Bulgarian Policies on the Republic of Macedonia

by Lyubomir Ivanov et al.

ФОНДАЦИЯ МАНФРЕД ВЬОРНЕР MANFRED WÖRNER FOUNDATION

BULGARIAN POLICIES ON THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Recommendations on the development
of good neighbourly relations
following Bulgaria’s accession to the EU
and in the context of NATO and EU enlargement
in the Western Balkans

Developed under the guidance of Lyubomir Ivanov,
with the participation and contribution of
Z. Andonova, P. Atanasov, S. Barakov, B. Bobev, G. Daskalov,
A. Dimitrov, B. Dimitrov, E. Ekov, S. Eldarov, Z. Georgiev,
S. Hadjitodorov, V. Iliev, Z. Ilieva, N. Kolev, K. Kossev,
M. Milanov, I. Mitov, P. Pantev, G. Papakochev, A. Parvanov,
A. Popov, V. Rachev, N. Stoyanova, V. Tekelov, M. Traykov,
et al.

Sofia, January 2007 / January 2008

... it is difficult to explain to the world why we have problems

with almost all [of the neighbouring states]

while they do not have so many with each other.

(Utrinski Vesnik – Skopje, 12/31/07)

1. Fundamentals

As a Balkan state and an EU and NATO member, and bordering

the Western Balkans, Bulgaria, along with Greece, has the specific

responsibility of guaranteeing that the states aspiring to EU and NATO

membership in the region attain modern European standards of good

neighbourly relations. Bulgaria also needs to set its relations with the

Republic of Macedonia on a sound and sustainable basis not only in

the best interests of Bulgaria’s own citizens, but no less of the citizens

of the Republic of Macedonia, and for the successful development of

the Balkan region as a modern and prosperous part of a United Europe.

Bulgaria recently made two particularly important steps in this

direction, which marked the end of one and the beginning of another

stage in its bilateral relations with the Republic of Macedonia.

The first step was made in 2006 by Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov

and Foreign Minister Ivaylo Kalfin who unequivocally warned Skopje

that the credit of unconditional support originally extended to the

Republic of Macedonia for its European Union and NATO membership

has been expended, and that future Bulgarian support would depend

on the willingness and success of the Republic of Macedonia in

adopting and pursuing a policy of good neighbourly relations.

The second major step was made during the visit of US President

George W. Bush to Sofia in 2007, when both President Parvanov and

Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev advised him of the failure of the

Republic of Macedonia to follow a good neighbour policy.

Articulated at the highest level, these political messages require the

elaboration in greater detail of the full range of policies related to

Bulgaria’s bilateral relations with the Republic of Macedonia, and

their development in the new circumstances. This paper aims to

formulate some possible starting points for such policies, putting

them forward for expert analysis, political decision making and prompt

implementation, along with due public debate and participation.

Bulgarian attitudes and views on the complex set of issues related to

Bulgarian policy on the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the relevant

aspects of Bulgaria’s relations with third states, especially Greece,

Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, were formed at various times in history,

and thus are the product of various historical realities. As a result, these

attitudes and views are inherently contradictory, effectively hindering

any attempt to pursue consistent and proactive policies. Moreover,

the present conceptual framework fails to reflect the most recent,

post-January 1, 2007 situation in which Bulgaria is a member of both

NATO and the European Union, while the Republic of Macedonia is not.

Owing to these circumstances, the present analysis and the ensuing

policy recommendations are based on a new interpretation and re-

evaluation, which requires new approaches in certain aspects.

It should be noted that the position of Skopje enjoys better exposure

and audibility than the Bulgarian one among decision makers and the

general public in Europe, the United States and Canada. Indeed, during

the last two decades the Republic of Macedonia has been building

its arguments and international public relations efforts on Yugoslav

propaganda disseminated in the course of forty-odd years, while

during that time Bulgaria remained virtually silent and refrained from

seeking support for its position from other nations. Macedonism also

benefits from public sympathy in Europe and North America towards

the small post-Yugoslav republic, viewed both as an offspring and to

some extent a victim of the Cold War victors.

The present pre-accession status of the Republic of Macedonia vis-аvis

the EU and NATO offers a unique window of opportunity to set the

country’s relations with Bulgaria on a stable and positive basis of good

neighbourliness. If this opportunity is missed, Sofia would only find a

fairly modest set of means at its disposal to further its cause, while the

capabilities of Skopje would expand. Furthermore, even the strongest

arguments of Bulgaria would then become intellectually and morally

deficient; for while the silence and passivity of this country in the past

could find some explanation (if not justification), the ability to pursue

a policy of good neighbourly relations is an important criterion for

both NATO and EU accession by candidate states such as the Republic

of Macedonia, and any further silence on the part of Bulgaria would

be interpreted by our allies in NATO and EU, and in the Republic of

Macedonia itself as condoning and legitimizing policies and practices

that cannot be accepted as good and neighbourly by any selfrespecting

state.

This paper deals mostly with specific problems in the relations

between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, outlining actions

for their sustainable solution, while briefly mentioning a variety of

other relevant measures such as joint infrastructure and other projects

(including those funded by the EU and NATO), Bulgarian investment

in the economy of the Republic of Macedonia, further streamlining

of the procedures for granting Bulgarian citizenship to persons of

Bulgarian origin in Balkan states, or incentives for such persons to study

at Bulgarian universities etc. Such measures can undoubtedly facilitate

the resolution of existing problems, but cannot resolve them alone.

