- 1 Categories
- 1.1 Chapter I — Of Homonyms, Synonyms, Paronyms
- 1.2 Chapter II — Of the logical division of Things and their Attributes
- 1.3 Chapter III — Of the connexion between Predicate and Subject
- 1.4 Chapter IV — Enumeration of the Categories
- 1.5 Chapter V — Of Substance
- 1.6 Chapter VI — Of Quantity
- 1.7 Chapter VII — Of Relatives
- 1.8 Chapter VIII — Of the Quale and Quality
- 1.9 Chapter IX — Of Action, Passion, and the other categories of Position; When; Where; and Posession
- 1.10 Chapter X — Of Opposition
- 1.11 Chapter XI — Opposites continued, especially as to the contrariety between the Evil and the Good
- 1.12 Chapter XII — Of Priority
- 1.13 Chapter XIII — Of things Simultaneous
- 1.14 Chapter XIV — Of Motion
- 1.15 Chapter XV — Of the verb “to Have”
- 2 Notes
Things are termed homonymous, of which the name alone is common, but the definition (of substance according to the name) is different; thus "man" and "the picture of a man" are each termed "animal," since of these, the name alone is common, but the definition (of the substance according to the name) is different: as if any one were to assign what was in either, to constitute it "animal," he would allege the peculiar definition of each. But those are called synonyms, of which both the name is common, and the definition (of the substance according to the name) is the same, as both "a man" and "an ox" are "animal," for each of these is predicated of as "animal" by a common name, and the definition of the substance is the same, since if a man gave the reason of each as to what was in either, to constitute it "animal," he would assign the same reason. Again, things are called paronyms which, though differing in case, have their appellation (according to name) from some thing, as "a grammarian" is called so from "grammar," and "a courageous man" from "courage."
Of things discoursed upon, some are enunciated after a complex, others after an incomplex, manner; the complex as "a man runs," "a man conquers," but the incomplex as "man," "ox," "runs," "conquers." Likewise also some things are predicated of a certain subject, yet are in no subject, as "the man" is predicated of a subject, i. e. of "some certain man," yet is in no subject. Others, again, are in a subject, yet are not predicated of any subject, (I mean by a thing being in a subject, that which is in any thing not as a part, but which cannot subsist without that in which it is,) as "a certain grammatical art" is in a subject, "the soul," but is not predicated of any; and "this white thing" is in a subject, "the body," (for all "colour" is in " body,") but is predicated of no subject. But some things are both predicated of and are in a subject, as "science" is in a subject—"the soul," but is predicated of a subject, namely, "grammar." Lastly, some are neither in, nor are predicated of, any subject, as "a certain man" and "a certain horse," for nothing of this sort is either in, or individuals predicated of, a certain subject. In short, individuals, and whatever is one in number, are predicated of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject, for "a certain grammatical art" is amongst those things which are in a subject, but is not predicated of any subject.
Chapter III — Of the connexion between Predicate and SubjectEdit
When one thing is predicated of another, as of a subject, whatever things are said of the predicate, may be also said of the subject, as "the man" is predicated of "some certain man," but "the animal" is predicated of "the man," wherefore "the animal" will be predicated of "some certain man," since "the certain man" is both "man" and "animal." The differences of different genera, and of things not arranged under each other, are diverse also in species, as of "animal" and "science". For the differences of "animal" are "quadruped," "biped," "winged," "aquatic," but none of these, forms the difference of "science," since "science," does not differ from "science," in being "biped." But as to subaltern genera, there is nothing to prevent the differences being the same, as the superior are predicated of the genera under them; so that as many differences as there are of the predicate, so many will there also be of the subject.
Chapter IV — Enumeration of the CategoriesEdit
Of things incomplex enunciated, each signifies either Substance, or Quantity, or Quality, or Relation, or Where, or When, or Position, or Possession, or Action, or Passion. But Substance is, (to speak generally,) as "man," "horse;" Quantity, as "two" or "three cubits;" Quality, as "white," a "grammatical thing;" Relation, as "a double," "a half," "greater;" Where, as "in the Forum," "in the Lyceum;" When, as "yesterday," "last year;" Position, as "he reclines," "he sits;" Possession, as "he is shod," "he is armed;" Action, as "he cuts," "he burns;" Passion, as "he is cut," "he is burnt." Now each of the above, considered by itself, is predicated neither affirmatively nor negatively, but from the connexion of these with each other, affirmation or negation arises. For every affirmation or negation appears to be either true or false, but of things enunciated without any connexion, none is either true or false, as "man," "white," "runs," "conquers."
Chapter V — Of SubstanceEdit
Substance, in its strictest, first, and chief sense, is that which is neither predicated of any subject, nor is in any; as "a certain man" or "a certain horse." But secondary substances are they, in which as species, those primarily-named substances are inherent, that is to say, both these and the genera of these species; as "a certain man" exists in "man," as in a species, but the genus of this species is "animal;" these, therefore, are termed secondary substances, as both "man" and "animal." But it is evident, from what has been said, that of those things which are predicated of a subject, both the name and the definition must be predicated of the subject, as "man" is predicated of "some certain man," as of a subject, and the name, at least, is predicated, for you will predicate "man" of "some certain man," and the definition of man will be predicated of "some certain man," for "a certain man" is both "man" and "animal;" wherefore both the name and the definition will be predicated of a subject. But of things which are in a subject for the most part, neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject, yet with some, there is nothing to prevent the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject, though the definition cannot be so; as "whiteness" being in a body, as in a subject, is predicated of the subject, (for the body is termed "white,") but the definition of "whiteness" can never be predicated of body. All other things, however, are either predicated of primary substances, as of subjects, or are inherent in them as in subjects; this, indeed, is evident, from several obvious instances, thus "animal" is predicated of "man," and therefore is also predicated of some "certain man," for if it were predicated of no "man" particularly, neither could it be of "man" universally. Again, "colour" is in "body," therefore also is it in "some certain body," for if it were not in "some one" of bodies singularly, it could not be in "body" universally; so that all other things are either predicated of primary substances as of subjects, or are inherent in them as in subjects; if therefore the primal substances do not exist, it is impossible that any one of the rest should exist.
But of secondary substances, species is more substance than genus; for it is nearer to the primary substance, and if any one explain what the primary substance is, he will explain it more clearly and appropriately by giving the species, rather than the genus; as a person defining "a certain man" would do so more clearly, by giving "man" than "animal," for the former is more the peculiarity of "a certain man," but the latter is more common. In like manner, whoever explains what "a certain tree" is, will define it in a more known and appropriate manner, by introducing "tree" than "plant." Besides the primary substances, because of their predicates; subjection to all other things, and these last being either predicated of them, or being in them, are for this reason, especially, termed substances. Yet the same relation as the primary substances bear to all other things, does species bear to genus, for species is subjected to genus since genera are predicated of species, but species are not reciprocally predicated of genera, whence the species is rather substance than the genus.
