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History of Mexico (Bancroft)/Volume 5/Chapter 23

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History of Mexico (Bancroft) (1886)
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CHAPTER XXIII.

ARISTA'S ADMINISTRATION.

1851-1852.

A Reformed Turncoat — False Economy — A National Finance Council — Clamoring Creditors — Cabinet Changes — Ramirez as Prime Minister — Inaction of the Chambers — Carbajal Invades the North — Eastern Provinces — The Avalos Tariff — Indian Raids — Severity toward Journalists and Party Leaders — Blancarte Starts the Revolution — Plan of Guadalajara — Uraga Manœuvering — Attitude of Congress — Growth of the Hostile Party — Vera Cruz Turns the Scale — Resignation of Arista — His Character and Death.

Mariano Arista, the new president, was a man from whose experience and ability, as the most successful minister of the preceding administration, the country expected some decisive benefits. It mattered not that his political and moral principles were of a somewhat shady hue, or that his generalship during the war of 1846-7 was far from meriting so prompt a token of national approval. Although trained in royal armies to the pursuit of insurgent, he possessed discernment enough, even at the age of nineteen, to join the victorious side, by marching into Mexico in 1821 with the trigarante army. Rapid promotion whetted the appetite of the youth, and convinced him that constancy was at best a burdensome virtue. Не passed in quick succession from one party to another, always ready to serve the victor, and displaying particular devotion during the centralist rule of Bustamante in persecuting federalists. Nor did he hesitate to join his quondam patron and subsequent enemy, ​Santa Anna, whom he soon abandoned in favor of Herrera. As minister of war, he lost no opportunity to promote his own aims for the succession, notably by a persistent pursuit of his former conservative allies.[1]

He took possession of the presidential chair on January 15, 1851, and at once managed to attract the ridicule of the opposition by petty regulations for the public offices, and for visitors and persons having business at the palace.[2] While introducing no material change in the policy of Herrera, which was practically his own, he transferred the portfolios for relations and justice to Yañez and Aguirre, two well-known lawyers, and placed General Robles Pezuela in charge of the war department, retaining only the finance minister Payno.

The finance problem remained as ever the most difficult and troublesome, partly from the constant changes in laws and administration, which gave no time for a thorough reorganization, partly from the lack of men at the proper moment fitted to plan and carry out the reform, and most of all from the want of harmonious and intelligent coöperation between the executive and the legislative body and general and state ​governments. Aware that the chambers stood resolved on economy, Arista determined to retrench in the most rigid manner in order to diminish the enormous difference exhibited in the budget between income and expenditure, estimated at $8,275,000 and $26,000,000, respectively.[3] True, the latter figures were somewhat exaggerated to impress the congress and people with the necessity for assisting a government, which after a revision of the estimate proposed to reduce it as low as $10,683,000. To this end salaries of active employés were cut to an alarming extent, and those of passive servants still more.[4] But the pruning was uneven; and while looking for the most petty saving in certain directions with even harsh strictness, large sums were heedlessly squandered in others. Finding that the president would not entertain what Payno regarded as better methods, and that the legislative power refused to assist in covering the smaller and more pressing deficit still left, he resigned, and so did several of the following finance ministers, in rapid succession, as in cases before mentioned,[5] until it became difficult to find any ​one willing to accept the position. Finally Piña y Cuevas proposed a series of light taxes to meet the requirement; but the states raised so many objections that the chambers held back; whereupon he summoned in August a council of governors to examine the condition of affairs and suggest better remedies. Far from sympathizing with the administration, they condemned it for lack of system and management, and presented a new estimate for expenditure that wholly removed the deficiency.[6]

Although their censure was not undeserved, they had not failed to duly consider the situation; the government required extra power from a hostile congress to act upon the new estimate, with its demand for further special retrenchment. The ministry accordingly resigned,[7] and a new cabinet was formed under the leadership of the advocate Fernando

