately, book xx. of Diodorus’ work carries us no farther than 303 B.C., and of the later books we have but scanty fragments. The narrative of Diodorus may be supplemented by the fragments of Arrian’s History of the events after Alexander’s death (which reach, however, only to 321 B.C.), and by Plutarch’s Lives of Eumenes and of Demetrius. For the rest of the 3rd century and the first half of the 2nd we have his Lives of Pyrrhus, of Aratus, of Philopoemen, and of Agis and Cleomenes. For the period from 220 B.C. onwards Polybius (q.v.) is our chief authority (see Rome: Ancient History, section “Authorities”). In a period in which the literary sources are so scanty great weight attaches to the epigraphic and numismatic evidence.
Bibliography.—The literature which deals with the history of Greece, in its various periods, departments and aspects, is of so vast a bulk that all that can be attempted here is to indicate the most important and most accessible works.
General Histories of Greece.—Down to the middle of the 19th century the only histories of Greece deserving of mention were the products of English scholarship. The two earliest of these were published about the same date, towards the end of the 18th century, nearly three-quarters of a century before any history of Greece, other than a mere compendium, appeared on the Continent. John Gillies’ History of Greece was published in 1786, Mitford’s in 1784. Both works were composed with a political bias and a political object. Gillies was a Whig. In the dedication (to George III.) he expresses the view that “the History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy, and arraigns the despotism of Tyrants, while it evinces the inestimable benefits, resulting to Liberty itself, from the steady operation of well-regulated monarchy.” Mitford was a Tory, who thought to demonstrate the evils of democracy from the example of the Athenian state. His History, in spite of its bias, was a work of real value. More than fifty years elapsed between Mitford’s work and Thirlwall’s. Connop Thirlwall, fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, afterwards bishop of St David’s, brought a sound judgment to the aid of ripe scholarship. His History of Greece, published in 1835-1838 (8 vols.), is entirely free from the controversial tone of Mitford’s volumes. Ten years later (1846) George Grote published the first volumes of his history, which was not completed (in 12 vols.) till 1856. Grote, like Mitford, was a politician—an ardent Radical, with republican sympathies. It was in order to refute the slanders of the Tory partisan that he was impelled to write a history of Greece, which should do justice to the greatest democracy of the ancient world, the Athenian state. Thus, in the case of three of these four writers, the interest in their subject was mainly political. Incomparably the greatest of these works is Grote’s. Grote had his faults and his limitations. His prejudices are strong, and his scholarship is weak; he had never visited Greece, and he knew little or nothing of Greek art; and, at the time he wrote, the importance of coins and inscriptions was imperfectly apprehended. In spite of every defect, however, his work is the greatest history of Greece that has yet been written. It is not too much to say that nobody knows Greek history till he has mastered Grote. No history of Greece has since appeared in England on a scale at all comparable to that of Grote’s work. The most important of the more recent ones is that by J. B. Bury (1 vol., 1900), formerly fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, afterwards Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. Mitford and Bury end with the death of Alexander; Gillies and Grote carry on the narrative a generation farther; while Thirlwall’s work extends to the absorption of Greece in the Roman Empire (146 B.C.).
While in France the Histoire des Grecs (ending at 146 B.C.) of Victor Duruy (new edition, 2 vols., 1883), Minister of Public Instruction under Napoleon III., is the only one that need be mentioned, in Germany there has been a succession of histories of Greece since the middle of the 19th century. Kortüm’s Geschichte Griechenlands (3 vols., 1854), a work of little merit, was followed by Max Duncker’s Geschichte der Griechen (vols. 1 and 2 published in 1856; vols. 1 and 2, Neue Folge, which bring the narrative down to the death of Pericles, in 1884; the two former volumes form vols. 5, 6 and 7 of his Geschichte des Altertums), and by the Griechische Geschichte of Ernst Curtius (3 vols., 1857-1867). An English translation of Duncker, by S. F. Alleyne, appeared in 1883 (2 vols., Bentley), and of Curtius, by A. W. Ward (5 vols., Bentley, 1868-1873). Among more recent works may be mentioned the Griechische Geschichte of Adolf Holm (4 vols., Berlin, 1886-1894; English translation by F. Clarke, 4 vols., Macmillan, 1894-1898), and histories with the same title by Julius Beloch (3 vols., Strassburg, 1893-1904) and Georg Busolt (2nd ed., 3 vols., Gotha, 1893-1904). Holm carries on the narrative to 30 B.C., Beloch to 217 B.C., Busolt to Chaeronea (338 B.C.). Busolt’s work is entirely different in character from any other history of Greece. The writer’s object is to refer in the notes (which constitute five-sixths of the book) to the views of every writer in any language upon every controverted question. It is absolutely indispensable, as a work of reference, for any serious study of Greek history. The ablest work since Grote’s is Eduard Meyer’s Geschichte des Altertums, of which 5 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1884-1902) have appeared, carrying the narrative down to the death of Epaminondas (362 B.C.). Vols. 2-5 are principally concerned with Greek history. It must be remembered that, partly owing to the literary finds and the archaeological discoveries of the last thirty years, and partly owing to the advance made in the study of epigraphy and numismatics, all the histories published before those of Busolt, Beloch, Meyer and Bury are out of date.
Works bearing on the History of Greece.—Earlier works and editions are omitted, except in the case of a work which has not been superseded.
Introductions.—C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte (1 vol., Leipzig, 1895); E. Meyer, Forschungen zur alten Geschichte (2 parts, Halle, 1892-1899; quite indispensable); J. B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians (London, 1909).
Constitutional History and Institutions.—G. F. Schömann, Griechische Altertümer (2 vols., Berlin, 1855-1859; vol. i., tr. by E. G. Hardy and J. S. Mann, Rivingtons, 1880); G. Gilbert, Griechische Staatsaltertümer (2nd ed., 2 vols., Leipzig, 1893; vol. i. tr. by E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin, Swan Sonnenschein, 1895); K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Antiquitäten (6th ed., 4 vols., Freiburg, 1882-1895); Iwan Müller, Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft (9 vols., Nördlingen, 1886, in progress; several of the volumes are concerned with Greek history); J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig, 1905, in progress); A. H. J. Greenidge, Handbook of Greek Constitutional History (1 vol., Macmillan, 1896); Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1894 foll.).
Geography.—E. H. Bunbury, History of Ancient Geography amongst the Greeks and Romans (2nd ed., 2 vols., Murray, 1883), W. M. Leake, Travels in the Morea (3 vols., 1830), and Travels in Northern Greece (4 vols., 1834); H. F. Tozer, Lectures on the Geography of Greece (1 vol., Murray, 1873), and History of Ancient Geography (1 vol., Cambridge, 1897); J. P. Mahaffy, Rambles and Studies in Greece (3rd ed., 1 vol., Macmillan, 1887, an admirable book); C. Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland (2 vols., Leipzig, 1872); H. Berger, Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen (4 parts, Leipzig, 1887-1893); Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos (2 vols., Gotha, 1850-1851).
Epigraphy and Numismatics.—Corpus inscriptionum Atticarum (Berlin, 1875, in progress), Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum (Berlin, 1892, in progress). The following selections of Greek inscriptions may be mentioned: E. F. Hicks and G. F. Hill, Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions (new ed., 1 vol., Oxford, 1901): W. Dittenberger, Sylloge inscriptionum Graecarum (2nd ed., 2 vols., Berlin, 1898); C. Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques (Paris, 1900). Among works on numismatics the English reader may refer to B. V. Head, Historia numorum (1 vol., Oxford, 1887); G. F. Hill, Handbook of Greek and Roman Coins (1 vol., Macmillan, 1899), as well as to the British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins. In French the most important general work is the Monnaies grecques of F. Imhoof-Blumer (Paris, 1883).
Chronology, Trade, War, Social Life, &c.—H. F. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici (3rd ed., 3 vols., Oxford, 1841, a work of which English scholarship may well be proud; it is still invaluable for the study of Greek chronology); B. Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb im griechischen Altertume (1 vol., Halle, 1869; this is still the best book on Greek commerce); J. Beloch, Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (1 vol., Leipzig, 1886); W. Rüstow and H. Köchly, Geschichte des griechischen Kriegswesens (1 vol., Aarau, 1852); J. P. Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece (2nd ed., 1 vol., 1875). (E. M. W.)
b. Post-Classical: 146 B.C.-A.D. 1800
I. The Period of Roman Rule.—(i.) Greece under the Republic (146-27 B.C.). After the collapse of the Achaean League (q.v.) the Senate appointed a commission to reorganize Greece as a Roman dependency. Corinth, the chief centre of resistance, was destroyed and its inhabitants sold into slavery. In addition to this act of exemplary punishment, which may perhaps have been inspired in part by the desire to crush a commercial competitor, steps were taken to obviate future insurrections. The national and cantonal federations were dissolved, commercial intercourse between cities was restricted, and the government transferred from the democracies to the propertied classes, whose interests were bound up with Roman supremacy. In other respects few changes were made in existing institutions. Some favoured states like Athens and Sparta retained their full sovereign rights as civitates liberae, the other cities continued to enjoy local self-government. The ownership of the land was not greatly disturbed by confiscations, and though a tribute upon it was levied, this impost may not have been universal. General powers of supervision were entrusted to the governor of Macedonia, who could reserve cases of high treason for his decision, and in case of need send troops into the country. But although Greece was in the provincia of the Macedonian proconsul, in the sense of belonging to his sphere of command, its status was in fact more favourable than that of other provincial dependencies.