The present report focuses exclusively on Bulgaria’s policies towards the

Republic of Macedonia. Actions and policies towards third states, or

the EU and NATO are considered only as much as they are essential in

achieving the policy goals related to the Republic of Macedonia.

1.1. The Republic of Macedonia

The Macedonian nation and the Macedonian state were created in

the process of implementation and evolution of a well known Serbian

political construction originally proposed in 1889, later supported by

a decision of the Communist International in Moscow in 1934, and

eventually put into effect between 1944 and 1991 in one particular

part of the geographical and historical region of Macedonia (about 36

percent of its territory) known as Vardar Macedonia, included in the

territory of Yugoslavia, and governed by the Yugoslav Communist Party.

This idea proclaimed that the ethnic Bulgarians in Macedonia, who had

lived there since the 7^th century, had nothing to do with the Bulgarian

state and the Bulgarian nation – a statement that contradicts the

historical interpretation predominantly accepted by historians around

the world. The Macedonist doctrine was enforced in Vardar Macedonia

by methods and means typical of a totalitarian communist regime:

by terror and repression against those who considered themselves

Bulgarian (30,000 executed, and another 120,000 sent to concentration

camps and prisons); by rewriting history through education and the

media; falsifying authentic historical evidence and artefacts; and by

counterfeiting historical monuments (inscriptions in churches and

monasteries, burial grounds etc.).

Such practices persist in various forms in the present Macedonian state.

The reason lies in the model of nation building chosen by the newly

independent Republic of Macedonia in the early 1990s. One of the

available options, which is still current, was to recognize the objective

parameters of this development as they are, i.e. independent statehood

within the borders of the Republic of Macedonia (a joint state of the

ethnic Macedonians and Albanians); changes in ethnic self-awareness

among much of the population of Vardar Macedonia (today’s Republic

of Macedonia) after 1944; the centuries of historical development of

the majority population on the territory comprising today’s Republic of

Macedonia as an integral part of Bulgarian ethnicity; and the Bulgarian

ethnic identity preserved among a certain portion of the population of

the Republic of Macedonia. Regrettably, the political elite of the new

state chose the alternative option of following the Serbo-Yugoslavian,

anti-Bulgarian scheme unaltered, now in a different environment and

to some extent with new protagonists and propagators.

In other words, the consolidation of a distinct Macedonian nation

proceeded in conditions of independence not on the basis of

recognition and appreciation of objective historical evidence, but

rather persisted in falsifying the past, and projecting processes

confined to a particular territory and period of time (Vardar Macedonia

in Yugoslavia, 1944 -1991) into other territories and other times. Given

that the history of the population of the Republic of Macedonia and

that of its neighbouring countries are interrelated, this exercise in

rewriting history (extending back to the Balkan Revival of the 19^th

century, the Middle Ages and even to Antiquity), while aimed at

adjusting the historic ethnic identity of the population of the Republic

of Macedonia to its present one, effectively attempts to redefine the

historic – and hence the modern – identity of neighbouring nations,

especially the Bulgarians. This attempt is perceived as outrageous by

the latter.

A new aspect of this old project is that its masterminds and

propagators today comprise not only political and other factions

ideologically and biographically connected to the former Yugoslav

nomenclature, but also their ideological opponents, including

the offspring of families persecuted in the past as Bulgarians or

Bulgarophiles.

Subsequently, due to Skopje’s failure to follow a good neighbour

policy, the very name of the Republic of Macedonia began to generate

problems in the traditional use of the name ‘Macedonia’ for other major

areas of the geographical region of the same name, i.e. Bulgarian (Pirin)

Macedonia and Greek (Aegean) Macedonia.

In this respect, the initial credit of trust extended by Bulgaria through its

unconditional recognition of the new state in 1992 was an investment

in good relations between the two countries that was unfortunately

not reciprocated. In hindsight, the early recognition without any

commitment by the new state to adopt standards of good neighbourly

behaviour rather served as an incentive for the continuation of old-style

Yugo-Macedonian policies.

Current bilateral relations are to a large extent disingenuous, with

representatives of Skopje making different statements when visiting

Sofia, when speaking at home, and when addressing third parties. In

view of the strongly divergent public attitudes in Bulgaria and in the

Republic of Macedonia, there is potential for serious deterioration

which should never occur between two European states, let alone

between two present or future EU member states.

Accordingly, in view of the anticipated invitation for the Republic of

Macedonia to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the

pending process of negotiations for the accession of the Republic

of Macedonia to the European Union, Bulgaria must insist on the

following, directly and/or by means of the opportunities provided by

the accession process and by making use of Bulgaria’s status as a full

member state:

1.1.1. Strict compliance by the Republic of Macedonia with the Joint

Declaration of February 22, 1999 that sets the rules governing good

neighbourly relations agreed between Bulgaria and the Republic

of Macedonia, by registering and identifying openly all established

infringements of the provisions of the Declaration. Strict monitoring of

the Republic of Macedonia’s compliance with the Declaration should

become an integral part of the assessment conducted by both Bulgaria

and the EU of the progress achieved by the Republic of Macedonia

in attaining the criteria and standards for EU membership (including

the requirement for strict adherence to a policy of good neighbourly

relations). Similar monitoring should be carried out in the process of

NATO accession.

