ARMOR-CAVALRY: Part 1; Regular Army and Army Reserve/Tanks in World War I

by Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor

• Few recognized during World War I that the means for returning mobility and shock action to combat was already present in a device destined to revolutionize warfare on the ground and in the air. This was the internal combustion engine, which had made possible the development of the tank and eventually would lead to the mechanized forces that were to assume the old roles of horse cavalry and to loosen the grip of the machine gun on the battlefield. With increased firepower and protection, these mechanized forces would, only some twenty years later, become the armor of World War II. When the armored artillery, the armored personnel carrier, the wheeled cargo vehicle, and supporting aviation- all with adequate communications- were added to constitute the combined arms team of the modern armored division, commanders regained the capability of maneuver in most of the land areas of the world.

• In the early stages of World War I, neither the Allies nor the Germans foresaw the ultimate value of the tank. In late 1914 after observing a small American-made caterpillar tractor in France, Lt. Col. Ernest D. Swinton, an English officer, recommended to the British Committee of Imperial Defence that caterpillar tractors be armored and armed for use in combat. Although his proposal was not immediately accepted by the committee, it gained strong support of one of its members, Winston S. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. The Royal Navy, largely at Churchill's urging, sponsored experiments and tests of the vehicle as a type of "land ship" during 1915, and the tank at last became a reality. In an effort to keep secret the real purpose of the early models when they were being shipped to France, the English labeled them tanks- for use as water tanks by Russia. Thus originated the name of tank for the new weapon. The naval background of the tank's development also explains such nautical tank terms as hatch, hull, bow, and ports.

• The first test of the tank in action came when the British, on 15 September 1916, used forty-nine 30-ton Mark I's in the Somme area. The results were encouraging. More spectacular was their success over a year later, when on 20 November 1917 around 400 tanks penetrated almost six miles on a 7-mile front in an attack at Cambrai. This was the first large-scale employment of tanks in combat. Unfortunately, success was not complete because the infantry failed to exploit and secure the tanks' gains. The massed tank attack was proved feasible, nonetheless, and allayed American fears as to the tank's value; it gave renewed impetus to the United States' tank plans, and agreement was soon reached with Great Britain and France for co-ordination of all tank programs.

• The British scored another victory the following year, on 8 August 1918, with 600 tanks in the Amiens salient. General Eric von Ludendorff referred to that date as the "Black Day" of the German Army, since for the first time entire German units collapsed.

• The French launched their first tank attack on 16 April 1917, seven months after the initial British tank action. Of the 194 tanks used in this unsuccessful French attempt to break through the German lines, the Germans reported that 66 were destroyed. A second French tank attack, on 5 May 1917, met with considerable success, prompting a German declaration that "tanks were able, for the first time, to show their full worth without heavy losses." The most successful French employment of tanks during the war was their use of 350 tanks in the Aisne-Marne offensive, beginning on 18 July 1918.

• Numerous mechanical failures and the inability of the British and French to mount any sustained tank drives in the early tank actions had cast doubt on the usefulness of tanks. But tank operations and training methods in the British and French sectors had been studied carefully by United States observers, and their reports and conclusions prompted Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), to request in September 1917 that 600 heavy and 1,200 light tanks be produced in the United States.

• The resulting American-produced heavy tank was the 43.5-ton Mark VIII, patterned after a British model. Armed with two 6-pounder and five .30-caliber machine guns, it was operated by an 11-man crew, had a maximum speed of 6.5 miles per hour, and a range of 50 miles. The American-built 6 ½-ton M1917 light tank was a copy of the French Renault. It had a maximum speed of 5.5 miles per hour and could travel 30 miles on its 30-gallon fuel capacity. The U.S. program was augmented in the summer of 1918 by the development of a 3-ton, 2-man tank, originated by the Ford Motor Company. This third tank to be mass-produced during 1918 was powered by two Ford Model T, 4-cylinder engines, armed with a .30-caliber machine gun, and had a maximum speed of 8 miles per hour.

• During the fall of 1917, General Pershing approved plans for an overseas tank corps, based upon an army to be composed of 20 combat divisions. As originally planned, the tank corps was to consist of a headquarters and 5 heavy and 20 light tank battalions. Later plans increased the heavy battalions to 10. On 22 December 1917 Col. Samuel D. Rockenbach was appointed Chief of the Tank Corps, AEF. Plans developed for this organization called for a general headquarters, 3 tank centers (for training and replacement of personnel), 2 army tank headquarters, and 10 brigades. Assembly of the Tank Corps, with an authorized strength of 14,827, began on 26 January 1918, and Colonel Rockenbach was soon placed on the staff of the Commander in Chief, AEF, as an adviser on all tank matters.