Of species themselves, however, as many as are not genera, are not more substance, one than another, for he will not give a more appropriate definition of "a certain man," who introduces "man," than he who introduces "horse," into the definition of "a certain horse:" in like manner of primary substances, one is not more substance than another, for "a certain man" is not more substance than a "certain ox." With reason therefore, after the first substances, of the rest, species and genera alone are termed secondary substances, since they alone declare the primary substances of the predicates; thus, if any one were to define what "a certain man" is, he would, by giving the species or the genus, define it appropriately, and will do so more clearly by introducing "man" than "animal;" but whatever else he may introduce, he will be introducing, in a manner, foreign to the purpose, as if he were to introduce "white," or "runs," or any thing else of the kind, so that with propriety of the others, these alone are termed substances. Moreover, the primary substances, because they are subject to all the rest, and all the others are predicated of, or exist in, these, are most properly termed substances, but the same relation which the primary substances bear to all other things, do the species and genera of the first substances bear to all the rest, since of these, are all the rest predicated, for you will say that "a certain man" is "a grammarian," and therefore you will call both "man" and "animal" "a grammarian," and in like manner of the rest.
It is common however to every substance, not to be in a subject, for neither is the primal substance in a subject, nor is it predicated of any; but of the secondary substances, that none of them is in a subject, is evident from this; "man" is predicated of "some certain" subject "man," but is not in a subject, for "man" is not in "a certain man." So also "animal" is predicated of "some certain" subject "man," but "animal" is not in "a certain man." Moreover of those which are, in the subject, nothing prevents the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject, but that the definition should be predicated of it, is impossible. Of secondary substances however the definition and the name are both predicated of the subject, for you will predicate the definition of "a man" concerning "a certain man," and likewise the definition of "animal," so that substance, may not be amongst the number, of those things which are in a subject.
This however is not the peculiarity of substance, but difference also is of the number of those things not in a subject; for "pedestrian" and "biped" are indeed predicated of "a man" as of a subject, but are not in a subject, for neither "biped" nor "pedestrian" is in "man." The definition also of difference is predicated of that, concerning which, difference is predicated, so that if "pedestrian" be predicated of "man," the definition also of "pedestrian" will be predicated of man, for "man" is "pedestrian." Nor let the parts of substances, being in wholes as in subjects, perplex us, so that we should at any time be compelled to say, that they are not substances; for in this manner, things would not be said to be in a subject, which are in any as parts. It happens indeed both to substances and to differences alike, that all things should be predicated of them univocally, for all the categories from them are predicated either in respect of individuals or of species, since from the primary substance there is no category, for it is predicated in respect of no subject. But of secondary substances, species indeed is predicated in respect of the individual, but genus in respect to species and to individuals, so also differences are predicated as to species and as to individuals. Again, the primary substances take the definition of species and of genera, and the species the definition of the genus, for as many things as are said of the predicate, so many also will be said of the subject, likewise both the species and the individuals accept the definition of the differences: those things at least were univocal, of which the name is common and the definition the same, so that all which arise from substances and differences are predicated univocally.
Nevertheless every substance appears to signify this particular thing: as regards then the primary substances, it is unquestionably true that they signify a particular thing, for what is signified is individual, and one in number, but as regards the secondary substances, it appears in like manner that they signify this particular thing, by the figure of appellation, when any one says "man" or "animal," yet it is not truly so, but rather they signify a certain quality, for the subject is not one, as the primary substance, but "man" and "animal" are predicated in respect of many. Neither do they signify simply a certain quality, as "white," for "white" signifies nothing else but a thing of a certain quality, but the species and the genus determine the quality, about the substance, for they signify what quality a certain substance possesses: still a wider limit is made by genus than by species, for whoever speaks of "animal," comprehends more than he who speaks of "man."
It belongs also to substances that there is no contrary to them, since what can be contrary to the primary substance, as to a certain "man," or to a certain "animal," for there is nothing contrary either at least to "man" or to "animal?" Now this is not the peculiarity of substance, but of many other things, as for instance of quantity; for there is no contrary to "two" cubits nor to "three" cubits, nor to "ten," nor to any thing of the kind, unless some one should say that "much" is contrary to "little," or "the great" to "the small;" but of definite quantities, none is contrary to the other. Substance, also, appears not to receive greater or less; I mean, not that one substance is not, more or less, substance, than another, for it has been already said that it is, but that every substance is not said to be more or less, that very thing, that it is; as if the same substance be "man" he will not be more or less "man;" neither himself than himself, nor another "man" than another, for one "man" is not more "man" than another, as one "white thing" is more and less "white" than another, and one "beautiful" thing more and less "beautiful" than another, and "the same thing" more or less than "itself;" so a body being "white," is said to be more "white" now, than it was before, and if "warm" is said to be more or less "warm." Substance at least is not termed more or less substance, since "man" is not said to be more "man" now, than before, nor any one of such other things as are substances: hence substance is not capable of receiving the greater and the less.
It appears however, to be especially the peculiarity of substance, that being one and the same in number, it can receive contraries, which no one can affirm of the rest which are not substances, as that being one in number, they are capable of contraries. Thus "colour," which is one and the same in number, is not "white" and "black," neither the same action, also one in number, both bad and good; in like manner of other things as many as are not substances. But substance being one, and the same in number, can receive contraries, as "a certain man" being one and the same, is at one time, white, and at another, black, and warm and cold, and bad and good. In respect of none of the rest does such a thing appear, except some one should object, by saying, that a sentence and opinion are capable of receiving contraries, for the same sentence appears to be true and false; thus if the statement be true that "some one sits," when he stands up, this very same statement will be false. And in a similar manner in the matter of opinion, for if any one should truly opine that a certain person sits, when he rises up he will opine falsely, if he still holds the same opinion about him. Still, if any one, should even admit this, yet there is a difference in the mode. For some things in substances, being themselves changed, are capable of contraries, since cold, being made so, from hot, has changed, for it is changed in quality, and black from white, and good from bad: in like manner as to other things, each one of them receiving change is capable of contraries. The sentence indeed and the opinion remain themselves altogether immovable, but the thing being moved, a contrary is produced about them; the sentence indeed remains the same, that "some one sits," but the thing being moved, it becomes at one time, true, and at another, false. Likewise as to opinion, so that in this way, it will be the peculiarity of substance, to receive contraries according to the change in itself, but if any one admitted this, that a sentence and opinion can receive contraries, this would not be true. For the sentence and the opinion are not said to be capable of contraries in that they have received any thing, but, in that about something else, a passive quality has been produced, for in that a thing is, or is not, in this, is the sentence said to be true, or false, not in that itself, is capable of contraries. In short, neither is a sentence nor an opinion moved by any thing, whence they cannot be capable of contraries, no passive quality being in them; substance at least, from the fact of itself receiving contraries, is said in this to be capable of contraries, for it receives disease and health, whiteness and blackness, and so long as it receives each of these, it is said to be capable of receiving contraries. Wherefore it will be the peculiarity of substance, that being the same, and one in number, according to change in itself, it is capable of receiving contraries; and concerning substance this may suffice.
Chapter VI — Of QuantityEdit
Of Quantity, one kind is discrete, and another continuous; the one consists of parts, holding position with respect to each other, but the other of parts, which have not that position. Discrete quantity is, as number and sentence, but continuous, as line, superficies, body, besides place and time. For, of the parts of number, there is no common term, by which its parts conjoin, as if five be a part of ten, five and five, conjoin at no common boundary, but are separated. Three, and seven, also conjoin at no common boundary, nor can you at all take a common limit of parts, in number, but they are always separated, whence number is of those things which are discrete. In like manner a sentence, for that a sentence is quantity is evident, since it is measured by a short and long syllable; but I mean a sentence produced by the voice, as its parts concur at no common limit, for there is no common limit, at which the syllables concur, but each is distinct by itself. A line, on the contrary, is continuous, for you may take a common term, at which its parts meet, namely, a point, and of a superficies, a line, for the parts of a superficies coalesce in a certain common term. So also you can take a common term in respect of body, namely, a line, or a superficies, by which the parts of body are joined. Of the same sort are time and place, for the present time is joined both to the past and to the future. Again, place is of the number of continuous things, for the parts of a body occupy a certain place, which parts join at a certain common boundary, wherefore also the parts of place, which each part of the body occupies, join at the same boundary as the parts of the body, so that place will also be continuous, since its parts join at one common boundary.
