History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 13

2932547History of Mexico (Bancroft) — Chapter 131886Hubert Howe Bancroft

CHAPTER XIII

CAUSES OF WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES.

1836-1846

Coercive Diplomacy Claims against Mexico Their Remarkable In crease Demands for Adjustment American Hostility and Mexican Forbearance — Diplomatic Relations Suspended and Renewed — Arbitration and its Results — More American Claims and Mexican Counter-claims — Unfairness of the United States Government — Recognition of Texan Independence — Foreign Intrigues — Annexation of Texas — Means of Accomplishment — A Casus Belli — Rupture of Relations — Pressure on Mexico — Warlike Demonstrations — Slidell's Unsuccessful Mission.

It was a premeditated and predetermined affair, the war of the United States on Mexico; it was the result of a deliberately calculated scheme of robbery on the part of the superior power. There were at Washington enough unprincipled men high in office, senators, congressmen, to say nothing about the president and his cabinet, and the vast array of demagogues and politicians, who were only too glad to be able in any way to pander to the tastes of their supporters-there were enough of this class, slaveholders, smugglers, Indian-killers, and foul-mouthed tobacco-spurting swearers upon sacred Fourth-of-July principles to carry spread-eagle supremacy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, who were willing to lay aside all notions of right and wrong in the matter, and unblushingly to take whatever could be secured solely upon the principle of might. Mexico, poor, weak, struggling to secure for herself a place among the nations, is now to be humiliated, kicked, cuffed, beaten by the bully on her northern border, whose greatest pride is christian liberty with puritan antecedents, whose greatest principle at this time finds exercise in hunting about for plausible pretexts to steal from a weaker neighbor a fine slice of lands suitable for slave labor. Let us inquire a little into the quality of these pretexts, and determine what were the real causes of the war.

In a previous chapter, treating of the Texan revolt and secession, I explained the cause, which was the desire of its acquisition on the part of the southern states of the American union, whose government yielded to the pressure of slave-holding interests. After exhausting all legitimate means, it resorted to somewhat sinister devices, clearly indicating, by its policy in 1836 and subsequently, an intent to coerce Mexico into a cession of the coveted territory.[1] It is true that the United States had declined a protectorate over Texas, which measure would have violated a treaty. Mexico must be made to appear as the culpable party and aggressor. So a long list of claims was presented, for which the republic was held responsible, though a number of them hardly affected American interests at all. An unseemly diplomatic pressure was then employed.

The American envoy, Powhatan Ellis, was instructed to demand such reparation "as these accumulated wrongs may be found to require." If no satisfactory answer should be returned in three weeks, he must inform the Mexican government that unless redress was afforded without delay, his further residence in Mexico would terminate. If this threat proved unavailing, he was to notify the Mexican cabinet that unless a satisfactory answer came to him in two weeks, he should ask for his passports and return home. Secretary Forsyth was a fit agent and Ellis was a fit instrument for the occasion. The latter was a Mississippian and a slave-holder.[2] He wanted war and he wanted Texas; and he fulfilled his instructions to the letter.[3]

Some of the acts complained of had been committed, before Mexico became an independent nation, by the Spanish authorities. Payment was demanded, on the mere assertions of claimants, for supplies said to have been furnished in furtherance of Mexican independence, and for goods confiscated in violation of the Mexican revenue laws. Events that never occurred were asserted to have taken place, for the purpose of trumping up claims. There appeared in the list complaints against acts of the national navy, and even against proceedings of the courts of justice, many of them unaccompanied with evidence to substantiate them.[4] The number of such claims accompanying the secretary's instructions was fifteen; and as important issues grew out of them, I give the merits of each in a note.[5]

No law or act of the supreme government is complained of; not one of the complaints in question afforded a legitimate cause for war. The conclusion to be naturally drawn from the instructions given Ellis is that he was to establish the principle that, under the treaty of amity with Mexico, when the decisions of Mexican courts did not happen to meet the views of citizens or denizens of the United States, the latter must be privileged to take action in the premises, demanding that those courts be ignored and their decisions set aside, mulcting the Mexican government in sums to satisfy the claimants. It so happened that before Forsyth's despatch reached the legation at Mexico, two of the fifteen claims, namely, the eleventh and fourteenth, had been settled by the Mexican government to the American minister's satisfaction.

On the 26th of September the remaining thirteen grievances were laid in writing by Ellis before the government, together with five others that his zeal had discovered.[6] He was assured that the general government would have them investigated. But in less than four weeks from the date of his first note Ellis announced to the foreign office that if the wrongs complained of were not redressed without unnecessary delay, "his further residence in Mexico would be useless." To this a reply was returned the next day that delay in answering a note calling for an investigation was not a sufficient cause for breaking off friendly relations; that in order to arrive at a decision on the claims preferred, documents had to be gathered from various parts of the country, and that the requisite instructions had been already issued to procure such documents, upon the receipt of which the government's decision on the several points would be made known to the American legation.

This was exactly what neither the minister nor the state department at Washington wanted. Having assumed an arbitrary and insulting attitude in the matter, these officials were determined that the issue should be so forced upon Mexico that there should be no escape. The United States was the stronger power, and there were many among her fire-eaters in those days who delighted in playing the cowardly part of bully. On the 4th of November Ellis gave formal notice that unless his complaints were satisfactorily answered in two weeks he would go. Mexico felt her feebleness and the humiliation. Within the prescribed time her minister of foreign affairs, Monasterio, replied that under the existing treaty the citizens of either country could bring their grievances before the courts of the other, and hence there was no need of government interference to procure that justice which the courts were ready to afford."

"You say that Mexican armed vessels have fired upon and insulted the American flag," continues Monasterio in his note of the 26th of September, "that American consuls have been maltreated, private citizens arrested and scourged like malefactors, some have been assassinated, and their property confiscated. But these charges are general, and the government

7 Monasterio's words were fully borne out by the 14th article of the treaty. Forsyth himself had made avail of that article, in his reply of Jan. 29, 1836, to a demand of the Mexican govt for the punishment of the com. officer of an American war ship for an outrage committed by him on a Mexican vessel. His words were: The courts of the U. S. are freely open to all persons in their jurisdiction, who may consider themselves to have been aggrieved in contravention of our laws and treaties.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 139, vol. iii. But it was quite a different affair, my bull and your ox or your bull and my ox. Ellis on the 15th of Nov. coolly declared Monasterio's opinion 'wholly indefensible.' desires that they may be specified before taking them into consideration."

It was well understood at Washington that these charges were pure trumpery, and by none better than those who made them. Said President Jackson — by no means averse to war and an enlargement of the national domain — to Governor Cannon of Tennessee, two weeks after the coercive instructions had been transmitted to Ellis, "Mexico has given the United States no cause for war."[7]

On the 7th of December Ellis demanded his passports.[8] The government requested the minister to say on what grounds he was taking a step so calculated to affect the relations between the two powers. Ellis deigned no reply.

The diplomatic intercourse between the two governments was now at an end, the Mexican representative, Gorostiza, having left Washington in October. He had, before demanding his passports, published a pamphlet containing portions of his official correspondence with the American government and his own, with an introduction defamatory of the people and government of the United States. This being deemed by the latter a manifest impropriety, a disavowal of it was demanded;[9] but the Mexican foreign office sustained his course. The satisfaction was given, however, at a later day.[10]

The opportunity so much desired was now at hand, but the American executive hesitated to recommend to congress an open declaration of war. In his

8 And again: 'Should Mexico insult our national flag, invade our territory, or interrupt our citizens in the lawful pursuits which are guaranteed to them by treaty, then the government will promptly repel the insult, and take speedy reparation for the injury. But it does not seem that offences of this character have been committed by Mexico.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 2, vol. i.; Bustamante, Gabinete Mex., ii. 27. message[11] he suggested that the sister republic should be allowed "one more opportunity to atone for the past, before we take redress into our hands. But to avoid any misconception on the part of Mexico, as well as to protect the American national character from reproach, this opportunity should be given with the avowed design and full preparation to take immediate satisfaction." The president accordingly asked for the passage of an act authorizing reprisals and the use of the navy against Mexico, to enforce them in the event of that government refusing to come to terms."[12] Though congress was not ready actually to declare war, the proposal to make another demand on Mexico was accepted, both houses making exaggerated and hostile reports.[13]

I have already alluded to the treaty stipulation forbidding acts of reprisal and declarations of war on complaints for grievances or damages, till they should have been presented and verified, a clause wholly ignored by the president of the United States in his message, which was accompanied by forty-six new grievances. Of the original eighteen, only one, dated as far back as 1831, and in the new set no less than thirty-two, were founded on acts said to have been committed prior to 1832, and which, had they ever been valid, were already consigned to the grave by the treaty of April 5, 1831.[14]

On the last day of the session congress appropriated money for the salary of a minister to Mexico, to be appointed "whenever, in the opinion of the president, circumstances will permit a renewal of diplomatic intercourse honorably with that power." The president, though nothing had occurred since December to invite a renewal of relations, appointed a minister, Powhatan Ellis, himself, being the individual chosen.[15] It was pretended that they wished to conciliate Mexico, and so they sent thither her most unprincipled enemy. He was not, however, despatched at once to his destination. A messenger or courier of the department of state went in his stead with a budget of grievances, old and new, now swelled to fifty-seven, which he was to place in the hands of the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, allowing him one week[16] in which to study their merits and return an answer.[17]

The Mexican congress, however, had anticipated such a step. Knowing only of the eighteen claims presented by Minister Ellis, it had passed an act authorizing the executive to submit those claims to the award of a friendly power. The foreign office, on the 29th of July, 1837, replied, giving assurances of the desire of the Mexican government to settle the claims upon the principles of justice and equity.[18] Mexico, anxious to preserve the peace, not only proposed to refer the claims to arbitration, but once more accredited a minister at Washington,[19] who arrived there in October 1837, but did not announce the proposal for arbitration till the 22d of December.[20] This was a sore disappointment to the enemies of Mexico; for it would postpone the object so dear to their hearts, namely, the annexation of Texas and other portions of Mexican territory. Secretary Forsyth dryly acknowledged the receipt of the proposition, and several times afterward pressed upon the Mexican minister, Francisco Pizarro Martinez, new demands without signifying his acceptance of it.[21] He did so at last on the 21st of April, 1838, saying that the president was "anxious to avoid proceeding to extremities." The negotiations following resulted in a convention concluded on the 10th of September, 1838, by which it was agreed that all claims against Mexico should be referred to a mixed commission composed of two members appointed by each government, and for cases in which they could not agree the king of Prussia was requested to name an umpire.[22] Owing to delay in obtaining the consent of Frederick William III. to act as umpire, the convention had to be renewed, when it suffered slight modifications, the most important of which was that the awards were to be paid one half in cash, and the other half in treasury notes bearing eight per cent interest per annum, and receivable for customs duties. The date of the signing of the new convention was the 11th of April, 1839.[23]

It must not be inferred that among the claims there was not a considerable number founded on justice and equity; but not all of these were proper topics for national controversy. Still, some of them came within that category.[24] Had the United States government confined itself to these, and preferred its demands in a temperate manner, its course would have been in order, and Mexico could not rightly have refused their proper adjustment.