• In the organization of the Tank Corps, AEF, all tank units were assigned to the General Headquarters, Tank Corps. For specific combat missions, they were attached to armies or to subordinate elements and reverted to general headquarters control as directed. An army tank headquarters, designed to function with an army headquarters, consisted of a headquarters and a heavy artillery mobile ordnance repair shop.

• Tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for other Tank Corps organizations were developed in 1918, although shortages of personnel and equipment for their full use prevented conclusive tests during combat. The tables provided for a light battalion of 72 light tanks and a heavy battalion of 69 heavy tanks. Both types of battalions had three companies of three platoons each and a battalion headquarters. All platoons were equipped with 5 tanks. The tank brigade, with a combined total of 225 tanks, consisted of 2 light battalions, a heavy battalion, a repair and salvage company, and a brigade headquarters. Almost identical to the brigade headquarters was the headquarters of a light or a heavy tank center.

In the United States developments were also under way for a tank organization similar to that overseas. The War Department, on 18 February 1918, authorized a Tank Service, National Army, under the Chief of Engineers, and the 65th Engineers was reorganized into tank units. The Tank Service, with an authorized strength of 914 officers and 14,746 men, became a separate branch on 5 March. Col. Ira C. Welborn was named its first director and charged with organizing, arming, equipping, and training tank units. Among Welborn's duties were the supervision of all tank activities in the United States, including procurement of officers and enlisted men, and the establishment and maintenance of tank camps. The primary tank training camp was Camp Colt, Pennsylvania, which was commanded for almost seven months of 1918 by Capt., Maj., and then Lt. Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower. On 22 March 1918 the Tank Service became the Tank Corps. Neither the Tank Service nor the Tank Corps in the United States had any direct command relationship with the Tank Corps, AEF.

• Units of the Tank Corps, AEF, and the Tank Corps, National Army, were organized in three separate areas during 1918-in the United States, in England, and in France. Some repetition of numerical designations resulted, and redesignations were required to eliminate the duplications. Tank units of all types were finally numbered in the 300 series.

• The first tank units were organized in February 1918 as elements of the 65th Engineers. The 1st Separate Battalion, Heavy Tank Service, 65th Engineers, and the 1st and 2d Battalions, Light Tank Service, 65th Engineers, were at Camp Upton, New York, while Company D, 2d Battalion, Heavy Tank Service, 65th Engineers, was at Camp Meade, Maryland. These elements were redesignated during the war as separate battalions, numbered in the 300 series. All tank battalions were numbered 301-346, but those from 309 through 325 were not organized.

• Four tank brigades were formed. Originally organized as the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Provisional Tank Brigades, they were redesignated in late 1918 as the 304th through the 307th Tank Brigades, respectively.

• The tank centers were also in the 300 series- being numbered from 301 through 314, although the 305th through the 308th and the 312th and 313th were never organized. The first tank centers, established overseas in February and March 1918, were initially designated as the 1st Light Tank Center and the 2d Heavy Tank Center. They, too, were redesignated into the 300 series.

• There were no National Guard tank units during World War I. However, since the lineage of National Guard units is determined on a geographical basis, a tank unit currently in the National Guard may descend from a World War I National Guard unit, or an even earlier organization.

• Despite concentrated efforts to organize and equip tank units as soon as possible, by June 1918 only 700 men were in the AEF Tank Corps and about 5,000 in the continental U.S. organization. By late July 1918 the combat tank units overseas were: 2 heavy battalion headquarters, 3 heavy companies, 2 light battalion headquarters, and 6 light companies. In the United States there were: a heavy battalion headquarters, 12 heavy companies, a light battalion headquarters, and 24 light companies. As late as mid-August 1918 no combat tanks, either American- or foreign-made, had been assigned to any unit of either Tank Corps. By the fall of 1918, nevertheless, American tank units, using British and French tanks, were in combat. Three battalions of light tanks fought with the U.S. First Army and a battalion of heavies was with the U.S. 27th and 30th Divisions.

• American tank units first entered combat on 12 September 1918 against the St. Mihiel salient with the First Army. They belonged to the 344th and 345th Light Tank Battalions, elements of the 304th Tank Brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. George S. Patton, Jr., under whom they had trained at the tank center in Bourg, France. Forty-five of the 2-man French Renault light tanks, probably the most popular type among Americans, had been issued to each battalion only about two weeks before the action. Weighing a little over 7 tons, the Renault had a maximum speed of 6 miles per hour and was armed with either a 37-mm. gun or a machine gun.