Moreover, some things consist of parts, having position with respect to each other, but others of parts not having such position; thus the parts of a line have relative position, for each of them lies some where, and you can distinguish, and set out, where each lies, in a superficies, and to which part of the rest, it is joined. So also the parts of a superficies, have a certain position, for it may be in like manner pointed out where each lies, and what have relation to each other, and the parts of a solid, and of a place, in like manner. On the contrary, in respect of number, it is impossible for any one to show that its parts have any relative position, or that they are situated any where, or which of the parts are joined to each other. Nor as regards parts of time, for not one of the parts of time endures, but that which does not endure, how can it have any position? you would rather say, that they have a certain order, inasmuch as one part of time is former, but another latter. In the same manner is it with number, because one, is reckoned before two, and two, before three, and so it may have a certain order, but you can, by no means, assume, that it has position. A speech likewise, for none of its parts endures, but it has been spoken, and it is no longer possible to bring back what is spoken, so that there can be no position of its parts, since not one endures: some things therefore consist of parts having position, but others of those which have not position. What we have enumerated are alone properly termed quantities; all the rest being so denominated by accident, for looking to these, we call other things quantities, as whiteness is said to be much, because the superficies is great, and an action long, because its time being long, and motion also, is termed, much. Yet each of these is not called a quantity by itself, for if a man should explain the quantity of an action, he will define it by time, describing it as yearly, or something of the sort; and if he were to explain the quantity of whiteness, he will define it by the superficies, for as the quantity of the superficies, so he would say is the quantity of the whiteness; whence the particulars we have mentioned are alone properly of themselves termed quantities, none of the rest being so of itself, but according to accident. Again, nothing is contrary to quantity, for in the definite it is clear there is nothing contrary, as to "two cubits" or to "three," or to "superficies," or to any thing of this kind, for there is no contrary to them; except indeed a man should allege that "much" was contrary to "little," or the "great" to the "small." Of these however, none is a quantity, but rather belongs to relatives, since nothing, itself by itself, is described as great or small, but from its being referred to something else. A mountain, for instance, is called "little," but a millet seed "large," from the fact of the one being greater, but the other less, in respect of things of the same nature, whence the relation is to something else, since if each were called "small" or "great" of itself, the mountain would never have been called "small," nor the seed "large." We say also that there are "many" men in a village, but "few" at Athens, although these last are more numerous, and "many" in a house, but "few" in a theatre, although there is a much larger number in the latter. Besides, "two cubits," "three," and every thing of the kind signify quantity, but "great" or "small" does not signify quantity, but rather relation, for the "great" and "small" are viewed in reference to something else, so as evidently to appear relatives. Whether however any one does, or does not, admit such things to be quantities, still there is no contrary to them, for to that which cannot of itself be assumed, but is referred to another, how can there be a contrary? Yet more, if "great" and "small" be contraries, it will happen, that the same thing, at the same time, receives contraries, and that the same things are contrary to themselves, for it happens that the same thing at the same time is both "great" and "small." Something in respect of this thing is "small," but the same, in reference to another, is "large," so that the same thing happens at the same time to be both "great" and "small," by which at the same moment it receives contraries. Nothing however appears to receive contraries simultaneously, as in the case of substance, for this indeed seems capable of contraries, yet no one is at the same time "sick" and "healthy," nor a thing "white" and "black" together, neither does any thing else receive contraries at one and the same time. It happens also, that the same things are contrary to themselves, since if the "great" be opposed to the "small," but the same thing at the same time be great and small, the same thing would be contrary to itself, but it is amongst the number of impossibilities, that the same thing should be contrary to itself, wherefore the great is not contrary to the small, nor the many to the few, so that even if some one should say that these do not belong to relatives, but to quantity, still they will have no contrary.
The contrariety however of quantity seems especially to subsist about place, since men admit "upward" to be contrary to "downward," calling the place toward the middle "downward," because there is the greatest distance from the middle, to the extremities of the world; they appear also to deduce the definition of the other contraries from these, for they define contraries to be those things which, being of the same genus, are most distant from each other.
Nevertheless quantity does not appear capable of the greater and the less, as for instance "two cubits," for one thing is not more "two cubits" than another; neither in the case of number, since "three" or "five" are not said to be more than "three" or "five," neither "five" more "five" than "three" "three;" one time also is not said to be more "time" than another; in short, of none that I have mentioned is there said to be a greater or a less, wherefore quantity is not capable of the greater and less.
Still it is the especial peculiarity of quantity to be called "equal" and "unequal," for each of the above-mentioned quantities is said to be "equal" and "unequal," thus body is called "equal" and "unequal," and number, and time, are predicated of as "equal" and "unequal;" likewise in the case of the rest enumerated, each one is denominated "equal" and "unequal." Of the remainder, on the contrary, such as are not quantities, do not altogether appear to be called "equal" and "unequal," as for instance, disposition is not termed entirely "equal" and "unequal," but rather "similar" and "dissimilar;" and whiteness is not altogether "equal" and "unequal," but rather "similar" and "dissimilar;" hence the peculiarity of quantity will especially consist in its being termed "equal" and "unequal."
Chapter VII — Of RelativesEdit
Such things are termed "relatives," which are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else; thus "the greater" is said to be what it is in reference to another thing, for it is called greater than something; and "the double" is called what it is in reference to something else, for it is said to be double a certain thing; and similarly as to other things of this kind. Such as these are of the number of relatives, as habit, disposition, sense, knowledge, position, for all these specified are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or however else they are referrible to another, and they are nothing else; for habit is said to be the habit of some one, knowledge the knowledge of something, position the position of somewhat, and so the rest. Relatives, therefore, are such things, as are said to be what they are, from belonging to others, or which may somehow be referred to another; as a mountain is called "great" in comparison with another, for the mountain is called "great" in relation to something, and "like" is said to be like somewhat, and other things of this sort, are similarly spoken of, in relation to something. Reclining, station, sitting, are nevertheless certain positions, and position is a relative; but to recline, to stand, or to sit, are not themselves positions, but are paronymously denominated from the above-named positions.
Yet there is contrariety in relatives, as virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being relative, and knowledge to ignorance; but contrariety is not inherent in all relatives, since there is nothing contrary to double, nor to triple, nor to any thing of the sort.