The mixed commission went into operation at Washington on the 17th of August, 1840,[25] and in about nine months, say to the 26th of May, 1841, had passed judgment upon every claim laid before it accompanied by the requisite vouchers. In February 1842 it ceased to act by virtue of the 18 months' limitation clause. The result was, that of the claims presented less than one fifth were allowed; three fourths were thrown out as spurious; others of the same fraudulent and speculative character, amounting to nearly three and a half millions, were not presented in time to be examined, even after the most unwearied efforts of the United States government to swell the demand against Mexico.[26] But adding for these one million, the outside estimate that they will bear with any degree of equity, Mexico was indebted to United States citizens about three millions, instead of nearly twelve millions as claimed. I give in a note a few samples of the claims.[27] The treaty of arbitration was a thorn in the flesh of many who had cast an evil eye on Mexico, as it did away with all pretexts for complaint against the latter republic, and postponed indefinitely the acquisition of Texas. Still they did not despair. Where strength on the one side and weakness on the other were so palpable; where success was certain if the issue could only be brought on; where all that stood in the way of magnificent plunder was some excuse for the deed — surely the Anglo-American mind should be fertile enough to produce such an excuse. The dissolution of the mixed commission by limitation left, as we have see, a large number of claims undecided. The United States government, therefore, had yet a pretext for continuing the diplomatic pressure upon Mexico. President Tyler, in March 1842, accredited to the latter government as minister Waddy Thompson, a slave-holder from South Carolina, who was anxious to see Texas annexed to his country.[28] The new representative found Mexican credit very low, the treasury notes being worth only thirty cents on the dollar. He succeeded by some means in negotiating, on the 30th of January, 1843, a new convention, under which Mexico agreed to pay on the 30th of April of that year all the interest then due, and the award itself in five years in equal quarterly instalments.[29] This arrangement has been represented as a boon to Mexico.[30] The fact is, that even by Thompson's showing the owners of the claims were anxious to make some other arrangement that would save them heavy loss in the acceptance of treasury notes, as they were bound to do under the last preceding convention.

The Mexican government paid the interest accrued, and decreed a forced loan collectible at periods corresponding to those stipulated in the agreement with the United States. The instalments for July and October 1843 and January 1844 were also paid; but whether for want of means or because the news came that Texas had been annexed to the United States, those for April and July 1844 were not covered. However, when it became known that the senate of the United States had rejected the annexation treaty, President Santa Anna ordered the payment of the 4th and 5th instalments, in cash, to Voss, the American government's agent, and his principal was duly apprised of it. It has been said, reflecting on Voss' good sense and integrity, that the government never received the cash; for instead of it, he had taken drafts, which were not honored, and he had given receipts for so much money.[31] After that, the objectionable arrangement having become an accomplished fact, Mexico paid no more instalments.[32]

The last understanding with the American plenipotentiary called for still more; it stipulated the negotiation of another arbitration treaty, one more comprehensive than the last; that is to say, a convention providing for the settlement of claims of the government and citizens of Mexico against the United States, as well as those of the latter government and its citizens against Mexico.-

The claims of Mexican citizens do not appear; but their government had several important ones. American vessels, captured by Mexican war ships for being engaged in contraband trade, had been forcibly rescued by United States cruisers; and even a Mexican national vessel, duly commissioned, had been taken and sent into a port of the United States.[33]

The treaty stipulated for by the convention of January 1843 was concluded in Mexico on the 20th of November; and under it a commission was to sit in Mexico — the Mexican government as a point of national pride, because the former one had met at Washington, made this a sine qua non — and the king of the Belgians, the choice of the United States minister, was to be the umpire. The United States senate, in utter disregard of the convention, only ratified the treaty with amendments, first striking out of it the right of each government to prefer before the commission any claims or complaints against the other — this point being considered 'strictly diplomatic' — and secondly, changing the place of meeting to Washington, thus ignoring the Mexican stipulation. The mutilated treaty, conditionally ratified, came back to Mexico, the government taking no further notice of it.[34] Hence the outcry of the friends of Texas that Mexico would not settle the claims against her, and President Polk's assertion that Mexico had thus violated a second time the faith of treaties by failing or refusing to carry into effect the sixth article of the convention of January 1843.[35] The subject was again before the United States congress in January 1844, when the president laid before the house information on the indemnity to be paid by Mexico.[36]

Mexico's efforts to maintain peace with the United States, by acceding to the settlement of claims on a just basis, only postponed the inevitable and predetermined war. The reader is informed of the unsuccessful attempts of the United States government to acquire by purchase the old province of Texas, which had been surrendered to Spain in 1819. The last expressed wish to this effect, as appears in a despatch to Joel R. Poinsett, its envoy to Mexico, was to obtain the cession of a much larger area, that is to say, the territory extending from the mouth of the Rio Grande along its eastern bank to the 37th parallel of latitude, and all north of that line to the Pacific Ocean.[37] Poinsett, however, aware that a proposition to that effect would be met with scorn, forbore even to make an overture for the purchase of Texas. The opposition of the Mexicans to all arrangements leading to the loss of national territory became more intensified from year to year. There were not wanting, nevertheless, representative men in Mexico willing to accede to the annexation of Texas to the United States rather than to see her an independent country, or under the control of England; for if a nation, other states of Mexico would unite with it willingly or by conquest; and if anywise connected with England, goods from the latter country would be smuggled through Texas into Mexico, to the ruin of Mexican manufactures and revenue. But the feeling finally culminated into a question not only of national pride, but of actual fear of the consequences that the alienation of Texas would entail.[38]

The Texan colonists had, however, from the earliest times desired to unite with the northern republic, a feeling which became intensified after their declared independence from Mexico. The slave-holders of the American southern states wanted no independent state there forming a barrier to the advance of their favorite institution. The Texans, on their side, in order to stimulate the desire of the slave-holders for annexation, a few days after declaring their independence, inserted in their constitution a clause giving the rights of citizenship to all white emigrants after a residence of only six months, and authorizing them to bring in their slaves, at the same time that the importation of slaves, except from the United States, was strictly forbidden.[39] Free negroes and mulattoes were required to leave the country within a short time, under penalty of being reduced to bondage.

The slave-holders, whose representative man at that time was Thomas H. Benton, senator from Missouri, thought of forming nine slave states out of Texas alone. But the Texans wanted to allure them with the prospect of a larger accession; and with that end in view, on the 19th of December, 1836, voted themselves the territory lying between the United States and the Rio Grande, from its source to its mouth.[40] The option of an independent nationality, or the consecration of that large domain to slavery through annexation to the United States, was submitted to the popular vote, and was decided in favor of the latter by 3,279 votes against 91. The slaveholders in the United States kept themselves well informed on these movements, and showed their alacrity to meet such manifestations half-way.

President Jackson despatched an agent to Texas to send reports upon the advantages of the country, in order to excite Americans to go there and take possession. His account of its political, military, and civil condition was laid before the Anemcan congress on the 22d of December, 1836, and was accompanied with remarks showing the policy pursued from the first by the American government toward Texas. It is said that the title of Texas to the territory she claimed was identified with her independence; that she asked the United States government to acknowledge that title by recognizing her independence, and then Texas, with a part of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, and New Mexico, might soon become integral portions of the United States. As Mexico would neither sell Texas nor allow herself to be provoked into a war, there was no recourse but to recognize the independence of Texas.

But the northern states were opposed to the acquisition of more slave territory, and it was necessary for the southern schemers to allay all suspicion that they were acting from interested motives. The president laid stress on the benefits to accrue from the recognition, but said that it must be postponed indefinitely. Prudence dictated this attitude till Mexico or some other power recognized the independence of the new nation, or at least "till the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond all cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty, and to uphold the government established by them." Mark the quoted words. Eight weeks after, namely, on the 1st of March, 1837, a majority in congress being secured, the lapse of time and course of events which the president contemplated in his message had come, the senate acknowledged the independence of Texas, and soon after the house passed a resolution to the same effect. Thus was Texas recognized as an independent republic. To Mexico's just protest, the United States government answered in effect that Texas as a sovereign state had the right to make herself independent if it suited her interests.[41] This was quite a different doctrine from that enforced at the mouth of the cannon by the northern United States against the Southern twenty-five years after. Of course it is right for a Mexican state to secede if the United States wants it, but it is very wrong for any of the states of the northern confederation to secede on any pretext whatsoever. It will be well to state here that Forsyth had on the 29th of May, 1836, assured Gorostiza that his government would adopt no resolution or decision on that question which was not founded on the same rules and principles that had guided its action in the dissensions between Spain and her American colonies. The department of state was now reminded of that declaration by Monasterio, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs, and asked if the Texans were in the same position that the Mexicans held toward Spain when the United States acknowledged Mexico's independence. Did the American government see the slightest point of similarity between a nation of upward of six million people, who by their unaided efforts had thrown off the yoke of Spain after a bloody struggle of eleven years, and a revolting "few thousand adventurers without country, without religion, without virtues, and without laws, menaced by a numerous army," etc.? The minister also alluded to Jackson's message of December 22, 1836, and in obedience to the orders of the executive makes known the solemn protest of Mexico before all civilized nations against the recognition of the "pretended republic of Texas," made by the United States.[42] General Tornel, minister of war of Mexico, in a speech before the congress of Mexico, accused the Americans of punic faith, reiterating his government's resolve to uphold its rights at all hazards, and ended with the words, "the Mexicans will conquer or cease to exist."

Soon after the recognition of Texas the United States accredited a diplomatic agent, named Alcée Labranche, to that government, and received an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary called Hunt, an American citizen until very recently, who in August 1837 proposed the annexation of Texas to the American Union. He found many obstacles in the way, the chief ones being that a treaty for its accomplishment would involve a war with Mexico, and that the requisite two-thirds vote in the senate for its ratification could not then be obtained. President Van Buren[43] was too shrewd a politician to risk its rejection and to jeopardize the popularity of his administration in the northern states. To decline the proposal for the time being would not affect him in the southern states. He trusted that by a dexterous management of the American claims against Mexico, the main obstacle to the annexation would soon be removed. In this he was disappointed, as we have seen that Mexico's offer to submit the matters in controversy to arbitration postponed for several years the maturity of that plan.