​Ramirez,[8] assisted by Urbano Fonseca, for justice, Márcos Esparza, for finance, and General Robles, who was retained for the war department. This quartette managed to hold its position into the following year by prudently bending before the winds, content with some slight concessions from a congress which frittered away its time in idle discussions and upon petty questions,[9] and displayed such dissension and lack of method and patriotic zeal that the ministers felt obliged to point out the need for its reorganization;[10] while more than one journal urged its suppression, or at least that of the senate, and gave wing to rumors that Arista might do so.[11]

But the idea was impracticable. With jealous discontent of states, and wide-spread dissatisfaction among the pinched soldiers, the country would not have suffered from the suppression of a body composed mainly of degenerate members, elected by intrigue and intent on pay and bribes,[12] and of those who aimed solely at thwarting a government hated by their party. A number, however, were actuated by the laudable desire to compel a retrenchment so seldom observed, although they might have used a little more judgment in their opposition, and reminded of their duties not only recalcitrant members, but the states, many of which were growing loose in their observance of the federal bond and its obligations, neglecting to ​pay the contingent and to promote harmonious and necessary measures.[13]

A notable transaction by Ramirez was his arrangement with the interior and foreign creditors of the republic, who had become clamorous and even threatening under the failure of a pressed administration to meet their demands.[14] A revolution in the northeast provinces had besides obliged it to infringe the tariff laws in an alarming manner. By decree of May 19, 1852, an effort was made to carry out the provisions of November 1850 for the consolidation and settlement of the interior debt; but the assignment proved insufficient to cover more than two thirds of the interest.[15] Before this the foreign ministers and representatives had formally protested against the inroads on customhouse revenues by tariff infringements in the northeast, and the glaring neglect to suppress smuggling,[16] The energetic steps taken in consequence served to appease them somewhat, and a number of pending and deferred claims were arranged by special conventions at the close of 1851,[17] which naturally affected the assignments for paying their claims.</ref> a settlement that was not to be of long duration. ​The enforced retrenchments of the government gave rise to a number of internal difficulties tending to weaken its hold on the public, although the blame mainly belonged to the states, legislative bodies, and people generally, which expected too much. One result was an alarming increase in highway robbery and other crimes, owing to the reduced patrol service and the indifference or connivance of underpaid officials;[18] another, the increase of pronunciamientos fostered by factions, and joined in or permitted by a neglected army. One broke out at Guanajuato immediately after the election of Arista; and although the government inflicted a severe lesson in suppressing it, another futile effort was made in July 1851.[19] Similar demonstrations were reported from San Luis Potosí, Vera Cruz, Puebla, Tlascala, and other central parts into the ever-restless Jalisco, and southward, as a rule on

​local issues, which only too frequently were the cloak for more serious designs to be revealed in case the attempt should succeed.[20]

The most serious movement was promoted on the north-east frontier by contrabandists. The extremely high duties imposed by this debt-ridden and badly administered country were in themselves an encouragement to illegal traffic. The officials were induced to close their eyes to it, and the inhabitants found enough profit therein to encourage it, disliking, as they besides did, a distant government which burdened them with disorderly and useless troops, while doing little toward their protection and welfare. Moreover, the merchants and manufacturers suffered so much from the undermining of their business that they secretly joined issue with the contraband party, in order to obtain some change for the better. The leader was the irrepressible Carbajal, who still labored to form an independent republic in this region, assisted by sympathizers in Texas and adjoining states, and meanwhile sought to benefit himself and his friends by smuggling. The moment appearing ripe for either project, he enlisted from his headquarters at Brownsville some 500 adventurers,[21] and crossed the border river on September 18th. He was joined by two hundred Mexicans, who had already been stirred by a confederate[22] to pronounce for a ​reduction of duties, and other reforms. At the head of the liberation army, as it was called, he readily took possession of Camargo, and advanced on Matamoros, whose inhabitants were known to favor his plans. Ávalos was not strong enough to resist both the citizens and the invaders; but aware of the motive influencing the former, he offered to purchase their active or passive coöperation by conceding the main point, a reduction in duties and removal of prohibitions.[23] The result was a flood of merchandise from the neighboring republic, to the injury of the revenue and of the manufacturing interests, and midst the outcry and protests of sufferers, notably creditors with assignments on the custom-houses; but the government could not remedy the evil, nor did it consider the step inappropriate under the circumstances. Haste was made to send reënforcements from the lower seaports and adjoining provinces, and to issue a decree of confiscation against any goods that might be introduced by the invaders.[24]