Relatives appear, notwithstanding, to receive the more and the less, for the like and the unlike are said to be so, more and less, and the equal and the unequal are so called, more and less, each of them being a relative, for the similar is said to be similar to something, and the unequal, unequal to something. Not that all relatives admit of the more and less, for double is not called more and less double, nor any such thing, but all relatives are styled so by reciprocity, as the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master, master of the servant; and the double, double of the half, also the half, half of the double, and the greater, greater than the less, and the less, less than the greater. In like manner it happens as to other things, except that sometimes they differ in diction by case, as knowledge is said to be the knowledge of something knowable, and what is knowable is knowable by knowledge: sense also is the sense of the sensible, and the sensible is sensible by sense. Sometimes indeed they appear not to reciprocate, if that be not appropriately attributed to which relation is made, but here he who attributes errs; for instance, a wing of a bird, if it be attributed to the bird, does not reciprocate, for the first is not appropriately attributed, namely "wing" to "bird," since "wing" is not predicated of it so far as it is "bird," but so far as it is "winged," as there are wings of many other things which are not birds, so that if it were appropriately attributed, it would also reciprocate; as "wing" is the wing of "a winged creature," and "the winged creature" is "winged" by the "wing." It is sometimes necessary perhaps even to invent a name, if there be none at hand, for that to which it may be properly applied: e. g. if a rudder be attributed to a ship, it is not properly so attributed, for a rudder is not predicated of a ship so far as it is "ship," since there are ships without rudders; hence they do not reciprocate, inasmuch as a ship is not said to be the ship of a rudder. The attribution will perhaps be more appropriate, if it were attributed thus, a rudder is the rudder of something ruddered, or in some other way, since a name is not assigned; a reciprocity also occurs, if it is appropriately attributed, for what is ruddered is ruddered by a rudder. So also in other things; the head, for example, will be more appropriately attributed to something headed, than to animal, for a thing has not a head, so far as it is an animal, since there are many animals which have not a head.
Thus any one may easily assume those things to which names are not given, if from those which are first, he assigns names to those others also, with which they reciprocate, as in the cases adduced, "winged" from "wing," and "ruddered" from "rudder." All relatives therefore, if they be properly attributed, are referred to reciprocals, since if they are referred to something casual, and not to that to which they relate, they will not reciprocate. I mean, that neither will any one of those things which are admitted to be referrible to reciprocals, reciprocate, even though names be assigned to them, if the thing be attributed to something accidental, and not to that to which it has relation: for example, a servant, if he be not attributed as the servant of a master, but of a man, of a biped, or any thing else of the kind, will not reciprocate, for the attribution is not appropriate. If however that, to which something is referred, be appropriately attributed, every thing else accidental being taken away, and this thing alone being left, to which it is appropriately attributed, it may always be referred to it, as "a servant," if he is referred to "a master," every thing else accidental to the master being left out of the question, (as the being "a biped," and "capable of knowledge," and that he is "a man,") and his being "a master" alone, left, here the "servant" will always be referred to him, for a "servant" is said to be the servant of a "master." If again, on the other hand, that to which it is at any time referred is not appropriately attributed, other things being taken away, and that alone left, to which it is attributed, in this case it will not be referred to it. For let a "servant" be referred to "man," and a "wing" to "bird," and let the being "a master" be taken away from "man," the servant will no longer refer to man, since "master" not existing, neither does "servant" exist. So also let "being winged" be taken away from "bird," and "wing" will no longer be amongst relatives, for what is "winged" not existing, neither will "wing" be the wing of any thing. Hence it is necessary to attribute that, to which a thing is appropriately referred, and if indeed a name be already given to it, the application is easy; but if no name be assigned, it is perhaps necessary to invent one; but being thus attributed, it is clear that all relatives are referred to reciprocals.
Naturally, relatives appear simultaneous, and this is true of the generality of them, for "double" and "half" are simultaneous, and "half" existing, "double" exists, and "a master" existing, the "servant" is, and the "servant" existing, the "master" is, and other things are also like these. These also are mutually subversive, for if there is no "double" there is no "half," and no "half" there is no "double"; likewise as to other things of the same kind. It does not however appear to be true of all relatives, that they are by nature simultaneous, for the object of "science" may appear to be prior to "science," since for the most part we derive science from things pre-existing, as in few things, if even in any, do we see science and its object originating together. Moreover, the object of science being subverted, co-subverts the science, but science being subverted, does not co-subvert the object of science, for there being no object of science, science itself becomes non-existent, (since there will be no longer a science of any thing); but on the contrary, though science does not exist, there is nothing to prevent the object of science existing. Thus the quadrature of the circle, if it be an object of scientific knowledge, the science of it does not yet exist, though it is itself an object of science: again, "animal" being taken away, there will not be "science," but still it is possible for many objects of science to be. Likewise also do things pertaining to sense subsist, since the sensible seems to be prior to the sense, as the sensible being subverted co-subverts sense, but sense does not co-subvert the sensible. For the senses are conversant with body, and are in body, but the sensible being subverted, body also is subverted, (since body is of the number of sensibles,) and body not existing, sense also is subverted, so that the sensible co-subverts sense. Sense on the other hand does not co-subvert the sensible, since if animal were subverted, sense indeed would be subverted, but yet the sensible will remain; such for instance as "body," "warm," "sweet," "bitter," and every thing else which is sensible. Besides, "sense" is produced simultaneously with what is "sensitive," for at one and the same time "animal" and "sense" are produced, but the "sensible" is prior in existence to "animal" or "sense," for fire and water, and such things as animal consists of, are altogether prior to the existence of animal or sense, so that the sensible will appear to be antecedent to sense.
It is doubtful however whether no substance is among the number of relatives, as seems to be the case, or whether this happens in certain second substances; for it is true in first substances, since neither the wholes, nor the parts, of first substances are relative. "A certain man" is not said to be a certain man of something, nor "a certain ox" said to be a certain ox of something; and so also with respect to the parts, for a "certain hand" is not said to be a certain hand of some one, but the hand of some one; and some head is not said to be a certain head of some one, but the head of some one, and in most secondary substances the like occurs. Thus man is not said to be the man of some one, nor an ox the ox of some one, nor the wood the wood of some one, but they are said to be the possession of some one; in such things therefore, it is evident, that they are not included amongst relatives. In the case of some secondary substances there is a doubt, as "head," is said to be the head of some one, and "hand," the hand of some one, and in like manner, every such thing, so that these may appear amongst the number of relatives. If then the definition of relatives has been sufficiently framed, it is either a matter of difficulty, or of impossibility, to show that no substance is relative; but if the definition has not been sufficiently framed, but those things are relatives, whose substance is the same, as consists with a relation, after a certain manner, to a certain thing; somewhat, perhaps, in reply to this, may be stated. The former definition, however, concurs with all relatives, yet it is not the same thing, that their being, consists in relation, and that being what they are, they are predicated of other things. Hence it is clear, that he who knows any one relative, definitely, will also know what it is referred to, definitely. Wherefore also from this it is apparent, that if one knows this particular thing to be among relatives, and if the substance of relatives is the same, as subsisting in a certain manner, with reference to something, he will also know that, with reference to which, this particular thing, after a certain manner, subsists; for if, in short, he were ignorant of that, with reference to which, this particular thing, after a certain manner, subsists, neither would he know, whether it subsists, after a certain manner, with reference to something. And in singulars, indeed, this is evident; for if any one knows definitely, that this thing is "double," he will also forthwith know that, definitely, of which it is the double, since if he knows not that it is the double, of something definite, neither will he know that it is "double," at all. So again, if a man knows this thing, to be more beautiful than something else, he must straightway and definitely know that, than which, it is more beautiful. Wherefore, he will not indefinitely know, that this, is better, than that which is worse, for such is opinion and not science, since he will not accurately know that it is better than something worse, as it may so happen that there is nothing worse than it, whence it is necessarily evident, that whoever definitely knows any relative, also definitely knows that, to which it is referred. It is possible, notwithstanding, to know definitely what the head, and the hand, and every thing of the sort are, which are substances; but it is not necessary to know that to which they are referred, since it is not necessary definitely to know whose, is the head, or whose, is the hand; thus these will not be relatives, but if these be not relatives, we may truly affirm no substance to be among relatives. It is, perhaps, difficult for a man to assert assuredly any thing of such matters, who has not frequently considered them, yet to have submitted each of them to inquiry, is not without its use.