The reason for focusing the attention of the European Union on the

implementation of the 1999 Declaration is that its infringement creates

serious problems in relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of

Macedonia. It would be unacceptable for these difficulties to persist

after the Republic of Macedonia joins the EU.

Bulgaria should insist that the resolution recommending the opening

of negotiations for the accession of the Republic of Macedonia to

the EU should include an obligation for Skopje to adhere strictly

to the 1999 Joint Declaration. During the negotiations Bulgaria

should regularly submit its assessment of the implementation of the

Declaration to the European Commission, reflecting any failures to

comply with the Declaration in its entirety in the annual reports of

the EC on the progress made by the Republic of Macedonia towards

meeting the membership criteria. Chapters in the negotiations should

then not be opened and/or closed without strict compliance with the

relevant requirements.

Assessments should take into account the actual behaviour of the

Republic of Macedonia rather than its proclaimed good intentions

(with failures to abide by these intentions conveniently attributed to

‘the old forces’, ‘Serbian influence’ etc. It would be naпve to believe

that such declarative intentions are anything other than political

expediency which can be abandoned after the country’s accession to

the EU and NATO).

1.1.2. Harassment of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who identify

as Bulgarians must be discontinued. Such acts of harassment include

extended police interrogations of citizens of the Republic of Macedonia

who have committed no offence, but have stated somewhere that

they are Bulgarians; arbitrary dismissal; pressure exerted on public

organizations of Bulgarians, etc.

1.1.3. The Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia who clearly identify

as such should enjoy an equal standing with other ethnic communities

in compliance with the relevant national legislation. This requires

their explicit listing in the preamble of the country’s Constitution.

Regardless of their numbers as officially registered in the Republic of

Macedonia, Bulgarians should be included along with the originally

listed Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Roma, and Serbs and Bosniaks which

were subsequently added.

In this context, it would be appropriate to examine the proposition that

today’s ethnic Macedonians (non-Bulgarians) and the ethnic Bulgarians

in the Republic of Macedonia constitute a single entity and that there is

no difference between them.

This statement is interpreted in two diametrically opposing ways.

Some maintain that this ‘single entity’ consists solely of Macedonians

(non-Bulgarians), while others support the view that all of them are

Bulgarians in some respects, or at least in a process of ‘re-Bulgarization’

as some would claim.

Both these interpretations are seriously flawed, and indeed

unacceptable, as they radically violate the basic principle of ethnic self-

determination: you, and not others, say who you are and, conversely,

you do not tell others who they are. Bulgaria has no other option

but to adhere strictly to this principle, and disassociate from any

interpretations that deviate from it. Given that there are Macedonians

who identify as non-Bulgarians (naturally, we refer only to descendents

of the Macedonian Bulgarians, and not to Albanians, Vlachs, Turks or

other traditional ethnic groups in Vardar Macedonia), one cannot claim

that Macedonians and Bulgarians are one and the same. As far as there

are Macedonians who identify as Bulgarians, one cannot maintain that

‘Macedonian’ is the same as ‘non-Bulgarian’. (While this is perfectly

legitimate in the context of ethnic self-identification by individual

persons or in the realm of the freedom of speech for citizens and

non-governmental circles, such opinions are inadmissible in a national

policy context.)

Both these interpretations are out of step with modern reality. Indeed,

as a result of changes in the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia during the last six decades, the majority of people of

Bulgarian ancestry in the Republic of Macedonia today identify as

ethnic Macedonians and non-Bulgarians. On the other hand, it is a fact

that part of the population has preserved its Bulgarian ethnic affiliation.

Clearly these two groups cannot form a single ethnic entity as they

differ precisely in their ethnic self-identification. In other words, the

proposition in question is factually untrue. Moreover, the numerical

ratio between the above two groups is considerably in favour of those

identifying as ethnic Macedonians, which means that denying the

difference is tantamount to supporting the cause of anti-Bulgarian

Macedonism, and is thus damaging to Bulgarian interests.

This is why ethnic Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia should not

be placed in a disadvantaged position as compared to other ethnic

minorities in the country, as modern European standards confirm.

Like other activities which protect the interests of ethnic Bulgarian

citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria’s demand for

recognition of the Bulgarian minority by Skopje would be in

compliance with the 1999 Joint Declaration. It is worth mentioning,

however, that in this particular aspect the Declaration is asymmetrical,

explicitly excluding any official action by the Republic of Macedonia

to protect the status of persons in Bulgaria who are not citizens of the

Republic of Macedonia.

As for the possible number of Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia,

concerns are expressed that official recognition of the Bulgarian

minority there might reveal its small size. However, regardless of that

size Bulgarian policy should be based on reality rather than wishful

thinking. Bulgaria’s behaviour until now of avoiding the issue of

recognition of the Bulgarian minority in the Republic of Macedonia

has two possible interpretations. The first is that despite the large

number of people (tens of thousands and growing) claiming Bulgarian

ethnic origins in the last few years and granted Bulgarian citizenship

on this basis, there is actually no Bulgarian minority in the Republic of

Macedonia but rather some ‘crypto-Bulgarians’ who would gradually

diminish with the succession of generations. The other interpretation

is based on the assumption that there are indeed Bulgarians in

the Republic of Macedonia but they are more than just a minority;

supporters of this interpretation maintain that there is currently a

widespread process of re-Bulgarization which in the near future will

return the Vardar Macedonians into the mainstream of the historical

continuity inherent to neighbouring Pirin Macedonia. Apparently, such

radically divergent interpretations derive from isolated cases rather

than from objective representative data on actual processes. In any

case, with their referral to assumed future reality, such interpretations

do not contribute to bringing current Bulgarian policies into line with

present-day reality.