The independence of Texas was recognized by Great Britain and France, which powers immediately afterward sent their diplomatic representatives, the former Captain Elliot of Canton war fame, and the latter the comte Dubois de Saligny, who in after years became so notorious for his diplomatic trickery in Mexico.[44] These two nations well knew that Texan independence was but a preliminary step toward annexation to the United States. But it seems that certain of their statesmen allowed themselves to be carried away with the idea, partly inspired by the leading men of Texas with General Houston at their head, that the small party existing in the new republic who sincerely wanted a separate nationality, and looked to a not distant day when they could carry her boundaries to the Sierra Madre, would succeed in warding off the annexation. Elliot supported that party, among whose members the annexationists had agents; he even went to Mexico and tried to prevail on the government to grant Texas her independence.

Texas as one of the family of nations now enjoyed facilities for trade of which both her citizens and those of the United States availed themselves to the fullest extent; and it may well be supposed that war material greatly entered into it, to the further displeasure of the Mexican government. Hence its protest on the 12th of May, 1842, wherein the minister Bocanegra accused the American government of flagrant violations of the treaty of friendship between the two nations in allowing its citizens to afford personal and other aid to Texas, and even at public meetings and in other ways, to promote her annexation to the United States.[45] The Mexican minister asked if the United States could act in a more hostile manner toward his government short of actual war. This protest was reiterated on the 31st of May, Bocanegra expressing "regrets that, to judge from facts patent to all the world, the United States cabinet and authorities observe a conduct openly opposed to the most sacred rights of men and to the solemn pact of friendship existing between two nations." Repeating the charges of his previous note, he adds that the "countenancing of this toleration will be regarded as positively hostile to the republic." The matter was also formally brought to the attention of the other members of the diplomatic corps residing in Mexico. I epitomize in a note this circular, and the correspondence with Minister Thompson arising from it.[46] Bocanegra's first complaint was answered by the American envoy on the 5th of September, under instructions of July 8th and 13th from Secretary Webster. He sustained the right of the United States to promote trade with independent Texas,[47] though recognizing the right of Mexico, as a belligerent, to intercept all articles embraced within the term 'contraband of war.' He reminded the Mexican government that under the treaty of 1831 obstructions to legitimate trade were guarded against. As to neutrality toward the belligerents, the United States government had provided for its strict observance, and had heard of no enrolment of troops or equipment of ships. Giving or lending money by Americans, he contended, was perfectly legal, and as to the expression of opinion at public meetings on Texas affairs, American citizens enjoyed that privilege under the general laws of the United States. The American government also declared that the emigration to Texas consisted of men who in the exercise of their rights and free will changed their domicile and nationality; if such men went back to the United States and claimed American citizenship after serving a foreign country, then the government could take action respecting them, but not before.[48] The declaration that Mexico would regard aggressions by American citizens as a violation of the treaty of friendship between the two republics, he added, had greatly surprised his government, and its only answer thereto must be that Mexico was demanding what could not be conceded, and if she should break the peace she must abide the consequences. To Bocanegra's second note Thompson replied that the president of the United States considered his language and tone as highly offensive, implying as it did want of faith on the part of the American government. The latter would not, however, alter its course, which was one of impartial neutrality.

Bocanegra was evidently anxious to keep the peace, for on the 10th of September he accepted the declaration of the United States of their intention to observe a strict neutrality.

An incident occurred the same year that tended to widen the breach and increase the alarm of Mexico. This was the capture and surrender of Montercy in Upper California, by Commodore Thomas Ap C. Jones.[49]

The Texas question was one pregnant with disagreeable complications for Mexico. Projects being contemplated to introduce French and English colonists into Texas, under concessions of the Texan government, the secretary of foreign relations, on the 19th of April, 1843, notified the diplomatic corps that such immigrants would not be recognized by his government as bona fide settlers. To translate his own words, "They will be treated as real invaders and enemies of Mexico, . . . and will receive condign punishment;" that Mexican troops in Texas would accord to persons calling themselves consuls only the rights of foreign neutrals. The representatives of powers that had recognized Texas as a nation insisted on the right of their governments to accredit consuls in Texas, and of their citizens or subjects to settle in the country, holding Mexico amenable for any disrespect to their agents, or for injuries to the persons or property of their innocent subjects.[50] Apprehensions of a possible collision with Great Britain on the north-eastern boundary question no longer existing, the United States government resolved that the annexation of Texas should not be delayed, notwithstanding the opposition of a large element in the northern states.[51]

As early as the 23d of August, 1843, the Mexican government, on hearing that a proposition would soon be submitted to the deliberations of the congress of the United States to incorporate Texas with them, notified the American envoy, for the information of his government, that an act of annexation passed by that congress would be looked on by Mexico as a casus belli. This brought out an undiplomatic reply the very next day from Minister Thompson, warning the Mexican government against a repetition of such threats, which he considered incompatible with the respect due alike to his government and to that of Mexico. If intended for intimidation, he said, they would have no effect; and if as a warning, they were unnecessary. The American republic had its character in its own keeping, and needed no adınonition to save it from stain or dishonor. Bocanegra disclaimed any intention to threaten, and still less to provoke and excite; but resolved to use the right that no one could deny his country, that of regarding the annexation of Texas to the United States as a hostile act, involving a violation of international law, and particularly of the treaty of April 5, 1831, between the two governments. In protesting against the violation of her rights she fulfilled an obligation peculiar to her sovereignty and independence.

On the 13th of September, 1843, Mr Upshur, who had become President Tyler's secretary of state, informed the American minister in Mexico of his government's intention to demand from Mexico that she should either make peace with Texas or show her ability with respectable forces to prosecute the war.[52]

It is not clear why the government of the United States should take umbrage at Mexico's failure to wage an active warfare on its friends in Texas. Its animus in the effort to bully Mexico[53] into making peace with Texas appears revealed in Secretary Upshur's note of September 8th to Murphy, American diplomatic agent in Texas, wherein he speaks of a rumor about a scheme in England to furnish the Texan government with pecuniary means to abolish slavery, indemnifying the masters, and the lenders to receive for their money large tracts of land in Texas. Such an attempt, Upshur said, would be viewed with deep concern by the United States, and must be prevented.[54] Slavery in Texas was made a subject of discussion in the house of lords by Brougham in August 1843, when Aberdeen, secretary of foreign affairs, referring to the armistice then in force between the belligerents, hoped it would lead to the acknowledgment of Texan independence, adding that the British government would use its best endeavors to this end. Brougham made some remarks in answer to that speech, which were considered ominous by the slave interest in the United States.[55] British policy on the slavery question was well known in the United States. Great Britain was pledged to encourage the abolition of the slave-trade, and of slavery as far as her influence extended, and in every proper way. The American minister in London was assured, however, by Lord Aberdeen, in November 1843, in reference to Texas, that "the suggestion of England having made or intending to make the abolition of slavery the condition of any treaty arrangement with her was wholly without foundation."

On the 17th of October, 1843, Upshur proposed to Texas a treaty of annexation, and General Almonte, the Mexican minister,[56] on the 3d of November notified the state department that if the United States should commit the 'inaudito atentado' of appropriating to themselves an integrant portion of the Mexican territory he would demand his passports, and his country would declare war. Upshur in his replies deigned no explanation, and treated the Mexican declaration with scorn.[57] Things were now working well for the United States war clique.

The Texans at first did not show much eagerness to be annexed, which worried Upshur, who then began to use menacing language.[58] He endeavors to allay any apprehension the Texan government may have of a possible rejection by the United States senate of the treaty. He assures it that a clear majority of two thirds of that body is in favor of it — a most extraordinary assertion, indeed, which the result failed to sustain. A treaty of annexation was finally concluded,[59] and laid before the senate of the United States on the 22d of April, 1844, when it was rejected by a vote of thirty-five to sixteen. Steps had been also adopted to induce Mexico to assent to the arrangement.[60] While the treaty was under consideration in the senate, a force of about 1,150 men under General Zachary Taylor was stationed at Fort Jesup, near Natchitoches, and a strong naval force ordered to the gulf of Mexico, to guard American interests in Texas and to check Mexican attempts at reconquest. Taylor was directed, if any danger threatened Texas, to march with his force to the Sabine, but not to go beyond the frontier out further orders. He was to keep everything in readiness, however, for a possible campaign.

The failure to secure the senate's ratification of the treaty opened the eyes of the president and his cabinet to the necessity of removing obstacles. The chief argument relied on was that war had virtually ceased between Mexico and Texas. But the Mexican government was now roused to activity, and issued some threatening proclamations indicative of a purpose to subdue Texas. Though Mexican efforts to that end must prove abortive, yet the existence of active war would be an argument against annexation, and if annexation was carried out, the United States must needs be a party to the war. Hence, the American government resolved at once to remonstrate against a further prosecution of the war and against the sanguinary manner in which it was waged. Shannon, the present envoy, was instructed on the 14th of October to that effect, and lost no time in carrying out his instructions in a manner that left no doubt the United States were determined to utterly disregard Mexican rights to and over Texas. Mexico, in her exhausted condition, could resent the insult with words only, but they were dignified and truthful words, and grounded on honesty and common sense. The particulars of the correspondence between this minister and Manuel C. Rejon, the Mexican secretary, which brought on a suspension of diplomatic intercourse, are given in a note attached.[61] President Tyler keenly felt the rebuke inflicted on him by the Mexican foreign office, and while yet writhing under it, in his message of December 19th, to congress, confined himself to comments on "the extraordinary and highly offensive language which the Mexican government had thought proper to employ." He believed Mexico's conduct merited punishment; but abstained, as he said, through a sincere desire to preserve peace, from recommending any measures of redress, and simply urged "prompt and immediate action on the subject of annexation."

Tyler's term of office was near its close. His successor, Polk, had been nominated as the candidate of the democratic party, on the pledge to carry out the immediate annexation of Texas. The democrats of the north had been forced at the party's convention to accept his candidacy, and to submit to the demands of the slave-holders of the south. Polk was elected, and stood as the champion of Texas annexation, representing the national will on that point.

