History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 4/Chapter 20

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

 

CHAPTER XX.

VICEROY CALLEJA AND HIS PLANS.

1813.

Calleja's Character and Appearance — How the Appointment was Received — Condition of Affairs — Fresh Taxes and Loans — Reforms — Insurgent Heroine — Constitution of 1812 Enforced — Inquisition Disappears — Increase of Crime — Protests and Counter-appeals — Extent of Insurrection — Calleja's Campaign Plan — Royalist Positions — Verdusco's Fiasco — Rayon's Tour of Inspection — Quarrel between the Leaders — Iturbide's Victory at Salvatierra.

The feeling in New Spain at the appointment of Calleja was by no means of unmixed delight. Spaniards naturally welcomed one from whose proved skill, energy, and experience they hoped to reach a speedy conclusion of the protracted civil war and attendant disorders, and the inhabitants of the capital could not object to a man whose fondness for ostentation promised to sustain the splendor of the court and the allurements of the metropolis. Society spoke of him besides as elegant in manners, with a conversation that revealed both wide reading and taste. Here the praise stopped, however, for there was something strongly repelling in his haughty disposition and sinister aspect, stamped by cold calculation and vindictiveness. Much of this was due to a bilious temperament, reflected also in his jaundiced complexion and cat-like face, with its greenish eyes and lowering glances.^[1] As a soldier he had distinguished himself less for daring feats than for prompt execution of cautiously planned movements. This at least inspired confidence in his subordinates; and he supplemented the same with strict discipline, softened by prudent attention to creature comforts; so that while his cold formality of intercourse and studied methods repressed enthusiasm, he nevertheless enjoyed good repute among his men, who manifested their deference and gratitude by calling him Amo Don Felix.^[2]

Respect was indeed the only feeling evoked by his positive qualities; it hardly warmed into admiration. Fear and distrust rose as a barrier; and those who ventured near him did so with a motive, prepared with concession or flattery. And Calleja was content; for he loved to be flattered and looked up to as a great man, and that without a too searching or microscopic analysis of the qualities comprising his character. Devoid of magnetism, and with a temperament hardened by sanguinary warfare on the border and by comparative isolation of life among rude soldiers and colonists, his ambitious spirit had come to regard fear as the sweetest of homage and the strongest of influences.

Acknowledged as the foremost soldier in New Spain, his appointment failed not to inspire the army with a wholesome confidence, and the insurgents with a corresponding awe, while the people at large coupled his name only with relentless cruelty. Yet even among the creoles there was a clique which had begun to look upon this new Tamerlane, as Bustamante calls him,^[3] as a possible liberator. He had more than once allowed to escape the utterance that independence would benefit the country.^[4] Encouraged by this and by the late ill feeling between him and the viceroy, the guadalupe society, in active sym pathy with the insurgents, had approached him, holding forth in alluring colors the fame and position he might acquire by casting his talents and influence with their party, and achieving the independence of an empire. Whether Calleja seriously entertained the proposition or merely sought to keep himself informed of the enemy's plans, remains uncertain; for just when the guadalupes regarded him as won, his appointment came as viceroy, and satisfied the ambitious craving which alone could have induced him to turn traitor.^[5] Jealous of the general, and aware to some extent of his leanings, Venegas had not neglected to throw out hints against him to the government in Spain, but the representations of Spanish residents proved stronger. Perhaps it was thought well to secure so able a man with the irresistible bribe of a vice regal sceptre.

While each was watching the other and awaiting the result of their machinations, Venegas had astonished his rival by the appointments lately conferred upon him. Some saw in these acts a desire to humiliate the general by obliging him to appear daily at the palace for orders; others, a mark of confidence and conciliation in view of the foreshadowed change. Though Calleja had refused the position of comandante general of the provincias internas de Oriente,^[6] it suited his plans to accept these positions in the capital. After his reception at the palace the last of February, Venegas visited him at his house,^[7] and arranged for the surrender of the command. On the 4th of March, 1813, Calleja was conducted in state to the palace, there to receive the staff of office and to take the oath. The attendant ceremonies were celebrated with all the pomp so dear to his heart, manifested further in the formation of a guard in flashing uniforms;^[8] but no popular applause greeted his ears.^[9]

Among his first acts was a proclamation wherein, alluding to the civil war and its ravages, he pointed out that no further cause existed for discontent, as the new constitution had gone forth enabling the people to choose their own guardians of civil economy and delegates to the national congress, and so prevent abuses. They knew that he could form armies and lead them to victory, but for this he needed funds and expected the necessary aid and temporary sacrifice which would procure the restoration of peace and prosperity. As he had shown himself ready to promote their welfare, so would he prove firm in chastising obstinacy and malevolence.^[10] The latter sentence was thoroughly characteristic, and the whole document appeared stamped with the energy expected from a general who had so severely criticised the policy of his predecessor. Nor was he wrong in his condemnation, to judge from the condition of affairs, with the administration in disorder, exchequer empty, army neglected, insurgents in greater force and control than ever, and public opinion growing more hostile. The reliance in Calleja was based also on his long experience in the country, with which he had in a sense grown up, imbibing lessons from different administrations.