Chapter VIII — Of the Quale and QualityEdit
By quality, I mean that, according to which, certain things, are said to be, what they are. Quality, however, is among those things which are predicated multifariously; hence one species of quality is called "habit" and "disposition," but habit, differs from disposition, in that it is a thing more lasting and stable. Of this kind too, are both the sciences and the virtues, for science appears to rank among those things, which continue more stable, and are hardly removed, even when science is but moderately attained, unless some great change should occur from disease, or from something of the sort; so also virtue, as justice, temperance, and so forth, does not appear capable of being moved or changed with facility. But those are termed dispositions, which are easily moved and quickly changed, as heat, cold, disease, health, and such things; or a man is disposed, after a manner, according to these, but is rapidly changed, from hot becoming cold, and from health passing to disease, and in like manner as to other things, unless some one of these qualities has, from length of time, become natural, immovable, or at least difficult to be moved, in which case we may term it a habit. But it is evident that those ought to be called habits, which are more lasting, and are with greater difficulty removed, for those persons who do not very much retain the dogmas of science, but are easily moved, are said not to possess a scientific habit, although they are in some manner disposed as to science, either worse or better; so that habit differs from disposition in the one being easily removed, but the former is more lasting, and less easily removed. Habits are dispositions also, but dispositions not necessarily habits, for those who have habits are also, after a manner, disposed according to them, but those who are disposed are not altogether possessed of the habit.
Another kind of quality is, that, according to which, we say that men are prone to pugilism, or to the course, or to health, or to disease, in short, whatever things are spoken of according to natural power, or weakness; for each of these is not denominated from being disposed after a certain manner, but from having a natural power or inability of doing something easily, or of not suffering; thus, men are called pugilistic, or fitted for the course, not from being disposed after a certain manner, but from possessing a natural power of doing something easily. Again, they are said to be healthy, from possessing a natural power of not suffering easily from accidents, but to be diseased, from possessing a natural incapacity to resist suffering easily from accidents: similarly to these, do hard and soft subsist, for that is called "hard" which possesses the power of not being easily divided, but "soft," that which has an impotence as to this same thing.
The third kind of quality consists of passive qualities and passions, and such are sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and all their affinities, besides warmth, and coldness, and whiteness, and blackness. Now that these are qualities, is evident from their recipients being called from them, "qualia," as honey from receiving sweetness, is said to be sweet, and the body white, from receiving whiteness; in like manner in other things. They are called passive qualities, not from the recipients of the qualities suffering any thing, for neither is honey said to be sweet from suffering any thing, nor any thing else of such a kind. In like manner to these are heat and cold called passive qualities, not from the recipients themselves suffering any thing, but because each of the above-mentioned qualities produces passion in the senses, they are denominated passive qualities; for as sweetness, produces a certain passion in the taste, and warmth, in the touch, so also do the rest. Whiteness, and blackness, and other colours are, on the contrary, not called passive qualities in the same manner with the above-mentioned, but from themselves being produced from passion; for that many changes of colours spring from passion is evident, since when a man blushes he becomes red, and when frightened, pale, and so every thing of this sort. Whence also if a man naturally suffers a passion of this nature, he will probably have a similar colour, since the disposition which is now produced about the body when he blushes, may also be produced in the natural constitution, so as that a similar colour should naturally arise. Whatever such symptoms then originate from certain passions difficult to be removed and permanent are called passive qualities. For whether in the natural constitution, paleness, or blackness, be produced, they are called qualities, (for according to them we are called "quales;") or whether through long disease or heat, or any such thing, paleness or blackness happens, neither are easily removed, or even remain through life, these are called qualities, for in like manner, we are called "quales" in respect of them. Notwithstanding, such as are produced from things easily dissolved, and quickly restored, are called passions, and not qualities, for men are not called "quales" in respect of them, since neither is he who blushes, in consequence of being ashamed, called red, nor he who turns pale, from fear, called pale, they are rather said to have suffered something, so that such things are called passions, but not qualities. Like these also are passive qualities, and passions denominated in the soul. For such things as supervene immediately upon birth from certain passions difficult of removal, are called qualities; as insanity, anger, and such things, for men according to these are said to be "quales," that is, wrathful and insane. So also as many other mutations as are not natural, but arise from certain other symptoms, and are with difficulty removed, or even altogether immovable, such are qualities, for men are called "quales" in respect of them. Those which, on the other hand, arise from things easily and rapidly restored, are called passions, as for instance, where one being vexed becomes more wrathful, for he is not called wrathful who is more wrathful in a passion of this kind, but rather he is said to have suffered something, whence such things are called passions, but not qualities.
The fourth kind of quality is figure and the form, which is about every thing, besides rectitude and curvature, and whatever is like them, for according to each of these a thing is called "quale." Thus a triangle or a square is said to be a thing of a certain quality, also a straight line or a curve, and every thing is said to be "quale" according to form. The rare and the dense, the rough and the smooth, may appear to signify a certain quality, but probably these are foreign from the division of quality, as each appears rather to denote a certain position of parts. For a thing is said to be "dense," from having its parts near each other, but "rare," from their being distant from each other, and "smooth," from its parts lying in some respect in a right line, but "rough," from this part, rising, and the other, falling.
There may perhaps appear to be some other mode of quality, but those we have enumerated are most commonly called so.
The above-named therefore are qualities, but "qualia" are things denominated paronymously according to them, or in some other manner from them; most indeed and nearly all of them are called paronymously, as "a white man" from "whiteness," "a grammarian" from "grammar," a "just man" from "justice," and similarly of the rest. Still in some, from no names having been given to the qualities, it is impossible that they should be called paronymously from them; for instance, a "racer" or "pugilist," so called from natural power, is paronymously denominated from no quality, since names are not given to those powers after which these men are called "quales," as they are given to sciences, according to which men are said to be pugilists or wrestlers from disposition, for there is said to be a pugilistic and palæstric science, from which those disposed to them are paronymously denominated "quales." Sometimes however, the name being assigned, that which is called "quale" according to it, is not denominated paronymously, as from virtue, a man is called worthy, for he is called worthy, from possessing virtue, but not paronymously from virtue; this however does not often happen, wherefore those things are called "qualia," which are paronymously denominated from the above-mentioned qualities, or which are in some other manner termed from them.
In quality, there is also contrariety, as justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness to blackness, and the like; also those things which subsist according to them are termed qualia, as the unjust to the just, and the white to the black. This however does not happen in all cases, for to the yellow, or the pale, or such like colours, though they are qualities, there is no contrary. Besides, if one contrary be a quality, the other, will also be a quality, and this is evident to any one considering the other categories. For instance, if justice be contrary to injustice, and justice be a quality, then injustice will also be a quality, for none of the other categories accords with injustice, neither quantity, nor relation, nor where, nor in short any thing of the kind, except quality, and the like also happens as to quality in the other contraries.