This settlement was acquiesced in by the Greek people, who had come to realize the hopelessness of further resistance. The internal disorder which was arising from the numerous disputes about property rights consequent upon the political revolutions was checked by the good offices of the historian Polybius, whom the Senate deputed to mediate between the litigants. The pacification of the country eventually became so complete that the Romans withdrew the former restrictions upon intercourse and allowed some of the leagues to revive. But its quiet was seriously disturbed during the first Mithradatic War (88-84 B.C.), when numerous Greek states sided with Mithradates (q.v.). The success which the invader experienced in detaching the Greeks from Rome is partly to be explained by the skilful way in which his agents incited the imperialistic ambitions of prominent cities like Athens, partly perhaps by his promises of support to the democratic parties. The result of the war was disastrous to Greece. Apart from the confiscations and exactions by which the Roman general L. Cornelius Sulla punished the disloyal communities, the extensive and protracted campaigns left Central Greece in a ruinous condition. During the last decades of the Roman republic European Greece was scarcely affected by contemporary wars nor yet exploited by Roman magistrates in the same systematic manner as most other provinces. Yet oppression by officials who traversed Greece from time to time and demanded lavish entertainments and presentations in the guise of viaticum or aurum coronarium was not unknown. Still greater was the suffering produced by the rapacity of Roman traders and capitalists: it is recorded that Sicyon was reduced to sell its most cherished art treasures in order to satisfy its creditors. A more indirect but none the less far-reaching drawback to Greek prosperity was the diversion of trade which followed upon the establishment of direct communication between Italy and the Levant. The most lucrative source of wealth which remained to the European Greeks was pasturage in large domains, an industry which almost exclusively profited the richer citizens and so tended to widen the breach between capitalists and the poorer classes, and still further to pauperize the latter. The coast districts and islands also suffered considerably from swarms of pirates who, in the absence of any strong fleet in Greek waters, were able to obtain a firm footing in Crete and freely plundered the chief trading places and sanctuaries; the most notable of such visitations was experienced in 69 B.C. by the island of Delos. This evil came to an end with the general suppression of piracy in the Mediterranean by Pompey (67 B.C.), but the depopulation which it had caused in some regions is attested by the fact that the victorious admiral settled some of his captives on the desolated coast strip of Achaea.
In the conflict between Julius Caesar and Pompey the Greeks provided the latter with a large part of his excellent fleet. In 48 B.C. the decisive campaign of the war was fought on Greek soil, and the resources of the land were severely taxed by the requisitions of both armies. As a result of Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus, the whole country fell into his power; the treatment which it received was on the whole lenient, though individual cities were punished severely. After the murder of Caesar the Greeks supported the cause of Brutus (42 B.C.), but were too weak to render any considerable service. In 39 B.C. the Peloponnese for a short time was made over to Sextus Pompeius. During the subsequent period Greece remained in the hands of M. Antonius (Mark Antony), who imposed further exactions in order to defray the cost of his wars. The extensive levies which he made in 31 B.C. for his campaign against Octavian, and the contributions which his gigantic army required, exhausted the country’s resources so completely that a general famine was prevented only by Octavian’s prompt action after the battle of Actium in distributing supplies of grain and evacuating the land with all haste. The depopulation which resulted from the civil wars was partly remedied by the settlement of Italian colonists at Corinth and Patrae by Julius Caesar and Octavian; on the other hand, the foundation of Nicopolis (q.v.) by the latter merely had the effect of transferring the people from the country to the city.
(ii.) The Early Roman Empire (27 B.C.-A.D. 323).—Under the emperor Augustus Thessaly was incorporated with Macedonia; the rest of Greece was converted into the province of Achaea, under the control of a senatorial proconsul resident at Corinth. Many states, including Athens and Sparta, retained their rights as free and nominally independent cities. The provincials were encouraged to send delegates to a communal synod (κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαίων) which met at Argos to consider the general interests of the country and to uphold national Hellenic sentiment; the Delphic amphictyony was revived and extended so as to represent in a similar fashion northern and central Greece.
Economic conditions did not greatly improve under the empire. Although new industries sprang up to meet the needs of Roman luxury, and Greek marble, textiles and table delicacies were in great demand, the only cities Social conditions. which regained a really flourishing trade were the Italian communities of Corinth and Patrae. Commerce languished in general, and the soil was mainly abandoned to pasturage. Though certain districts retained a measure of prosperity, e.g. Thessaly, Phocis, Elis, Argos and Laconia, huge tracts stood depopulated and many notable cities had sunk into ruins; Aetolia, Acarnania and Epirus never recovered from the effects of former wars and from the withdrawal of their surviving inhabitants into Nicopolis. Such wealth as remained was amassed in the hands of a few great landowners and capitalists; the middle class continued to dwindle, and large numbers of the people were reduced to earning a precarious subsistence, supplemented by frequent doles and largesses.
The social aspect of Greek life henceforward becomes its most attractive feature. After a long period of storm and stress, the European Hellenes had relapsed into a quiet and resigned frame of mind which stands in sharp contrast on the one hand with the energy and ability, and on the other with the vulgar intriguing of their Asiatic kinsmen. Seeing no future before them, the inhabitants were content to dwell in contemplation amid the glories of the past. National pride was fostered by the undisguised respect with which the leading Romans of the age treated Hellenic culture. And although this sentiment could degenerate into antiquarian pedantry and vanity, such as finds its climax in the diatribes of Apollonius of Tyana against the “barbarians,” it prevented the nation from sinking into some of the worst vices of the age. A healthy social tone repressed extravagant luxury and the ostentatious display of wealth, and good taste long checked the spread of gladiatorial contests beyond the Italian community of Corinth. The most widespread abuse of that period, the adulation and adoration of emperors, was indeed introduced into European Greece and formed an essential feature of the proceedings at the Delphic amphictyony, but it never absorbed the energies of the people in the same way as it did in Asia. In order to perpetuate their old culture, the Greeks continued to set great store by classical education, and in Athens they possessed an academic centre which gradually became the chief university of the Roman empire. The highest representatives of this type of old-world refinement are to be found in Dio Chrysostom and especially in Plutarch of Chaeroneia (q.v.).
The relations between European Greece and Rome were practically confined to the sphere of scholarship. The Hellenes had so far lost their warlike qualities that they supplied scarcely any recruits to the army. They retained too much local patriotism to crowd into the official careers of senators or imperial servants. Although in the 1st century A.D. the astute Greek man of affairs and the Graeculus esuriens of Juvenal abounded in Rome, both these classes were mainly derived from the less pure-blooded population beyond the Aegean.
The influx of Greek rhetoricians and professors into Italy during the 2nd and 3rd centuries was balanced by the large number of travellers who came to Greece to frequent its sanatoria, and especially to admire its works of art; the abundance in which these latter were preserved is strikingly attested in the extant record of Pausanias (about A.D. 170).
The experience of the Greeks under their earliest governors seems to have been unfortunate, for in A.D. 15 they petitioned Tiberius to transfer the administration to an imperial legate. This new arrangement was sanctioned, but Roman administration. only lasted till A.D. 44, when Claudius restored the province to the senate. The proconsuls of the later 1st and 2nd centuries were sometimes ill qualified for their posts, but cases of oppression are seldom recorded against them. The years 66 and 67 were marked by a visit of the emperor Nero, who made a prolonged tour through Greece in order to display his artistic accomplishments at the various national festivals. In return for the flattering reception accorded to him he bestowed freedom and exemption from tribute upon the country. But this favour was almost neutralized by the wholesale depredations which he committed among the chief collections of art. A scheme for cutting through the Corinthian isthmus and so reviving the Greek carrying trade was inaugurated in his presence, but soon abandoned.
As Nero’s grant of self-government brought about a recrudescence of misplaced ambition and party strife, Vespasian revoked the gift and turned Achaea again into a province, at the same time burdening it with increased taxes. In the 2nd century a succession of genuinely phil-Hellenic emperors made serious attempts to revive the nation’s prosperity. Important material benefits were conferred by Hadrian, who made a lengthy visit to Greece. Besides erecting useful public works in many cities, he relieved Achaea of its arrears of tribute and exempted it from various imposts. In order to check extravagance on the part of the free cities, he greatly extended the practice of placing them under the supervision of imperial functionaries known as correctores. Hadrian fostered national sentiment by establishing a new pan-Hellenic congress at Athens, while he gave recognition to the increasing ascendancy of Hellenic culture at Rome by his institution of the Athenaeum.
In the 3rd century the only political event of importance was the edict of Caracalla which threw open the Roman citizenship to large numbers of provincials. Its chief effect in Greece was to diminish the preponderance of the wealthy classes, who formerly had used their riches to purchase the franchise and so to secure exemption from taxation. The chief feature of this period is the renewal of the danger from foreign invasions. Already in 175 a tribe named Costoboci had penetrated into central Greece, but was there broken up by the local militia. In 253 a threatened attack was averted by the stubborn resistance of Thessalonica. In 267-268 the province was overrun by Gothic bands, which captured Athens and some other towns, but were finally repulsed by the Attic levies and exterminated with the help of a Roman fleet.