The intimation for funds produced most unpleasant apprehension; for Calleja was as unceremonious in levying contributions as he was prodigal in expenditure. Not long after, indeed, he came forth with a woful complaint. There was a debt of more than thirty millions and a monthly deficit of $260,000, and the sources for revenue were insufficient, the best ones being, moreover, hypothecated for advances.^[11] The first necessary step for relief, he declared, was to liberate trade, and mining and other industries, from the crushing weight of oppression by the rebels, who ravaged and kept in perpetual alarm the settlements, and blocked the roads in every direction. To this end funds were above all required wherewith to organize forces; and as the interests of merchants would receive the earliest benefit, he appealed first to the tribunal del consulado for a loan of a million and a half. Although the demand was not fully complied with, the prompt response revealed a flattering confidence in Calleja, united perhaps with a wholesome fear, which proved stronger than the feelings evoked by his discouraging revelation of affairs.^[12]

The loan itself drew attention to the main issue, which was means to increase the revenue, a problem intrusted to a council of representatives from different classes,^[13] whose efforts were assisted by reports from the provincial governors on the economic condition. Among the results was a continuance of the five per cent tax on urban rents, and the impost on articles of consumption, a levy of one per cent on money in circulation, and an additional fifty per cent on tobacco. The latter measures proved so onerous that they were repealed, and instead of them was placed a direct contribution on property and income. Fixed without sufficient data, and affected by the long reign of disorder, the contribution proved difficult to collect, and led rather to arbitrary exactions,^[14] before which Calleja never shrank. Indeed, in December he again called on the merchants for a loan, this time increased to two millions. The struggles of the finance department, however, and the failure to carry out the promise of hypothecation and repayment had created a reaction, so that the first appeal elicited only a paltry hundred thousand. Pressure was thereupon applied without compunction, often with a doubling or trebling of the amount assigned.^[15]

An encouraging adjunct to those dispositions was the enforcement of economy in government departments, partly by stopping all extra salaries, contingent expenses, and gratuities, save those granted in campaigns.^[16] Several changes were also made among officials, Secretary Velazquez de Leon,^[17] for one, being replaced by Patricio Humana, and a special war department was created and intrusted to Joaquin Pelaez.^[18] All army men and provincial officials were sent to their posts, and impressment was called into action to enforce the levies for recruits. These had to swell the regular army; and in order to leave it free to take the field against the insurgents, Calleja resolved to form a militia for the garrison duty and local defence, as vainly recommended by him to Venegas. Country proprietors were required to join in raising companies, and at the capital even prominent nobles had to swell the ranks.^[19]

The military councils lately inaugurated received orders to watch the observance of regulations, and persons suspected of favoring the rebellion. Even women were not spared from their rigorous ferreting, the celebrated wife of Corregidor Dominguez of Querétaro being arrested and arraigned, although the state of her health averted punishment for a time.^[20] A prominent young lady of the capital, named Leona Vicario, sent not only information but funds and other aid to her insurgent lover, a law student serving under the banners of Rayon. Betrayed by a servant, she was arrested, and notwithstanding the influence of her family, it would have fared badly with her, for she boldly avowed revolutionary sympathies, had not her friends come to the rescue, and one night breaking into the convent where she was detained, carried her off. She reached her betrothed in the mountains of Tlalpujahua, and followed him as his wife in his campaigns, submitting bravely to every hardship.^[21]

While taking energetic measures for crushing the insurgents, Calleja endeavored to give effect to the concessions of the córtes, as manifested above all in reëstablishing the suspended constitution of 1812, which was expected to mollify a host of malecontents and wavering factions.^[22] Foremost among the privileges it conferred was the election for town governments, provincial assembly, and representatives, which created the most excitement. The requirement for a municipal body in every settlement of a thousand souls was not strictly attended to, owing to the ignorance of the Indians and indifference of the authorities; but in towns with mestizo and white settlers the opportunity was not lost. The curas naturally wielded great influence in the choice of men, and decidedly so in the villages; officials also interfered, and at Mexico the viceroy made a strong effort to prevent the exclusion of Spaniards, as had happened at the former annulled election; but all was vain, for the creoles carried everything here and at most other places.^[23] A similar result obtained in the formation of the provincial assembly. According to the constitution, each intendencia could regard itself as a province and choose its own assembly;^[24] but the definition not being very clear, the intendencias united to elect one body for the whole country.^[25] At the election of deputies to the córtes in Spain,^[26] each intendencia acted for itself. Owing to the wide control of the insurgents, the representation of one for every seventy thousand souls was attained only in certain provinces, and here the Indians were almost wholly disregarded, and the Europeans nearly so, mestizos joining the creoles in controlling the choice which fell mainly on ecclesiastics and lawyers.^[27] When the time came for sending the deputies, the viceroy declared that no funds could be spared for their expenses; they who wished to go must do so at their own cost. Only a few could afford to undertake the journey, and so the representation faded to a shadow.^[28]

The change in the administration of justice began in May. Special tribunals were abolished with a few exceptions, such as army and church, and the audiencia was deprived of extra-judicial privileges. Prominent among the fallen institutions was the inquisition, which had so long cast its shadow over the land. Not content with opposing heresy, bigamy, and the like, and indorsing the existence of witchcraft by its dread cognizance, it had of late devoted special attention to repelling the invasion of modern philosophic thought and scientific investigation, by restricting publications and persecuting students. The suppression was hailed with unfeigned delight, and the inquisitors responded with admirable promptness to the popular will, surrendering the records and property without subterfuge. The estates and bonds alone, not counting allowances from churches and other sources, amounted to a million and a fifth of pesos, which went to swell the national resources.^[29]