The former plan of annexing Texas by treaty, involving its ratification by a two-thirds vote of the senate under constitutional provision, was now abandoned, Tyler having discovered, as he and the supporters of annexation claimed, that the object in view could be accomplished by means of joint resolutions of the two houses of congress.[62] In short, the joint resolutions had been passed on the 1st of March, 1845, the senate leaving, however, to the president the option of effecting the annexation by resolution or by treaty,[63] which that functionary promptly availed himself of. A messenger was at once despatched with a letter from Secretary Calhoun to the American representative in Texas to propose the resolutions of annexation to the acceptance of the Texan government.[64] On the 4th of July Texas agreed to be annexed,[65] and on the 22d of December, 1845, she formally became a member of the American Union. The European governments which had recognized Texas as a nation, albeit they had endeavored to prevail on her to retain her independent status, made no objection to the change effected.[66]

It is almost needless to state that General Almonte, the Mexican minister, upon the official publication of the joint resolutions, on the 7th of March, demanded his passports after addressing a protest to the diplomatic corps at Washington against the spoliation thus decreed of his country's territory.[67] This was followed by a correspondence in Mexico between Secretary Cuevas and the American legation, in which the former signified the resolution of his government to close all relations with the United States, and therewith enclosed him his passports. The fact was also formally made known to the other foreign representatives.[68] The next step of the Mexican government was to announce the condition of affairs to the nation, summoning the people to take up arms in defence of their country's rights and honor.[69]

Measures were decreed to raise a large loan, in order to meet the expenses of the impending war.[70] Generals Arista, Paredes, and Gaona with their divisions, numbering together about 1,000 men, were ordered to the front. It was still hoped, notwithstanding these preparations, that war might be averted through foreign mediation or otherwise.

On the other hand, the American government thought proper to concentrate on the frontier of Mexico[71] all the disposable portion of the United States army. Arms, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds in considerable quantities were shipped for the same destination. A strong fleet was also despatched to the coast of Mexico. In one word, the military and naval departments used all necessary means to guard the Texan frontier, and to intimidate Mexico. The troops, however, had orders to stand on the defensive as long as they could fairly and properly do so, and not to commit or provoke any hostilities.[72] General Taylor accordingly encamped in June at Corpus Christi, ready to advance on the Rio Bravo.

Texas secured, Mexico exasperated, and diplomatic relations at an end, everything was now favorable to secure the war determined upon, and which would result in the acquisition of more valuable territory, including much-coveted California. But such a war, to be popular or even tolerated in the northern states of the American union, must be made to appear a war by the act of Mexico. It would be a fine stroke to pretend to further negotiation, or even conciliation, howsoever hypocritical they might be, and these failing, as care should be taken that they should fail, then Mexico might easily be provoked to strike the first blow. It would then be, on the part of the United States, a war of defence, not of aggression, and the national conscience would remain satisfied. This was the policy adopted by the administration of President Polk, and it met with the most infamous success.

Now for the first step, namely, renewing the negotiations. On the 13th of October, 1845, John Black, consul of the United States in the city, of Mexico, confidentially apprised Secretary Peña y Peña of the desire of the American secretary of state that the Mexican government should receive an envoy clothed with powers to arrange the questions pending between the two republics. Two days afterward Peña delivered Black a written reply of the 14th, saying that though the Mexican nation had been deeply injured by the acts of the United States in the department of Texas, his government was disposed to receive a commissioner clothed with powers to settle the present dispute[73] in a peaceful, reasonable, and decorous manner; and thus give a new proof that notwithstanding those injuries and its firm decision to exact adequate reparation, it would not repel with contumely peaceful overtures. The secretary did not agree to receive a minister fully empowered to adjust all questions in dispute, but expressly alludes to the dispute about Texas. His language refers to a commissioner, who was to come and offer — not demand — reparation for the alleged injury inflicted in Texas. Such seems to be the inference that should be drawn from his language, and yet the wording may have been intended to leave the Mexican government the option to reject an American minister, or to refuse entering with him into negotiations on other topics than Texas, if circumstances demanded such a course. If Peña's reply was intentionally equivocal, the American government, with equal diplomacy, accepted it as a full and explicit answer to Consul Black's question. Polk's government must have acted not only with its eyes open, but likewise with an ulterior and sinister design. It asked for no explanation, and hurried off John Slidell as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and gave him full powers to discuss and settle all disputed questions. That was three weeks before the meeting of congress, and before his confirmation by the senate.

There were two other suggestions, at least one of which was intended as a condition sine qua non, namely, that the American squadron stationed off Vera Cruz should retire, inasmuch as its presence there would degrade Mexico in receiving the commissioner, and at the same time place the United States in an equivocal position, apparently contradicting the vehement desire for conciliation, peace, and friendship that was offered and assured with words. Peña's other remark was that he hoped the United States would send a person "whose dignified deportment, prudence, and moderation, and the discreetness and reasonableness of whose proposals will tend to calm, as much as possible, the just irritation of the Mexicans." But care was taken by the Washington officials that the chosen agent should not be one who would in any wise attempt a calming influence.

The envoy arrived inopportunely at Vera Cruz, December 3, 1845, and Consul Black was asked to prevail on him to postpone his visit to Mexico, as he had not been expected before January, by which time the government hoped to receive the assent and approval of the departments, so as to be able "to proceed in the affair with greater safety."

The minister, however, addressed his first note to Secretary Peňa on the 8th of December in Mexico, accompanying his credentials, and though the fleet had not wholly retired, the correspondence began. The question of Slidell's reception having been submitted by the executive, for advice, to the council of government, that body decided on the 16th that he was not in duty bound to receive him in that capacity.[74] This solution of the point was written to Secretary Buchanan on the 20th, and also to Slidell; and to the latter were communicated in detail the grounds for the Mexican government's action. Slidell refused to transmit Peña's note to Buchanan because it was sealed. The American envoy again on the 24th addressed the department of relations, and in a long argument endeavored to charge the Mexican government with equivocation, and laid stress upon other matters that the United States required a settlement of, referring specially to pending claims of American citizens.[75] Prior to this a change of administration through revolution had occurred, and his last note aforesaid not having been answered, Slidell, from Jalapa on the 1st of March, 1846, tried to obtain a recognition from Joaquin Castillo Lanzas, who was now secretary of relations, and met with the same refusal as before.[76] After some further correspondence without any change in the government's resolution, Slidell demanded his passport, which was sent him on the 21st of March.[77]

Meantime, in the early part of the foregoing diplomatic imbroglio, Slidell having apprised the state department[78] that the Mexican government would probably refuse to treat with him except on the Texas question, all hope of acquiring California by peaceable negotiations now vanished, and at once orders were transmitted to General Taylor to march to the Rio Grande. The American government was bent on war, professedly for two causes: first, the injuries said to have been inflicted on American citizens, which were to be atoned for by Mexico with money; and second, the insults involved in the imputations of bad faith cast by the Mexican rulers on the government at Washington for its course in Texas. There were two other causes, which were kept in the background, the acquisition of California, and the desire to extend the area of slavery.