(iii.) The Late Roman Empire.—After the reorganization of the empire by Diocletian, Achaea occupied a prominent position in the “diocese” of Macedonia. Under Constantine I. it was included in the “prefecture” of Illyricum. It was subdivided into the “eparchies” of Hellas, Peloponnesus, Nicopolis and the islands, with headquarters at Thebes, Corinth, Nicopolis and Samos. Thessaly was incorporated with Macedonia. A complex hierarchy of imperial officials was now introduced and the system of taxation elaborated so as to yield a steady revenue to the central power. The levying of the land-tax was imposed upon the δεκάπρωτοι or “ten leading men,” who, like the Latin decuriones, were entrusted henceforth with the administration in most cities. The tendency to reduce all constitutions to the Roman municipal pattern became prevalent under the rulers of this period, and the greater number of them was stereotyped by the general regulations of the Codex Theodosianus (438). Although the elevation of Constantinople to the rank of capital was prejudicial to Greece, which felt the competition of the new centre of culture and learning and had to part with numerous works of art destined to embellish its privileged neighbour, the general level of prosperity in the 4th century was rising. Commercial stagnation was checked by a renewed expansion of trade consequent upon the diversion of the trade routes to the east from Egypt to the Euxine and Aegean Seas. Agriculture remained in a depressed condition, and many small proprietors were reduced to serfdom; but the fiscal interests of the government called for the good treatment of this class, whose growth at the expense of the slaves was an important step in the gradual equalization of the entire population under the central despotism which restored solidarity to the Greek nation.
This prosperity received a sharp set-back by a series of unusually severe earthquakes in 375 and by the irruption of a host of Visigoths under Alaric (395-396), whom the imperial officers allowed to overrun the whole land unmolested and the local levies were unable to check. Though ultimately hunted down in Arcadia and induced to leave the province, Alaric had time to execute systematic devastations which crippled Greece for several decades. The arrears of taxation which accumulated in consequence were remitted by Theodosius II. in 428.
The emperors of the 4th century made several attempts to stamp out by edict the old pagan religion, which, with its accompaniment of festivals, oracles and mysteries, still maintained an outward appearance of vigour, and, along with the philosophy in which the intellectual classes found comfort, retained the affection of the Greeks. Except for the decree of Theodosius I. by which the Olympian games were interdicted (394), these measures had no great effect, and indeed were not rigorously enforced. Paganism survived in Greece till about 600, but the interchange of ideas and practices which the long-continued contact with Christianity had effected considerably modified its character. Hence the Christian religion, though slow in making its way, eventually gained a sure footing among a nation which accepted it spontaneously. The hold of the Church upon the Greeks was strengthened by the judicious manner in which the clergy, unsupported by official patronage and often out of sympathy with the Arian emperors, identified itself with the interests of the people. Though in the days when the orthodox Church found favour at court corruption spread among its higher branches, the clergy as a whole rendered conspicuous service in opposing the arbitrary interferences of the central government and in upholding the use of the Hellenic tongue, together with some rudiments of Hellenic culture.
The separation of the eastern and western provinces of the empire ultimately had an important effect in restoring the language and customs of Greece to their predominant position in the Levant. This result, however, was long retarded by the romanizing policy of Constantine and his successors. The emperors of the 5th and 6th centuries had no regard for Greek culture, and Justinian I. actively counteracted Hellenism by propagating Roman law in Greece, by impairing the powers of the self-governing cities, and by closing the philosophical schools at Athens (529). In course of time the inhabitants had so far forgotten their ancient culture that they abandoned the name of Hellenes for that of Romans (Rhomaioi). For a long time Greece continued to be an obscure and neglected province, with no interests beyond its church and its commercial operations, and its culture declined rapidly. Its history for some centuries dwindles into a record of barbarian invasions which, in addition to occasional plagues and earthquakes, seem to have been the only events found worthy of record by the contemporary chroniclers.
In the 5th century Greece was only subjected to brief raids by Vandal pirates (466-474) and Ostrogoths (482). In Justinian’s reign irruptions by Huns and Avars took place, but led to no far-reaching results. The emperor had endeavoured to strengthen the country’s defences by repairing the fortifications of cities and frontier posts (530), but his policy of supplanting the local guards by imperial troops and so rendering the natives incapable of self-defence was ill-advised; fortunately it was never carried out with energy, and so the Greek militias were occasionally able to render good service against invaders.
Towards the end of the century mention is made for the first time of an incursion by Slavonic tribes (581). These invaders are to be regarded as merely the forerunners of a steady movement of immigration by which a considerable Slavonic immigrations. part of Greece passed for a time into foreign hands. It is doubtful how far the newcomers won their territory by force of arms; in view of the desolation of many rural tracts, which had long been in progress as a result of economic changes, it seems probable that numerous settlements were made on unoccupied land and did not challenge serious opposition. At any rate the effect upon the Greek population was merely to accelerate its emigration from the interior to the coastland and the cities. The foreigners, consisting mainly of Slovenes and Wends, occupied the mountainous inland, where they mostly led a pastoral life; the natives retained some strips of plain and dwelt secure in their walled towns, among which the newly-built fortresses of Monemvasia, Corone and Calamata soon rose to prosperity. The Slavonic element, to judge by the geographical names in that tongue which survive in Greece, is specially marked in N.W. Greece and Peloponnesus; central Greece appears to have been protected against them by the fortress-square of Chalcis, Thebes, Corinth and Athens. For a long time the two nations dwelt side by side without either displacing the other. The Slavs were too rude and poor, and too much distracted with cantonal feuds, to make any further headway; the Greeks, unused to arms and engrossed in commerce, were content to adopt a passive attitude. The central government took no steps to dislodge the invaders, until in 783 the empress Irene sent an expedition which reduced most of the tribes to pay tribute. In 810 a desperate attempt by the Slavs to capture Patrae was foiled; henceforth their power steadily decreased and their submission to the emperor was made complete by 850. A powerful factor in their subjugation was the Greek clergy, who by the 10th century had christianized and largely hellenized all the foreigners save a remnant in the peninsula of Maina.
II. The Byzantine Period.—In the 7th century the Greek language made its way into the imperial army and civil service, but European Greece continued to have little voice in the administration. The land was divided into four “themes” under a yearly appointed civil and military governor. Imperial troops were stationed at the chief strategic points, while the natives contributed ships for naval defence. During the dispute about images the Greeks were the backbone of the image-worshipping party, and the iconoclastic edicts of Leo III. led to a revolt in 727 which, however, was easily crushed by the imperial fleet; a similar movement in 823, when the Greeks sent 350 ships to aid a pretender, met with the same fate. The firm government of the Isaurian dynasty seems to have benefited Greece, whose commerce and industry again became flourishing. In spite of occasional set-backs due to the depredations of pirates, notably the Arab corsairs who visited the Aegean from the 7th century onwards, the Greeks remained the chief carriers in the Levant until the rise of the Italian republics, supplying all Europe with its silk fabrics.
In the 10th century Greece experienced a renewal of raids from the Balkan tribes. The Bulgarians made incursions after 929 and sometimes penetrated to the Isthmus; but they mostly failed to capture the cities, and in 995 their strength was broken by a crushing defeat on the Spercheius at the hands of the Byzantine army. Yet their devastations greatly thinned the population of northern Greece, and after 1084 Thessaly was occupied without resistance by nomad tribes of Vlachs. In 1084 also Greece was subjected to the first attack from the new nations of the west, when the Sicilian Normans gained a footing in the Ionian islands. The same people made a notable raid upon the seaboard of Greece in 1145-1146, and sacked the cities of Thebes and Corinth. The Venetians also appear as rivals of the Greeks, and after 1122 their encroachments in the Aegean Sea never ceased.
In spite of these attacks, the country on the whole maintained its prosperity. The travellers Idrīsī of Palermo (1153) and Benjamin of Tudela (1161) testify to the briskness of commerce, which induced many foreign merchants to take up their residence in Greece. But this prosperity revived an aristocracy of wealth which used its riches and power for purely selfish ends, and under the increasing laxity of imperial control the archontes or municipal rulers often combined with the clergy in oppressing the poorer classes. Least of all were these nobles prepared to become the champions of Greece against foreign invaders at a time when they alone could have organized an effectual resistance.
III. The Latin Occupation and Turkish Conquest.—The capture of Constantinople and dissolution of the Byzantine empire by the Latins (1204) brought in its train an invasion of Greece by Frankish barons eager for new territory. The natives, who had long forgotten the use of arms and dreaded no worse oppression from their new masters, submitted almost without resistance, and only the N.W. corner of Greece, where Michael Angelus, a Byzantine prince, founded the “despotat” of Epirus, was saved from foreign occupation. The rest of the country was divided up between a number of Frankish barons, chief among whom were the dukes of Achaea (or Peloponnese) and “grand signors” of Thebes and Athens, the Venetians, who held naval stations at different points and the island of Crete, and various Italian adventurers who mainly settled in the Cyclades. The conquerors transplanted their own language, customs and religion to their new possessions, and endeavoured to institute the feudal system of land-tenure. Yet recognizing the superiority of Greek civil institutions they allowed the natives to retain their law and internal administration and confirmed proprietors in possession of their land on payment of a rent; the Greek church was subordinated to the Roman archbishops, but upheld its former control over the people. The commerce and industry of the Greek cities was hardly affected by the change of government.
Greek history during the Latin occupation loses its unity and has to be followed in several threads. In the north the “despots” of Epirus extended their rule to Thessaly and Macedonia, but eventually were repulsed by the Asiatic Greeks of Nicaea, and after a decisive defeat at Pelagonia (1259) reduced to a small dominion round Iannina. Thessaly continued to change masters rapidly. Till 1308 it was governed by a branch line of the Epirote dynasty. When this family died out it fell to the Grand Catalan Company; in 1350 it was conquered along with Epirus by Stephen Dushan, king of Servia. About 1397 it was annexed by the Ottoman Turks, who after 1431 also gradually wrested Epirus from its latest possessors, the Beneventine family of Tocco (1390-1469).