The Indians were deprived of their protective fiscales and governors, and, ignored as a representative body, rather suffered than gained by the reform movement; of the promise of land distribution and freedom from personal service there was no indication of fulfilment.^[30] Another revolutionary reform was the suppression of the acordada, which had proved so efficient in checking brigandage and robbery, and of the less valuable police, established with much care and expenditure under Venegas; while the primary administration of justice in the capital, hitherto confided to thirty-two subordinates, alcaldes, and others, was now surrendered to six elected judges,^[31] as aids to the two alcaldes, who were burdened also with the duties hitherto performed by the acordada, the police, and other bodies. The effect soon became manifest in an accumulation of delayed suits, neglect of court formalities and prison regulations, and a startling increase of crime; so much so that patrols had to be established, as well as a soldier police. Several of the measures led to open quarrels between the viceroy and the alcaldes, who were naturally jealous of interference. Beyond the capital the military took matters into their own hands with respect to insurgents, robbers, and others, to whom the summary proceedings of a civil war period might be safely applied.^[32]

Matters were not improved by the jealous objection on the part of the newly invested authorities to all interference from the government or the now humbled Europeans. The latter retaliated by withdrawing as much as possible from any position where they might be exposed to further insult and defeat. They made their displeasure manifest during the epidemic which ravaged the plateau this year, by contributing sparingly for the relief of the sick and poor, who so far had depended chiefly on their charity. The infliction was malignant fevers, which began in the preceding year, and extended over the central provinces, from Vera Cruz to Michoacan, carrying off nearly forty thousand persons in Mexico and Puebla alone.^[33] The defects revealed in the constitution of 1812, and to be expected from its experimental nature, were seized upon as weapons by its opponents. The audiencia took the lead in a lengthy representation to the córtes, of November 18th, explaining the origin and growth of the rebellion, which now affected nearly all natives of the soil, and pointing out the inapplicability of the constitution to the colony, with its mixture of races, interests, and feelings. Afraid to expose the defects of the law itself, they preferred to instance the bad results of its partial enforcement, and the danger of carrying out the full text in the midst of civil war. The people were intent on independence, and would regard any concession as due to fear, using it to promote their ultimate object. The country would inevitably be ruined and lost to Spain unless decisive measures were taken to suppress the rebellion, by endowing the viceroy with necessary freedom of action under previous laws. Only when this had been effected should reforms be introduced.^[34]

The argument of the oidores that the constitution favored the independence movement, under present circumstances at least, was not entertained by all Spanish residents. The ayuntamiento of Vera Cruz, which, owing to the exceptional local influence of the merchants, was of a European stamp, but firmly devoted to the liberty party in Spain, insisted that the full enforcement of the constitution would tend to quell the revolution by removing all cause for discontent. This view they supported in a representation to the córtes, wherein Calleja stood accused as the main cause for all existing trouble, partly for neglecting to let the constitution prevail.^[35] Indeed, if we except the clauses relating to tribunals and elections, the organic law remained a dead letter. Not only did Calleja retain his power as viceroy, but by allowing the attributes of the audiencia to decline, and the administration of justice to became involved, and by nullifying to a great extent the effect of the elections, he obtained more unrestrained control of affairs. Nor can he be blamed for acting as he did, levying funds and troops, suppressing the liberty of the press, and otherwise encroaching on the prerogatives of the córtes; for the situation was critical, and in order to perform his duty as royal representative and agent for Spain, arbitrary measures were needed.^[36]

The insurgents, as we have seen, had risen with renewed strength after the apparently crushing disaster at Cuautla, and occupied at the time of Calleja's entry into office the greater part of the region south of a line drawn from Tampico to Lagos and Colima. "The government," writes the viceroy himself, "could barely claim anything else than the capitals of the provinces, and even one of these, perhaps the richest, Oajaca, was absolutely lost."^[37] Morelos controlled all the southern parts of Puebla and Vera Cruz, and the present Oajaca and Guerrero, except Acapulco, which was even then about to fall. North of Jalapa, Vera Cruz was overrun by bands whose strongholds lay within the Sierra Madre, whence they extended from the gulf inland, and to the south line of Tamaulipas. Prominent among their leaders was the elder Villagran, who held sway at Zimapan, in semi-independence of the other revolutionary chiefs, and under the pompous title of Julian I., emperor of the Huasteca.^[38] Further inland his son, known as Chito,^[39] occupied the districts centring in Huichapan and carried his operations into the valley of Mexico, while Osorno controlled the region south and east, in northern Puebla, to the gulf shore, with his headquarters at Zacatlan, where he had important factories of arms and ammunition. He was the terror of the highway to Vera Cruz, and the main reliance of all oppressed and discontented refugees from the royalist lines. While following his own plans he recognized the insurgent council, although discord had broken out among its members, to the detriment of the cause.

The latter held different sections of Michoacan and Guanajuato; Ignacio Rayon from his retreat at Tlalpujahua commanding the region from Zitácuaro to Toluca and northward, his brother Ramon obstructing traffic on the high road to Querétaro, while Cañas, Sanchez, and other followers kept the lake valley in alarm from the mountains of Chapa de Mota, even threatening the neighborhood of the capital. The coast districts of Michoacan also adhered to Rayon, and most of the southern towns, among which Verdusco was recruiting his forces and extending his influence. In this province, indeed, the government could claim little more than Valladolid and Zamora; but in Guanajuato nearly all the large towns stood on its side, the insurgents under Liceaga, and his lieutenant Cos, the latter in the north-east, the other near Lake Cuitzeo, hovering in the country districts and seeking to cut off supplies for the royalists.

The comparative remoteness of Morelos from the provinces nearest to the capital, and the approach of

Map of The Revolution.