Great was the disappointment and rage of Carbajal on finding his plans forestalled and his weapons turned against himself. He nevertheless laid siege to Matamoros, carried several strongholds, and inflicted no little damage on the buildings; but the garrison managed to regain the positions, and even compel him to retreat on October 30th, after ten days' fighting. The report that reënforcements were approaching hastened their movements.[25] Carbajal reorganized at

​Reinosa to face the now allied opponents, but was so severely chastised during an attack on Cerralvo, at the close of November, that he took refuge across the border. In the following February he made a fresh inroad, with about five hundred men. The government was on the watch, however, and forced him back at once with considerable loss.[26] The old tariff was now restored, to the relief of creditors and foreign traders, and pretexts for sympathetic pronunciamientos, notably at Tampico and in Vera Cruz, were removed.

The government lodged a reasonable protest against the criminal forbearance which permitted adventurers to enroll and equip in Texas for raids into Mexican territory. Orders were accordingly issued in the United States for checking such movements, but the local authorities had reasons for giving little heed to them.[27] Mexico, therefore, remained exposed to this infliction, as well as to the inroads of wild Indians, for which her northern neighbor was likewise blamed, although less at fault. By the treaty of Guadalupe, the government of the United States had bound itself in a measure to check this evil, only to find the task beyond its power, owing to the habits of the savages and the vast expanse and wild nature of the region which sheltered them. It could not protect its own settlements against such swift and flitting marauders. ​Colonization on both sides of the line could alone provide the remedy, and this was slow of action, yet operating with marked effect along the lower course of the Rio Grande del Norte; while westward the ravages increased, till they reached the climax in Sonora and Arizona. The history of this region, as related in other parts of my work, is filled with savage deeds and pathetic incidents, that cluster round smoking ruins and redden the land with blood, where bleaching bones and rude Samaritan crosses add to the horror of desolation.[28]

Every ill afflicting the republic was, of course, ascribed by a growing opposition to the government, till even hitherto neutral states and parties joined in the prevailing cry, and caused friendly spirits to waver. As petty outbreaks increased, and rumors spread of impending revolution, the executive became more suspicious, and ordered a number of arbitrary arrests, including persons whose popularity and prominence created much feeling in their behalf. Severe injunctions were directed to starving officials, who clamored for their pay; and finally a decree was issued, imposing heavy fines and imprisonment upon editors who criticised the acts of the supreme authority.[29] These injudicious acts, which served merely to exhibit the fear and weakness that dictated them, produced a general remonstrance; and the supreme court, headed by Ceballos, objecting to the press decree as anti-constitutional, it had to be revoked.[30] ​Every such rebuke and defeat brought on ridicule, and lessened the influence of the government, causing an exaggerated sense of liberty to prevail in all directions, manifested by the states in a disregard for the federal bond, and the enactment of measures beyond their province.

In the middle of 1852 several hitherto despised movements began to assume alarming proportions. Rebolledo, who at the close of the preceding year had risen at Jalapa against the local authorities and their tax levies, and for some time struggled with little success, was now creating some attention[31] by his firm stand and more extended range of pretensions for reform. At Mazatlan a no less powerful uprising took place on similar grounds, with the advocacy of state division,[32] and in Michoacan religious feeling added its potent influence to the trouble there brewing. The lately installed governor, Melchor Ocampo, was a man of liberal views,[33] whose precepts became no less obnoxious to the clergy than his measures. They used every effort in behalf of the opposition, pointing among other things to the immense increase in cost of the local administration as compared with centralist times. The result was not exactly as expected, for a number of armed factions rose, which endangered the interests of the state rather than the stability of the government. Nevertheless the religious element of the strife spread far beyond the borders, to add strength to germinating movements elsewhere, among them in Jalisco, which once more was to cradle the revolution.