The leading power in central Greece was the Burgundian house de la Roche, which established a mild and judicious government in Boeotia and Attica and in 1261 was raised to ducal rank by the French king Louis IX. A conflict with the Grand Catalan Company resulted in a disastrous defeat of the Franks on the Boeotian Cephissus (1311) and the occupation of central Greece by the Spanish mercenaries, who seized for themselves the barons’ fiefs and installed princes from the Sicilian house of Aragon as “dukes of Athens and Neopatras” (Thessaly). After seventy-five years of oppressive rule and constant wars with their neighbours the Catalans were expelled by the Peloponnesian baron Nerio Acciaiuoli. The new dynasty, whose peaceful government revived its subjects’ industry, became tributary to the Turks about 1415, but was deposed by Sultan Mahommed II., who annexed central Greece in 1456.
The conquest of the Peloponnese was effected by two French knights, William Champlitte and Geoffrey Villehardouin, the latter of whom founded a dynasty of “princes of all Achaea.” The rulers of this line were men of ability, who controlled their barons and spiritual vassals with a firm hand and established good order throughout their province. The Franks of the Morea maintained as high a standard of culture as their compatriots at home, while the natives grew rich enough from their industry to pay considerable taxes without discontent. The climax of the Villehardouins’ power was attained under Prince William, who subdued the last independent cities of the coast and the mountaineers of Maina (1246-1248). In 1259, however, the same ruler was involved in the war between the rulers of Epirus and Nicaea, and being captured at the battle of Pelagonia, could only ransom himself by the cession of Laconia to the restored Byzantine empire. This new dependency after 1349 was treated with great care by the Byzantine monarchs, who sought to repress the violence of the local aristocracies by sending their kinsmen to govern under the title of “despots.” On the other hand, with the extinction of the Villehardouin dynasty the Frankish province fell more and more into anarchy; at the same time the numbers of the foreigners were constantly dwindling through war, and as they disdained to recruit them by intermarriage, the preponderance of the native element in the Morea eventually became complete. Thus by 1400 the Byzantines were enabled to recover control over almost the whole peninsula and apportion it among several “despots.” But the mutual quarrels of these princes soon proved fatal to their rule. Already in the 14th century they had employed Albanians and the Turkish pirates who harried their coasts as auxiliaries in their wars. The Albanians largely remained as settlers, and the connexion with the Turks could no longer be shaken off. In spite of attempts to fortify the Isthmus (1415) an Ottoman army penetrated into Morea and deported many inhabitants in 1423. An invasion of central Greece by the despot Constantine was punished by renewed raids in 1446 and 1450. In 1457 the despot Thomas withheld the tribute which he had recently stipulated to pay, but was reduced to obedience by an expedition under Mahommed II. (1458). A renewed revolt in 1459 was punished by an invasion attended with executions and deportations on a large scale, and by the annexation of the Morea to Turkey (1460).
IV. The Turkish Dominion till 1800.—Under the Ottoman government Greece was split up into six sanjaks or military divisions: (1) Morea, (2) Epirus, (3) Thessaly, (4) Euboea, Boeotia and Attica, (5) Aetolia and Acarnania, (6) the rest of central Greece, with capitals at Nauplia, Jannina, Trikkala, Negropont (Chalkis), Karlili and Lepanto; further divisions were subsequently composed of Crete and the islands. In each sanjak a number of fiefs was apportioned to Turkish settlers, who were bound in return to furnish some mounted men for the sultan’s army, the total force thus held in readiness being over 7000. The local government was left in the hands of the archontes or primates in each community, who also undertook the farming of the taxes and the policing of their districts. Law was usually administered by the Greek clergy. The natives were not burdened with large imposts, but the levying of the land-tithes was effected in an inconvenient fashion, and the capitation-tax, to which all Christians were subjected was felt as a humiliation. A further grievance lay in the requisitions of forced labour which the pashas were entitled to call for; but the most galling exaction was the tribute of children for the recruiting of the Janissaries (q.v.), which was often levied with great ruthlessness. The habitual weakness of the central government also left the Greeks exposed to frequent oppression by the Turkish residents and by their own magistrates and clergy. But the new rulers met with singularly little opposition. The dangerous elements of the population had been cleared away by Mahommed’s executions; the rest were content to absorb their energies in agriculture and commerce, which in spite of preferential duties and capitulations to foreign powers largely fell again into the hands of Greeks. Another important instrument by which the people were kept down was their own clergy, whom the Turkish rulers treated with marked favour and so induced to acquiesce in their dominion.
In the following centuries Greece was often the theatre of war in which the Greeks played but a passive part. Several wars with Venice (1463-79, 1498-1504) put the Turks in possession of the last Italian strongholds on the mainland. But the issue was mainly fought out on sea; the conflicts which had never ceased in the Aegean since the coming of the Italians now grew fiercer than ever; Greek ships and sailors were frequently requisitioned for the Turkish fleets, and the damage done to the Greek seaboard by the belligerents and by fleets of adventurers and corsairs brought about the depopulation of many islands and coast-strips. The conquest of the Aegean by the Ottomans was completed by 1570; but Venice retained Crete till 1669 and never lost Corfu until its cession to France in 1797.
In 1684 the Venetians took advantage of the preoccupation of Turkey on the Danube to attack the Morea. A small mercenary army under Francesco Morosini captured the strong places with remarkable ease, and by 1687 had conquered almost the whole peninsula. In 1687 the invaders also captured Athens and Lepanto; but the former town had soon to be abandoned, and with their failure to capture Negropont (1688) the Venetians were brought to a standstill. By the peace of Karlowitz (1699) the Morea became a possession of Venice. The new rulers, in spite of the commercial restrictions which they imposed in favour of their own traders, checked the impoverishment and decrease of population (from 300,000 to 86,000) which the war had caused. By their attempts to cooperate with the native magistrates and the mildness of their administration they improved the spirit of their subjects. But they failed to make their government popular, and when in 1715 the Ottomans with a large and well-disciplined army set themselves to recover the Morea, the Venetians were left without support from the Greeks. The peninsula was rapidly recaptured and by the peace of Passarowitz (1718) again became a Turkish dependency. The gaps left about this time in the Greek population were largely made up by an immigration from Albania.
The condition of the Greeks in the 18th century showed a great improvement which gave rise to yet greater hopes. Already in the 17th century the personal services of the subjects had been commuted into money contributions, and since 1676 the tribute of children fell into abeyance. The increasing use of Greek officials in the Turkish civil service, coupled with the privileges accorded to the Greek clergy throughout the Balkan countries, tended to recall the consciousness of former days of predominance in the Levant. Lastly, the education of the Greeks, which had always remained on a comparatively high level, was rapidly improved by the foundation of new schools and academies.
The long neglect which Greece had experienced at the hands of the European Powers was broken in 1764, when Russian agents appeared in the country with promises of a speedy deliverance from the Turks. A small expedition under Feodor and Alexis Orloff actually landed in the Morea in 1769, but failed to rouse national sentiment. Although the Russian fleet gained a notable victory off Chesme near Chios, a heavy defeat near Tripolitza ruined the prospects of the army. The Albanian troops in the Turkish army subsequently ravaged the country far and wide, until in 1779 they were exterminated by a force of Turkish regulars. In 1774 a concession, embodied in the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, by which Greek traders were allowed to sail under the protection of the Russian flag, marked an important step in the rehabilitation of the country as an independent power. Greek commerce henceforth spread swiftly over the Mediterranean, and increased intercourse developed a new sense of Hellenic unity. Among the pioneers who fostered this movement should be mentioned Constantine Rhigas, the “modern Tyrtaeus,” and Adamantios Coraës (q.v.), the reformer of the Greek tongue. The revived memories of ancient Hellas and the impression created by the French revolution combined to give the final impulse which made the Greeks strike for freedom. By 1800 the population of Greece had increased to 1,000,000, and although 200,000 of these were Albanians, the common aversion to the Moslem united the two races. The military resources of the country alone remained deficient, for the armatoli or local militias, which had never been quite disbanded since Byzantine times, were at last suppressed by Ali Pasha of Iannina and found but a poor substitute in the klephts who henceforth spring into prominence. But at the first sign of weakness in the Turkish dominion the Greek nation was ready to rise, and the actual outbreak of revolt had become merely a question of time.
Authorities.—General: G. Finlay, History of Greece (ed. Tozer, Oxford, 1877), especially vols. i., iv., v.; K. Paparrhigopoulos, Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους (4th ed., Athens, 1903), vols. ii.-v.; Histoire de la civilisation hellénique (Paris, 1878); R. v. Scala, Das Griechentum seit Alexander dem Grossen (Leipzig and Vienna, 1904); and specially W. Miller, The Latins in the Levant (1908).