Extent of the revolution in New Spain in the spring of 1813; the dark shading indicates the territory absolutely under control of the insurgents; the lighter shading the ground overrun or raided by them, but where royalists held the chief towns.

the rainy season, which would seriously affect the health and movement of troops in the lower-lying southern regions, rendered it less needful as well as more difficult to undertake a campaign against him for some time. The most pressing demand was to liberate the central provinces from the numerous bands which obstructed communication with the mines and the outlet to the gulf, impeded the flow of supplies, and played havoc with the main resources of the government.^[40]

It was proposed, therefore, to direct every effort against the different headquarters along the line north of the capital, leaving only the necessary force southward to watch Morelos, and guard against any sudden inroad from his forces. To this end a main corps of nearly six thousand men was stationed south of Puebla, in connection with a semicircle of reënforced posts at Jalapa, Orizaba, Perote, Izúcar, Tasco, and Toluca; while other troops were massed northward, partly at Tula and other places, but mainly round Guanajuato.^[41]

Castro Terreño, who had been removed by Venegas for incapacity, under the guise of another motive, was reinstated in Puebla and made general of the southern army, which spread from Izúcar north eastward to Perote, a step which Calleja had soon to regret. Negrete held command in Guanajuato. García Conde succeeded Trujillo at Valladolid, although he soon yielded to General Sotarriba. Castillo y Bustamante was stationed in Toluca Valley, connected by strong detachments with Querétaro; and Armijo occupied the districts southward to the right banks of the Mescala, with his cavalry, the garrisons of Tasco and Iguala, and recruits from the estates, to which was added a corps of observation at Cuernavaca, under Daoiz, who also extended his movements to the Mescala.^[42]

We have seen but lately how the insurgent cause gained, if anything, by their bands being so scattered as to prevent the royalists from crushing them in one grand effort. Now, Calleja's plans, on the contrary, were destined to find no little support in the discord and lack of coöperation among the insurgents, which led to a series of false manœuvres and disastrous defeats. In this respect, Doctor Verdusco distinguished himself in Michoacan, the province assigned

Operations in Michoacan.

to his charge. After abandoning Uruapan and Tancitaro as untenable,^[43] he was overtaken in September by Negrete, in the barrancas of Araparícuaro, and his men dispersed with loss of guns and baggage.^[44] Assisted by Delgado and Rosales, he again mustered 1,000 men, only to fall in anew with his pursuer, and repeat the previous performance, with greater loss than before.^[45]

Verdusco now proceeded to Ario, where soon nearly all of the leaders in the province assembled, including Muñiz, Carbajal, Rosales, Montaño, and Sanchez, with a force of fully 15,000 men^[46] very fairly armed. So large a reunion could not be without an object, and it was but natural that this should correspond to the magnitude of the representation. It was proposed to attempt the capture of Valladolid, by which the control of the entire province would be assured. The moment seemed opportune, for the not very strong garrison, now in charge of Lieutenant-colonel Antonio Linares, had been further reduced by the escort taken by the departing commandant, Trujillo. Aware of Verdusco's lack of prudence, Rayon hastened to bid him await his arrival before undertaking so important an operation; but the prize seemed too glittering and easy of acquisition for surrender to another, and on January 30th, Verdusco appeared before the city with 6,000 men, well provided with cannon, scaling-ladders, and other material. On the following day he prepared for the assault with great deliberation and manifest assurance. Linares, who had called in all the aid possible from the neighborhood, soon discovered the weak points in the position, and by a series of successful charges and feints managed to create such distraction along the line that a final sortie in force led to a complete rout of the insurgents, with a loss in killed of several hundred, and the capture of 150, together with twenty cannon.^[47] Some of the fleeing artillerists were mere boys under sixteen years of age, from which may be judged the value of the other troops, which now scattered in different directions.

Rayon had reason to feel indignant with Verdusco for his disobedience, and took him formally to task at Pátzcuaro; but a column of royalist pursuers broke up the meeting, and the leaders hastened away in different directions.^[48] These undignified mishaps did not, however, interfere with Rayon's projects of making a tour through the province, for the purpose of asserting his authority as well as reforming abuses; for complaints had been flowing in against the exactions, raids, and other outrages committed by guerrillas and countenanced by the higher commanders. The hope for relief brought a host of applicants to the front wherever the president appeared, and added no little eclat to the occasion. Rayon readily accepted the princely homage tendered, as manifested in processions, ringing of bells, and solemn masses.^[49]

The result of his investigations implicated a number of chiefs, including the cura Delgado, the intendente, who was found guilty also of negotiating with the royalists for pardon. Out of regard for his sacerdotal character, he was merely exiled; but Arias and several other colonels and minor officers were executed for their bandit operations.^[50]

The licentiate Francisco Solorzano was now appointed intendente, and Muñiz comandante general. It was easier to issue commands than to enforce them. Instead of obeying the order of exile, Delgado met the equally offended and recalcitrant Verdusco at Urecho; and joined by Liceaga, they issued a proclamation declaring that in them as members of the supreme council resided the sovereignty. They made a series of counter-charges against Rayon for usurpation of authority, for invasion of Michoacan, which stood subject to Verdusco and Delgado, and for unauthorized and traitorous acts, such as holding intercourse with royalists, and seeking to oust ecclesiastics from commands, and cited him to appear and give answer. They even marched against him and surprised his escort at Santa Efigenia, killing several men; where upon they proclaimed him a traitor.^[51] Returning to Tlalpujahua, Rayon issued a defence of his conduct, declared the hostile vocales suspended, and appealed to all leaders for support. Most of them took his part, but others sided with the Villagranes, Morelos avoiding a decisive answer, while expressing disapproval of the quarrel.^[52] Doctor Cos took the best step in addressing both parties, pointing out the danger of discord and urging reconciliation. All declared themselves ready to yield, but they failed to enter into negotiations with a corresponding spirit.^[53]

