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Dissenting Opinion
Thompson

United States Supreme Court

25 U.S. 419

Brown  v.  The State of Maryland

ERROR to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.

This was an indictment in the City Court of Baltimore, against the plaintiffs in error, upon the second section of an act of the legislature of the State of Maryland, passed in 1821, entitled, 'An act supplementary to the act laying duties on licenses to retailers of dry goods, and for other purposes.' The second section of the act provides, 'That all importers of foreign articles, or commodities, of dry goods, wares, or merchandises, by bail or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey, and other distilled spirituous liquors, &c. and other persons selling the same by whole sale, bale, or package, hogshead, barrel, or tierce, shall, be fore they are authorized to sell, take out a license as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures as are prescribed by the original act, to which this is a supplement.' The penalties and forfeitures prescribed by the original act, which was passed in 1819, were, a forfeiture of the amount of the license tax, and a fine of 100 dollars, to be recovered by indictment.

The defendants having demurred to the indictment, a judgment was rendered upon the demurrer against them, in the City Court, which was affirmed in the Court of Appeals, and the case was brought, by writ of error, to this Court. Feb. 28th.

Mr. Meredith, for the plaintiffs in error, contended, that the law in question was an unconstitutional exercise of the taxing power of Maryland. He did not deny the existence of such a power. As a necessary incident to sovereignty, it belonged to the several States before the adoption of the constitution, and it still belongs to them, subject, however, to the restrictions imposed upon its exercise by the paramount authority of that instrument. With regard to these restrictions, he did not mean to contend, that the general grant contained in the eighth section of the first article of the constitution, vested in the national government any thing more than a concurrent power of taxation. He admitted the rule of construction, that a grant of power to Congress does not, of itself, imply a prohibition of its exercise by the States. The powers granted to the general government are never to be considered as exclusive, unless they are made so in express terms, or unless, from the nature of the power itself, its concurrent exercise must necessarily produce direct repugnancy or incompatibility. But he argued, that this was by no means the inevitable result from a concorrent exercise of the taxing power, because its peculiar nature rendered it often capable of being exercised by different authorities at the same time, and even upon the same subject, without actual collision or interference.

The restrictions which he had alluded to, were to be found in other provisions of the constitution; and they were both express and implied. The former were all comprised in the tenth section of the first article, by which the States are prohibited, unless with the consent of Congress, from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws; and are, also, without such consent, forbidden to impose any duty upon tonnage. The effect of this prohibition, coupled with the general grant of the taxing power before referred to, is to vest in the national government an exclusive right to the commercial imposts of the country. With the exception of these, however, the power to lay and collect taxes is a concurrent power.

But, like all the other concurrent powers of the States, this power of taxation is subject, in its exercise, to that general implied restriction which necessarily results from the supreme and paramount authority of the Union. This is a vital principle of the political system, and its direct operation is to restrain the States from the exercise of any power repugnant to, or incompatible with, the constitution, or the constitutional laws of the national government. By which is to be understood, not merely a repugnancy growing out of a concurrent exercise of the same power by Congress and a State legislature, but that which may arise from the exercise of one power by a State, with reference to a different power, whether exclusive or concurrent, express or implied, residing in the general government.

Having stated and illustrated these as the constitutional limits of the taxing power of the States, he insisted, that they had been transgressed by the legislative act under consideration. The second section comprises all the provisions of the law which are material to the question. The true construction of this section is somewhat doubtful; upon any interpretation, however, it prohibits the importer from selling the imported merchandise without having first taken out a license to do so, for which he is required to pay a stipulated tax.

The question then is, whether this is such a law as the legislature of Maryland have a right to pass. Under colour of a license law, he contended that this statute was a palpable evasion of the express restriction upon the States to 'lay duties on imports;' an indirect attempt to do that which the constitution has explicitly inhibited. And he said this, because he thought it might be clearly shown, that a law, laying a tax on the importer for the privilege of selling the merchandise he has himself imported, which is this law, and this case, is equivalent, in all substantial respects, to a duty on imports, since, with a few slight and unimportant differences, it answers all the purposes, and produces all the effects of a concurrent power in the States to impose such a duty.