Special—(a) The Roman period: Strabo, bks. viii.-x.; Pausanias, Descriptio Graeciae; G. F. Hertzberg, Die Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer (Halle, 1866-1875); Sp. Lampros, Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Athens, 1888 sqq.), vol. iii.; A. Holm, History of Greece (Eng. trans., London, 1894-1898). vol. iv., chs. 19, 24, 26, 28 seq.; Th. Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire (Eng. trans., London, 1886, ch. 7); J. P. Mahaffy, The Greek World under Roman Sway, from Polybius to Plutarch (London, 1890); W. Miller, “The Romans in Greece” (Westminster Review, August 1903, pp. 186-210); L. Friedländer, “Griechenland unter den Römern” (Deutsche Rundschau, 1899, pp. 251-274, 402-430). (b) The Byzantine and Latin periods: G. F. Hertzberg, Geschichte Griechenlands seit dem Absterben des antiken Lebens (Gotha, 1876-1879), vols. i., ii.; C. Hopf, Geschichte Griechenlands im Mittelalter (Leipzig, 1868); J. A. Buchon, Histoire des conquêtes et de l’établissement des Français dans les États de l’ancienne Grèce (Paris, 1846); G. Schmitt, The Chronicle of Morea (London, 1904); W. Miller, “The Princes of the Peloponnese” (Quarterly Review, July 1905, pp. 109-135); D. Bikelas, Seven Essays on Christian Greece (Paisley and London, 1890); La Grèce byzantine et moderne (Paris, 1893), pp. 1-193. (c) The Turkish and Venetian periods: Hertzberg, op. cit., vol. iii.; K. M. Bartholdy, Geschichte Griechenlands von der Eroberung Konstantinopels (Leipzig, 1870), bks. i. and ii., pp. 1-155; K. N. Sathas, Τουρκοκρατουμένη Ἑλλάς (Athens, 1869); W. Miller, “Greece under the Turks” (Westminster Review, August and September 1904, pp. 195-210, 304-320; English Historical Review, 1904, pp. 646-668); L. Ranke, “Die Venetianer in Morea” (Historisch-politische Zeitschrift, ii. 405-502). (d) Special subjects: Religion. E. Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church (London, 1890). Ethnology. J. P. Fallmerayer, Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters (Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1830); S. Zampelios, Περὶ πηγῶν νεοελληνικῆς ἐθνότητος (Athens, 1857); A. Philippson, “Zur Ethnographie des Peloponnes” [Petermann’s Mitteilungen 36 (1890), pp. 1-11, 33-41]; A. Vasiljev, “Die Slaven in Griechenland” [Vizantijsky Vremennik, St Petersburg, 5 (1898), pp. 404-438, 626-670].
c. Modern History: 1800-1908.
At the beginning of the 19th century Greece was still under Turkish domination, but the dawn of freedom was already breaking, and a variety of forces were at work which prepared the way for the acquisition of national The decadence of Turkey. independence. The decadence of the Ottoman empire, which began with the retreat of the Turks from Vienna in 1683, was indicated in the 18th century by the weakening of the central power, the spread of anarchy in the provinces, the ravages of the janissaries, and the establishment of practically independent sovereignties or fiefs, such as those of Mehemet of Bushat at Skodra and of Ali Pasha of Tepelen at Iannina; the 19th century witnessed the first uprisings of the Christian populations and the detachment of the outlying portions of European Turkey. Up to the end of the 18th century none of the subject races had risen in spontaneous revolt against the Turks, though in some instances they rendered aid to the sultan’s enemies; the spirit of the conquered nations had been broken by ages of oppression. In some of the remoter and more mountainous districts, however, the authority of the Turks had never been completely established; in Montenegro a small fragment of the Serb race maintained its independence; among the Greeks, the Mainotes in the extreme south of the Morea and the Sphakiote mountaineers in Crete had never been completely subdued. Resistance to Ottoman rule was maintained sporadically in the mountainous districts by the Greek klephts or brigands, the counterpart of the Slavonic haiduks, and by the pirates of the Aegean; the armatoles or bodies of Christian warriors, recognized by the Turks as a local police, often differed little in their proceedings from the brigands whom they were appointed to pursue.
Of the series of insurrections which took place in the 19th century, the first in order of time was the Servian, which broke out in 1804; the second was the Greek, which began in 1821. In both these movements the influence of Russian influence. Russia played a considerable part. In the case of the Servians Russian aid was mainly diplomatic, in that of the Greeks it eventually took a more material form. Since the days of Peter the Great, the eyes of Russia had been fixed on Constantinople, the great metropolis of the Orthodox faith. The policy of inciting the Greek Christians to revolt against their oppressors, which was first adopted in the reign of the empress Anna, was put into practical operation by the empress Catharine II., whose favourite, Orlov, appeared in the Aegean with a fleet in 1769 and landed in the Morea, where he organized a revolt. The attempt proved a failure; Orlov re-embarked, leaving the Greeks at the mercy of the Turks, and terrible massacres took place at Tripolitza, Lemnos and elsewhere. By the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainarji (July 21, 1774) Russia obtained a vaguely-defined protectorate over the Orthodox Greek subjects of Turkey, and in 1781 she arrived at an arrangement with Austria, known as the “Greek project,” for a partition of Turkish territory and the restoration of the Byzantine empire under Constantine, the son of Catharine II. The outbreak of the French Revolution distracted the attention of the two empires, but Russia never ceased to intrigue among the Christian subjects of Turkey. A revolt of the inhabitants of Suli in 1790 took place with her connivance, and in the two first decades of the 19th century her agents were active and ubiquitous.
The influence of the French Revolution, which pervaded all Europe, extended to the shores of the Aegean. The Greeks, who had hitherto been drawn together mainly by a common religion, were now animated by the sentiment Greek revolutionary activity. of nationality and by an ardent desire for political freedom. The national awakening, as in the case of the other subject Christian nations, was preceded by a literary revival. Literary and patriotic societies, the Philhellenes, the Philomousi, came into existence; Greek schools were founded everywhere; the philological labours of Coraës, which created the modern written language, furnished the nation with a mode of literary expression; the songs of Rhigas of Velestino fired the enthusiasm of the people. In 1815 was founded the celebrated Philiké Hetaerea, or friendly society, a revolutionary organization with centres at Moscow, Bucharest, Triest, and in all the cities of the Levant; it collected subscriptions, issued manifestos, distributed arms and made preparations for the coming insurrection. The revolt of Ali Pasha of Iannina against the authority of the sultan in 1820 formed the prelude to the Greek uprising; this despot, who had massacred the Greeks by hundreds, now declared himself their friend, and became a member of the Hetaerea. In March 1821 Alexander Ypsilanti, a former aide-de-camp of the tsar Alexander I., and president of the Hetaerea, entered Moldavia from Russian territory at the head of a small force; in the same month Archbishop Germanos of Patras unfurled the standard of revolt at Kalavryta in the Morea.
For the history of the prolonged struggle which followed see Greek War of Independence. The warfare was practically brought to a close by the annihilation of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino by the fleets of Great Britain, France Independence of Greece. and Russia on the 20th of October 1827. Nine months previously, Count John Capo d’Istria (q.v.), formerly minister of foreign affairs of the tsar Alexander, had been elected president of the Greek republic for seven years beginning on January 18, 1828. By the protocol of London (March 22, 1829) the Greek mainland south of a line drawn from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Volo, the Morea and the Cyclades were declared a principality tributary to the sultan under a Christian prince. The limits drawn by the protocol of London were confirmed by the treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829), by which Greece was constituted an independent monarchy. The governments of Russia, France and England were far from sharing the enthusiasm which the gallant resistance of the Greeks had excited among the peoples of Europe, and which inspired the devotion of Byron, Cochrane, Sir Richard Church, Fabvier and other distinguished Philhellenes; jealousies prevailed among the three protecting powers, and the newly-liberated nation was treated in a niggardly spirit; its narrow limits were reduced by a new protocol (February 3, 1830), which drew the boundary line at the Aspropotamo, the Spercheios and the Gulf of Lamia. Capo d’Istria, whose Russian proclivities and arbitrary government gave great offence to the Greeks, was assassinated by two members of the Mavromichalis family (October 9, 1831), and a state of anarchy followed. Before his death the throne of Greece had been offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, afterwards king of the Belgians, who declined it, basing his refusal on the inadequacy of the limits assigned to the new kingdom and especially the exclusion of Crete.
By the convention of London (May 7, 1832) Greece was declared an independent kingdom under the protection of Great Britain, France and Russia with Prince Otto, son of King Louis I. of Bavaria, as king. The frontier King Otto. line, now traced from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Lamia, was fixed by the arrangement of Constantinople (July 21, 1832). King Otto, who had been brought up in a despotic court, ruled absolutely for the first eleven years of his reign; he surrounded himself with Bavarian advisers and Bavarian troops, and his rule was never popular. The Greek chiefs and politicians, who found themselves excluded from all influence and advancement, were divided into three factions which attached themselves respectively to the three protecting powers. On the 15th of September 1843 a military revolt broke out which compelled the king to dismiss the Bavarians and to accept a constitution. A responsible ministry, a senate nominated by the king, and a chamber elected by universal suffrage were now instituted. Mavrocordatos, the leader of the English party, became the first prime minister, but his government was overthrown at the ensuing elections, and a coalition of the French and Russian parties under Kolettes and Metaxas succeeded to power. The warfare of factions was aggravated by the rivalry between the British and French ministers, Sir Edmond Lyons and M. Piscatory; King Otto supported the French party, and trouble arose with the British government, which in 1847 despatched warships to enforce the payment of interest on the loan contracted after the War of Independence. A British fleet subsequently blockaded the Peiraeus in order to obtain satisfaction for the claims of Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew under British protection, whose house had been plundered during a riot. On the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Turkey in 1853 the Greeks displayed sympathy with Russia; armed bands were sent into Thessaly, and an insurrection was fomented in Epirus in the hope of securing an accession of territory. In order to prevent further hostile action on the part of Greece, British and French fleets made a demonstration against the Peiraeus, which was occupied by a French force during the Crimean War. The disappointment of the national hopes increased the unpopularity of King Otto, who had never acquiesced in constitutional rule. In 1862 a military revolt broke out, and a national assembly pronounced his deposition. The vacant throne was offered by the assembly to Duke Nicholas of Leuchtenberg, a cousin of the tsar, but the mass of the people desired a constitutional monarchy of the British type; a plebiscite was taken, and Prince Alfred of England was elected by an almost unanimous vote. The three protecting powers, however, had bound themselves to the exclusion of any member of their ruling houses. In the following year Prince William George of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg, whom the British government had designated as a suitable candidate, was elected by the National Assembly with the title “George I., king of the Hellenes.” Under the treaty of London (July 13, 1863) the change of dynasty was sanctioned by the three protecting powers, Great Britain undertaking to cede to Greece the seven Ionian Islands, which since 1815 had formed a commonwealth under British protection.