Another frequently expressed concern is that the recognition of the

Bulgarian minority would ‘encapsulate’ and isolate it from the larger

category of people in the Republic of Macedonia (over 200,000,

according to some rough expert estimates) who have dual ethnic

self-awareness, identifying both as Bulgarians and Macedonians at the

same time. This concern is groundless. Prominent Bulgarians in the

Republic of Macedonia have repeatedly stressed the need for more

robust and proactive support on the part of Bulgaria. Undoubtedly,

an important element of such support would be to take care of the

Bulgarian minority whose recognition, visible presence, and self-

confidence would also help to strengthen, and not weaken, the

Bulgarian dimension in those who identify both as Macedonian

and Bulgarian. (By way of comparison it is noteworthy that those in

Bulgaria who identify as ethnic Macedonians and non-Bulgarians do

not seem to be concerned about any such ‘encapsulation’ in their

differentiation from the Bulgarians, and their cause is well represented

and publicized internationally.)

1.1.4. Teaching of history using textbooks which thoroughly falsify

history and contain insulting qualifications of the Bulgarian state and

nation, sometimes bordering on open racism, should discontinue.

Bulgaria must insist that the textbooks formally approved by the

relevant authorities of the Republic of Macedonia should contain an

explicit reference to the Bulgarian national affiliation (accepted by

historians) of prominent figures in our common history such as

St. Clement of Ohrid, Tsar Samuel of Bulgaria, the Miladinov Brothers

and Gotse Delchev.

The education system of the Republic of Macedonia, from primary

school to university, is a powerful tool for inciting widespread and

strong anti-Bulgarian attitudes and sentiments by implanting the

image of Bulgaria as an occupying, assimilatory, and divisive power.

Such attitudes and sentiments in turn hold the politics of the Republic

of Macedonia as a permanent hostage regardless of political changes

or the succession of political factions in government.

It is important to stress that the elimination of falsifications and anti-

Bulgarian hate speech in textbooks and in the media will not deprive

the Republic of Macedonia of its raison d'кtre. The state may well

continue to exist on the basis of its accomplishments and present-day

realities without having to project them retrospectively in an effort

to create a past which did not happen; it may continue to exist while

recognizing its Bulgarian historical heritage, just like Bulgaria recognizes

present realities without transferring the past to the present.

1.1.5. Restoration of the destroyed or falsified inscriptions in churches,

monasteries, on icons, frescoes, water fountains, bridges etc. in

accordance with the relevant international standards and agreements.

1.1.6. Assistance in the restoration, or at least removal of the obstacles

to restoration, of the 471 Bulgarian military cemeteries on the territory

of the Republic of Macedonia, a particularly sensitive issue for Bulgaria.

1.2. Albania and Kosovo

The activities of Skopje aimed at affiliating the descendents of the

Macedonian Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia and in some regions

of Albania and Kosovo to the Serb-Yugoslav project of building a

Macedonian nation are a substantial component of the effort to justify

this project retrospectively. Despite the otherwise modest means at its

disposal, the Republic of Macedonia has been investing considerable

propaganda, political and material resources to this end and has thus

achieved certain results.

While few in number, the Bulgarians in Greece, Albania and Kosovo

who have preserved their ethnic identity constitute important

evidence for the history of the geographical region of Macedonia.

Particularly in the context of the integration process of Albania’s

accession to the EU and NATO, the consolidation of Kosovo as an

independent state and its future integration with the EU and NATO,

Bulgaria should accordingly demand the following:

1.2.1. Equality for Bulgarians in Albania with the other ethnic

communities in compliance with state practices and legislation in

this sphere. This means that the Bulgarian minority must be formally

recognized along with the other formally recognized minorities,

regardless of the number of those who identify as Bulgarian.

Recognition of this equality should become an integral part of the

assessments by Bulgaria, the EU and NATO of the progress made by

Albania in meeting EU and NATO membership criteria.

1.2.2. Equality for Bulgarians in Kosovo (regardless of their number)

with the other ethnic groups. This equality should be embedded

in the local practices and legislation in this sphere currently being

established. The progress of Kosovo institutions in this respect must

be taken into account in defining Bulgaria’s position and participation

in the establishment and development of an independent Kosovo;

in due course, these assessments should become an integral part of

assessments by Bulgaria, the EU and NATO of the progress made by

Kosovo in fulfilling EU and NATO membership criteria.

Bulgaria should strengthen its presence among the Bulgarians in

Albania and Kosovo, including by sponsoring joint non-governmental

projects. It should ease procedures for granting Bulgarian citizenship

and university scholarships to individuals of Bulgarian origin, and

should immediately begin negotiations for the formal recognition of

Bulgarian minorities in both countries.