• For the attack, initially, the 344th was assigned to the 1st Division and the 345th to the 42d Division, with 16 tanks from the 344th and 25 from the 345th composing the brigade reserve. Muddy conditions, caused by heavy rain the night before the offensive, resulted in a much greater consumption of gasoline than anticipated. .Although the mud, lack of gas, and mechanical failure caused many tanks to stall in the German trenches, the attack succeeded and much valuable experience was gained. In most actions tanks supported the infantry, but at times they executed normal cavalry reconnaissance missions.

• In early October the tactical situation was ideal for tank employment since the Germans were short of artillery and relying heavily on their machine guns. On the other hand, the U.S. light tank battalions had been in almost continuous action during the Meuse-Argonne Campaign and numerous rear. area moves and were too weak to furnish effective support. General Pershing sent the chief of the AEF Tank Corps to Paris with instructions to "give anything in the A.E.F. for 500 tanks," but only forty-eight could be obtained locally.

• The third U.S. light tank battalion, the 331st, joined the AEF in the final phase of the war. Located at Varennes, France, during early November 1918, it was also credited with participation in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign. In the heavy tank category, the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion trained at the British Tank School at Wareham, England, from April until August 1918. It was to remain with the British Tank Corps until American tanks became available, but when the battalion arrived in France in late August 1918 and could not be supplied with American tanks, it was equipped with 47 British Mark V and Mark V Star tanks and assigned to the U.S. 27th Division. Both the Mark V and the Mark V Star had 8-man crews and a maximum speed of approximately 4 miles per hour. The Mark V Star, weighing 36 or 3 7 tons, depending upon armament, was about 5 tons heavier than the Mark V. Both were armed with either 2 6-pounder guns or an additional 2 machine guns, which were added to the Mark V's usual 4 machine guns or the Star's usual 5. The 301st was first committed on 29 September at the Battle of Le Catelet-Bony, in support of a British offensive. For that engagement, its tanks were divided among three U.S. infantry regiments of the 27th Division and the Australian Corps Reserve. Although the attack reached its objective, it was several hours late and considered as unsuccessful. Heavy mist and haze made visibility extremely poor, but the failure was attributed mainly to lack of combined tank and infantry training before the operation and a consequent lack of co-ordination between the two as the attack progressed. Thus, the value of tank-infantry training and co-operation was recognized from the beginning of the development of tactical doctrine involving the use of tanks and has continued to be given emphasis.

• In the 301st's next action, on 8 October at Brancourt with the 30th Division, tank-infantry cooperation was excellent, and the tanks earned a large share of the credit for the successful advance. The 301st's tanks were again parceled out for the Battle of the Selle on 17 October, this time being split between the 27th and 30th Divisions. By 23 October the battalion could muster only a composite company of twelve tanks to support the British at Marmol Forest, but the attack reached its objective.

• By the armistice of 11 November 1918, the AEF was critically short of tanks; no American made tanks were completed in time for use in combat. The new weapon was a very complex item, not only requiring extensive technical training for its crew but a long lead time for production as well.

• At the end of the war, the strength of the AEF Tank Corps and the Tank Corps, National Army, had reached a total of 1,090 officers and 14,780 men, 53 percent being in the United States and the remainder either overseas or en route.

• After the war, General von Ludendorff of the German High Command praised the Allied tanks as being a principal factor in Germany's defeat. The Germans had been too late in recognizing the value of tanks to consider them in their own plans. Even if their already hard-pressed industry could have produced tanks in quantity, fuel was in very short supply. Of the total of ninety tanks fielded by the Germans during 1918, seventy-five had been captured from the Allies.

• At the war's end, the main role of the tank was considered to be that of close support for the infantry. The U.S. tank units fought so briefly and were so fragmentized during the war, and the number of tanks available to them was so limited, that there was practically no opportunity to develop tactics for the large-scale employment of tanks. Nonetheless, the work of the tanks was sufficiently impressive to imbue at least a few military leaders with the idea that the use of tanks in mass was the most likely principal role of armor in the future.

• Highlights of U.S. Army appraisal for the development and use of tanks, developed from combat experience, were: (1) the need for a tank with more power, fewer mechanical failures, heavier armor, longer operating range, and better ventilation; (2) the need for combined training of tanks with other combat arms, especially the infantry; (3) the need for improved means of communication and of methods for determining and maintaining directions; and (4) the need for an improved supply system, especially for gasoline and ammunition.