Rayon was probably not altogether insincere; but he resolved to neglect no means for extending his own influence, and sent his brother Ramon into the old territory of Liceaga, north of Lake Cuitzeo, to assert his claims and draw recruits to his side. Liceaga also hastened to the scene with the same object. At this time Iturbide received orders at Zamora to proceed to Guanajuato, whence, among other duties, he should lead a convoy with silver to Querétaro. On the way he learned of the mustering by the two insurgent leaders, and believing it necessary for the safety of the convoy to impose a check, he turned aside to engage them. Ramon Rayon's force was by no means numerous or disciplined enough to meet so renowned an opponent with any confidence; and he would undoubtedly have hastened away but for the accusations so widely spread by his rivals that he stood in accord with the viceregal party. A retreat would lend confirmation to the charge, and he resolved rather to face defeat.

He took up a position at Salvatierra, a town situated on the right banks of the Rio de Lerma, distributing his force at the bridge and the adjoining fords. It was good Friday.^[54] Iturbide proposed to attack on the following day or during the night; but while reconnoitring he was assailed and fell back on his line skirmishing. Believing that they had gained an advantage, the insurgents continued the pursuit. Iturbide perceived his advantage and turned upon them with his whole strength, throwing them into disorder and pursuing in his turn. He reached the bridge at the same time as the fugitives, and was thus able to cross it without fear from their artillery. His success promoted the advance of a detachment by the ford, and the town was taken with hardly another blow.^[55]

The battle is remarkable less for the forces engaged and the direct result than for its effect on later operations, and for the decided step toward greatness which Iturbide gained thereby. He was made colonel of the Celaya regiment, his later main reliance, and comandante general of Guanajuato province, now taken back by the viceroy from the control of Cruz, of Nueva Galicia.^[56] Another feature of the engagement was the neglect of Liceaga to relieve Rayon, though it was in his power, it is said, to have done so.^[57] He is even said to have rejoiced over the mishaps of Rayon, who retaliated by proclaiming his conduct. Indeed, Liceaga was unfortunate in other respects. In January he had failed in an assault on Celaya,^[58] and after avenging himself on the surrounding settlements, he joined Verdusco, as we have seen, in whose company he sustained another defeat near Puruándiro on April 24th, at the hands of Antonelli. Little resistance was offered, Verdusco escaping on an unsaddled horse, leaving his uniform, baton, and seals of the council. The royalists slaughtered a number, and took nearly a hundred prisoners. Contrary to precedent, Antonelli not only set them free, but gave each a peso with which to reach his home. His generosity met with no great gratitude; for on finding themselves at a safe distance on a hill, they sent back a volley of annihilating epithets.^[59] This was the last exploit of the venerable cura and member of the council. He determined to retire for a time.^[60] A decree of Rayon removing him as well as Liceaga from the council afterward went into effect. As regards the latter, he was arrested, together with Delgado. Rayon himself made the first advances toward reconciliation; and although not reinstated in any command, Liceaga was allowed to leave for his hacienda near Leon.^[61]

 

 