Cong. Globe, 1835-6, 24, index 33-4; 1836-7, 6, 12, 94; 1837, 8; 1837-8, 9, 21, app. 35-6; 1838-9, 15; 1839-40, 304, 368, 428, 431: 1841, pp. v., viii., extra, p. vi.: 1841-2, p. vi. app. 513; 1842-3, 30; 1844-5, 50, 64, 77, 127, 140, 200, 259, app. 1, 27, 101, 128; 1845, арp. 2; 1845-6, 1р. х.-хі., ххvii. app., passim; 1847-8, 4, 274; 1851-2, 100; Cong. Debates, 1834-5, i. 929-30; 1834-5, iii. 3493, 3593; 1836-7, i. 723-4, 854-7, 982, 986, ii. 1912-18, xiii. 723-4, 854-5, 982-6; Bustamante, Gabinete Mex., i. 10–12, 20-6, ii. 2-39; Id., Mem. Hist. Mex., ii.-iii. passim, iv. 82-4, 117; Id., Nuevo Bernal Diaz, i. 43-53, 71-2, 92-4, 105; Id., Hist. Sta Anna, 82, 272-4, MS., ii. 38; Id., Diario Mex., MS., xliv. 181, xlv. 53, xlvi. 69; Brook's Hist., 6-104; Rejon, Justific., 1-35; Ramsey's Other Side, 22-3, 28-9; Atocha's Statement: Jenkins' Mex. War, 256, 43-6, 64-9, 96-8; Маyer's Mеx. Аst., і. 331-3; Id. Мех. аs It Was, 311-12; Id., Hist. Мех. War, 26-32, 54-66, 76-84, 113-23; Roa Bárcena, Recuerdo, 1-31; Taylor's Broad Pennant, 201-22; Payno, Conven. Mex., 15; Fallejo, Col. Doc. Mex., ii. no. 333; Amer. Review, ii. 221-9, iii. 565-80, iv. 1-16, v. 217-30, 325-38, vi. 331; Ceballos, Vind. Méx., 47-77, 93-7, 129-35; Bolet. de Not., 1845, March 31, 1-2; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 639; Id., Hist. Jalapa, iii. passim; La Abeja, 1844, Oct.-Nov., 70-1, 119, 181; Falconer's On Discon. Miss., 55-9: Livermore's War with Mex., 5-30, 162-7, 187-200, 259-86; El Arco-Iris, Aug. 26, 1847, 1-2; Def. Integ. Nac., Nov. 16, 1844, 4; Monit. Constit., March-May 1845, passim; Hughes' Doniphan's Ex., 21; Otero, Ensayo Cuest. Polit., 9i-5; Young's Am. Statesman, 835-49; Id., Hist. Mex., 311, 323; Polk, Mensage, 1-53; Derecho Intern. Mex., 1st pt 180-93, 2d pt 154-63; Federacion y Texas, 13-39; Ariz., Howell's Cole, 460-72; Becher, Mex., 56-73; Gwin's Memoirs, 205-6; Claimants on Mex.; Crane's Past. etc. of Pacific, 63-4; Baldwin's Claim; Mex. Pamphlets, v.; Domenech, Hist. du Mex., ii. 192-8; Porter's Review Mex. War, 36-51; Viglietti, Reseña, 1-18; El Pabel. Nac., Oct.-Dec. 1844, passim; Cal. Star, April 3, 1847; The Californian, June 5, 1847; Amigo det Pueblo, July-Dec. 1845, passim; El Constit., April 16, 1841; Benton's Thirty Years View, ii. 639-49, 679-711; Id. Deb. in Congr., xv. 241, 487, 622, 664; Morse's Speech; Peterson's Mil. Heroes, ii. 26-9, 137-60; Hays' Scraps, Cal. Notes, v. 54; Holmes' Speech on Mex. War; Cartas de D. Valentin Gomez Farias; Doc. Hist. Mex., no. 14; Jay's Mex. War, 9-271; Méx., Corresp. sobre Paso del Sabina, 81-122; Id., Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 6-28; Id., Contest. Legac. Ext., 81-120; Id., Col. Leyes y Dec., 1840, 492-505; Id., Contestac. habidas, 3-11; Id., Dec. Min., 1845, no. 20; Id., Discus., Dict. sobre Tejas, 1-37; Id., Dict. Agreg. Tejas, 1-8; Am. Quart. Reg., i. 8-17, 38-84, 531-41; Gallatin's Peace with Mex., 5-14; Rivero, Méx. en 1842, 211-313; Southern Quart. Rev., ii. 107-12, xv. 83-113; Memor. Hist., Jan. 5, 17, 19, etc., 1846; Parker's Sermon Mex. War; Wood's Wand. Sketches, 302-1; Capron's Hist. Cal., 38; Mansfield's Mex., 27-30; Hansard's Parl. Rec., lxxxviii. 978-95; Parrott's Memorial, in Mex. Pamphl., v.; Thompson's Recoll. Mex., 222-9, 238-41, 279-304; La Minerva, April-May 1845, passim; Gutierrez Estrada, Méj. en 1840 y 1847, 1-55; Giddings' Speeches in Cong., 250-3; El Razonador, Jan. 19, 1848; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 178-93; Payo de N. Méj., Aug. 2, 1845, 4; Furber's Volunteer, 13-44, 272-4; Tribune Alm., 1847, 7-8, 17; 1848, 4-6; Webster's Speech, pp. 23, no. 29, in Mex. War Pamphl.; Corwin's Speech, no. 1, in Cong. Speeches, i.; Sumner's Orations, ii. 131-62, 186-95; Grattan's Civ. America, ii. 46-50; Escalera y Llana, Méx. hist.-descript., 81, 93; Mex., Claims on; Mex. War Pamphlets, nos 2, 3, 6, 813, 16-18, 21, 25, 27, 303; Green's Journal, 382-405; Guerra entre Méx. y los Est. Un., 1-28; Est. Un., 1-28; Santangelo's Memorial; Id., Claims on Mex.; Id., A Lesson to Mr Harding; Id., Address; Id., Charges against Velasquez de Leon; Mex. Treaties, ii. nos 10, 12; Montgomery's Life of Z. Taylor, 60-373; Ruxton's Advent., 301-6; Tejas, Dict. Com., 1-11; Id., Ult. Comunic., 1-22; Id., Supl., 1-30; Id., Com. Agreg. Est. Un., 3-30; Niles' Register, xlix. 334, 339-41, li. 225, 378, 400-13, index 'Mex'., lii. passim, liii 45-S, 96, 102, 273, 280, 385, liv. 147, 336, 385, 387, 407, 415, index 'Mex.,' lvi. 25-6, 213-14, 242, 318, 384, Ivii. 132, 180, index 'Texas', 'Mex'., lvii. 107, 218, 274, 305, 370, 338, index 'Texas,' 'Mex'., lix. 97, lx. 33, 130, 337, index 'Mex'., lxi. 11, 14-15, 37, 53, 395, 412, lxii. passim, lxiii. 3-4, 51, 83, 227, 242, 1xiv. 51, lxv. 204-8, lxvi.-lxxi. passim, lxxii. 58-9; Tornel, Tejas Est. Un., 79-80; El Tiempo, Jan. 21-5, March 9, 22, April 23, 1846; Ripley's War Mex., i. 43-84, 496-510; Semmes' Service Afloat, 41-67; Robinson's Mex. and Her Mil., 304-12; Shackford's Citizen's Appeal, 3-40; Méx., Mem. Guerra, 1846, 1-43, annexes 1-17; Id., Mem. Min. Rel., 1838, 10-14; 1839, 6-8; 1841, 11-14; 1844, passim; 1845, 16-22; 1846, passim; 1847, 1-60, doc. 13-26; 1850, 6-10; Chih., Represent., 8, 10; Paredes y Arrillaga, Manif., 1-19; Repub. of U. S., 77-99, 101-12, 212-17, 236-58, 288; Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 251-2, 257-8, 262-73; Peña y Peña, Comunic., 1-35; Arrillaga, Rerop., 1837, 391-2, 399; Dublan and Lozano, Legis. Mex., ii. 411, iii. 392, 712-16; Pap. Varios, lxxx. pt 8, lxxxv. pt 15, lxxxvi. pts 1, 8, xcix. pts 1, 2, cvii. pt 1, cxcviii. pt 4; U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 24, Ses. 2, Sen. 1, vol. i., pp. 4-5, 26-105; 160, vol. ii., pp. 1-170; 189, vol. ii., passim; H. Jour., 354-5; H. Com. Rept, 281, vol. ii.; H. Ex. 105, 139, 281; Id., Cong. 25, Ses. 2, H. Ex., 3, pp. 6-8, 31-164, vol. i.; 75, vol. ii.; Id., Cong. 26, Ses. 1, Acts and Resol., 22 3, 111-18; H. Ex. 2, p. 6, 190, vol. iv.; Id., Cong. 27, Ses. 1, Sen. 61; Id., Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Jour., 554; H. Jour., 855, 1189; H. Com. Rept, 1096, vol. v.; H. Ex. 291, vol. v.; Sen. 320, vol. iv., 411-12, vol. v.; Id., Cong. 27, Ses. 3, H. Ех. 2, p. 5-6, 144-55, vol. i.; Sen. 1, pp. 146-57, vol. i.; H. Jour., 18; Id., Cong. 28, Ses. 1, Sen. Jour., 10-12; H. Jour., 167-8, 198, 402; Sen. Com. Rept, 70; H. Com. Rept, 151, vol. i.; Sen. 341, 349, 350, 351; 11. Ех., 2, pp. 26-48, vol. i.; Id., Cong. 28, Ses. 2, H. Jour., pp. 154-5, index 'Mex. Claims;' Sen. Jour., 108, 134, 142, 189, 248; Id., Sen. 81, pp. 1-26; H. Ex. 2, 19, 158; Id., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 2, 196; Id., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4; Id., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, 83.

  1. J. Q. Adams said it was not only Texas the U. S. wanted, but the whole course of the Rio del Norte, and five degrees of latitude across the continent to the Pacific.
  2. Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 37.
  3. A full copy of Secretary Forsyth's despatch, dated July 20, 1836, to Minister Ellis, appears in Niles' Reg., xi. 409-10.
  4. Forsyth, in the despatch above mentioned, uses these words: "The department is not in proof of all the circumstances of the wrong done in the above cases, as represented by the aggrieved parties.' The government deemed it expedient to prefer the complaints then, and to seek afterward for proof. The Mexican minister of foreign affairs said that the number, character, and dates of the claims show that the U. S. govt was actuated by hostile sentiments, and assured congress that few of them were just. Méx., Mem. Min. Relaciones, 1838, 10, 11, 14.
  5. 1. Doctor Baldwin, an American, had in 1832 some unjust judgments passed against him in the Mexican courts, and on one occasion, because of an altercation between him and a magistrate of Minatitlan, he was put in the stocks. Baldwin resisted and attempted to escape, fell, and injured his leg. He was seized, returned to the stocks, and afterward imprisoned. Baldwin's Claim, in Mex. Pamph., v. denied the right, which he probably used, of recourse to a superior court. 2. The American vessel Topaz was chartered by the Mexican government in 1832 to convey troops. The master and mate were murdered by the soldiers, the crew imprisoned, and the vessel seized and used in the Mexican service. The Mexican version of this affair was that the crew attempted to steal some money which was on board, to which effect they had planned to kill the Mexican force and then abandon the vessel. After throwing Captain Ryder overboard, and having the soldiers below under the hatches, they tried to murder the two Mexican officers. Their plan failed; their leader, the mate, was wounded, and they themselves were secured. The crew endeavored to palım It does not appear that Baldwin was ever off their crimes on the Mexicans. Two American shipmasters who afterward visited that coast, and investigated the case, decided it against the crew. In 1832 the Mexican officers in Tabasco seized the steamboat Hidalgo and schooner Constitution, both the property of the American Leggett. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 83. It appears, according to the Mexican account, that Leggett had special privileges from the government of Tabasco, burdened with the condition, willingly assumed by himself, to convey free of charge Mexican troops when such service should be needed. He was, however, paid for one transportation $1,433. The steamboat afterward foundered when not in the government's service, owing to the bad state of her hull and excessive lading. This was decidedly a case for a court to adjudicate, and not for diplomatic interference. 4. The Brazoria was seized by John Austin, military commandant at Brazoria in Texas, and used for an expedition against Anáhuac. She was damaged and her owner received no compensation. The facts of the case were that Austin was a Texan rebel. The owner abandoned his vessel under protest; afterward the judicial authority declared her unseaworthy, and she was sold at auction. The government long before had ordered the proceeds to be paid to the owner, but he never applied for them. 5. Captain MacKeigé was imprisoned and heavily fined in 1834. The government disapproved the proceedings, and ordered the revenue official and judge arrested for trial to compel them to pay MacKeigé the damages he sustained at their hands. 6, 7, 8, and 9 are cases of vessels engaged in carrying contraband of war, or accused of violating the revenue laws. 10. Two Americans were in 1836 temporarily detained in Matamoros, on suspicion that they were on their way to join the Texan rebels; a mare and two mules were taken out of the yard of the house where they were arrested, which happened to be the American consul's. As soon as they produced their passports they were released, and the animals were returned to them. An apology was made to the consul for the ignorance of the soldiers in entering his house to make the arrest. 11, 12, 13, and 14 were complaints for acts of subordinates, unauthorized by the supreme government, and which caused no injury, pecuniary or otherwise, to any one. 15. The American vessel Northampton was wrecked in 1836, near Tabasco, and being taken possession of by custom-house officers and soldiers, more than half her cargo was pillaged or lost by them. The attempt by Mexican local authorities to save the vessel and cargo was certainly in order. If the wreckers committed crimes on board, the injured parties had free action to lay their complaints before the courts. Bustamante, Gabinete Mex., ii. 27-31; Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 36-9, 43-5.

    William Jay. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican War. The author aimed — regardless of considerations prompted by so-called patriotism, and national glory and prosperity — to furnish all the facts connected with the acquisition, by the United States, of Texas and other Mexican territory. He also endeavored to show the dishonest devices that were resorted to for the accomplishment of the preconcerted plan; and to excite abhorrence for that kind of statesmanship which, upholding the maxim that 'all is fair in politics,' seeks to aggrandize a country in defiance of the laws of justice and equity. Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the author's conclusions, his facts are incontrovertible.

