Object of the inquiry (1-3). The common notion of Responsibility (3-8); irreconcileable with ‘Freedom’ (8-12); and with rational prediction (13-17). Ground of the objection to rational prediction (17-22). Common opinion and Necessitarianism (22-24). Irreconcileable as to Punishment and Responsibility (24-30). Reason of this twofold (30-37).
|WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?||. . .||53|
Question rests on a dogmatic preconception (53-56); which is opposed to the moral consciousness (56-57); and is unreasonable (58-59). The End is self-realization (59); as is shown from morality (60); and from psychological considerations (61-62). It means realizing self as a whole (63-67); and an infinite whole (67-74).
Note to Essay II. (75).
|PLEASURE FOR PLEASURE’S SAKE,||. . .||78|
Happiness a vague phrase (78-79). Common opinion on pleasure (79-80). Hedonism irreconcileable with morality (81-85). Illusory nature of the Hedonistic end (86-89). My pleasure as the end gives no rule of life (90-94). And the pleasure of all is illusory (94-95); opposed to morality (96); and gives no practical guidance (96-101); it is dogmatically postulated (101-103); and irreconcileable with Hedonistic psychology (103-105). Further modifications of Hedonism. Qualitative distinction of pleasures is, in both its forms, untenable (106-111). Further criticism on Mill’s view (111-112). Results (113-114).
Note to Essay III. (118).
|DUTY FOR DUTY’S SAKE,||. . .||128|
The end is the Good Will (128-129). This is the universal form (130-131). What ‘ought’ means (131-132). Principle of non-contradiction (133). This contradicts itself (134-136). Duty and duties (137-138). Psychological objection (138-139). Practical uselessness of non-contradiction (139-141). Collision of duties unavoidable (141-143).
|MY STATION AND ITS DUTIES,||. . .||145|
Present result (145-146). Advance to a higher point of view (146-148). Individualism criticized (148-156). The end is realization as member of a community (157). The moral organism seems to be the solution of ethical problems (158-166). Satisfactoriness of this view (166-171). Relative and absolute morality (171-174). Intuitive character of moral judgments (174-180). Morality not a mere private matter (180-183). Criticism of the above view (183-186).
Note. Rights and Duties (187).
|IDEAL MORALITY,||. . .||193|
No limit to the moral sphere (193-197). Content of the ideal self (198-203). Collisions of moral elements (203-206). Morality not simply equal to self-realization (206). What it is (206-212). Difficulties as to its nature (212-220). In what sense is it approximative? (220-225).
|SELFISHNESS AND SELF-SACRIFICE,||. . .||226|
Statement and refutation of the argument for general selfishness, which is founded on the confusion as to ‘motive’ (227-235). What is the idea of a pleasure? (236). Psychological genesis of the voluptuary (237-245). What selfishness is (245-247). General problem of the good and bad self (247-248). Hereditary theory insufficient (249). Content of good and bad selves (250). Genesis of the good self (251-261). Genesis of the bad self (261-265). Origin of morality proper (265-271). Nature of the morally good and bad selves (271-275). What self-sacrifice is (276).
|CONCLUDING REMARKS,||. . .||279|