1. Bustamante compares his eyes to two boiled tomatoes. His beard terminated in a point. The portrait in Alaman, iv. 77, shows no beard. Other wise the former gives him a fine figure, 'agestado, elegante, airoso en los movimientos.' Campañas de Calleja, app. 17.
2. Amo, meaning the master of an estate, or factory.
3. Campañas de Calleja, sup. 2. Pages 177-8 are laden with choice epithets against him.
4. Even in a private letter to the viceroy, in January 1811, he had written: 'Sus naturales y aun los mismos Europeos estan convencidos de las ventajas que les resultarian de un gobierno independiente.' Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., i. 163.
5. Unaware of the extent of the negotiations, Alaman would not believe that he could have proved false. Hist. Méj., ii. 348-9. But Zerecero states that the society used often to meet in the house of his family, and he as secretary knew that the day was fixed when Calleja should join the revolution. Sanchez de Tagle and Licentiate Cristo y Conde, the persecuted asesor general of Iturrigaray, were those who treated with him. The day after Calleja received news of his advancement they came to confer with him as usual. 'If you were not my friends I would have you shot,' was now the startling reply. 'You speak to the viceroy of New Spain.' Mem., 257. Calleja did not abuse the secrets of the society, although availing himself to a great extent of what he knew. Letters by O. Lizana in Adalid, Causa, MS., i. 2-3, hint at Calleja's leanings to independence.
6. As explained by Arechederreta.
7. He lived in the same house, hotel de Iturbide, where the liberator Agustin I. received his proclamation as emperor.
8. Called 'dragones del virey.' Orders from Spain soon changed the term to 'del rey.' His consort, Francisca de la Gandara, moved the same eight to the palace, where the usual besamanos receptions took place.
9. There was no lack, however, of felicitations, addresses, and celebrations, as at the university and other institutions. Lizardi joined with a eulogistic address in his Pensador Mexicano, sup. pt iii. Cancelada expressed delight in his Telégrafo, 269, and loyal addresses were sent in. See also Torrente, Revol., i. 425-6; Mendíbil, Resúm. Hist., 168. Portrait and autograph are given in Alaman, Hist. Mej., iv. 77, 724.
10. This was the characteristic closing sentence. The opening alluded to his appointment as unexpected and unsought. The clergy and other classes were urged to promote restoration of peace. For full text, see Calleja, á los habitantes, fol. 1-8, dated March 20, 1813; Pap. Var., xxxvi. pt vii.; Gaz. de Mex. . 1813, iv. 355-62; Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 6-10.
11. Manifesto dated April 17, 1813. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 421-2. Many condemned it as dangerous to reveal the condition so publicly, but it was well enough known, from the frequent recourse to forced loans.
12. The interest offered was five per cent, and the security half the revenue of the city custom-houses from Jan. 1814, but which received no corresponding application. In the list of subscribers, published in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 11-12, are found the names of prominent local nobles, Basoco, Cortina, and others, for sums of $50,000 downward. At the same time the Gaz. de Mex., Jan. 5, 1813 et seq., continued to exhibit respectable donations for Spain.
13. Calleja's decree of April 17th contains the appointees, representing mines, agriculture, church, and other departments. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 422-3.
14. It was passed by a representative meeting of Nov. 15th, and proclaimed Dec. 16th. The sale of tobacco fell so rapidly after the 50 per cent tax of July 4th, mainly owing to the growth of contraband, that the repeal had to be made by Dec. 11th. Dispos. Varias, ii. 23; Pinart Coll., print i. doc. 15. Mendíbil explains some of the difficulties Calleja had to contend with. The government had recommended a lottery, issue of copper coinage, and hypothecation of national property. For nature of contributions on ecclesiastic corporations, see Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 247-9. For regulation of custom-house duties, see Gutierrez, Leyes Ref., 449-56.
15. Alaman furnishes some instances. Hist. Méj., iii. 433.
16. Orders had come to Venegas for reducing salaries, but the increased cost of living, etc., made it not advisable to obey.
17. He had stood suspected among the Spaniards ever since the time of Iturrigaray.
18. Who escaped the first massacre at Guanajuato by proclaiming to the Indians that Hidalgo had promised to give 500 pesos to any one who should deliver him alive. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 43.
19. The leading persons who at first formed the battalions of the patriotas de Fernando VII. had gradually substituted paid men, or left the ranks altogether. Although severe pressure was now applied, large numbers managed to escape duty.
20. The reëstablished constitution led to the removal of corregidores, and accusations now grew stronger against her, Archdeacon Beristain declaring 'que la corregidora es una Ana Bolena, y añado, quc Gil [a cura at Querétaro] es su Wolseo.' Letters of Dec. 14th, 23d, 29th. She was hurried away one day without warning, and placed in the convent Santa Teresa at Mexico. The husband was also charged, but vindicated. Being enceinte she enjoyed comparative liberty; indeed, she was even sheltered by a suspicion of insanity. Reports and charges connected with the case may be consulted in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 370 et seq. Other arrests in Querétaro are noted in Id, 345-6. Decree against rebel sympathizers in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 697-8; Cavo, Tres Siglos, iv. 96-104.
21. Her estates were confiscated, although she was a minor. Her indictment occupied voluminous documents. Arechederreta speaks at length of her. Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 414-16.
22. Measures for circulating it are given in Córtes, Diario, 1813, xxi. 152, 168, and allusions to its adoption, in Id., i. 89, etc.
23. The alcaldes at Mexico as elected on April 4th were Conde de Medina and Antonio de Velasco, the former colonel and the other trader, assisted by 16 regidores and 2 síndicos. Curioso Mex., i. pt ii. The audiencia reported to Spain against the legality of such election, the result of rebel sympathy. Their representation in Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., iv. 95-7. The viceroy had released the electors formerly arrested for supposed correspondence with rebels, and recalled Villaurrutia. It was a repetition of the old ticket, 'tenidos por adictos á la independencia.' Alaman, Hist. Méj., iii. 412. For rules governing ayuntamientos, see Córtes, Diario, xix. 385; Mex. Col. Dec. y Ord., 66-7, 86-101; Mex., Legist., 1849, 341-68. Querétaro elected liberals despite all care. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 369. Pensador Mex., sup. 92-3, gives a homily.
