Christmas v. Russell (72 U.S. 290)

by Nathan Clifford

United States Supreme Court

72 U.S. 290

Christmas  v.  Russell

IN March, 1840, Christmas, being a citizen and resident of Mississippi, made at Vicksburg, in that State, and there delivered to one Samuel, a promissory note, promising to pay to his order in March, 1841, a sum certain. This note was indorsed by Samuel to Russell, a citizen and resident of Kentucky. By statute of Mississippi, action on this note was barred by limitation, after six years, that is to say, was barred in March, 1847. In 1853, the defendant, who was still, and had continuously been, a resident of Mississippi, having a mansion-house therein, went into Kentucky on a visit, and was there sued in one of the State courts upon the note.

Defence was taken on a statute of limitations of Mississippi and otherwise, and the matter having been taken to the Court of Appeal of Kentucky and returned thence, judgment was entered below in favor of the plaintiff.

A transcript being promptly carried into Mississippi, the place of the domicil of Christmas, an action of debt was brought upon it in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi; the action which was the subject of the writ of error now before this court.

The transcript above referred to, was one duly authenticated under the act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, which provides that records authenticated in a manner which it prescribes, shall 'have such faith and credit given to them in every other court in the United States, as they have by law or usage in the court from which they are taken;' an act passed in pursuance of Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States, declaring that 'full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in every other State;' and that 'Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such records shall be proved, and the effect thereof.'

In the action brought as above said, in the Circuit Court of Mississippi, the defendant filed six pleas-of which the second was to this effect:

'That at the time the cause of action accrued, and thenceforth until suit was brought in Kentucky, and at the time when said suit was brought, he was a resident of Mississippi, and that the cause of action would have been barred by an act of limitation of that State, if the suit had been brought therein, and so by the law of Mississippi, no action could be maintained in said State upon the said judgment.'

He also pleaded

4th. 'That the judgment set forth was obtained and procured by the plaintiff by fraud of the said plaintiff.'

And

6th. 'That the said suit in whch judgment was obtained, was instituted to evade the laws of Mississippi, and in fraud of said laws.'

The second and sixth pleas were intended to set up a defence under a statute of Mississippi, adopted in February, 1857, and which went into effect on the 1st day of November of that year. ^[1] That statute enacted:

'No action shall be maintained on any judgment or decree rendered by any court without this State against any person who, at the time of the commencement of the action in which such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was or shall be a resident of this State, in any case where the cause of such action would have been barred by any act of limitation of this State, if such suit had been brought therein.'To these pleas the plaintiff below demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and judgment having gone for the plaintiff, the question on error here was, as to the sufficiency of these pleas, or either of them, to bar the action.

Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson, for the plaintiff in error:

We will, for convenience, discuss the fourth plea first, and then the second and sixth together.

I. The fourth plea offered to prove, in bar to the action, that the judgment sued on was obtained and procured by the plaintiff by his fraud.

1. Fraud by the plaintiff in procuring the judgment, if well and sufficiently pleaded and proven, would have barred the action.

This is the established rule of law, and was so laid down by this court in the case of Webster v. Reid. ^[2]

It is also the rule in Kentucky, where the judgment now sued on was rendered. ^[3]

2. Fraud was well and sufficiently pleaded. ^[4]

II. As to the 2d and 6th pleas. The manifest policy of the State of Mississippi in passing the statute set up by the defendant in his second plea below was to protect its citizens from unjust and harassing litigation under circumstances such as those under which the present one is brought on. And the question is, whether this statute, having such intent and policy, was within the constitutional competency of the State to enact.

It will be maintained on the opposite side that such a power cannot be exercised without violating that clause of the Constitution, respecting the full faith and credit due to the records and judicial proceedings of the several States.

Without here examining the authorities on this subject in detail, it is sufficient to observe that on the one hand they clearly establish that 'the full faith and credit' which is guaranteed to the records and judicial proceedings of the several States, has relation to them only as instruments of evidence, ^[5] while on the other all the cases concede that the whole subject of remedies by action or suit at law or in equity, is within the undoubted competency of the respective States. In Bronson v. Kinzie, ^[6] Chief Justice Taney syas:

Notes

1. Revised Code, pp. 43, 400.
2. 11 Howard, 441, 460.
3. Talbott v. Todd, 5 Dana, 194-6.
4. 3 Chitty's Pleading, 1184.
5. Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481.
6. 1 Howard, 315