1.3. Greece

The policy and attitudes of Greece are relevant to the issue of good

neighbourly relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia

in the context of EU and NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans

for several reasons: Greece was the first Balkan state to become an EU

member; the country played an important role and contributed to

the accession of both Bulgaria and Romania to the EU and NATO; the

territory of Greece includes over half of the geographical region of

Macedonia, according to the definition of that region accepted since

the 19^th century (Thessaloniki, the principal city and natural centre

of the region, is also in Greece); furthermore, due to their historical

awareness, Greeks, as indeed Albanians, have a very good idea of

the Bulgarian ethnic identity of the majority population of Vardar

Macedonia in the past, and its evolution during the last few decades.

While the problems of Greece in its bilateral relations with the Republic

of Macedonia are quite different from those faced by Bulgaria, Greece

is no less interested in the Republic of Macedonia adopting European

standards of good neighbourly relations. Bulgaria and Greece may

assist in this respect (including by joint efforts) during the process

of preparation of the Republic of Macedonia for EU and NATO

membership, in particular by means of the following.

1.3.1. In the framework of the European Union, Bulgaria and Greece

could initiate the drafting and enactment of a suitable аcquis

communautaire in the sphere of education aimed at creating common

standards of objectivity in teaching history at school and in academic

institutions.

As for the descendants of Macedonian Bulgarians living today in

Greece (following several large-scale formal or de facto exchanges

of population between Bulgaria and Greece, the last one after World

War II), a dominant majority of them identify as Greek; some of them

claim that they are ethnic Bulgarians and others identify as ethnic

Macedonians. In line with the relevant Greek legislation (which differs

from those of the Republic of Macedonia and Albania as far as ethnic

minorities are concerned) and the existing agreements forming the

legal basis of bilateral relations between Greece and Bulgaria, minority

issues are not treated as a topic at the level of state relations and are

instead considered as an exercise of specific rights by EU citizens.

In conclusion, as a member of both the EU and NATO, Bulgaria bears

a special responsibility for the development of good neighbourly

relations in the process of European and Atlantic integration of

the Western Balkans, which requires certain decisions and actions.

Following January 1, 2007 there is no justification for any further delay

or abdication from this national responsibility, especially in view of

the considerable political, financial and other resources available to

Bulgaria as an EU and NATO member state with a stable economy and

influential allies and partners. Bulgaria’s preoccupation with reforms

in pursuit of European and Atlantic integration can no longer be used

as an excuse. Failure of the responsible Bulgarian authorities to take

action would be detrimental to Bulgaria’s national interests; such a

failure would tolerate, endorse, and effectively foster anti-Bulgarian

Macedonism with its stereotypes and practices rooted in the past,

which have no place in the Euro-Atlantic family of nations.

2. Action Plan

2.1. Framework

The practical implementation of the proposed new Bulgarian policies

on the Republic of Macedonia requires the development and adoption

of an action plan with a clearly defined framework specifying the

following:

2.1.1. The instruments for pursuing Bulgaria’s policy (institutions such

as ministries, state agencies, municipalities and embassies, research

units, lobbyists, politicians etc.);

2.1.2. Particular steps to be undertaken in order to attain the specific

objectives set out above;

2.1.3. The form, in which Bulgarian statesmen and politicians should

publicly articulate the damage caused by the policy of the Republic

of Macedonia and reiterate Bulgaria’s demand for maintaining good

neighbourly relations during their visits to the Republic of Macedonia

or at international fora;

2.1.4. The political and financial resources to be invested in lobbying

for international support, and for launching an open and vigorous

campaign against the negative propaganda in the Republic of

Macedonia;

2.1.5. Prioritization of the objectives above in accordance with the

resources required for their attainment and their importance for

changing the widespread negative attitudes among the citizens of the

Republic of Macedonia.

2.2. Activities

The proposed fundamentals of Bulgaria’s policy on the Republic of

Macedonia require a thorough review of the whole spectrum of

Bulgaria’s foreign relations, with the ‘Bulgaria – Republic of Macedonia’

dimension addressed in the spirit of this report:

2.2.1. Firstly, Bulgaria should prepare a package of historical, cultural,

political, geographical, ethnographical, economic and other arguments

in support of the propositions outlined above. The package would

be used as the foundation of Bulgaria’s position in its foreign relations.

There are ample prerequisites for this purpose, both from the period

before and after 1989. The package should be dominated by a positive

attitude to the Republic of Macedonia, based on the understanding

that a recently-established state has prospects for development based

on its constructive deeds and achievements following independence

without seeking support in some fictional past.

2.2.2. This Bulgarian package should be well balanced with the

consistent policy of Athens of protecting Greek interests against the

lack of good neighbourly policies maintained by the Republic of

Macedonia. In this way, the consolidated impact would be cooperative

towards Skopje, and cumulative and coordinated in nature. With

regard to Greece, Bulgaria must stress the lengthy and painful transition

of the country during which the national political potential was

dedicated to achieving the priority goals of NATO and EU membership

as a reason for the hitherto passive Bulgarian stance towards the

Republic of Macedonia. Cooperation with Greece needs no specific

base other than the regional responsibilities of both states as EU and

NATO members and the application of European standards in relation

to Skopje. Nevertheless, Bulgaria’s position regarding the Republic of

Macedonia would be stronger and more principled if Bulgaria extends

its support to Skopje in the event that Greek claims towards Skopje

diverge from European standards. The international community

and the general public in the three states should not harbour the

impression that the set of foreign policy tools used by Bulgaria with

regard to the Republic of Macedonia replicate those of Greece.