  6. 1. The American consul at Tampico had been, on the 26th of May, 1836, summoned by the authorities to authenticate certain papers, and on his refusal had been threatened with imprisonment. To which the government had answered it was ignorant of the whole matter and would investigate it. 2. The American vessel Peter V. Vroom being wrecked on the coast in June 1836, the American consul had the cargo brought to Vera Cruz, where the consignees abandoned it to the underwriters. There being no agent of the latter in the place, the court appointed one, who sold the cargo, and the demand of the consul to have the proceeds turned over to him was refused. The Mexican government said to this that the court had acted right, and that the American consul had no authority in the premises. 3. Certain judicial proceedings concerning the American brig Aurora had been denied the consul. The government answered that the consul could have had an authenticated copy of all the papers, but he had refused to pay the legal fees charged for making it. 4. The American vessel Bethlehem was seized by a Mexican armed vessel on the 2d of September, 1836, the crew detained 20 days, and then landed, the vessel being confiscated, and the master refused a copy of the proceedings. The government in Mexico had not heard of the affair, and promised to investigate. 5. The American vessel Fourth of July had been taken charge of by Mexican soldiers. The facts of this case, as the Mexicans represented them, were that the vessel was built for the Mexican government. The agent hat contracted before a notary public for the sale, but a party of soldiers had been sent on board previous to the delivery of the bill of sale. The owner had been paid for his vessel and made no complaint. Forsyth on hearing of this case directed Ellis, Dec. 9, 1836, not to insist, of course, on the restoration of the vessel, but 'only to demand satisfaction for the insult offered to the American flag.'
  7. Mayer's Hist. Mex. War, i. 29-30; Niles' Reg., li. 225, lii. 4.
  8. 9
  9. The matter was referred by the American president to congress on the 5th of Dec. 1837, together with the list of claims against Mexico. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 25, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 3, pp. 6-8, 31–164, vol. i.; Niles' Reg., li. 410-11.
  10. In 1839 by Gorostiza himself, when he was secretary of foreign relations. Rivera, Hist, Jalapa, iii. 200, 317.
  11. Of Feb. 6, 1837. Cong. Debates, 1836–7, xiii. 723-4; U. S. Govt, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Journ., 354-5, Sen. Doc., 160, pp. 1-170.
  12. Upon another demand thereof, made on board one of our vessels of war on the coast of Mexico.' U. S. Govt, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 105 and 139; Niles' Reg., li. 378.
  13. The committee of foreign affairs in the house declared that the U. S. would be justified in taking redress; that of the senate was equally hostile. U. S. Govt, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 281, pp. 1-4, H. Comm. Rept, 281, vol. ii., Sen. Doc. 189, vol. ii.; Cong. Debates, 1836-7, i. 723-4, 854-7, 982, 986, ii. 1912-18; Cong. Globe, 1836-7, 6, 12, 94; 1837, 1-8.
  14. Mexican Company, Baltimore, 1816; amount not given. This association furnished Gen. Mina with means to invade New Spain, which they asserted had never been paid. Mrs Young, 1817; sum not stated. She was the widow of Col Guilford Young, one of Mina's companions killed in action in Mexico that year. The claim was probably for arrears of pay. These two demands were for revolutionary services against Spain, with whom the U. S. and their citizens were at the time at peace, several years before her domination over Mexico had ceased. John B. Marie, 1824; amount not given; for goods seized on being imported contrary to a Mexican law of which the claimant pretended ignorance J. E. Dudley and J. C. Wilson, for property robbed from them by Comanches on their return from a trading expedition to Mexico; sum not stated. U. S. Govt, Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 139, in Mex. Treaties, ii. no. 1.
  15. J. Q. Adams said: 'And who was this minister of peace to be sent with the last drooping twig of olive to be replanted and revivified in the genial soil of Mexico? It was no other than Powhatan Ellis of Mississippi, famishing for Texas, and just returned in anger and resentment from an abortive and abruptly terminated mission to the same government. His very name must have tasted like wormwood to the Mexican palate.'
  16. The messenger was instructed to remain in Mexico one week. Rep. of Cong., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, iv.
  17. The courier reached Mexico July 20, 1837. As a specimen of the new claims, I give the following: In 1829, as the reader knows, a Spanish army under Brigadier Barradas invaded the republic of Mexico at Tampico. It destroyed a printing-press said to be the property of an American citizen. Eight years after Mexico was for the first time told that she was held responsible for what her enemies had done in time of war.
  18. The anxiety of the Mexican government was 'not to delay the moment of that final and equitable adjustment which is to terminate the existing difficulties between the two governments;' and that nothing 'should be left undone which may contribute to the speediest and most equitable termination of the subjects which have so seriously engaged the attention of the United States;' that the 'Mexican government would adopt, as the only guides for its conduct, the plainest principles of public right, the sacred obligations imposed by international law, and the religious faith of treaties;' and that 'whatever reason and justice may dictate respecting each case will be done.' The American government was further assured that the decision in each case would be communicated to it by the Mexican legation at Washington. U. S. Govt, Cong. 25, Ses. 2, vol. viii. passim; Mayer's Hist. War Mex., i. 29-30. The president in his message of Dec. 8, 1846, referring to the steps taken in July 1837, said that Mexico gave solemn assurances, and yet again delayed, and the moderation of the United States only complicated the difficulties. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2,. . Doc. 4,. 3-8.
  19. It was authorized by the act of the Mcxican congress of May 20, 1837. The minister was appointed May 23d. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., iii, 392; Arrillaga, Recop., 1837, 399; Niles' Reg., lii. 309, 354. .
  20. Owing, it seems, to a misapprehension on his part that the proposal had been at an earlier date made to the U. S. cabinet.
  21. Four months were allowed to elapse. When the public heard of the Mexican offer, petitions came from all quarters to congress to accept.
  22. The board was to meet at Washington three months after the exchange of ratifications, and to sit not over 18 months. It was left to the option of the Mexican government to effect payments in government stock having in London a value equal to the award.
  23. For instance: American vessels taken with contraband of war on board, and condemned by the Mexican admiralty courts. The contraband of war was liable to forfeiture; but the vessels themselves, and such portions of their cargoes as were not of a contraband nature, were by treaty exempt from condemnation. Art. xvi. of treaty of April 5, 1831.
  24. Ratified by Mexico, Jan. 11, 1840; by the U. S., April 6th. The exchange of ratifications was published in Mexico, June 2d. The Spanish and English texts may be seen in Méx., Derecho Intern., 1st pt, 180-9; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., iii. 712-16; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1840, 492-505; Mayer's Hist. War Mex., i. 31-2; U. S. Govt, Cong. 25, Ses. 1, Acts and Resol., 111-18, 122–3, H. Ex. Doc., vol. iv. passim.
  25. The American commissioners were William L. Marcy and John Rowan, with John Demitri as secretary; on the part of Mcxico, Pedro Fernandez del Castillo and Joaquin Velazquez de Leon, with Lúcas Palacio y Margarola as secretary. The umpire was the baron de Roenne, Prussian minister at Washington. Méx., Mem. Min. Relaciones, 1841.
  26. Total amount of claims presented. $11,850,578
    Amount of claims presented too late for adjudication. 3,336,837
    $8,513,741
    Referred to umpire and undecided for want of time. 918,627
    Amount of claims adjudicated. $7,595,114
    Rejected by commissioners and umpire. 5,568,975
    Allowed by commissioners and umpire. $2,026,139

    Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 418; U. S. Govt, Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Doc., vol. iv. passim, H. Comm. Rept, 1096, vol. v.; Id., Cong. 27, Ses. 3, H. Journ., 18; Brook's Hist., 13-22; Mayer's Hist. War Mex., i. 31-2. The president on Aug. 9, 1841, said to congress, with reference to certain reflections cast on the Prussian umpire, that the government had no complaint to make against him. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 27, Ses. 2, Sen. Journ., 554.