24. To be composed of a president, intendente, and seven members. There was a vagueness in art. 332, however, which left the impression that the president was the viceroy, now known as gefe superior, and which implied that New Spain was but one province. Consult further the text in Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., i. 375, etc.
25. Mexico chose two, one for itself and one for Oajaca, which being wholly in the hands of Morelos, could not take part in the election. The two were Provisor Alcocer and J. M. Fagoaga. For rules governing the body, see Mex. Col. Dec. y Ored., 91-5, 103-4; Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 446. The guadalupes reported the result joyously to Morelos. Bustamante, Campañas Calleja, 177. Election was performed by an electoral college, constituted by a secondary vote.
26. The election for Mexico began July 4th, and ended on July 18th. Of the 41 partidos in this province, only 22 appointed electors, 29 in number, who chose 14 deputies, whereof 9 were lawyers and 5 ecclesiastics.
27. Caste distinction was sharply discussed at the time in the córtes, partly owing to the exclusion of negro blood from equality. Córtes, Diario, xx. 319, etc. Comment on election influences in Pap. Var., clviii. pt 56, 1-4.
28. From Mexico only two were sent, and those partly by way of expulsion, as they were deemed dangerous to the public peace, Canon Alcalá and Licentiate Cortazar. Alaman, Hist. Méj., in. 423. In Córtes, Actas, 1813, i. 62, the representation from New Spain proper is put at 11, and from the provincias internas at 2, Yucatan being counted by itself.
29. The suppression decree, dated Feb. 22d, was issued at Mexico in June. Three months later the archbishop took the preliminary steps for enforcing it. Gutierrez, Leyes Ref., 33; Mex., Provid. Dioces., MS.,496-7. In Inquisition, Informe, Mex., 1813, 1-69, is an argument against the proceedings presented to the córtes. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 430-3, has preserved a synopsis of its executions in New Spain.
30. By decree of Jan. 4, 1813, the córtes ordered vacant lands to be assigned to the villages for cultivation with community funds. Lands could even be borrowed from adjoining jurisdictions for two years. Córtes, Col. Dec., iii. 189-93. The decree was issued in New Spain in April, but the war prevented its enforcement; and so with the exemption from service to curas and others, proclaimed in June.
31. The law assigned only one to aid the two alcaldes, but these being too few, the viceroy added five. See his decree in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 462. For other suppressed and reformed departments of justice, see Id., 565-6, etc. The pay of these judges was $1,500 and fees. See also Mex., Col. Dec, y Ord., 67-72.
32. The audiencia seeks naturally to exaggerate the condition somewhat for its own sake. See report in Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., iv. 113-17. In their report of Feb. they showed a disposal in the sala del crímen for the preceding three years, of 9,080 cases with 14,835 criminals, of whom half were liberated. This did not include the much larger number 'quintuplicado' of cases of the junta de seguridad. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 208; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 169. Eighteen cases alone remained pending at the close of 1812; and this is strong testimony against the subsequent condition.
33. Alaman intimates that the capital alone lost over 14,000 'quedando desde entónces desierto el barrio de Santiago.' Hist. Méj., iii. 414. Concerning the board of health, see Id., Apuntes, 11-12. Humboldt attributes the fevers to the siege of Cuautla, but Bustamante believes they were spread by the Zamora soldiers, and originated in the humid habitations of the poor, the germ still lurking. Cuad. Hist., ii. 286-7. The southern line of San Luis Potosí to Jalisco proved the limit northward; but Oajaca also suffered.
34. The opening paragraphs show that the audiencia retains the duty to interfere by making the present protest, and that the opposition ascribed to Europeans against the constitution consists really in their devotion to the mother country. The clergy fostered rebellious ideas. Art. 132. Whatever the motives of the audiencia, the document contains in its 270 articles a mass of valuable statements, and presents some unanswerable arguments in support of its aim. It is addressed to the king and signed by eleven members, Yañez, an American, alone refusing to sign so 'ignominious' an exposition. Oidor Bodega, appointed to another position in Spain, no longer attended the sessions. Bustamante admits the value of the paper, but declares that 'cada linea de este papel tiene mucho veneno.' Cuad. Hist., iv. 137. He reproduces the whole text in pp. 27-136. Alaman doubts his supposition that Oidor Pedro de la Puente, a Spaniard, prepared it, and ascribes it rather to the relator J. M. Torres Cataño, a trusted and well informed Mexican. Hist. Méj., iii. 438. A valuable synopsis is given in Ward's Mex., i. 490-507.
35. It was prepared by Comoto, editor of Amigo de la Patria, and a protégé of Venegas; and among the municipal members who signed it were Arrillaga and Ignacio Esteva, the latter a native of the town, both suspected of holding intercourse with the insurgents, and later holding ministerial posts under the republic. The document was secretly intrusted to Oidor Bodega, on his way to Spain; but on his arrival Fernando had changed the aspect of affairs, and he held back the paper, thus saving the signers; yet Calleja was informed of the facts by his friends. Bustamante reproduces the document in Cuad. Hist., iv. 8-22; Mendíbil, Resúmen Hist., 286-7.
36. It is curious to note that decrees had been issued imposing severe penalties on all who refused to take the oath to the constitution, although so little effort was made to carry out its provisions, or demand fulfilment of the oath. Another decree substituted the word 'national' for 'royal' in all public papers. In June of this year a special law was made in Spain to regulate the sustained liberty of the press. Text in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 65-73.
37. His later proclamation, in Bustamante, Camp. Calleja, app. 7.
38. So Calleja declares. Id., 8. Alaman had heard that he even coined money with this inscription.
39. The term is applied to dried goat meat, and may allude to his achievements in climbing hills.
40. While the royalists held the leading towns and posts along the roads to Guanajuato and Vera Cruz, extending their lines as far as Jalapa and Tlacotalpan on either side, and occupying scattered positions between insurgent camps, such as Tulancingo and Ixmiquilpan, and even posts in Huasteca, yet communication was cut off in every direction, and trains required strong escorts to make their way.
41. See Calleja's review of plan in Bustamante, Campañas, Supl., 9. Torrente estimates Calleja's forces at 84,000, including the militia still in course of formation. Of these he places a second main body of 6,000 in Vera Cruz. He gives Morelos 10,000 men withdrawn by him to the coast, and 8,000 with Rayon. Hist. Rev., i. 430-2. Cancelada alludes with some detail to the movements and supposed plans on both sides, accusing the insurgents of assassination, robbery, and other outrages. Telég., 273-8.