Governor Portillo had made himself unpopular at Guadalajara by introducing an obnoxious police ​x, and seeking to control affairs too closely in behalf of the authorities at Mexico. He had, moreover, incurred the anger of a hatmaker named José María Blancarte by arresting him for assault on the police, and expelling him and a fellow-officer from the militia, wherein the former held by popular suffrage the rank of colonel. To injure the people was bad encugh, but to offend the hatmaker colonel was unpardonąble. Blancarte saw his opportunity in the prevailing discontent, and found no difficulty in obtaining adherents among the soldiers as well as the citizens. On July 26th he took possession of the gubernatorial palace, and at the head of a self-constituted council proclaimed as governor Gregorio Dávila, who was empowered to summon a legislature to revise the state constitution and introduce reforms,[34] Blancarte retaining the chief military command. Portillo retired with a few faithful troops to Lagos, where he sought in vain to impose a check on the movement. The federal government responded to his appeal for aid by the futile despatch of commissioners, a peaceful course which only gave time for the revolution to take root, favored by other local movements.

The ever-wrathful Santanists, who had so long been wasting their efforts in different directions, did not fail to exert themselves on so promising an occasion, partly by holding before the soldiery the well-known liberality and care of their chief for the army, and before the clergy and conservatives the need for a strong hand at the helm in order to stay the evident loosening of the union, with its attendant ravages, spoliation,and mob rule. Blancarte was really flattered into giving a wider scope to his pronunciamiento. On September 13th he hastened, at the head of the militia, to proclaim the deposal of Arista for having infringed the laws, and the recall of Santa Anna ​to coöperate in reorganizing the government in accordance with the federal constitution, and in choosing a temporary president to act until the states decided upon an executive with extraordinary power to restore order.[35] Dávila, who appears to have been an excellent man, objected to this plan, and the Santanists seized the opportunity to thrust into his place one of their own party, General Yañez.[36] This step gained, it was less difficult to persuade the prominent civilians, clergy, and regular army men to assert their will in an issue of such growing importance, and not let it collapse under the leadership of so insignificant a person as Blancarte, unknown beyond Guadalajara, or under restrictions objectionable to different parties and sections of country. A week later, accordingly, a modified plan was agreed upon, calling on José L. Uraga, one of the leading generals in the army, to place himself at the head of the movement, and within thirty days summon, in place of the actual unworthy congress, an extraordinary body of two deputies from each state, whose task should be to elect a president for the unexpired quadrennial term, to revise the constitution on a federal basis, reform the financial and electoral systems, reorganize the neglected army, and systematize the frontier defence against Indians. Herein were direct concessions to discontented troops and suspicious federalists, and strong inducements to the other leading parties — a plan and indorsement that could not fail to win respect. Blancarte, indeed, found it prudent to give his approval.[37] Well aware ​of the mixed feeling with which the ecclesiastical signatures would be regarded, the opposition was assured that they joined merely to prevent bloodshed, and Santa Anna was prudently kept apart from political nomination; yet both features added immense weight to the document.