Qualia also admit the more and the less, as one thing is said to be more or less "white" than another, and one more and less "just" than another; the same thing also itself admits accession, for what is "white," can become more, "white." This however, does not happen with all, but with most things, for some one may doubt whether justice, can be said to be more or less justice, and so also in other dispositions, since some doubt about such, and assert that justice cannot altogether be called more and less, than justice, nor health than health, but they say, that one man has less health, than another, and one person less justice, than another, and so also of the grammatical and other dispositions. Still the things which are denominated according to these, do without question admit the more and the less, for one man is said to be more grammatical, than another, and more healthy, and more just, and similarly in other things. Triangle and square appear nevertheless incapable of the more, as also every other figure, since those things which receive the definition of a triangle, and of a circle, are all alike triangles or circles, but of things which do not receive the same definition, none can be said to be more such, than another, as a square, is not more a circle, than an oblong, for neither of them admits the definition of the circle. In a word, unless both receive the definition of the thing propounded, one cannot be said to be more so and so, than another, wherefore all qualities do not admit the more and the less.
Of the above-mentioned particulars then, no one is peculiar to quality, but things are said to be similar, and dissimilar, in respect of qualities alone, for one thing is not like another in respect of any thing else, than so far as it is quale, so that it will be peculiar to quality, that the like and the unlike should be termed so in respect of it.
Yet we need not be disturbed lest any one should say that, proposing to speak of quality, we co-enumerate many things which are relatives, for we said that habits and dispositions are among the number of relatives, and nearly in all such things the genera are called relatives, but not one of the singulars. Science, for example, although it is a genus, is said to be what it is, with respect to something else, for it is said to be the science of a certain thing, but of singulars not one is said to be what it is, with reference to something else, as neither grammar is said to be the grammar of something, nor music the music of something. But even perhaps these, are called relatives, according to genus, as grammar is said to be the science of something, not the grammar of something, and music the science of something, not the music of something; so that singulars are not of the number of relatives. Still, we are called quales from singulars, for these we possess, as we are called scientific from possessing certain singular sciences; so that these may be singular qualities, according to which we are sometimes denominated quales, but they are not relatives; besides, if the same thing should happen to be both a particular quality and a relative, there is no absurdity in its enumeration under both genera.
Chapter IX — Of Action, Passion, and the other categories of Position; When; Where; and PosessionEdit
Action and Passion admit contrariety, and the more and the less, for to make warm, is contrary to making cold; to be warm, contrary to the being cold, to be pleased, contrary to being grieved; so that they admit contrariety. They are also capable of the more and the less, for it is possible to heat, more and less, to be heated, more and less, and to be grieved, more and less; wherefore, to act, and to suffer, admit the more and less, and so much may be said of these. But we have spoken of the being situated in our treatment of relatives, to the effect that it is paronymously denominated, from positions: as regards the other categories, when, where, and to have, nothing else is said of them, than what was mentioned at first, because they are evident; e.g. that "to have," signifies to be shod, to be armed; "where," as in the Lycæum, in the Forum, and the rest which are spoken of these. Of the proposed genera therefore, sufficient has been stated.
Chapter X — Of OppositionEdit
We must now speak of opposites, in how many ways opposition takes place. One thing then is said to be opposed to another in four ways, either as relative, or as contrary, or as privation and habit, or as affirmation and negation. Thus speaking summarily, each thing of this kind is opposed, relatively, as "the double" to "the half," contrarily, as "evil" to "good," privatively and habitually, as "blindness" and "sight," affirmatively and negatively, as "he sits," "he does not sit."
Whatever things then are relatively opposed, are said to be what they are with reference to opposites, or are in some manner referred to them, as "the double of the half," is said to be what it is, with reference to something else, for it is said to be the double of something; and "knowledge" is opposed relatively to the object of knowledge, and is said to be what it is, in reference to what may be known, and what may be known, is said to be what it is, in reference to an opposite, namely, "knowledge," for "the object of knowledge" is said to be so, to something, namely, to "knowledge."
Things therefore relatively opposed are said to be, what they are, with reference to opposites, or in whatever manner, they are referrible to each other, but those which are opposed as contraries, are by no means, said to be what they are, with reference to each other, but are said to be contrary to each other, for neither is "good" said to be the "good" of "evil," but the contrary of evil, nor is "white," denominated the "white "of "black," but its contrary, so that these oppositions differ from each other. Such contraries however, as are of that kind, that one of them must necessarily be in those things, in which it can naturally be, or of which it is predicated, these have nothing intermediate; but in the case of those, in which it is not necessary, that one should be inherent, there is something intermediate. For instance, health and disease may naturally subsist in the body of an animal, and it is necessary that one, should be therein, either disease, or health; the odd and even are also predicated of number, and one of the two, either the odd or the even, must necessarily be in number, yet there is nothing intermediate between these, neither between disease and health, nor between the odd and the even. Those contraries, again, have something intermediate, in which one of them need not be inherent, as black and white are naturally in body, but it is not necessary, that one of these, should be inherent in body, for every body, is not white or black. Vileness, also and worth, are predicated of man, and of many others, yet one of these, need not be in those things of which it is predicated, for not all things are either vile or worthy; at least, there is something intermediate, as between white and black, there is dark brown, and pale, and many other colours, but between vileness and worth, that, is intermediate, which is neither vile, nor worthy. In some instances, the intermediates have names, thus, the dark brown, and the pale, and such colours are media between white and black, but in other cases, it is not easy to assign a name to the intermediate, but the latter is defined, by the negation of either extreme, as, for example, whatever is neither good nor bad, nor just nor unjust.
Privation, however, and habit are predicated of something identical, as sight and blindness of the eye, and universally, in whatever the habit is naturally adapted to be produced, of such is either predicated. We say then, that each of the things capable of receiving habit is deprived of it, when it is not in that, wherein it might naturally be, and when it is adapted naturally to possess it; thus we say that a man is toothless, not because he has no teeth, and blind, not because he has no sight, but because he has them not, when he might naturally have them, for some persons from their birth, have neither sight nor teeth, yet they are neither called toothless nor blind. To be deprived of, and to possess habit, then, are not privation and habit, for the sight is habit, but the privation is blindness, but to possess sight is not sight, nor to be blind, blindness, for blindness is a certain privation, but the being blind is to be deprived, and is not privation, for if blindness were the same as being blind, both might be predicated of the same person, but a man is said to be blind, yet he is never called blindness. To be deprived also, and to possess habit, appear to be similarly opposed, as privation and habit, since the mode of opposition is the same, for as blindness is opposed to sight, so likewise is the being blind, opposed to the possession of sight.
Neither is that, which falls under affirmation and negation, affirmation and negation; for affirmation is an affirmative sentence, and negation a negative sentence, but nothing which falls under affirmation and negation is a sentence (but a thing). Still these are said to be mutually opposed, as affirmation and negation, since in them the mode of opposition is the same, for as affirmation is sometimes opposed to negation, for example, "he sits" to "he does not sit," so that thing which is under each is opposed, as "sitting" to "not sitting."
But that privation and habit, are not opposed as relatives, is evident, since what a thing is, is not asserted of its opposite, for sight is not the sight of blindness, nor in any other way spoken in reference to it, so also blindness, cannot be called the blindness of sight, but blindness indeed is said to be the privation of sight, not the blindness of sight. Moreover, all relatives are referred to reciprocals, so that if blindness were relative, it would reciprocate with that to which it is referred, but it does not reciprocate, for sight is not said to be the sight of blindness.