What are the apparent differences between this and a tax directly on imports? It may be said, in the first place, that the one is a tax for the privilege of bringing the foreign article into the country, and the other a tax for the privilege of selling it after it is so brought in. But these privileges are indissolubly connected; the right to sell is a necessary incident to the right of importing. The grant of a privilege to import would be of no value, unless it implies a right to sell. Prohibit sale, and importation necessarily ceases. He maintained that, on a fair and just construction of the whole revenue system, the implication was irresistible. That the duties exacted by the general government were paid, not for the privilege to import simply, but for the privilege of importing foreign commodities, and using them in the way of merchandise, might be incontestably proved, by showing that no goods were dutiable, unless imported with the intention, and for the purpose of traffic. With this view, he referred to various provisions of the act of March, 1799, (ch. 128. s. 30. 32. 45, 46. 60. and 107.) and to the case of the Concord. [a] This is the principle, also, of the English law of customs, from which our system is mainly borrowed. [b] It was likewise worthy of remark, that the legislation of Maryland, upon this subject, before the adoption of the constitution, was in strict accordance with the same principle, and carried it so far as to permit the merchant to try the market by an actual sale, and paying the duties only on the portion sold, to export the residue free of duty. [c] There is, then, no difference in this respect between these two modes of taxation.

It may be said that these taxes are payable at different times; in the one case, at the time of importation, in the other, at the time of sale. But if they are both paid substantially for the same privilege, surely this is not a material difference. It is a matter that simply concerns the safety, certainty, and convenience of collection; but it gives no distinctive character to the law. In point of fact, however, the duty imposed by the revenue system is not payable, except it is less than fifty dollars, until after the importation.

A third apparent difference may be said to consist in this: that the import duty is a charge upon the goods, the license upon the person; but the one is as much a charge upon the goods as the other, if by that is meant an increase of their actual cost. The import duty is, however, a personal charge upon the importer; it is not the bond that alone makes him personally liable; without having given a bond, he is still answerable for the duties. [d]

These are the only differences in the operation of the two taxes, and they are apparent, but not substantial; they are the disguise thrown about the law to elude detection. The true test, however, is, to consider the effect of this law upon the exclusive grant to the general government, to raise revenue from imposts. The reasons for such a grant are obvious. The objects committed by the constitution to the general government are of immense magnitude, and require corresponding means. Of all species of taxation, that upon imports is most fruitful and least oppressive. It is sound policy, therefore, to cherish and extend this branch of the public revenue; because, whenever it fails, other modes of taxation must necessarily be resorted to of a more odious and oppressive nature. Now, the consequence of the right claimed by this law on the part of Maryland, is, to place this branch of the public revenue completely in her power; as entirely so, as if she had constitutionally a concurrent right to tax imports. It is to enable her, at her pleasure, by means of license laws, to annihilate, as it regards her own territory, the commercial revenues of the country. What is to prevent her from prohibiting altogether the importation of foreign merchandise into any of her ports? It is only to increase the price of the license until the commodity will no longer bear the burden, and the end is accomplished. Importation must, in that case, necessarily cease, and with it revenue. It is not pretended that these consequences are produced by this particular law; it is not necessary that this should be the case. We are not to look at the particular exercise of power so much as at the principle upon which the power is asserted. We are not to judge of the constitutionality of this law by the amount of tax which it imposes; it is not the degree of taxation, in the particular instance, that determines the right to tax. That the public revenue is, to a certain degree, affected by the operation of this law, is incontestable. But if, on principle, Maryland has a right to demand fifty dollars as the price of a license to sell imported merchandise, she has a right to demand any sum for the same privilege. If, in other words, she is within the proper sphere of her taxing power, that power is, in its nature, unlimited, and she may carry it to what extent she pleases. A power to tax, this Court has emphatically said, is a power to destroy. In this case, it is a power to prohibit; a power to deprive the government of the means to accomplish its great objects, and conduct all its important operations; a power to defeat the intention of the exclusive grant of commercial revenue.

If Maryland has a right to enact laws of this description, she has a right to regulate her own foreign commerce, although, by the constitution, it is exclusively vested in Congress. The imposition of import duties is often resorted to, not for the purpose of revenue, but to regulate commercial intercourse with foreign countries. Discriminating duties, protecting duties, prohibitory duties, are so many commercial regulations. These may all be resorted to under the disguise of license laws. If Maryland has a right to pass general license laws, she may pass partial ones; she may select particular commodities, and burthen their sale with a license duty; she may establish a tariff of discriminating duties for herself, and affect, if not defeat, the commercial policy of the country. In one word, she may exercise the same right to regulate commerce by means of license laws, which a concurrent power to tax imports would give her, and thus evade, in this respect also, the constitutional prohibition. It may be said, that this law looks to no such object; that it is simply a tax for revenue, and that there is no ground to apprehend that it will be used for any other purpose. But the motives for legislative acts are not fit subjects of judicial inquiry. If the power can be exercised for one purpose, it may be for another; the intention may always be effectually concealed. It is the principle of the law, and its capacity to be exerted for the attainment of other objects than that which it professes to aim at in the particular case, that it is proper and necessary to look to. If the States are authorized to pass laws of this description, the purposes which induced the prohibition are defeated, and it is rendered altogether nugatory.