  27. Orazio de Atellis Santangelo, a school-master, writer, and printer, of whose unjustifiable expulsion from Mexico I spoke in an early chapter of this work, after that act settled in New Orleans, and in due time became a naturalized citizen of the U. S. After a while he presented through the U. S. govt a demand against Mexico for $398,690 for damages. The Mexican commissioners denied that anything was due; the U. S. com. allowed $83,440; the umpire cut the sum down to $50,000. On what grounds the United States government demanded an award for a person who was not an American citizen at the time the claim originated was not made to appear. Santangelo afterward published several papers against the U. S. govt, in one of which he employs his terrible satire against President Polk for having 'defrauded the U. S. claimants on Mexico out of their money.' He also preferred before the president of the U. S. accusations against the Mexican members of the commission. There was also a memorial of his to the American congress in 1846. Mex. Treaties, ii. no. 12. Rhoda McCrae claimed $6,694 for a pension for her son killed in the Mexican service. It was allowed by the American commissioners, disallowed by the Mexican, and rejected by the umpire. Sophia M. Robinson claimed for services rendered by her husband in Mexico, when a dependency of Spain in 1817, $16,000, and as much more for interest. Rejected bodily by the umpire. John Baldwin claimed for a trunk of wearing apparel seized by the Mexican custom-house officials, principal and interest, $1,481, allowed by the American commissioners; undecided by the umpire. There was one claim for 56 doz. bottles of porter, original cost and six years' interest, $8,260! Even Mr Pendleton, member of congress from Virginia, called such claims utterly ridiculous. A Texan land company wanted $2,154,604; a certain man demanded $690,000 for erroneous decisions against him in Mexican courts, etc. Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 72-3; U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 27, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 21.
  28. He had as a member of congress made a motion in favor of annexation as soon as it should be consistent with the treaty stipulations of the government. This naturally rendered him offensive to the Mexicans, and for that reason he was not a fit person for the appointment. Bustamante had no good opinion of his character or course; and with his usual venom accuses him of being a spy rather than a minister, and a flatterer of Santa Anna's. Hist. Gen. Santa Anna, MS., ii. 38.
  29. Méx., Derech. Intern., 1st pt, 189-93; Thompson's Recoll. Mex., 229, app. 279-304. The interest due was about $270,000. The quarterly instalments were to begin the same day. To secure the payments the direct taxes were hypothecated. Méx., Mem. Min. Rel., 1841, xcvii.-c. 8; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, i. 507-9; Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 257-8; U. S. Govt, Cong. 28, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 158, in Mex. Treaties, ii. no. 6.
  30. Rept of C. J. Ingersol, chairman of comm. of Foreign Af., June 24, 1846.
  31. This has been denied by Minister Thompson, who speaks in high terms of Voss' business ability and integrity; he says that only a small portion of the two last instalments was not paid until perhaps a month after it was due, and the money was immediately sent to Vera Cruz, and shipped thence as soon as it could be counted. Recol. Mex., 225.
  32. On the 30th of January, 1846, eight instalments and two years' interest were due. Young's Hist. Mex., 323; Santangelo, Memorial, in Mex. Treaties, no. 12.
  33. On the 1st of Sept. 1835, the Correo, a revenue cutter commanded by Lieut Thomas Thompson, was captured by an American armed vessel aided Ly a Texan steamboat, for interfering with smugglers, and sent for adjudication to New Orleans. The captors were accused of robbing the cutter's papers and her officers' property. The officers and men were kept in jail for some time in New Orleans, and there tried on the charge of piracy preferred by the captors; but the vessel, officers, and crew were released. No satisfaction or indemmity was given them, however, on the ground that the officers had not established their status. This decision was given in the face of their declarations that their papers had been taken from them, and of the Mexican consul's assurance that the Correo was a revenue vessel, and her officers and men servants of his government. Report of Thompson's Trial, 3-44. In Nov. 1835, an expedition was openly fitted out in New Orleans to commit hostilities against the Mexican government, and landed in the Tampico River. Niles' Reg., xlix. 339-40. Another cause of complaint, and a very serious one, was the invasion of Mexican territory by U. S. forces in 1836. Again, the Mexican squadron captured two American schooners engaged in conveying contraband goods to the Texans, then at war with Mexico, and taken into Matammoros. This act was in perfect accord with articles 18th and 20th of the treaty of 1831. The American corvette Natchez then arrived at the bar and demanded, on the 16th of April, 1837, their surrender, which being refused by the commander on the frontier, she retook one of the schooners, and made a prize of the Mexican war brig General Urrea. The latter was afterward ordered to be released at Pensacola. Id., lii. 163, 193, 204-5, 209, 249, 289. That act of the corvette was a deliberate infraction of the 3d clause in the 34th article of the treaty of 1831. The Mexican government with good reason was indignant at such proceedings, but exercising a wise moderation in its efforts to avert a conflict, ordered the release of the schooners, and of the bark Anne Eliza that had been detained at Vera Cruz. Id., lii. 209, 228. 362. U. S. Govt, Cong. 25, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doc. 75, vol. ii.; Bustamante, Gabinete Mex., i. 10-12; Méx., Mem. Min. Relaciones, 1838, 11-14; Tornel, Tejas y Est. Unidos, 79-80. Later, on the 24th of June, an American squadron of one frigate and four sloops of war, under Commodore Dallas, called at Sacrificios, and the commodore demanded of Castro, the comandante general, an assurance, such as had been given him by Gen. Filisola at Matamoros, that there should be no more attempts against American merchantmen; otherwise he would adopt efficacious measures to deprive the Mexican squadron of tho means of annoying American commerce. Gen. Castro, without manifesting a hostile spirit, replied that neither he nor Gen. Filisola could give such assurances, as they were of the exclusive province of the supreme government. Niles' Reg., lii. 362-3. Dallas then wrote back on the 28th, saying that he would leave on the Mexican coast a sufficient naval force to protect American commercial interests from future Mexican aggressions. Bustamante, Gabinete Мех., i. 20-6.
  34. As originally made, it had been ratified by Mexico on the 24th of Nov. 1843. Méx., Derecho Intern., 2d pt, 154-66; Thompson's Recol. Mex., 225-7.
  35. Polk's message to congress, Dec. 8, 1846, p. 6.
  36. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 28, Ses. 1, H. Journ., 167, 198; Id., Cong. 28, Ses. 2, Sen. Journ., 134, 248.
  37. Including Texas and the largest and best portion of California, together with the port of San Francisco. Official correspond. in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 25, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 42.
  38. President Santa Anna said it would be like signing the death-warrant of Mexico; for the U. S. would gradually take one after another of the Mexican departments till they had them all. Thompson's Recol. Mex., 233-9.
  39. This offered to the slave-breeders of the U. S. a monopoly which they failed not to take advantage of. The desire of the slave interest in the U. S. became an anxiety when the young republic entered later into a treaty with England for the suppression of the African slave-trade. The slave-holders were greatly alarmed at the idea that a time might come when Texas, if left to herself, would decree the abolition of slavery. That fear was shared in by some of the Texan leaders; for even at the latest day, preceding the annexation, though the anti-slavery party was in the minority, the fact could not be disregarded that the majority of the people of Texas were not slave-owners, and that ere long the number of opponents to slavery would be increased by immigration from Europe. The idea of emancipation was an alarming one; whereas, on the other side, annexation was deemed of the highest importance to give stability and safety to slavery, and 'thereby save them forever from the unparalleled calamities of abolition.' Mirabeau Lamar's Letter, in Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 87-8.
  40. Taking in parts of Coahuila and Tamaulipas and New Mexico. According to the report of Henry M. Morfit, special agent of the U. S., the boundaries claimed by Texas extended from the mouth of the Rio Grande, on the east side, up to its head waters, thence on a line due north until it intersected that of the U. S.; thence to the Sabine, and along that river to its mouth, and from that point westwardly with the gulf of Mexico to the Rio Grande. The political limits of Texas proper, previous to her revolution, were the Nueces on the west, along the Red River on the north, the Sabine on the east, and the gulf of Mexico on the south. It had been the intention of the Texan government, immediately after the victory of San Jacinto, to have claimed from the mouth of the Rio Grande along its course to lat. 30°, and thence west to the Pacific. It was, however, discovered that this would not strike a convenient point on the California coast, that it would be difficult to control a wandering population so distant, and that the territory now determined upon would be sufficient for a young republic. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 24, Ses. 2, H. Ех. Doc. 35, vol. ii.
  41. See Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 262.
  42. José María Ortiz Monasterio's note bears date of March 21, 1837. His protest involves the following points: that the acknowledgment complained of could in no manner whatever weaken, diminish, or compromit the rights of Mexico to the territory of Texas, nor her right to employ every means in her power to recover that territory. A translation of the note is given in Niles' Reg., lii. 248-9.
  43. Ycleped the 'old fox,' and more specially the 'northern man with southern principles.'
  44. The Mexican minister of foreign affairs refers on the 31st of Jan. 1840, to the provisional declarations of the French government relative to its recognition of Mexico's independence from Spain, adding that no such dilatoriness was observed in acknowledging Texan independence from Mexico. Existing ties of friendship were as naught; and in the same manner was the fact ignored that Texan population and resources as compared with those of Mexico were insufficient. Without giving Mexico any prior notice, France recognized Texas and made a treaty of amity and commerce with her. Méx., Mem. Relaciones, in Diario del Gob., May 20, 1840.
  45. Corroborative documents accompanied the protest.
  46. The note to the legations of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia explained Mexico's good faith toward the U. S., and complained of the aid afforded, against her rights, in men, arms, and money, to the Texan rebels. The American envoy, Waddy Thompson, then, on the 6th of June, also addressed his colleagues a note denying the allegations of the Mexican government. He argued, quoting Vattel and the treaty with Mexico, that American citizens had a right to send war material to either belligerent, though such material was liable to seizure by the other. He concluded saying that though the U. S. looked on war without cause as the greatest of crimes, they would not shrink from it if necessary to uphold their rights and great principles. Bocanegra, on the 6th of July, objected to Thompson's circular, claiming that the American legation should have waited till the answer from the secretary of state had come. Referring to the oft-repeated charges, he said that his govermment expected that contraband trade would occur, but had a right to object to its being countenanced by the U. S. government, as such a course, on the part of the latter, rendered it as guilty as the offenders themselves. Bocanegra insisted on the fact that the Texan rebels for a long time past had openly kept an agency in New Orleans; that Texan war vessels were built and repaired in the U. S.; that the proclamation of the Texan president calling for the aid of Americans had been published; that a commission bad been recruiting men and procuring supplies openly in New Orleans; that the legislatures of Louisiana and Kentucky, and members of the national congress, had urged war against Mexico. The two war vessels claimed to have been allowed to leave the U. S. for Mexico to fight against Texas were despatched as American vessels with regular papers, and after full guaranties had been furnished; and yet they had been detained at the moment of sailing, and only unwillingly permitted to sail. But Texan vessels publicly recruited and refitted at New Orleans to cruise against Mexican trade and to wage war against Mexican ports. Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1844, xli.-lxii.; Bustamante, Diario Mex., MS., xlv. 53; U. S. Govt., Cong. 27, Ses. 8, Sen. Doc. 1, pp. 146-57, vol. i., H. Ex. Doc. 1, pp. 144-55, vol. i.; Thompson's Recoll. Mex., 284-303; Niles' Reg., lxii. 305, 318-19, 321, 326-9, 333.
  47. Secretary Webster received Bocanegra's first note on the 29th of June, and his second on the 9th of July. Thompson's despatches, and a copy of his answer to Bocanegra's circular to the diplomatic corps, reached the state department at Washington about the 3d of July.
  48. Mexico was reminded that when she was fighting against Spain she received all who came to her standard from the United States or Europe, and that in her warfare against Texas, before 1836, an American held high command in the Mexican army stationed in that country. The constitution and laws allowed no interdiction of legal trade or emigration to Texas. Should the emigrant, however, enlist there he would be no longer entitled to American protection, as the government of the U. S. must look on Texas as a foreign independent nation.