From these things, also, it is manifest that those which are predicated, according to privation and habit, are not contrarily opposed, for of contraries which have no intermediate, one must always necessarily be inherent, wherein it is naturally adapted to be inherent, or of which it is predicated, but between these, there is no intermediate thing wherein it was necessary that the one should be in what was capable of receiving it, as in the case, of disease and health, in odd and the even number. Of those however between which there is an intermediate, it is never necessary that one should be inherent in every thing; for neither is it necessary that every thing capable of receiving it, should be white or black, or hot or cold, since there is no prevention to an intermediate being between them. Again, of these also there was a certain medium, of which it was not requisite that one should be in its recipient, unless where one is naturally inherent, as in fire to be hot, and in snow to be white: still in these, one, must of necessity be definitely inherent, and not in whatever way it may happen, for neither does it happen that fire is cold, nor that snow is black. Wherefore it is not necessary that one of them should be in every thing capable of receiving it, but only in those wherein the one is naturally inherent, and in these, that which is definitely and not casually, one. In privation however, and habit, neither of the above-mentioned particulars is true, since it is not always necessary that one should be inherent in what is capable of receiving it, as what is not yet naturally adapted to have sight, is neither said to be blind nor to have sight; wherefore these things will not be of such contraries as have nothing intermediate. But neither, on the other hand, will they be amongst those which have something intermediate, since it is necessary that at some time, one of them, should be inherent in every thing capable of receiving it: thus when a man is naturally fitted to have sight, then he will be said to be blind, or to have sight, and one of these, not definitely, but whichever may happen, since he need not necessarily be blind, nor see, but either, as it may happen. In respect nevertheless of contraries, which have an intermediate, it is by no means necessary that one, should be inherent in every thing, but in some things, and in these, one of them definitely, and neither casually, so that things which are opposed according to privation and habit, are evidently not in either of these ways opposed, as contraries.
Again, in contraries, when the recipient exists, a change into each other may happen, unless one is naturally inherent in something, as for instance, in fire to be hot. It is possible also for the healthy to be sick, the white to become black, cold to become hot, (and the hot to become cold); from good it is possible to become bad, and from bad good, for he who is depraved, being led to better pursuits and discourses, advances, though but a little, to be better, and if he once makes an advancement ever so little, he will evidently become either altogether changed, or have made a very great proficiency, since he ever becomes more disposed to virtue, even if he has obtained the smallest, increase, from the beginning. Wherefore he will probably acquire greater increase, and this perpetually occurring, he will at last be transformed entirely to a contrary habit, unless he be prevented by time; but in privation and habit, it is impossible for a mutual change to occur, since it may take place from habit to privation, but from privation to habit is impossible, as neither can he who has become blind, again see, the bald again have hair, nor has the toothless ever yet again got teeth.
Whatever things are opposed, as affirmation and negation, are evidently opposed according to none of the above-mentioned modes, since in these alone it is always necessary that one should be true, but the other false: as neither, is it always necessary in contraries that one should be true, but the other false, nor in relatives, nor in habit and privation. For instance, health and disease, are contrary, yet neither of them is either true or false; so also the double and the half are relatively opposed, and neither of them is either true or false; nor in things which are predicated as to privation and habit, as sight and blindness. In short, nothing predicated without any conjunction, is either true or false, and all the above-named are predicated without conjunction. Not but that a thing of this kind may appear, to happen in contraries, which are predicated conjunctively, for "Socrates is well" is opposed to "Socrates is sick," yet neither in these is it always necessary, that one should be true and the other false, for while Socrates lives, one will be true and the other false, but when he is not alive, both will be false, since neither is it true that Socrates is sick, nor that he is well, when he is not in existence at all. In privation and habit, then when the subject is non-existent, neither is true, but when the subject exists, the one is not always true, nor the other false. "Socrates sees" is opposed to "Socrates is blind," as privation and habit, and whilst he exists, one need not be true or false, for when he is not naturally fitted to possess them, both are false, but when Socrates does not exist at all, both will thus be false, that he sees, and that he is blind. In affirmation and negation always, if Socrates be or be not, one will always be false and the other true; for it is evident with respect to these two, "Socrates is sick," and "Socrates is not sick," that when he exists one of them is true and the other false; and in like manner when he does not exist, for in the latter case that he is ill is false, but that he is not ill is true; so that in those things alone which are affirmatively and negatively opposed will it be the peculiarity that one of them is either true or false.
Chapter XI — Opposites continued, especially as to the contrariety between the Evil and the GoodEdit
"Evil" is of necessity opposed to good, and this is evident from an induction of singulars, as disease to health, and cowardice to courage, and similarly of the rest. But to evil, at one time, good, is contrary, and at another, evil, for to indigence being an evil, excess is contrary, which is also an evil; in like manner, mediocrity, which is a good, is opposed to each of them. A man may perceive this in respect of a few instances, but in the majority the contrary to evil is always good.
Again, of contraries it is not required, if one is, that the remainder should be; for when every man is well, there will indeed be health, and not disease, and so also when all things are white, there will be whiteness, but not blackness. Besides, if "Socrates is well" be the contrary of "Socrates is ill," and both cannot possibly be inherent in the same subject, it follows, that when one of the contraries exists, the other cannot possibly exist, for "Socrates is well" existing, "Socrates is ill" cannot exist.
Contraries, however, evidently are, by their nature, adapted to subsist about the same thing, either in species or genus, since disease and health naturally subsist in the body of an animal, but whiteness and blackness simply in body, and justice and injustice in the soul of man.
Notwithstanding, it is requisite that all contraries be either in the same genus, or in contrary genera, or be genera themselves; for white and black are in the same genus, as "colour" is the genus of them; but justice and injustice in contrary genera, for "virtue" is the genus of one, but "vice" of the other; lastly, "good" and "bad" are not in a genus, but are themselves the genera of certain things.
Chapter XII — Of PriorityEdit
A thing is said to be prior to another in four respects: first and most properly, in respect of time, according to which, one is said to be older and more ancient than another, since it is called older and more ancient, because the time is longer. Next, when it does not reciprocate, according to the consequence of existence: thus one is prior to two, for two existing, it follows directly that one exists; but when one is, it is not necessary that two should be, hence the consequence of the remainder's existence does not reciprocate from the existence of the one; but such a thing appears to be prior, from which the consequence of existence does not reciprocate.
Thirdly, the prior is that predicated according to a certain order, as in the instance of sciences and discourses, for in demonstrative sciences, the prior and the posterior, subsist in order, since the elements are prior in order, to the diagrams, and in grammar, letters are before syllables; so also of discourses, as the proem is prior, in order, to the narration.
Moreover, besides what we have mentioned, the better and more excellent appear to be prior by nature. The common people are accustomed to say, that those whom they chiefly honour and especially regard, are prior in their esteem; but this is nearly the most foreign of all the modes, wherefore such are (nearly) the modes of priority which have been enumerated.
Besides the above-mentioned, there may yet appear to be another mode of the prior; as of things reciprocating, according to the consequence of existence, that which in any respect is the cause of the existence of the one, may justly be said to be by nature prior, and that there are, certain things of this kind, is manifest. For that man exists, reciprocates, according to the consequence of existence, with the true sentence respecting him, since if man is, the sentence is true, by which we say, that man is, and it reciprocates, since if the sentence be true, by which we say that man is, then man is. Notwithstanding, a true sentence, is by no means the cause of a thing's existence, but in some way, the thing appears the cause of the sentence being true, for in consequence of a thing existing, or not existing, is a sentence said to be true or false. Wherefore one thing may be called prior to another, according to five modes.