Mr. Taney and Mr. Johnson, contra, insisted, that the law of Maryland did not lay a duty on imports, and was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.

The act of assembly (they said) does not impose a tax on the importation of foreign goods, nor upon the trade and occupation of an importer. But the tax is imposed upon the trade and occupation of selling foreign goods by wholesale after they have been imported. It is a tax upon the profession or trade of the party, when that trade is carried on within the State. It is laid upon the same principle with the usual taxes on retailers, or innkeepers, or hawkers and pedlars, or upon any other trade exercised within the State. It is true, the importers of foreign goods are, by express words, made subject to the provisions of this law, provided they sell by wholesale; but it is the selling by wholesale which subjects the party to the tax; it is upon that trade that the tax is imposed.

Does the constitution of the United States forbid Maryland to impose such a tax? This is the only question presented by the record.

The plaintiffs in error insist, that the tax in question is virtually a duty on imports, and violates that clause in the constitution which declares that a State shall not lay duties on imports.

We answer, it is not, either directly or indirectly, a duty on imports. A duty on imports is a tribute paid to the sovereignty of the country for permission to introduce foreign goods. To import, and to bring in, mean the same thing. [e] A duty on imports is, therefore, a duty on the bringing in of foreign goods-on the act of importation. The duty is paid for the permission to introduce them; it is the consideration given for that privilege. The party buys the right to introduce the goods into the United States, and to place them under the protection of the laws of the country. He becomes liable to the whole duty by the very act of importation; and the amount is the same, whether he proposes to sell the goods, or to keep them for his own use, or to give them as a present to another.

After the goods have been brought into a State, the importer has one peculiar relation to them by reason of his being the importer. He is known to the State laws in the character of owner, or as the party entitled to the custody of the goods, and he receives the same degree of protection whether he be the importer or not the importer. The property, when it has passed through the custom houses, is no longer under the exclusive protection of the United States. It is guarded by the laws of the State-must be transferred and otherwise dealt with, according to the laws of the State. It is, therefore, imported, or brought in, and the act of importation is completed. If, therefore, a duty on imports means a duty on the act of importation, or the permission to introduce, it is very clear, that the law in question is not, directly or indirectly, a duty on imports.

But, it is said, that the word 'imports,' as used in the constitution of the United States, does not mean importation, but means the goods imported.

If this interpretation be right, then the constitution of the United States must be expounded as if it had said, No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on goods imported.' And if such be the true reading of the constitution, then no State can lay a tax upon any article of property which was imported from a foreign country. According to this construction, imported plate, imported furniture, imported property of every kind, would be privileged property, and exempt from taxation by the States. For, if the word imports,' as used in the constitution, means 'goods imported,' or 'imported goods,' then the States, without the permission of Congress, cannot tax property within their dominion, and owned by their citizens, provided that property has been introduced from abroad. Such would be the inevitable consequence of expounding the word imports as if the words imported goods had been used. The uniform practice of the States, the principles of justice, the interests of the community, are all directly opposed to this construction.

But, it is said, that if 'imports' means importation, and not the goods imported, yet the privilege of selling is inseparably incident to the importation, and is always implied in the privilege to import. This argument, like the one last replied to, will be found to prove too much, and to lead to results that can hardly be acquiesced in.

The right to import foreign goods is derived from the United States. The duties are imposed by the federal government, and are paid to that sovereignty. The permission to import is conferred by that government, and if the right to sell is implied in the permission to import, then the right to sell is derived from the United States, and becomes an absolute and vested right in the importer as soon as he acquires the privilege of introducing the goods; that is, as soon as he pays the duties, or secures them, according to the acts of Congress. And if the right to sell is a vested right, derived from the general government, then this right cannot be limited, restrained, regulated, or in any manner affected by State legislation. The importer, then, having an absolute and unconditional right to sell, may sell in any place, and in any manner he thinks proper. He may offer for sale large quantities of gunpowder in the heart of a city, and thus endanger the lives of the citizens; he may offer hides, fish, and articles of that description, in places offensive and inconvenient to the public, and dangerous to the health of the citizens; he may hold an auction at his own warehouse, and refuse to pay any tax to the State; he may sell at retail; he may sell as a hawker and pedlar; and the laws of the States which impose taxes on these trades, are unconstitutional and void, so far as the importer is concerned. These taxes have been always imposed by some of the States, and their right to derive a revenue from these sources has never before been questioned.