On the 29th of October 1863 the new sovereign arrived in Athens, and in the following June the British authorities handed over the Ionian Islands to a Greek commissioner. King George thus began his reign under the most Accession of George I. favourable auspices, the patriotic sentiments of the Greeks being flattered by the acquisition of new territory. He was, however, soon confronted with constitutional difficulties; party spirit ran riot at Athens, the ministries which he appointed proved short-lived, his counsellor, Count Sponneck, became the object of violent attacks, and at the end of 1864 he was compelled to accept an ultra-democratic constitution, drawn up by the National Assembly. This, the sixth constitution voted since the establishment of the kingdom, is that which is still in force. In the following year Count Sponneck left Greece, and the attention of the nation was concentrated on the affairs of Crete. The revolution which broke out in that island received moral and material support from the Greek government, with the tacit approval of Russia; military preparations were pressed forward at Athens, and cruisers were purchased, but the king, aware of the inability of Greece to attain her ends by warlike means, discouraged a provocative attitude towards Turkey, and eventually dismissed the bellicose cabinet of Koumoundouros. The removal of a powerful minister commanding a large parliamentary majority constituted an important precedent in the exercise of the royal prerogative; the king adopted a similar course with regard to Delyannes in 1892 and 1897. The relations with the porte, however, continued to grow worse, and Hobart Pasha, with a Turkish fleet, made a demonstration off Syra. The Cretan insurrection was finally crushed in the spring of 1869, and a conference of the powers, which assembled that year at Paris, imposed a settlement of the Turkish dispute on Greece, but took no steps on behalf of the Cretans. In 1870 the murder of several Englishmen by brigands in the neighbourhood of Athens produced an unfavourable impression in Europe; in the following year the confiscation of the Laurion mines, which had been ceded to a Franco-Italian company, provoked energetic action on the part of France and Italy. In 1875, after an acute constitutional crisis, Charilaos Trikoupes, who but ten months previously had been imprisoned for denouncing the crown in a newspaper article, was summoned to form a cabinet. This remarkable man, the only great statesman whom modern Greece has produced, exercised an extraordinary influence over his countrymen for the next twenty years; had he been able to maintain himself uninterruptedly in power during that period, Greece might have escaped a long succession of misfortunes. His principal opponent, Theodore Delyannes, succeeded in rallying a strong body of adherents, and political parties, hitherto divided into numerous factions, centred around these two prominent figures.
In 1877 the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War produced a
fever of excitement in Greece; it was felt that the quarrels
of the party leaders compromised the interests of the
country, and the populace of Athens insisted on the
New frontier, 1881.
formation of a coalition cabinet. The “great” or
“oecumenical” ministry, as it was called, now came
into existence under the presidency of the veteran Kanares; in
reality, however, it was controlled by Trikoupes, who, recognizing
the unpreparedness of the country, resolved on a pacific policy.
The capture of Plevna by the Russians brought about the fall
of the “oecumenical” ministry, and Koumoundouros and
Delyannes, who succeeded to power, ordered the invasion of
Thessaly. Their warlike energies, however, were soon checked
by the signing of the San Stefano Treaty, in which the claims
of Greece to an extension of frontier were altogether ignored.
At the Berlin congress two Greek delegates obtained a hearing
on the proposal of Lord Salisbury. The congress decided that
the rectification of the frontier should be left to Turkey and
Greece, the mediation of the powers being proposed in case of
non-agreement; it was suggested, however, that the rectified
frontier should extend from the valley of the Peneus on the east
to the mouth of the Kalamas, opposite the southern extremity
of Corfu, on the west. In 1879 a Greco-Turkish commission
for the delimitation met first at Prevesa, and subsequently at
Constantinople, but its conferences were without result, the
Turkish commissioners declining the boundary suggested at
Berlin. Greece then invoked the arbitration of the powers,
and the settlement of the question was undertaken by a conference
of ambassadors at Berlin (1880). The line approved by
the conference was practically that suggested by the congress;
Turkey, however, refused to accept it, and the Greek army was
once more mobilized. I
n was evident, however, that nothing
could be gained by an appeal to arms, the powers not being
prepared to apply coercion to Turkey. By a convention signed
at Constantinople in July 1881, the demarcation was entrusted
to a commission representing the six powers and the two
interested parties. The line drawn ran westwards from a point
between the mouth of the Peneus and Platamona to the summits
of Mounts Kritiri and Zygos, thence following the course of
the river Arta to its mouth. An area of 13,395 square kilometres,
with a population of 300,000 souls, was thus added to the kingdom,
while Turkey was left in possession of Iannina, Metzovo and
most of Epirus. The ceded territory was occupied by Greek
troops before the close of the year.
In 1882 Trikoupes came into power at the head of a strong party, over which he exercised an influence and authority hitherto unknown in Greek political life. With the exception of three brief intervals (May 1885 to May Trikoupes and Delyannes. 1886, October 1890 to February 1892, and a few months in 1893), he continued in office for the next twelve years. The reforms which he introduced during this period were generally of an unpopular character, and were loudly denounced by his democratic rivals; most of them were cancelled during the intervals when his opponent Delyannes occupied the premiership. The same want of continuity proved fatal to the somewhat ambitious financial programme which he now inaugurated. While pursuing a cautious foreign policy, and keeping in control the rash impetuosity of his fellow-countrymen, he shared to the full the national desire for expansion, but he looked to the development of the material resources of the country as a necessary preliminary to the realization of the dreams of Hellenism. With this view he endeavoured to attract foreign capital to the country, and the confidence which he inspired in financial circles abroad enabled him to contract a number of loans and to better the financial situation by a series of conversions. Under a stable, wise, and economical administration this far-reaching programme might perhaps have been carried out with success, but the vicissitudes of party politics and the periodical outbursts of national sentiment rendered its realization impossible. In April 1885 Trikoupes fell from power, and a few months later the indignation excited in Greece by the revolution of Philippopolis placed Delyannes once more at the head of a warlike movement. The army and fleet were again mobilized with a view to exacting territorial compensation for the aggrandizement of Bulgaria, and several conflicts with the Turkish troops took place on the frontier. The powers, after repeatedly inviting the Delyannes cabinet to disarm, established a blockade of Peiraeus and other Greek ports (8th May 1886), France alone declining to cooperate in this measure. Delyannes resigned (11th May) and Trikoupes, who succeeded to power, issued a decree of disarmament (25th May). Hostilities, however, continued on the frontier, and the blockade was not raised till 7th June. Trikoupes had now to face the serious financial situation brought about by the military activity of his predecessor. He imposed heavy taxation, which the people, for the time at least, bore without murmuring, and he continued to inspire such confidence abroad that Greek securities maintained their price in the foreign market. It was ominous, however, that a loan which he issued in 1890 was only partially covered. Meanwhile the Cretan difficulty had become once more a source of trouble to Greece. In 1889 Trikoupes was grossly deceived by the Turkish government, which, after inducing him to dissuade the Cretans from opposing the occupation of certain fortified posts, issued a firman annulling many important provisions in the constitution of the island. The indignation in Greece was intense, and popular discontent was increased by the success of the Bulgarians in obtaining the exequatur of the sultan for a number of bishops in Macedonia. In the autumn of 1890 Trikoupes was beaten at the elections, and Delyannes, who had promised the people a radical reform of the taxation, succeeded to power. He proved unequal, however, to cope with the financial difficulty, which now became urgent; and the king, perceiving that a crisis was imminent, dismissed him and recalled Trikoupes. The hope of averting national bankruptcy depended on the possibility of raising a loan by which the rapid depreciation of the paper currency might be arrested, but foreign financiers demanded guarantees which seemed likely to prove hurtful to Greek susceptibilities; an agitation was raised at Athens, and Trikoupes suddenly resigned (May 1893). His conduct at this juncture appears to have been due to some misunderstandings which had arisen between him and the king. The Sotiropoulos-Rhalles ministry which followed effected a temporary settlement with the national creditors, but Trikoupes, returning to power in the autumn, at once annulled the arrangement. He now proceeded to a series of arbitrary measures which provoked the severest criticism throughout Europe and exposed Greece to the determined hostility of Germany. A law was hastily passed which deprived the creditors of 70% of their interest, and the proceeds of the revenues conceded to the monopoly bondholders were seized (December 1893). Long negotiations followed, resulting in an arrangement which was subsequently reversed by the German bondholders. In January 1895 Trikoupes resigned office, in consequence of a disagreement with the crown prince on a question of military discipline. His popularity had vanished, his health was shattered, and he determined to abandon his political career. His death at Cannes (11th April 1896), on the eve of a great national convulsion, deprived Greece of his masterly guidance and sober judgment at a critical moment in her history.