2.2.3. Sixteen years after the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia

by Bulgaria, the time has come for the latter to emerge from its

paternalistic attitudes towards the smaller neighbouring country and

to reiterate Bulgaria’s unconditional position that Sofia, being a NATO

and an EU member, has no territorial claims.

2.2.4. The integration of the Western Balkans into the EU and NATO

should become a key concept of Bulgarian diplomacy as grounds for

the affiliation to the Bulgarian nation of Bulgarians in the Republic of

Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Kosovo by means of achieving the

required standards related to national and ethnic minorities in the EU.

2.2.5. The proposed Bulgarian activities should be preceded by a critical

analysis of the 1999 Joint Declaration and its application, along with

the development of Bulgaria’s own comprehensive concept for the

future of its relations with the Republic of Macedonia and its people.

The above should be carried out in accordance with the expectations

and prospects for ethical and positive relations with the Republic of

Macedonia as a future member state of the EU and NATO. This requires

comprehensive and methodical coordination of Bulgarian positions

with the USA and other NATO and EU allies, starting with the most

important, and in the event of positive responses, proceeding with the

more special cases of Greece and other relevant Balkan states such as

Romania, Cyprus, Slovenia and Turkey. Due attention should be paid

to countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic

(and to a certain extent Russia), where politicians and academics have

provided some support to the Yugoslav position on the Macedonian

issue. Approaches should be tailored to each country with which

Bulgaria maintains diplomatic relations, in order to promote Bulgaria’s

case.

2.2.6. Bulgaria’s case should be promoted in the European media

as widely as possible, including the use of well known examples

such as Germany and Austria, or Romania and Moldova, where the

creation of new nations on the basis of independent statehood is not

accompanied by Macedonian-style negativism.

2.2.7. Ongoing pressure should be exerted with regard to specific

cases at international human rights institutions, including by non-

governmental organizations active on the issue.

2.2.8. A detailed fact file should document and present the longstanding

activities of Skopje in obstructing the development of

constructive bilateral relations despite Bulgaria’s goodwill.

2.2.9. The particular events and developments which prompted

Bulgaria to assume its critical position towards the Republic of

Macedonia should be clearly explained.

2.2.10. It would be helpful to expose the links and contacts of

prominent members of the Republic of Macedonia’s elite who have

been active in undermining bilateral relations with Bulgaria, with the

secret services of the former Milošević regime, and with the present

anti-democratic factions in Serbia.

2.2.11. Under its obligations as a donor country participating in the

UN Millennium Development Goals campaign, Bulgaria has decided

to concentrate its efforts and resources in several priority countries,

including the Republic of Macedonia. In an aid programme expected

to amount to 0.17% of the Gross Domestic Product in 2010 and 0.33%

in 2015, Bulgaria should develop a special programme providing

the Republic of Macedonia with useful know-how, assistance and

partnership in the sphere of reforms and European and Atlantic

integration. The Bulgarian non-governmental sector, local authorities,

state administration and business sector have accumulated much

valuable experience in preparation for EU and NATO accession, which

is relevant for a country like the Republic of Macedonia and some

other states in the Western Balkans. Such assistance would represent

a strategic investment in good neighbourly relations, and it would be

regrettable if its provision were to be left to other countries.

2.2.12. All available opportunities existing within the common EU

visa policy should be used to facilitate the access of the citizens of

the Republic of Macedonia to Bulgaria; at a minimum, the relevant

Bulgarian regulations and procedures should be at least as liberal as the

Greek ones. Transborder contacts and border area cooperation would

benefit from the opening of more border crossings.

2.2.13. Conditions should be created to maintain and extend

opportunities for students from the Republic of Macedonia to study at

Bulgarian colleges and universities and suitable forms should be found

to maintain further contacts between and with them, both as a natural

Bulgarian lobby group in their home country and as welcome potential

participants in the increasingly attractive Bulgarian labour market.

2.2.14. Administrative capacity should be developed to facilitate and

accelerate procedures for obtaining Bulgarian citizenship, with the

overall duration of the procedures shortened from years to months.

Bulgaria is on the verge of a new stage in its social, economic, and

demographic development and an important aspect of this will be

mass immigration. Spurred by the needs of an expanding Bulgarian

economy, immigration is set to grow, whether spontaneously or

managed by proactive Bulgarian policies to attract and integrate

immigrants. Bulgarian citizens in the Republic of Macedonia represent

a significant resource in this respect. Furthermore, the fact that

Bulgarian citizenship has been granted to a now substantial and

growing number of people in the Republic of Macedonia provides

grounds under international law for Bulgaria to intervene to protect

their rights and interests.

2.2.15. The activities of the Bulgarian Culture and Information Centre

in Skopje should be expanded by investing the effort and resources

needed to promote Bulgarian culture and policies in the Republic of

Macedonia. Bulgarian culture and information centres should also be

established in Tirana and Prishtina.

2.2.16. Incentives should be provided for the Bulgarian nongovernmental

and business sectors to establish partnership relations

with citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in their local Bulgarian

cultural and educational initiatives (such as the creation of Bulgarian

libraries or chitalishta, clubs etc.) in various cities, towns and villages in

the country.

2.2.17. Prominent cultural, political and media leaders of the Bulgarian

community in the Republic of Macedonia should be supported and

assistance provided to promote their work in both countries.