The call upon Uraga proved a surprise to many. He held command of the division lately ordered to crush this very uprising. Hearing of the favor with which the revolutionists regarded him, the government naturally became suspicious, and resolved to transfer the command, pretending that his services were required as comandante general of Guanajuato, where he could be watched by a loyal governor. Uraga understood the motives, and declined to serve the government any longer, yet he coquetted for some time before yielding to the invitation from Jalisco. The chief reason for the delay was his vain effort to start a pronunciamiento of his own in Guanajuato, which should give him greater importance and power.[38]

Shortly before the issue of the general plan of Guadalajara, the cabinet had become so discouraged at the outlook as to resign, and a new ministry entered, composed of Mariano Yañez, J. M. Aguirre, ​Guillermo Prieto, a distinguished writer, and P. M. Anaya.[39] An extra session of congress was now called to consider a fresh appeal for aid, in the shape of a loan of three millions, additional taxes, and special power for the executive. A small advance was secured to sustain an army which might otherwise pass over to the enemy; but beyond this the chambers were afraid to go, especially as the government might succumb at any moment, now that only half of the governors signified a doubtful adherence.[40] Indeed, a decree hinting at confiscation,[41] and certain arbitrary proceedings against suspected and obstinate citizens, had increased the bitterness against the executive. Finally the lower house was moved by the representations of Prieto, on behalf of the imperilled credit of the republic, with interest on debt overdue, and the possible loss of twenty-five millions by the failure to meet engagements; on behalf of a defenceless frontier ravaged by Indians and invaded by adventurers; on behalf of an army demoralized by misery and neglect; and for the sake of preventing perhaps a dissolution of the republic, with fratricidal war.[42] Just then, however, the revolution took a turn which brought the senate to resistance against a government evidently doomed, and congress closed without effecting anything.[43] ​Three fourths of the country now stood arrayed against the capital and its rulers. Mazatlan had sided with Jalisco; Durango adopted its plan; Aguascalientes did not, on being promised an independent state organization. Chihuahua and Puebla were fermenting. Michoacan was torn by different factions, the leading one under the clerical champion Bahamonde, whose pronunciamiento on September 9th had given impulse to the general plan of Guadalajara.[44] In Tamaulipas the struggle for the governorship,[45] together with a certain adhesion to the plan of Jalisco, had encouraged the persevering Carbajal to repeat his invasion, this time converted by his adventurous following into a marauding tour.[46] Sonora was also the scene of an invasion headed by Count Raousset de Boulbon, with more laudable aim, yet no less a source of apprehension;[47] and the disputed territory of Soconusco had been entered by Guatemalans, while Chiapas, Tamaulipas, and Tehuantepec were more or less disturbed. The crowning blow was, however, to come from Vera Cruz. Tampico had pronounced early in December for the plan of Jalisco, and lowered at once the tariff. Fearing the effect of this reduction on its trade, Vera Cruz considered itself obliged on the 27th to follow the example, and was sustained by the garrison of Ulúa.[48]

​In addition to this, the government suffered direct military disasters. Its troops had laid siege to Guadalajara December 15th, but met with so severe a repulse that active operations were suspended within a fortnight.[49] The motives of the general in command were evidently similar to those influencing the congress — to watch the turn of the current — for the soldiers could not be relied upon, and the revolutionists were preparing to advance upon the capital.[50] The turn soon came. Arista saw that resistance was useless. After one more vain appeal to the chambers,[51] which opened the regular session with the new year, he resigned January 5, 1853, surrendering the government, in accordance with the constitution, to Chief Justice Juan Bautista Ceballos.[52] He lived for a while on his estate, till exiled in May, when he proceeded to Spain, dying at Lisbon in August 1855.[53] ​Arista entered office under unfavorable circumstances, when demoralization had already taken root, fostered by an exaggerated idea of liberty, and a lack of energetic measures and good management. He had to bear the accumulated ills of the preceding administration, and suffer from the reaction following his manceuvred election, manifested also in congressional hostility. Whatever his defects as statesman, he had evidently resolved, after gaining the supreme object of ambition, the presidency, to be loyal to his trust; but the change of heart came late, for the consequent leniency and self-restraint were classed as weakness, and served to encourage his many enemies, who could be controlled only by force and intrigue. The change also indicates a character not equal to the responsible position of ruler over a people so difficult to manage. He shone best as minister under Herrera, in reforming the army and sustaining the union. A later federal government recognized his laudable adhesion to the constitution, and respect for national representation, by crowning his memory with the much-coveted title of benemérito.[54] a soldier and