It may be said, that the right of the importer to sell, is a right to sell by wholesale only, and not by auction, or by retail. If, however, the right exists at all, it cannot be limited to sales by wholesale. It is said to be incident to the permission to import; and if it be annexed to that permission, then it must be an absolute and unconditional right; for where can we find the qualification? If the States are disabled from imposing a tax on the sales of foreign merchandise, when made by the bale or package, why are they not equally unable to impose a tax on the sales of such goods when made by auction, or retail, or in any other manner? The constitution gives no peculiar privilege to any particular mode of sale; and this Court, in expounding the instrument, well not introduce into it new limitations, and new divisions of power, not implied by its words.

In fine, the importer, by the payment of the duties, either acquires the right to sell, as well as the right to introduce the goods, or he acquires the right to bring in merely. In the first case, his right to sell would be beyond the reach of State control, and State regulation. In the second case, the goods would be subject to the laws and authority of the State. It can hardly be held, that an importer may sell in any place, and in any manner he pleases; and if he may not, it is because the disposition of the goods is subject to the regulations of the State authorities; and if they are so subject, they are, consequently, liable to such burthens as the State may impose on any particular mode of sale or transfer; and, therefore, liable to the tax in question.

The cases cited of goods wrecked on our shores, can hardly be supposed to bear on this argument. To import, implies an act of the will, a voluntary introduction of the goods. Besides, in those cases, the question is, are the goods liable to pay duty? not what rights will the payment of the duty procure? And when the questions are so different, it is not perceived how a decision of the one can in any degree affect the other.

But, it is insisted, on the other side, that if the law in question be not repugnant to that clause in the constitution which forbids a State to lay a duty on imports, yet it is in violation of that clause which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. It must be observed, that this argument admits, argumenti gratia, that the tax in question is not, either directly or indirectly, a duty on imports. But the plaintiffs in error contend, that although it be not a duty on imports, still the tax in question is forbidden by the constitution of the United States. In other words, they maintain, that the tenth section in the constitution of the United States is not the only one which limits the taxing power of the States; and that this power is still further curtailed by the clause which gives Congress the power to regulate commerce.

It has been settled by the decisions of this Court, that the grant of a power to Congress, does not extinguish the right of the States to legislate on the same subject, unless Congress exercises the power granted. And when the power is exercised, the States may yet legislate, if the whole ground of legislation has not been covered by the laws of the United States; provided the State law be not repugnant to that of the federal government. Assuming these principles as settled, it would be a sufficient answer to this argument to say, that no law of Congress gives, or professes to give to the importer, the right to sell: The revenue laws referred to, charge duties in certain cases, where sales may be made. The laws are framed on the assumption that certain foreign goods will be permitted to be sold; but these laws do not give that permission generally, nor point out in what mode they may be sold. If, therefore, under this power to regulate commerce, Congress may give the importer a right to sell, yet the right is not given; and until it is given by Congress, the States may regulate and tax the sales without violating the constitution of the United States.

But this clause in the constitution does not give to Congress the power contended for. By the constitution of the United States, the power of taxation by the States is restrained, by express words, in certain cases.

It has always been supposed, that these limitations of State sovereignty, in matters of revenue, so carefully and particularly set down, excluded all inference and implication, and left with the States all the powers of taxation not expressly denied to them in the restraining section. It is very clear, that the men who framed the constitution, and the people who adopted the constitution, so understood it. The Federalist must be considered as expressing the opinions of the friends of the federal constitution, both in and out of the Convention; and in No. 33, and near the conclusion of that number, the commentary on the subject of the taxing power is thus concluded: 'The inference from the whole is, that the individual States would, under the proposed constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and exports.' And, throughout No. 32 and No. 33 of the Federalist, the same principle is repeatedly asserted as a clear and indisputable one.