2.2.18. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church should be asked to contribute

in the spirit of its historical traditions and capabilities to bringing the

two nations closer together.

2.2.19. The issue of registration of the OMO Ilinden political party in

Bulgaria has undoubtedly become one of the major irritants in bilateral

relations in recent years. Both Skopje and human rights organizations

like the Helsinki Committee have internationalized the issue to the

detriment of Bulgaria. The refusal to register OMO Ilinden is likely to

become increasingly difficult to defend, particularly after the future

accession of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO and EU. While the

case is mostly legal in nature, the Bulgarian position and the Bulgarian

cause would undoubtedly benefit if a solution to this issue were found

sooner rather than later.

2.2.20. Regardless of the policies pursued by the governments

of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia, certain independent

intellectuals, media and civil groups have been promoting ideas that

have nothing in common with good neighbourly relations. Such local

factors are capable of influencing public opinion, forming attitudes

towards the neighbour and sometimes even exerting political

influence. The power of the most radical of these stems from the fact

that they usually have no opponents on their respective domestic

grounds. Their ideas are disseminated as a monologue; there is no

dialogue, no polemics, no clash of factual evidence, no arguments nor

interpretations. The worst aspect of this situation is that the general

public in both countries is not well informed about the motivation,

the history and the arguments of the other side. Bulgaria should

initiate a variety of high-profile forums and debates on all disputed

cultural and historical issues, with wide media coverage, to take place

both in Bulgaria and in the Republic of Macedonia in order to achieve

openness, goodwill and a better appreciation of the other side.

Developing Bulgaria’s policy on the Republic of Macedonia to rise to

current challenges – and it would be an act of national irresponsibility

to miss the present historic opportunity to do so – requires the

Bulgarian public, media and relevant official institutions to be

adequately prepared to provide the favourable conditions for success.

The present recommendations have been developed
under the guidance
of Sen. Res. Assoc. Dr. Lyubomir Ivanov,
Institute of Mathematics and Informatics,
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS);
President of the Manfred Wörner Foundation;
Chairman of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria

With the participation and the contribution of:

Dr. Zoya Andonova, Editor, Bulgaria Macedonia Journal

Amb. Petar Atanasov

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Stoyan Barakov, Faculty of Law and History, Southwest

University Neophite Rilski, Blagoevgrad

Amb. Dr. Bobi Bobev

Prof. D.Sc. Georgi Daskalov, Faculty of History, Sofia University St.

Kliment Ohridski

Sen. Res. Assoc. Dr. Angel Dimitrov, Institute of History, BAS

Prof. Dr. Bozhidar Dimitrov, Director, National Museum of History, Sofia

Amb. Evgeniy Ekov

Sen. Res. Assoc. D.Sc. Svertlozar Eldarov, Institute for Balkan Studies, BAS

Dr. Zhivko Georgiev, Director of Strategic Studies, Manfred Wörner

Foundation

Sen. Res. Assoc. D.Sc. Stefan Hadjitodorov, Scientific Secretary, BAS

Velyo Iliev, Mayor of the City of Petrich, Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia

Zornitsa Ilieva, Chief Expert, National Assembly

Amb. Nikolay Kolev

Acad. Konstantin Kossev, Vice-President, BAS

Marin Milanov, Expert on European Integration

Iliya Mitov, Political Analyst

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Plamen Pantev, Director, Institute for Security and

International Studies, Sofia; Deputy Dean, Law Faculty, Sofia University

St. Kliment Ohridski

Dr. Georgi Papakochev, Political Analyst

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Anton Parvanov, International Relations Department,

University of National and World Economy, Sofia

Alexander Popov, Chief Expert, Ministry of Education and Science

Amb. Dr. Valeri Ratchev

Nadezhda Stoyanova, Programme Director, Manfred Wörner

Foundation

Valentin Tekelov, Expert on the Western Balkans

Martin Traykov, Expert on the Western Balkans

and others.

Submitted to the attention of the relevant Bulgarian institutions

on January 24, 2008

Appendix

JOINT DECLARATION ^ж
of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

and of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Prime Minister of

the Republic of Macedonia,

Proceeding from a common aspiration to promote the goodneighbourly

relations between the two countries,

Profoundly convinced of the need of promotion of cooperation

on the basis of mutual respect, confidence, understanding,

good-neighbourliness and mutual respect for the interests of their

countries and peoples,

Convinced of the need to enhance security and peace, cooperation

and confidence in Southeastern Europe,

Proceeding from the aspirations of the two countries to

integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures,

Believing that constructive dialogue on all aspects of bilateral

relations, as well as on regional and international problems, will

contribute to a further development of contacts between the two

countries on a basis of equality,

Respecting the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE

documents, as well as the democratic principles enshrined in the acts

of the Council of Europe,

1. Express their readiness and common desire for promotion

of relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of

Macedonia in all spheres. These relations shall develop in compliance

with the fundamental principles of international law.

2. The two countries shall co-operate within the framework of

the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

Europe, the Council of Europe, NATO’s Partnership for Peace Initiative,

the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, and other

international organisations and forums.

3. The two countries shall contribute to the promotion

of co-operation among the states of Southeastern Europe, to the

enhancement of understanding, peace and stability in the region and

to the implementation of regional projects as part of the process of

establishing a united Europe.

4. The two countries shall maintain contacts and hold

meetings between representatives of the government authorities at

different levels for the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation.