42. At Vera Cruz the brusque brigadier de marina, Quevedo y Chieza, replaced Col. Soto and treated the people like sailors. Attached to Terreño's command were the sections of Olazábal and Monduy, the former guarding the Jalapa route from Puebla to Vera Cruz, the other the Orizaba line. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 401-3. Olazábal's force was the strongest united body at this time, embracing the regiments of Fernando VII., Zamora, Guanajuato, and another, with some dragoons of Spain and San Luis. Col. Águila had returned to Puebla after observing at Tehuacan Morelos' early movements. Tlascala, San Martin, and other points had strong garrisons. The troops from Spain were nearly all stationed in Vera Cruz and Puebla. Castillo y Bustamante's lines connected with Querétaro by means of bodies operating round Tula and San Juan del Rio, and under command of Col. Ordoñez and Linares respectively. For other officers and appointments, see Córtes, Diario, xx. 257-9, xxii. 207, 390; Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 96, etc.; Córtes, Actas, i. 232, etc. For regulations to enforce discipline, etc., Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 539-40, 87884, 1043-4, 1068, 1107-12, 1324-6; Mex. Col. Dec. y Órd., 111-12.
43. His secretary, Velasco, had rejoined him after suffering defeat near Pátzcuaro, at the hands of Linares. The pair buried at Tancitaro some recently manufactured guns, which were discovered, however. Bustamante y Cuad. Hist., ii. 239 et seq.
44. Five guns were captured. Report of Negrete, in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 12-14
45. Seven guns were taken, with 'horrible matanza,' Id., 21, on Oct. 26th.
46. 'Mas de veinticinco mil hombres bien armados,' writes Bustamante, Cuadro Hist., ii. 241; but this appears doubtful. He adds Vedoya, Rodriguez, Suarez, and Arias to the leaders.
47. That is, all the artillery and other material, according to Linares' reports of Feb. 3d and 8th, in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 248-52, 203. He routed and carried disorder into the flanks before he charged the centre body to the south. He estimates the killed moderately at 1,200, and took in the final charge 138 prisoners. Verdusco's main supporters were Rosales, Muñiz, Navarrete, and Anaya. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 24,1-3. This author accepts the report of Linares, but it appears somewhat contradictory as regards numbers.
48. Verdusco passed to Ario, and later massed some troops with which he met Antonelli in April. Navarrete occupied Zacapo.
49. As fully related in the diary kept by his secretary. He inspected troops, and gave attention to roads and other measures. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 631-6.
50. Arias on Aug. 12th. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., vi. 52. The cura was banished to Las Balsas. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 633. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 244-5, presents the formulated charge against Verdusco and others, for disobedience, outrages, etc.
51. On March 7th, three days after the surprise, Diario de Rayon, 634. In his circular to support charges against Rayon, Verdusco seeks to create prejudice against him by insisting that his aim is to remove all ecclesiastics from political and military command. The object of the attack at Santa Efigenia was merely to disperse a body intended for the support of Rayon. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., v. 440-5, claims to be the only writer who has noticed this document. Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 275-C, 315, etc., defends Rayon against the charge of traitorous intercourse.
52. Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 5-6. He maintained relations with Liceaga and others. Rayon's decree removing Verdusco and Liceaga is dated April 7th.
53. The decree which dispossessed the members was issued only after a strong letter from Liceaga, with whom Ramon Rayon had been negotiating. Diario Rayon, 636. In Liceaga, Adic. y Rectific., 244, there is merely an allusion to the quarrel.
54. Zamacois takes pains to point out that Alaman calls this April 16th, when it should be the 18th. Hist. Méx., ix. 153.
55. In his report of the action, sent April 17th to General Cruz, under whom Guanajuato then stood, Iturbide assumes that Rayon had 4,000 men, with 14 cannon, including nearly all the forces from Tlalpujahua, and estimates loosely that some 350 'miserable excommunicated ones descended into the profound abyss,' and 25 were captured and shot, while his own men suffered a loss of one killed and 14 wounded. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 439-42; Méx. Bosquejo, 13, 253-6; Mendíbil, 165-6. Bustamante, who attributes Ramon Rayon's disposition for fighting to the calumny of his rivals, indicates merely 500 infantry, including some cavalry and 3 or 4 cannon. He was assisted by his brother Francisco. Ramon collected more than 300 men, leaving 40 killed and 130 captured or missing. Cuad. Hist., ii. 276-8. Rayon reported the total losses at merely little over 47. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., v. 481.
56. Iturbide naturally maintained his boast of the achievement as one of his greatest, and obtained a shield with the inscription 'Venció en el puente de Salvatierra.' He certainly behaved brilliantly, but he also stained this victory by shooting the prisoners. Liceaga adds the story of a clergyman's execution, after a convivial supper in Iturbide's company. Adic. y Rectific., 245-6.
57. 'Se mantuvo espectador. . .distante tres leguas,' says Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., ii. 278, adding that his men urged him at least to fall on the unprotected silver convoy; but he mistakes, the convoy had not yet left Guanajuato. This conduct led royalists to state that he had assisted them. Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 407.
58. Assisted by Rubí and others, he had attacked January 10th, and obtained at first an advantage over the garrison, which was exhausted by an expedition of the preceding day; but a reenforcement of 250 men under Gomez Pedraza came up and routed him at Peña Colorada, with a loss of 90 killed, and 400 horses, according to Gomez's report. Gaz. de Méj., 1813, iv. 193-4, reproduced in Zamacois, Hist. Méj. , ix. 775-7, and others.
59. So Bustamante relates. Cuad. Hist.,ii. 243-4. Antonelli's report with inventory is given in Gaz. de Mex., 1813, iv. 511-15.
60. Early in March, during the height of the quarrel with Rayon, he had prepared his resignation, which was probably now allowed to take effect. Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., v. 445-6, reproduces the document.
61. This was probably due to some extent to Morelos' remonstrances in his favor. See his letter to Rayon, in Hernandez y Dávalos, Col. Doc., v. 147. Liceaga issued a defence of his conduct, given in Negrete, Mex. Siglo XIX., v. 486-90.