But, if Congress, under the power to regulate commerce, may authorize the importer to sell, then certain important powers of taxation, besides duties on imports and exports, have been surrendered by the States. For if Congress may give by law to the importer the right to sell, Congress may direct how the sale may be made, or may allow the importer to elect any mode he pleases; and, whenever this shall be done by the general government, the power of the States to regulate such sales is at an end, and, consequently, their power of taxation also. If this argument, then, be sustained by the Court, the authority of the States to regulate and to tax auctioneers and retailers is not 'an independent and uncontrollable authority,' as was supposed by the distinguished writers in the Federalist, but is a mere dependent authority, and liable to the control of Congress, so far as foreign goods are concerned. Congress, it is said, may give the importer the right to sell. If Congress may do so, then the States cannot tax any mode of sale which Congress may please to permit. Such powers were surely too important and valuable to have been surrendered in this loose and slovenly manner. If they were to have been given up by the States, they would have been given up in express terms, like the duties on imports, and not by vague and uncertain inferences. Besides, if Congress may give the right to sell in any manner, they may also give the right to sell in any place; and the police laws of the different States, made for their safety or health, exist only by the permission of Congress. And again, if Congress may not only prescribe the terms upon which foreign goods may be introduced into the country, but may direct how they shall be sold, and thus exempt the sales from State taxation, why may not Congress, upon the same principle, exempt all foreign goods from taxation by the States? If Congress may exercise exclusive dominion over foreign goods, for one purpose, after they have been brought into a State, why may not the same exclusive power be exercised for any other purpose? Reasons of policy might, indeed, make a difference; but we are not now discussing the policy of introducing new provisions into the constitution, but endeavouring to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the instrument.

The last argument urged in behalf of the plaintiff in error, is founded on the supposed policy and objects of the constitution, rather than on the interpretation of any words used in the instrument itself. It is said, that if a State may impose the tax in question, it may increase it to any amount, and by that means the States may prevent importations altogether. And, hence it is inferred, that a power capable of being so much abused, was not intended to have been left with the States.

Nothing can be more fallacious than to urge the possible abuse of power by the States, for the purpose of proving that the power has been taken away. Such an argument goes to the destruction of all State power. Such a principle of construction would put an end to all State authority; for all power may possibly be abused. The States cannot and ought not to be deemed more liable than the federal government to abuse the powers confided to them by the people; nor can any supposed and merely possible inconvenience, which might arise from an improper use of State power, furnish a ground for deciding against the existence of the power. We must be continually liable to this inconvenience from the complex character of our government. In the Federalist, No. 32, the rule of construction is thus stated: 'It is not a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate and constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.' The possibility of inconvenience from the improper use of this power by the States, is not, therefore, any argument against the existence of this power. It cannot, by implication, alienate and extinguish the power for which we are contending.

But, indeed, it is impossible that the power to lay the tax in question can lead to any inconvenience, or can be used to embarrass the regulations, or lessen the revenue of the federal government. If the tax on wholesale dealers should be so heavy as to prevent importations, the people of the State will be the principal sufferers. If it enhances the price of imported goods, the burthen is at least as heavy on the people of the State as it is on the citizens of other States, and this furnishes abundant security that no such tax will ever be vexatiously laid. The people of a State cannot be justly suspected of imposing heavy burthens upon themselves, for the purpose of thwarting or embarrassing the general government. If, indeed, the people of a State could be guilty of such folly, they might, by bounties and other facilities to manufacturers in their own State, effectually prevent the importation of foreign goods. Nobody would deny that the States possess this power; but nobody suspects them of being disposed to abuse it.

There is, indeed, no real danger of serious inconvenience from these conflicting powers. The good sense and good feelings of the people will always apply the remedy; and we may safely confide, that the State governments, and the general government, will never embark in the unprofitable contest of trying which shall do each other the mostharm. But if such a state of things should ever take place, it would matter very little how the boundaries of power had been marked out by judicial decision. The Union cannot be preserved by the mere strength and power of the federal government. It is dissolved as soon as it shall forfeit the affection and confidence of the States.

The Attorney General, for the plaintiffs in error, in reply, stated the question to be, whether a State law, which rendered it criminal to import and sell foreign goods, without the permission of the State, which permission was only to be obtained by paying a tax to the State, was repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the Union. If the State of Maryland had the power to lay such a restraint on the importation and sale of foreign goods, every other State must have the same power; and the consequence would be, that this power of taxation would directly interfere, both with the power of regulating commerce, and with the taxing power of Congress. The quantum of tax imposed by the State could make no difference. The same principle would apply, as in the attempt of the same State to tax the Bank of the United States, where the Court held, that a power to tax, was a power to tax limited only by the pleasure of the State; and that it was, therefore, a power to destroy. [f]

In the present case, the power was denied upon two grounds; first, because the power exerted by the law in question is that of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, which the Court has determined to be exclusively vested in Congress. [g] Secondly, because it was that of laying an impost, or duty on imports, without the consent of Congress.