  49. Bocanegra's two notes, having been published in a Mexican journal, fell at Callao into the commodore's hands, together with a Boston newspaper, copying from another of New Orleans a false rumor of British interference, to the effect that Mexico had ceded California to Great Britain for seven million dollars. The commodore, from the tenor of those notes, jumped at the conclusion that Mexico had declared war against the United States; and there being at the time in the Pacific three British war-ships, of whose business he had obtained no knowledge, he thought they were going to take possession of the supposed recent purchase. Jones resolved to be before them, and sailed for the coast of Mexico. Reaching Monterey, the capital of California, on the 19tih of Oct., and finding the territory still under the Mexican flag, without more ado he took formal possession of the place on the next day, only to discover his error one day later, and to find himself obliged to restore the Mexican flag, with an apology for his proceeding. The American government of course disavowed the commodore's act; but Mexico's demand for his punishment was disregarded. She was told that he had 'intended no indignity.' Bustamante, Diario Mex., MS., xlvi. 69. Full details given in Hist. Cal., this series.
  50. Doyle, British chargé, said on the 20th that his government having acknowledged Texan nationality, British consuls and subjects must be respected by Mexico. The French legation took the same view. Spain and Prussia not having recognized Texas, their representatives referred the subject to their respective superiors. The American minister said that the U. S. claimed no rights over those who had joined the Texan army or become citizens of Texas; but could not accept the declaration as far as it related to American consuls who had to reside in the country to protect American citizens and trade. Bocanegra, on the 27th of May, wrote the British chargé that only persons in arms or plotting against Mexico would be treated as enemies; but Mexico could not hold herself responsible for injury to others that had entered Texas fully aware of the effects of the unavoidable struggle. Consuls, if not found aiding the rebels, would be treated as neutrals; for to recognize then as foreign officials would involve the recognition of Texas. To the French minister he said that land grants by the Texan government would be looked upon as invalid. Doyle replied on the 7th of June, hoping that Mexican troops would respect the property and persons of peaceable residents, or his government would claim indemnity for innocent parties injured. The French minister said the same, with this addition, namely, that he had instructions to represent to Mexico the bad effects of her disregard of popular rights in Texas, and to seek their recognition. Bocanegra then, on the 11th of July, 1843, informed the French envoy that the Mexican troops would respect the property of foreigners, but not any grants obtained from the Texan authorities, inasmuch as they were usurpations from Mexico. He declared that Mexico was forbearing in war, though false reports represented her as cruel. Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1844, lxxi.-lxxxvi.
  51. The southern slave-holders were now so determined that at the close of the session of congress in March 1843 a number of its members, headed by J. Q. Adams, issued an address of warning to the American people against the plans of annexation for extending the area of slavery, which might even bring on a dissolution of the Union; at the same time pointing out the gross infringement of treaty obligations toward Mexico, involved by those plans. Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 88.
  52. Upshur's predecessor had endeavored to bring about a settlement of the war. In Jan. 1843 he directed the American envoy to use his good offices with the Mexican secretary to mitigate the animosity of his government. He did not doubt Mexico's right to subjugate Texas if she could do so by the common and lawful means of war; but other states — specially the United States — were interested, 'not only in the restoration of peace between them, but in the manner in which the war shall be conducted, if it shall continue.' The envoy was directed to use these suggestions at the time, and was likewise informed that 'it is in the contemplation of this government to remonstrate in a more formal manner with Mexico, at a period not far distant, unless she shall consent to make peace with Texas, or shall show the disposition and ability to prosecute the war with respectable forces.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 28, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 271, p. 69, 2, pp. 26-48; Mayer's Hist. War Mex., i. 55-6.
  53. The purity of the motives of our government became open to suspicion.' Gallatin's Peace with Mex., 9.
  54. It cannot be permitted to succeed without most strenuous efforts on our part to avert a calamity so serious to every part of our country. Few calamities could befall this country more to be deplored than the establishment of a predominant British influence, and the abolition of domestic slavery in Texas.' Murphy replied, assuming the liberty to give his superior what he considered a little wholesome advice; nothing should be said 'which can offend even our fanatical brethren of the north; let the United States espouse at once the cause of civil, political, and religious liberty in this hemisphere; this will be found to be the safest issue to go before the world with.' U. S. Govt Doc, Cong. 28, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 271; Niles' Reg. lxvi. 166.
  55. Nothing could satisfy him more, while the minister's statement 'would be hailed with joy by all who were favorable to the object of anti-slavery societies.' London Morn. Chronicle, Aug. 19, 1843.
  56. Accredited after Waddy Thompson was received in Mexico as American plenipotentiary. Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1814, 6, 7.
  57. Two notes passed from each side between Nov. 3d and Dec. 1st, both inclusive. Niles' Reg., lxv. 60-8.
  58. He wrote Murphy, the American agent, Jan. 14, 1844, if the proposal for annexation should be rejected, 'instead of being, as we ought to be, the closest friends, it is inevitable we shall become the bitterest foes.' Without annexation, 'Texas cannot maintain that institution [slavery] ten years — probably not half that time.'
  59. April 12, 1844, in nine articles, signed by John C. Calhoun, Upshur's successor, for the United States, Isaac Van Zandt and J. Pinckney Henderson for Texas.
  60. Gilbert L. Thompson, a special agent of the United States, had a conference with Gen. Santa Anna at Puente Nacional on the 17th of May, to obtain Mexico's acquiescence, offering a sum of money for differences of limits. His proposals were rejected, and Mexico's resolve to reconquer Texas assured him. Santa Anna's report of the same date in El Siglo, June 12, 1844, and its translation in Niles' Reg., lxvi. 351.
  61. Shannon accused Mexico of barbarous practices in the manner of waging war, confessing that his government for twenty years past had fostered the policy of detaching Texas from Mexico with the ulterior view of her annexation to its territory for the safety and welfare of the latter; and now it would not permit Mexico to renew the war for the purpose of defeating the annexation. He clearly intimated that in view of the importance of Texas to the United States, the American government would espouse her cause. Rejon repelled such pretensions, declaring that the American president was greatly mistaken in supposing that Mexico would yield to the menace which he, 'exceeding the powers given him by the fundamental law of his nation, had directed against her. His argments are powerful, but the great length of his note precludes its insertion here. After some comments on the conduct of the U. S., to show that the latter were practising a 'descarada usurpacion,' he scathingly says: 'If one party labors to obtain more ground to blot it with the enslavement of a hapless branch of the human family, the other is trying to diminish, by preserving its own, the incentive that the former seeks for sɔ detestable a traffic. Let the world now decide which of the two has justice and reason on its part.' The New Orleans Bee declared the answer coached in courteous and respectful terms; but it had made Shannon wrathful, and prompted his unheeded demand for an immediate retraction on penalty of discontinuance of all further diplomatic intercourse till he received instructions from his government. Rejon then retorted that the American minister's reluctance to discuss the conduct of his government was not surprising. 'And indeed, to what else can be attributed this exclusive desire to claim for himself, his nation, and his government the respect denied by him to the Mexican republic and its government, to which he has so often applied the term "barbarous" in his note of Oct. 14th? Is the government of the United States superior in dignity? or has its legislature any right to be thus disrespectful to a gɔvernment to whom it has refusal that courtesy which is due even to mere individuals? Instead of withdrawing his letter, he is ordered to reiterate his former statements.' Méx., Mem. Relaciones, Docs Justif., 1847, 41-60; Niles' Reg., lxvii. 224, 234-5.
  62. See his message of Dec. 1844. Id., 222.
  63. In the house it was adopted by a majority of 22 votes; in the senate, finally, by a majority of two. Id., 369, 378-83, 401.
  64. Some of the most prominent American statesmen and jurists not only pronounced this device unconstitutional, but the whole plan of annexation and the consequent war, violent, unjust, pernicious, and unprincipled. Among these were Chancellor Kent, Judge William Jay, Charles Sumner, Theodore Parker, Giddings, and many others. See Kent's and Jay's letters in Id., lxviii. 89-90; Jay's Rev. War Mex., 101; Sumner's Orations, ii. 131-62, 18695; Parker's Sermon on Mex. War, Am. Rev., ii. 221-9, iii. 565-80, iv. 1-16, v. 217-30, vi. 331; Giddings' Speeches in Cong., 230-63; Mansfield's Mex. War 9-19; Livermore's War with Mex., 5-40. On the other hand, the authors and upholders of the annexation plot were numerous and able, though interested in the scheme of enlarging the area of slave territory, and to a great extent unprincipled. Among the most prominent was Thos H. Benton, a man always too ready to sacrifice right to interest. See Benton's Debates in Cong., xv. 241, 487, 622, 634; Benton's Thirty Years' View, ii. 639-49, 679-711.
  65. The convention held at Austin voted 55 ayes against one nay, Richard Bache's being the only negative vote. That action was almost unanimously ratified by the people Oct. 10th. Thrall's Hist. Texas, 348-50.
  66. Their commercial treaties with Texas accordingly ceased to have any effect.
  67. The correspondence may be found in Monitor Constituc. Ind., 1845, March 22d, 29th, and May 3d; Boletin de Notic., 1845, March 31st: U. S. Govt, Cong. 23. Ses. 2, San Journ., 142;Niles' Reg., lxviii. 17, 84, 117; Mayer's Hist. War Mex., i. 76.
  68. The note passed may be sen in Niles' Reg., lxviii. 134-5.
  69. March 29, 1845, the government urged on the departmental authorities the utmost zeal to defend the national honor, and the respect due the supreme powers. From that time a number of war measures were adopted. Among them were the following: on the 13th of May, wheresoever American vessels might make their appearance the consuls should cease exercising official functions, and American citizens should be made to reside in the interior, at least 60 miles from the coast; on the 30th of May, that the American consuls in Mexico, and Mexican consuls in the United States, should cease acting as such. Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1847, 8-10; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., ii. 221-3; Amigo del Pueblo, 1845, July 19th, Sept. 4th; Niles' Reg., lxviii. 305; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 19-22; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1844-6, 117-20; Méx., Decretos, Min., 1845, no. 19.
  70. Bustamante, Nuero Bernal Diaz, i. 43-53, 71-2; Id., Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., ii. 14-99 passim, 210, 221, iii. 14-15, 77-8, 113-14, 146; Niles' Reg., lxviii. 388; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 36.
  71. The United States regarded Texas as extending to the Rio Bravo or Grande on two grounds: 1st, on the declaration of the Texan congress in December, 1836; and 2d, that said river had been the natural limit of Louisiana. Both grounds were untenable.
  72. The details of those measures accompanied the American president's message of December 8, 1846. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. Doe. 4, pp. 3-20%; Аm. Quаrt. Rev., i. 38-84.
  73. 'Está dispuesto á recibir al comisionado que de los Estados Unidos venga á esta capital con plenos poderes de su gobierno para arreglar de un modo pacifico, razonable y decoroso la contienda presente.' Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1847, 11, and Doc. Justif., 8-10; Niles' Reg., lxx. 205.
  74. The obligation assumed by the supreme government of receiving a plenipotentiary of the U. S., with special powers to treat on the affair of Texas, does not bind it to receive an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary appointed to reside near the government, in which capacity Mr Slidell has come, according to his credentials.' Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1847; Doc. Justif., 16.
  75. The amount now claimed was a little over eight million dollars. The commissioners and umpire, under the treaty for settlement of American claims, rejected as spurious and fraudulent over five and a half millions. The unliquidated claims amounted, after deducting the award, to $6,455,464. Of these, the American government, by the treaty of peace with Mexico, assumed the payment of such as might be found valid, not exceeding, however, $3,230,000, so that claims amounting to $3,203,464 at least were abandoned altogether, and Mexico by treaty stipulation was released from all obligation to pay then.
  76. The government council had reiterated the advice of last December.
  77. The whole correspondence may be found in U. S. Govt, Cong. 20, Ses. 1, H. Ex. Doc. 196; Méx., Mem. Relaciones, 1847, 7-12, and Doc. Justif., 11-46; Niles' Reg., lxx. 204-7, lxxi. 20, 270-1, 1xxii. 58-9. The same and other interesting details in Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., iii. 43-31, 83-210, passim, iv. 82-4, 117; Id., Hist. Santa Anna, 272-4; Id., Nuevo Bernal Diaz, i. 3-18, 43-53, 71-2, 92-4, 103; Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 262-73; Mem. Hist., 1846, Jan. 17, 19; El Tiempo, 1846, Mar. 9, 22, Ap. 23; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 745-6; Apuntes Hist. Guerra, 21-5; Gallatin's Peace with Mex., 9-13; Mansfield's Mex. War, 27-30; Ramsey's Other Side, 28-9; Mayer's Mex. Aztec, i. 331-3; Id., Hist. War Mex., i. 79-81; Jay's Rev. Mex. War, 111-16; Cong. Globe, 1845, app. 2.
  78. His first despatch reached Washington January 12, 1846.