  1. ↑ Born at San Luis Potosí in July 1802, he became a cadet in his eleventh year, joined the royal armies toward the close of the revolutionary war, and had just gained a lieutenancy when in 1821 he passed over to the victorious republicans, among whom he speedily became lieut-col. This rank was confirmed in 1824 after he had assisted in overthrowing Iturbide. He turned against Guerrero under the rising star of Bustamante, attained in 1831 the rank of brigadier, and ten years later that of chief of the northern army and general of division, the reward for his successful suppression of federalists from Tampico northward. He was arraigned for his miserable failures in the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in 1846, which measure was partly the result of jealousy of Ampudia, but escaped conviction, probably through his influence as minister of war, for the trial had been prolonged for years. As Herrera's guiding spirit, he deserves credit, however, for his energy in maintaining the peace and promoting the reorganization of the army. Concerning his election and other points, see Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., vi. 6; Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 10; Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 378-80, who rather screens his mistakes, through political sympathy; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xiii. 442, etc., as a conservative, is less lenient. Bib. Mex., Amen., i. 17; Sosa, Biog. Mex., 75-9.
  2. ↑ To promote the despatch of business, but assumed by many to be directed against conspiracy, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 18-24. Even Arista's supporter, Monitor Rep., same dates, condemned the order.
  3. ↑ Half of the revenue came from custom-house receipts, and of the expenditure, $10,867,293 were toward the public debt, and $7,284,529 toward the military department, as calculated by Piña y Cuevas in July 1851.
  4. ↑ 'Á las dos terceras partes el sueldo de los empleados en servicio activo, á tres cuartas el de las clases pasivas.' Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 383. Arista required monthly statements from every department whereon to exercise his efforts at reduction.
  5. ↑ Payno was succeeded, Feb. 15th, by Ignacio Esteva of Vera Cruz, well known as a writer, and he in the following month by Aguirre, who adopted several of Payno's plans for revising the tariff and closing certain ports as costly and unreliable. He also proposed that the government be authorized to remove officials and close certain offices, for greater economy, to place a new tax on textile goods, to assume control of the three per cent mining tax, to transfer the Vera Cruz railway to a corporation, and to raise a loan of $5,500,000 for converting the interior debt, hypothecating, if necessary, church estates. Esteva had similar designs on this tempting property, but Arista was too much of a churchman, or too politic, to permit any such inroad. The journals, indeed, attacked the government for obsequiously assisting the church in collecting condemned books. The result was the tender of the portfolio to Lerdo de Tejada, the later famous right hand of Juarez. A mere survey of the disorder to be unravelled and the opposition to be encountered sufficed to make him step out again. None else offering to succeed, Yañez himself took charge in April, leaving the relations to Monasterio till a head for the cabinet was found in Mariano Macedo, a lawyer of repute. An appeal was made to the states for an exhibit of their finances, and these proving too poor, under the more or less dark coloring purposely imparted, to afford any hope for departmental aid, the chambers were again appealed to for an assignment on the money set aside toward the debt and an annulment of the tobacco contracts, but it was not thought well to abuse further the good faith of creditors and contractors. Yañez accordingly resigned, and Piña y Cuevas assumed his place in June. He submitted that the deficit, almost wholly connected with the interior debt, must be removed by settling interest thercon in accordance with the law of Nov. 30, 1850, by suspending all payments toward it, or by reducing the appropriations. The second plan would'leave a deficit of only $360,129; the last one $3,237,544; yet he preferred this, and suggested a series of new taxes. See references to projects to follow ministerial changes so far, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 173, 220, etc.; Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1830-1, 265, 329, etc.; also, with comments on financial management, Siglo XIX., Jan. to July 1851; Universal, id.; Regulador, id.; and other journals. As an instance of Arista's capricious management of funds may be mentioned that he took about $100,000 from the impoverished treasury for embellishing the palace with balconies, etc.