In order to determine whether the present law interfered with the exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it was only necessary to see whether it undertook to prescribe the terms on which commerce may be carried on with foreign nations, and among the States. If it were a power to prescribe those terms, it was a power to prescribe the whole terms. After Congress, in the exercise of its exclusive power, has prescribed certain terms, it is incompetent for the States to add other terms. Could there be any doubt that the exclusive power of regulating foreign commerce included that of prescribing to all the citizens of the Union the conditions, and the whole conditions, on which they shall be permitted to bring into the United States, for sale or consumption, the productions of foreign countries? This power does not stop with the permission to bring them in; for if the States may prohibit their sale, or restrain, or burthen it, in any mode, they may, in effect, prohibit their importation. If they may prevent their sale, they may prohibit their barter or exchange, or use and consumption in the country, in any and every mode; and thus effectually defeat the beneficial exercise of the permission to import. TheStates might even contiscate the goods, or order them to be burnt and destroyed after they were landed; and this would no more interfere with the right of importation, according to the opposite argument, than the law now in question. And, it was asked, whether the sagacious statesmen who framed the constitution meant to confer upon Congress a power so idle and illusory? They looked to the exercise of this power of regulating commerce as a great source of national wealth and aggrandizement. [h] They looked to it as a great means of developing the agricultural and manufacturing resources of the country, and its general industry; as an instrument by which the nation should be enriched at home, and rendered capable of countervailing the commercial regulations of foreign and rival nations. But if the power of regulating commerce ceases on the landing of the goods, and the whole subject is then delivered over to the discretion of the respective States, with their various partial and discordant views of policy, its exclusive exercise by Congress will be utterly vain and useless. So that the very existence of that commerce, a power of regulating and preserving which is so studiously conferred on Congress, is at last made to depend upon the caprice and pleasure of the States. What signifies the power of regulation, if the States may destroy the very substance of the thing to be regulated? Uniformity, or permanency of regulation, with a view to any purpose of policy in regard to the agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial interests of the nation, is, of course, as much out of the question, as if there were no Union, or as if it were still infected with all the debility of the former confederation. The same State power, exercised upon short sighted and narrow views, might be exerted so as to defeat the other branch of the power, that of regulating commerce among the States. The free intercommunication which now prevails between the States, may be effectually checked, by requiring a similar license to import into a particular State the productions of other States. So, also, what the State may do as to imports, it may do as to exports. It may require a license from the exporting merchant, and thus, in effect, lay a duty on exports, although both the States and Congress are expressly forbidden in the constitution from laying such a duty; and the whole power of regulating the commerce, both of exports and imports, is exclusively vested in Congress. By the joint exercise of these two usurped powers, the State may establish a total non-intercourse with other States, and with foreign nations, in direct violation of the laws, and treaties, and constitution of the Union. Or it may make a discrimination among foreign nations, or among the different States, with a view of discouraging their commerce, or of encouraging some branch of its own internal industry, in direct repugnancy to the policy of the Union, as exhibited in its laws and treaties. One of the avowed objects for conferring the power of regulating commerce upon Congress, was that of raising a revenue for the support of the national government. It was foreseen, that the prosperity of commerce would best be promoted by uniform regulations contained in the laws and treaties of the Union; and it was also foreseen, that an impost was that species of taxation hest suited to the genius and habits of the American people. [i] But if the power now in question may be exercised by one State, it may be exercised of all; and the principal source from which the revenues of the Union were to be derived, will be dried up, or diverted to local purposes. In short, it was insisted, that all the evils for which the constitution was intended to provide an effectual remedy, would be entailed upon the country, by confirming the validity of such State laws as the act now in question. March 12th.

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

NotesEdit

^a  9 Cranch, 388. See also 4 Cranch, 347.

^b  Hale on the Customs, Pt. 3. ch. 20. in Hargr. Law Tracts, 211.

^c  Hanson's Laws of Maryland, Act of 1783, ch. 36. s. 34. Act of 1784, ch. 84. s. 5.

^d  1 Mason's Rep. 482.

^e  Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 123. 1 Mason's Rep. 499. 4 Wheat. Rep. 246.

^f  M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. Rep. 316.

^g  Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. Rep. 1.

^h  The Federalist, No. 11.

^i  The Federalist, No. 12.

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