His funeral took place at Athens on 23rd April, while the city was still decorated with flags and garlands after the celebration of the Olympic games. The revival of the ancient festival, which drew together multitudes of Greeks Nationalist agitation, 1896. from abroad, led to a lively awakening of the national sentiment, hitherto depressed by the economic misfortunes of the kingdom, and a secret patriotic society, known as the Ethniké Hetaerea, began to develop prodigious activity, enrolling members from every rank of life and establishing branches in all parts of the Hellenic world. The society had been founded in 1894, by a handful of young officers who considered that the military organization of the country was neglected by the government; its principal aim was the preparation of an insurrectionary movement in Macedonia, which, owing to the activity of the Bulgarians and the reconciliation of Prince Ferdinand with Russia, seemed likely to be withdrawn for ever from the domain of Greek irredentism. The outbreak of another insurrection in Crete supplied the means of creating a diversion for Turkey while the movement in Macedonia was being matured; arms and volunteers were shipped to the island, but the society was as yet unable to force the hand of the government, and Delyannes, who had succeeded Trikoupes in 1895, loyally aided the powers in the restoration of order by advising the Cretans to accept the constitution of 1896. The appearance of strong insurgent bands in Macedonia in the summer of that year testified to the activity of the society and provoked the remonstrances of the powers, while the spread of its propaganda in the army led to the issue of a royal rescript announcing grand military manœuvres, the formation of a standing camp, and the rearmament of the troops with a new weapon (6th December). The objects of the society were effectually furthered by the evident determination of the porte to evade the application of the stipulated reforms in Crete; the Cretan Christians lost patience, and indignation was widespread in Greece. Emissaries of the society were despatched to the island, and affairs were brought to a climax by an outbreak at Canea on 4th February 1897. The Turkish troops fired on the Christians, thousands of whom took refuge on the warships of the powers, and a portion of the town was consumed by fire.
Delyannes now announced that the government had abandoned the policy of abstention. On the 6th two warships were despatched to Canea, and on the 10th a torpedo flotilla, commanded by Prince George, left Peiraeus Cretan crisis, 1897. amid tumultuous demonstrations. The ostensible object of these measures was the protection of Greek subjects in Crete, and Delyannes was still anxious to avoid a definite rupture with Turkey, but the Ethniké Hetaerea had found means to influence several members of the ministry and to alarm the king. Prince George, who had received orders to prevent the landing of Turkish reinforcements on the island, soon withdrew from Cretan waters owing to the decisive attitude adopted by the commanders of the international squadron. A note was now addressed by the government to the powers, declaring that Greece could no longer remain a passive spectator of events in Crete, and on the 13th of February a force of 1500 men, under Colonel Vassos, embarked at Peiraeus. On the same day a Greek warship fired on a Turkish steam yacht which was conveying troops from Candia to Sitia. Landing near Canea on the night of the 14th, Colonel Vassos issued a proclamation announcing the occupation of Crete in the name of King George. He had received orders to expel the Turkish garrisons from the fortresses, but his advance on Canea was arrested by the international occupation of that town, and after a few engagements with the Turkish troops and irregulars he withdrew into the interior of the island. Proposals for the coercion of Greece were now put forward by Germany, but Great Britain declined to take action until an understanding had been arrived at with regard to the future government of Crete. Eventually (2nd March) collective notes were addressed to the Greek and Turkish governments announcing the decision of the powers that (1) Crete could in no case in present circumstances be annexed to Greece; (2) in view of the delays caused by Turkey in the application of the reforms, Crete should be endowed with an effective autonomous administration, calculated to ensure it a separate government, under the suzerainty of the sultan. Greece was at the same time summoned to remove its army and fleet within the space of six days, and Turkey was warned that its troops must for the present be concentrated in the fortified towns and ultimately withdrawn from the island. The action of the powers produced the utmost exasperation at Athens; the populace demanded war with Turkey and the annexation of Crete, and the government drew up a reply to the powers in which, while expressing the conviction that autonomy would prove a failure, it indicated its readiness to withdraw some of the ships, but declined to recall the army. A suggestion that the troops might receive a European mandate for the preservation of order in the island proved unacceptable to the powers, owing to the aggressive action of Colonel Vassos after his arrival. Meanwhile troops, volunteers and munitions of war were hurriedly despatched to the Turkish frontier in anticipation of an international blockade of the Greek ports, but the powers contented themselves with a pacific blockade of Crete, and military preparations went on unimpeded.
While the powers dallied, the danger of war increased; on 29th March the crown prince assumed command of the Greek troops in Thessaly, and a few days later hostilities were precipitated by the irregular forces of the Ethniké War with Turkey. Hetaerea, which attacked several Turkish outposts near Grevena. According to a report of its proceedings, subsequently published by the society, this invasion received the previous sanction of the prime minister. On 17th April Turkey declared war. The disastrous campaign which followed was of short duration, and it was evident from the outset that the Greeks had greatly underrated the military strength of their opponents (see Greco-Turkish War). After the evacuation of Larissa on the 24th, great discontent prevailed at Athens; Delyannes was invited by the king to resign, but refusing to do so was dismissed (29th April). His successor, Rhalles, after recalling the army from Crete (9th May) invoked the mediation of the powers, and an armistice was concluded on the 19th of that month. Thus ended an unfortunate enterprise, which was undertaken in the hope that discord among the powers would lead to a European war and the dismemberment of Turkey. Greek interference in Crete had at least the result of compelling Europe to withdraw the island for ever from Turkish rule. The conditions of peace put forward by Turkey included a war indemnity of £10,000,000 and the retention of Thessaly; the latter demand, however, was resolutely opposed by Great Britain, and the indemnity was subsequently reduced to £4,000,000. The terms agreed to by the powers were rejected by Rhalles; the chamber, however, refused him a vote of confidence and King George summoned Zaimes to power (October 3). The definitive treaty of peace, which was signed at Constantinople on the 6th of December, contained a provision for a slight modification of the frontier, designed to afford Turkey certain strategical advantages; the delimitation was carried out by a commission composed of military delegates of the powers and representatives of the interested parties. The evacuation of Thessaly by the Turkish troops was completed in June 1898. An immediate result of the war was the institution of an international financial commission at Athens, charged with the control of certain revenues assigned to the service of the national debt. The state of the country after the conclusion of hostilities was deplorable; the towns of northern Greece and the islands were crowded with destitute refugees from Thessaly; violent recriminations prevailed at Athens, and the position of the dynasty seemed endangered. A reaction, however, set in, in consequence of an attempt to assassinate King George (28th February 1898), whose great services to the nation in obtaining favourable terms from the powers began to receive general recognition. In the following summer the king made a tour through the country, and was everywhere received with enthusiasm. In the autumn the powers, on the initiative of Russia, decided to entrust Prince George of Greece with the government of Crete; on 26th November an intimation that the prince had been appointed high commissioner in the island was formally conveyed to the court of Athens, and on 21st December he landed in Crete amid enthusiastic demonstrations (see Crete).
In April 1899 Zaimes gave way to Theotokes, the chief of the Trikoupist party, who introduced various improvements in the administration of justice and other reforms including a measure transferring the administration of the Macedonian troubles. army from the minister of war to the crown prince. In May 1901 a meeting took place at Abbazia, under the auspices of the Austro-Hungarian government, between King George and King Charles of Rumania with a view to the conclusion of a Graeco-Rumanian understanding directed against the growth of Slavonic, and especially Bulgarian, influence in Macedonia. The compact, however, was destined to be short-lived owing to the prosecution of a Rumanian propaganda among the semi-Hellenized Vlachs of Macedonia. In November riots took place at Athens, the patriotic indignation of the university students and the populace being excited by the issue of a translation of the Gospels into modern Greek at the suggestion of the queen. The publication was attributed to Panslavist intrigues against Greek supremacy over the Orthodox populations of the East, and the archbishop of Athens was compelled to resign. Theotokes, whose life was attempted, retired from power, and Zaimes formed a cabinet. In 1902 the progress of the Bulgarian movement in Macedonia once more caused great irritation in Greece. Zaimes, having been defeated at the elections in December, resigned, and was succeeded by Delyannes, whose popularity had not been permanently impaired by the misfortunes of the war. Delyannes now undertook to carry out extensive economic reforms, and introduced a measure restoring the control of the army to the ministry of war. He failed, however, to carry out his programme, and, being deserted by a section of his followers, resigned in June 1903, when Theotokes again became prime minister. The new cabinet resigned within a month owing to the outbreak of disturbances in the currant-growing districts, and Rhalles took office for the second time (July 8). The Bulgarian insurrection in Macedonia during the autumn caused great excitement in Athens, and Rhalles adopted a policy of friendship with Turkey (see Macedonia). The co-operation of the Greek party in Macedonia with the Turkish authorities exposed it to the vengeance of the insurgents, and in the following year a number of Greek bands were sent into that country. The campaign of retaliation was continued in subsequent years.