5. Considering their geographic proximity, the two countries

shall seek to establish the appropriate legal, economic, financial and

trade conditions for an unimpeded movement of goods, services and

capital. They shall promote reciprocal investments and ensure their

protection.

6. The two countries shall support the broadening of tourist

exchange, as well as the pursuit of suitable forms of co-operation in the

field of tourism.

7. The two countries shall extend and upgrade transport

links and communications between each other, inter alia within the

framework of regional infrastructure projects.

They shall seek to ease customs and border formalities for

passengers and goods moving between the two countries.

8. The two countries shall encourage active and unimpeded

co-operation in the field of culture, education, healthcare, social welfare

and sports.

9. The two countries shall make efforts for free dissemination

of information by encouraging and promoting co-operation in the field

of the press, radio and television broadcasts, using the capabilities of

modern communication media.

The two countries commit themselves to protect the

copyrights and intellectual rights of creative artists in the two countries.

10. The two countries shall expand their co-operation in

the legal and consular sphere and, in particular, on civil, criminal and

administrative issues, with a view to facilitating travel and visits of their

citizens as well as addressing their humanitarian and social problems.

11. Neither of the two countries shall undertake, instigate

or support any actions of a hostile nature directed against the other

country.

Neither of the two countries shall allow its territory to be used

against the other by any organisations or groups which make it their

object to carry out subversive, separatist or other actions threatening

the peace and security of the other country.

The two countries do not have, and will not lay, any territorial

claims to each other.

The Republic of Macedonia hereby declares that nothing in

its Constitution can or should be interpreted as constituting, now or

whenever in the future, a basis for interference in the internal affairs

of the Republic of Bulgaria for the purpose of defending the status

and the rights of persons who are not citizens of the Republic of

Macedonia.

The two countries shall undertake effective measures for

preventing ill-intentioned propaganda by institutions and agencies

and shall not allow activities by private individuals aimed at instigating

violence, hatred or other such actions which might harm relations

between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia.

Signed on 22 February 1999 in Sofia, in two originals, each

in the official languages of the two countries - in Bulgarian language,

according to the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, and in

Macedonian language, according to the Constitution of the Republic of

Macedonia, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE REPUBLIC                          FOR THE REPUBLIC

OF BULGARIA:                                  OF MACEDONIA:

IVAN KOSTOV                                   LJUBČO GEORGIEVSKI

Prime Minister                                    Prime Minister

__________________

^ж   The 1999 Joint Declaration was reaffirmed by a joint memorandum signed

     by Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia on January 22, 2008 in Sofia.

TESTIMONIALS

Kraste Misirkov (1874 -1926), proclaimed as the most important personality of

the 20^th century for the Republic of Macedonia:

[The Ilinden Uprising] has been ill-founded from the very beginning:

it does not relate to Macedonia as a whole, it is fragmentary and

has a Bulgarian flavour. Its leaders consist only of Macedonian Slavs

identifying as Bulgarians ...

It was, and still is, an affair of the Exarchists who glorify themselves as

‘Bulgarians’; it is therefore a Bulgarian manoeuvre aiming to resolve

the Macedonian question in Bulgaria’s favour; it is intended to create a

Bulgarian Macedonia. (On Macedonian Matters, 1903)

If good fortune had left Simeon and Samuel to reign for a long time,

under the authority of the Bulgarian state ... and let these Bulgarian

Tsars unite the Southern Slavs politically and culturally ...

The lands populated by Bulgarian people were a cradle of Slavonic

Enlightment in the old times; Serbian and Russian people drew

spiritual nourishment from here for centuries. The Bulgarian nation

has been of great cultural and historical service to the Slavonic World ...

(Macedono-Adrianopolitan Review, Issue 34 -35, 1907)

Whether we call ourselves Bulgarians or Macedonians, we always

identify as a distinct and unified people with Bulgarian national

awareness, completely different from Serbs. (20 July Newspaper,

May 11, 1924)

Ljubčo Georgievski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia (1998 -2002):

It is nothing new to mention the fact that Gotse Delchev, Dame Gruev,

Gyorche Petrov and Pere Toshev – do I have to list all of them – were

teachers with the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia ... [Gotse] returned

to Macedonia as a Bulgarian Exarchist teacher, incidentally teaching

children Bulgarian as their mother tongue.

Wherever they wrote about their mother tongue, or about the reforms

of this language, Parthenius of Zograf, Kiril Peychinovich, Theodosius of

Sinai, the Miladinov Brothers, Grigor Parlichev, Kuzman Shapkarev and

Marko Tsepenkov (and how many more?!) always referred to it as the

Bulgarian language. (Pulse Weekly, June 7 and 14, 1995)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Published
with the kind support
of
National Museum of History in Sofia
Bobokov Bros. Foundation
Science and High Technologies Foundation
Nikolai Gigov
Rumen Ivanov
Stefan Lazarov
Petar Mandzhukov

Kancho Stoychev

ФОНДАЦИЯ МАНФРЕД ВЬОРНЕР MANFRED WÖRNER FOUNDATION

BULGARIAN POLICIES ON THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

First Edition
ISBN 978-954-92032-2-6
Authors: Lyubomir Ivanov et al.
Design: Todor Vardjiev
Prepress: Double T
Printed in Bulgaria
by NI Plus Publishing House
© Manfred Wörner Foundation
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License