  6. ↑ Based on a decree of Nov. 1849, which limited the expenditure to a trifle over half a million a month. They further offered to increase the state contingent from $724,865 to one fifth of their revenue, equivalent to $1,000,000, which of course availed nothing. Report in Gob. Estados, Doc., 1851, 1-72, with projects and arguments. Other special treatises on the question in Méx., Hac. Expos., 1851, 1-34; Prieto, Manif. sobre Recursos, 1-17; Gomez del Palacio, Rápida Ojeada, 1-14; Méx., Proyecto, 7, 16, etc.; Pap. Var., ccviii. pt 4. The council consisted of three governors and seven delegates; other governors excused themselves or required legislative permission. The session began Aug. 17th and ended the 29th, prolonged beyond need by the neglect of the ministry to prepare efficient data. It had been hoped to obtain sanction for an extraordinary contingent, a two per mille estate tax, a reorganization of the tobacco revenue, increased duty, and certain industrial contributions, and to effect a settlement of the interior debt.
  7. ↑ Macedo narrowly escaped formal arraignment for certain acts.
  8. ↑ Ramirez took possession Sept. 11th, making as usual a host of promises, among others to be guided by public opinion. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 310, etc.
  9. ↑ The Monitor Rep., Dec. 15, 1851, in reviewing its acts during the year, inflicts a scathing rebuke, in which other journals join.
  10. ↑ Méx., Mem. Min. Just., 1852, 3, etc.
  11. ↑ The editor of Las Cosquillas had to seek a hiding-place to escape arrest. The Regenerador of Morelia and Eco del Comercio of Vera Cruz were nearly as bold. The chambers also created trouble by meddling in local affairs of states, and ordering payments where the government sought to economize. Rivera, Gob. de Mex., ii. 382; Id., Hist. Jalapa, iv. 218 et seq. Concerning prorogations, etc., see Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 119, 209, 222-3; Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1850-1, 200-1, 322-3, 328-9. List of congress members in Mex., Col. Мап. y Guia, 1852, 1-51.
  12. ↑ As the open accusation ran. While several departments were suffering from a lack of funds, congress took care in the following year to decree an assignment of eight per cent on duties for the payment of its members and of treasury officials. Méx., Legisl, Mej., 1852, 150.
  13. ↑ Some insisted on retaining the excise tax abolished during the late war, while others had adopted direct contributions, to the increase of confusion. Arista divided the country into 15 treasury districts, and created a military comisaría.
  14. ↑ The interior creditors had formed an association which claimed the right to be consulted in all custom-house appointments. It was known as the junta de crédito público, having the right to appoint an agent to watch proceedings at custom-houses.
  15. ↑ The three per cent on net receipts of custom-house, the state contingent, and some smaller appropriations toward this debt amounted to only $560,000, while the interest was $827,176. A law of June 1, 1852, created a funding department for the debt. Both decrees with regulations are given in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 112-16, 137-45. For projects and comments, consult Méx., Hac. Expos., 1851, 1-32; Deuda Int., Ley de 1852, 1-15; Id., Doc. relat., 1851, 1-92, and app.; Méx., Comis. de Hac. Dictámen, 1851, 1-26.
  16. ↑ See record of conference held on Jan. 28, 1852, between Ramirez and representatives from France, Spain, Eng., the U. S., and Guatemala. Derecho Intern. Mex., i. 619 et seq. Not long after came war vessels to support them. Falconnet, Manif., is a protest in behalf of Mexican bondholders. Mex., Debt Rept., i. 3, 20, etc. Comments in Español, Oct. 9, 1852, etc.