In December Rhalles, who had lost the support of the Delyannist party, was replaced by Theotokes, who promulgated a scheme of army reorganization, introduced various economies and imposed fresh taxation. In December Murder of Delyannes. the government was defeated on a vote of confidence and Delyannes once more became prime minister, obtaining a considerable majority in the elections which followed (March 1905), but on the 13th of June he was assassinated. He was succeeded by Rhalles, who effected a settlement of the currant question and cultivated friendly relations with Turkey in regard to Macedonia.
In the autumn anti-Greek demonstrations in Rumania led to a rupture of relations with that country. In December the ministry resigned owing to an adverse vote of the chamber, and Theotokes formed a cabinet. The new government, as a preliminary to military and naval reorganization, introduced a law directed against the candidature of military officers for parliament. Owing to obstruction practised by the military members of the chamber a dissolution took place, and at the subsequent elections (April 1906) Theotokes secured a large majority. In the autumn various excesses committed against the Greeks in Bulgaria in reprisal for the depredations of the Greek bands in Macedonia caused great indignation in Greece, but diplomatic relations between the two countries were not suspended. On the 26th of September Prince George, who had resigned the high commissionership of Crete, returned to Athens; the designation of his successors was accorded by the protecting powers to King George as a satisfaction to Greek national sentiment (see Crete). The great increase in the activity of the Greek bands in Macedonia during the following spring and summer led to the delivery of a Turkish note at Athens (July 1907), which was supported by representations of the powers.
In October 1908 the proclamation by the Cretan assembly of union with Greece threatened fresh complications, the cautious attitude of the Greek government leading to an agitation in the army, which came to a head in 1909. On the 18th of July a popular demonstration against his Cretan policy led to the resignation of Theotokes, whose successor, Rhalles, announced a programme of military and economical reform. The army, however, took matters into its own hands, and on the 23rd of August Rhalles was replaced by Mavromichales, the nominee of the “Military League.” For the next six months constitutional government was practically superseded by that of the League, and for a while the crown itself seemed to be in danger. The influence of the League, however, rapidly declined; army and navy quarrelled; and a fresh coup d’état at the beginning of 1910 failed of its effect, owing to the firmness of the king. On the 7th of February Mavromichales resigned, and his successor, Dragoumis, accepting the Cretan leader Venezelo’s suggestion of a national assembly, succeeded in persuading the League to dissolve (March 29) on receiving the king’s assurance that such an assembly would be convened. On the 31st, accordingly, King George formally proclaimed the convocation of a national assembly to deal with the questions at issue.
Authorities.—Finlay, History of Greece (Oxford, 1877); K. N. Sathas, Μεσαιωνικὴ βιβλιοθήκη (7 vols., Venice, 1872-1894); and Μνημεῖα Ἑλληνικῆς ἱστορίας. Documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire du moyen âge (9 vols., Paris, 1880-1890); Sp. Trikoupes, Ἱστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως (4 vols., 3rd ed., Athens, 1888); K. Paparrhegopoulos, Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους (5 vols., 4th ed., Athens, 1903); J. Philemon, Δοκίμιον ἱστορικὸν περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπσναστάσεως (Athens, 1859-1861); P. Kontoyannes, Οἱ Ἕλληνες κατὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἐπὶ Αἰκατερίνης Ῥωσσοτουρκικὸν πόλεμον (Athens, 1903); D. G. Kampouroglos, Ἱστορία τῶν Ἀθηναίων, Τουρκοκρατία, 1458-1687 (2 vols., Athens, 1889-1890); and Μνημεῖα τῆς ἱστορίας τῶν Ἀθηναίων, (3 vols., Athens, 1889-1892); G. E. Mavrogiannes, Ἱστορία τῶν Ἰονίων νήσων, 1797-1815 (2 vols., Athens, 1889); P. Karolides, Ἱστορία τοῦ ιθ᾿ αἰῶνος, 1814-1892 (Athens, 1891-1893); E. Kyriakides, Ἱστορία τοῦ συγχρόνου Ἑλληνισμοῦ 1832-1892 (2 vols., Athens, 1892); G. Konstantinides, Ἱστορία τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ γεννήσεως μεχρὶ τοῦ 1821 (2nd ed., Athens, 1894); D. Bikelas, La Grèce byzantine et moderne (Paris, 1893). (J. D. B.)
- See also Greek Art, Greek Language, Greek Law, Greek Literature, Greek Religion.
- For the Geology of Greece see: M. Neumayr, &c., Denks. k. Akad. Wiss. Wien, math.-nat. Cl. vol. xl. (1880); A. Philippson, Der Peloponnes (Berlin, 1892) and “Beiträge zur Kenntnis der griechischen Inselwelt,” Peterm. Mitt., Ergänz.-heft No. 134 (1901); R. Lepsius, Geologie von Attika (Berlin, 1893); L. Cayeux, “Phénomènes de charriage dans la Méditerranée orientale,” C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, vol. cxxxvi. (1903) pp. 474-476; J. Deprat, “Note préliminaire sur la géologie de l’île d’Eubée,” Bull. Soc. Géol. France, ser. 4, vol. iii. (1903) pp. 229-243, p. vii. and “Note sur la géologie du massif du Pélion et sur l’influence exercée par les massifs archéens sur la tectonique de l’Égéide,” ib. vol. iv. (1904), pp. 299-338.
- No state survey of Greece was available in 1908, though a survey had been undertaken by the ministry of war.
- Including suburbs.
- Reduction of interest on foreign debt by 70%.
- War with Turkey.
- International Financial Commission instituted.
- It would be more accurate to say to the year 1500 B.C. At Cnossus the palace is sacked soon after this date, and the art, both in Crete and in the whole Aegean area, becomes lifeless and decadent.
- See T. W. Allen in the Classical Review, vol. xx. (1906), No. 4 (May).
- It has been impugned by J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, i. 149 ff.
- History of Greece (Eng. trans., i. 32 ff.); cf. the same writer’s Ioner vor der ionischen Wanderung.
- If the account of early Athenian constitutional history given in the Athenaion Politeia were accepted, it would follow that the archons were inferior in authority to the Eupatrid Boulē, the Areopagus.
- The dates before the middle of the 7th century are in most cases artificial, e.g. those given by Thucydides (book vi.) for the earlier Sicilian settlements. See J. P. Mahaffy, Journal of Hellenic Studies, ii. 164 ff.
- At Syracuse the demos makes common cause with the Sicel serf-population against the nobles (Herod. vii. 155).
- An exception should perhaps be made in the case of Thucydides.
- The Peisistratidae come off better, however.
- The numbers given by Herodotus (upwards of 5,000,000) are enormously exaggerated. We must divide by ten or fifteen to arrive at a probable estimate of the forces that actually crossed the Hellespont.
- It has been denied by some writers (e.g. by A. H. J. Greenidge) that Athens interfered with the constitutions of the subject-states. For the view put forward in the text, the following passages may be quoted: Aristotle, Politics 1307 b 20; Isocrates, Panegyricus, 105, 106, Panathenaicus, 54 and 68; Xenophon, Hellenica, iii. 4. 7; Ps.-Xen. Athen. Constit. i. 14, iii. 10.
- The evidence seems to indicate that all the more important criminal cases throughout the empire were tried in the Athenian courts. In civil cases Athens secured to the citizens of the subject-states the right of suing Athenian citizens, as well as citizens of other subject-states.
- After this date, and partly in consequence of the change, the archonship, to which sortition was applied, loses its importance. The strategi (generals) become the chief executive officials. As election was never replaced by the lot in their case, the change had less practical meaning than might appear at first sight. (See Archon; Strategus.)
- For an estimate of the numbers annually engaged in the service of Athens, see Aristot. Ath. Pol. 24. 3.
- Foreign is not used here as equivalent to non-Hellenic. It means “belonging to another state, whether Greek or barbarian.”
- It failed even to create a united Arcadia or a strong Messenia.
- See Demosthenes, On the Crown, 235. Philip was αὐτοκράτωρ, δεσπότης, ἡγεμών, κύριος πάντων.
- See Archidamus, 68; Philippus, 96, ὤστε ῥᾷον εἶναι συστῆσαι στρατόπεδον μεῖζον καὶ κρεῖττον ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ῆ ἐκ τῶν πολιτευομένων.
- The Liturgies (e.g. the trierarchy) had much the same effect as a direct tax levied upon the wealthiest citizens.
- His extreme caution in approaching the question at an earlier date is to be noticed. See, e.g., Olynthiacs, i. 19, 20.
- e.g. the two expeditions sent to Euboea, the cavalry force that took part in the battle of Mantinea, and the army that fought at Chaeronea. The troops in all these cases were citizens.
- For the altered character of warfare see Demosthenes, Philippics, iii. 48, 49.
- It is known that the councillors were appointed by the states in the Aetolian league; it is only surmised in the case of the Achaean.
- Strictly speaking, to 411 B.C. For the last seven years of the war our principal authority is Xenophon, Hellenica, i., ii.
- Possibly some of his information about Persian affairs may have been derived, at first or second hand, from Zopyrus, son of Megabyzus, whose flight to Athens is mentioned in iii. 160.
- For a defence of Thucydides’ judgment on all three statesmen, see E. Meyer, Forschungen, ii. 296-379.
- On the discrepancies between Xenophon’s account of the Thirty, and Aristotle’s, see G. Busolt, Hermes (1898), pp. 71-86.
- The fragment of the New Historian (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. v.) affords exceedingly important material for the criticism of Xenophon’s narrative. (See Theopompus.)
- Vol. iii. goes down to the end of the Peloponnesian War.