Chapter XIII — Of things SimultaneousEdit
Things are called simultaneous simply and most properly, whose generation occurs at the same time, for neither is prior or posterior; these, therefore, are said to be simultaneous as to time. But by nature those are simultaneous, which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence, although one, is by no means the cause of the existence of the other, as in the double and the half, for these reciprocate; thus the double existing, the half also exists, and the half existing, the double exists, but neither is the cause of existence to the other.
Those, also, which being derived from the same genus, are by division mutually opposed, are said to be naturally simultaneous; but they, are said to have a division opposite to each other, which subsist according to the same division; thus the winged is opposed to pedestrian and aquatic, as these being derived from the same genus, are by division mutually opposed, for animal is divided into these, viz. into the winged, the pedestrian, and aquatic, and none of these is prior or posterior, but things of this kind appear naturally simultaneous. Each of these again, may be divided into species, for instance, the winged, the pedestrian, and the aquatic; wherefore, those will be naturally simultaneous which, derived from the same genus, subsist according to the same division. But genera are always prior to species, since they do not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence; for the aquatic existing, animal exists, but though animal exists, it is not necessary that the aquatic should.
Hence those are called naturally simultaneous, which indeed reciprocate, according to the consequence of existence; but the one is by no means the cause of existence to the other, which is also the case with things that, derived from the same genus, have by division a mutual opposition; those, however, are simply simultaneous whose generation is at the same time.
Chapter XIV — Of MotionEdit
Of motion, there are six species, generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.
The other motions then evidently differ from each other, for neither is generation, corruption, nor increase, diminution, nor alteration, change of place, and so of the rest. In the case of alteration however, there is some doubt, whether it be not sometimes necessary that what is altered, be so, in respect to some one, of the other motions, but this is not true, for it happens that we are altered, as to nearly all the passions, or at least the greater part of them, without any participation of the other motions, for it is not necessary that what is passively moved should be either increased or diminished. Wherefore, alteration will differ from the other motions, since if it were the same, it would be necessary that what is altered, be forthwith increased or diminished. Wherefore, alteration will differ from the other motions, since if it were the same, it would be necessary that what is altered, be forthwith increased or diminished, or follow some of the other motions, but this is not necessary. Similarly, also, what is increased or moved with any other motion, ought to be altered (in quality); but some things are increased which are not so altered, as a square is increased when a gnomon is placed about it, but it has not become altered (in quality); and in like manner with other things of this kind, so that these motions will differ from each other.
Nevertheless simply, rest is contrary to motion, the several rests to the several motions, corruption to generation, diminution to increase, rest in place to change in place; but change to a contrary place seems especially opposed, as ascent to descent, downwards to upwards. Still it is not easy, to define the contrary to the remainder of these specified motions, but it seems to have no contrary, unless some one should oppose to this, rest according to quality, or change of quality into its contrary, just as in change of place, rest according to place, or change to a contrary place. For alteration is the mutation of quality, so that to motion according to quality, will rest according to quality, or change to the contrary of the quality, be opposed; thus becoming white is opposed to becoming black, since a change in quality occurs, there being an alteration of quality into contraries.
Chapter XV — Of the verb “to Have”Edit
To have, is predicated in many modes; either as habit and disposition or some other quality, for we are said to have knowledge and virtue; or as to quantity, as the size which any one has; thus he is said to have the size of three or four cubits; or as things about the body, as a garment or a tunic; or as in a part, as a ring in the hand; or as a part, as the hand or the foot; or as in a vessel, as a bushel has wheat, or a flagon, wine, for the flagon is said to have the wine, and the bushel the wheat; all these therefore are said to have, as in a vessel; or as a possession, for we are said to have a house or land.
A man is also said to have a wife, and the wife a husband, but the mode now mentioned, of "to have," seems the most foreign, for we mean nothing else by having a wife, than that she cohabits with a man; there may perhaps appear to be some other modes of having, but those usually mentioned have nearly all been enumerated.
- Categories, or Predicaments, so called because they concern things which may always be predicated, are the several classes under which all abstract ideas, and their signs, common words, may be arranged. Their classification under ten heads was introduced by Arhytas and adopted by Aristotle. The reason why, in this treatise about them, Aristotle does not begin from these, but from Homonyms, &c., is that he might previously explain what was necessary to the doctrine of the Categories to prevent subsequent digression. Vide Porphyr. in Prædicam. After comparing various opinions of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Syranius, Simplicius, and others, it appears agreed by all, that Aristotle's intention in this treatise was, to discuss simple primary and general words, so far as they are significant of things; at the same time to instruct us in things and conceptions, so far as they are signified by words. A recollection of this digested explanation will must assist the student in the enunciation of the plan.
- “Homonyms”, equivocal words, — “Synonyms”, univocal, — “Paronyms”, derivative. We may remark here, that analogous nouns constitute only one species of equivocal; that the synonyms of Aristotle must be distinguished from the modern synonyms, which latter are defined by Boethius, “those which have many names, but one definition;” and lastly, that paronyms have been limited by the schoolman to certain concrete adjectives, a limitation which is not warranted by Aristotle, and is expressly rejected by his Greek commentators. — Mansel's Rudiments of Logic. See also Simplicius Scholia, p. 43, b. 5. “The reason,” says Syrianus “why things polynomous, and heteronomous, are omitted by Aristotle, is because they rather pertain to ornament of diction, than to the consideration of things; they are therefore more properly discussed in the Rhetoric and Poetics”
- Taylor translates λόγος sometimes “reason,” at other “definition.” It is better to preserve the latter as far as may be, though the student will do well to remember that it is capable of both significations. The brackets are retained from Leipsic and other copies.
- Ούσια,“a thing sufficient of itself to its own subsistence.” Taylor. He translates it “essence”, rather than “substance” because this latter word conveys no idea of self-subsistence. See his Introduction of Porthyry. It must be observed, however, that whilst by continued abstraction from the subject and different prediacates of Propositions, the predicates arrive at the nine categories, the subject will ultimately end in “substance”. Cf. Phys. Ausc. lib. iii.
- This chapter, containing the several divisions of terms, into absolute an connotative, abstract and concrete, respectively, has presented endless difficulties to commentators; and the question of relation seems as far from being settled as ever. The whole subject may perhaps be properly condensed in the following manner. All όντα are divided by Aristotle into four classes, Universal and Singular Substances, and Universal and Singular Attributes; the former existing per se, the latter in the former. Universals are predicated of singulars, but attributes, in their original state are not predicable of substance; but by the mental act, we may so connect an attribute with a subject, as to render the former predicable of the latter, as a difference, property, or accident. When a predicate is thus formed from an attribute, it called connotative, or, as Whateley justly remarks, “attributive,” and signifies primarily, the attribute, and secondarily, the subject of inhesion. Original universals or attributes, as “man,” “whiteness,” are called “absolute;” but terms may be made to cross, so that by an act of mind, that which signifies substance may be conceived as an attribute, and as no longer predicable of the individuals; in this sense they called “abstract”, as “humanitas” from “homo;” but when they are primarily or secondarily predicable of individuals, they become “concrete,” e.g. “man” is concrete and absolute; “white,” concrete and connotative; “whiteness,” abstract and absolute; it must be remembered only, that no abstract term is connotative. Vid. Occam, Log. p. i. ch. 5, 10. Simplicius enumerates eleven modes of predication, arising from the relations of genus and species. Aristotle, in the Physics, divides substance in eight modes, omitting “time” — considering subject as both composite and individual. The division into universals and particulars was probably taken from categorical scheme of Pyphagoras. We annex a scheme of the relation of subject to predicate, in respect of consistency and inhesion.