  17. ↑ Spanish claims, partly dating from the time of the independence war, amounted to $7,500,533. Some of them, already recognized by convention of July 1847, were somewhat modified, and the rest were to be examined without further loss of time, five per cent interest being allowed on those without assigned funds and three per cent on others; treasury notes for certain portions were to be accepted at the custom-house in liquidation. Decree in Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., vi. 163, 277, with comments in Mex. et l'Espagne, Mem., 251-64. Ramirez was accused of yielding too much to Spain. Ramirez, Acus., i. 1-8; Id., Apuntes Convenciones, 1-20; Id., Observ., 1-11; Pap. Var., clxxxv. pts 14, 16; but he was exonerated. Mendoza, Cuestion Mej., 3 et seq. Certain English claims through Montgomery, Nicod, & Co., Martinez del Rio, etc., amounting to more than $4,700,000, were now to receive three per cent interest and five per cent toward a sinking fund, merging later in the proposed consolidation fund. See also Mex., Debt Rept., i., with report of Apr. 23, 1832. Percy W. Doyle was the English diplomatic agent in the beginning of 1852. Español, Feb. 18, 1852; Universal, Oct. 3, 1850, July 15, 1852. A. de Iturbide figured at London for Mexico. Arch. Mex., Actas, ii. 314. Of the French claim by Serment, Fort, et Cie, somewhat over $1,000,000, received assigned funds in July 1851, but damages for non-fulfilment Ramirez would not recognize. A small claim by Hargous of the U. S. was settled. See Méx., Mem. Min. Hac., 1852; Méx., Mem. Min. Rel., id.; Luchet, Observ., 1-60; Pap. Var., clxxxv. pt x. By decree of Oct. 9, 1851, a consumption tax of eight per cent was levied on foreign effects, to be divided with the states, which stopped their special smaller levies of the same class. Méx., Legis'. Mej., 1851, 323-5.
  18. ↑ See Monitor Rep., Feb. 6-21, 1851, etc.
  19. ↑ The former outbreak, on January 8th, was started by the brothers Liceaga, guilty of a similar movement in June 1850. Universal, June 12, 1850. They arrested Gov. Arrellano and gained possession of the city and fortress; but Uraga marched quickly to the spot, and regained possession by assault on the 13th, executing several ringleaders. Méx., Mem. Min. Guer., 1852, 5-6. Pardon issued, Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1851, 223-4; Guan., Mem., 1852, 5, etc.; Sonorense, Feb. 21, 1851. The movement in July was headed by Ortiz, a son of the famous Pachon, in favor of Santa Anna; but informers caused it to be suppressed.
  20. ↑ In San Luis Potosí, Olivares and Velarde rose in Jan. 1851 against the prefect of Tancanhuitz. In Vera Cruz certain Córdovans rebelled in Sept. against the local chief, and took to the hills, declaring for a division of the state, and in Dec. the militia at Acayucan had a conflict with the suspicious citizens, while Rebolledo pronounced at Jalapa against an excise tax. In Pucbla, Lopez demanded the reëstablishment of the bases of 1843, and at Tenancingo the presbyter Alcocer also declared for more general reforms. Details in Méx., Mem. Min. Guer., 1852, 9, 30-3, 77-9, no. 20; Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 252-61; Universal, May, passim, June 18, July 23, Aug. 5, 1850; Jan.-Dec. 1852, passim; Siglo XIX., Jan.-Dec. 1852, passim, etc.; Español, Jan. 3, 10, 1852. The southern movements which kept Chiapas and adjoining states in trouble have been spoken of.
  21. ↑ Who were offered $25 a month, besides booty and glory. Ávalos, commanding at Matamoros, had before this summoned troops on a false alarm, but relapsed into inactivity.
  22. ↑ J. M. Canales, who pronounced on the 3d near Guerrero, Méx., Mem. Min. Guer., 1852, 22, demanding the withdrawal of federal troops, the reform of the constitution, equal senatorial representation for the states, free introduction of provisions on the Rio del Norte frontier for five years, the removal of prohibition, reduction of duties, and greater leniency toward smugglers.
  23. ↑ Les négociants, profitant de cette circonstance, introduisirent á Matamoros une quantité de cotonnades américaines, estimée à plusieurs millions de piastres,' says Domenech, Hist. du Mex., ii. 235, who was there at the time. He intimates that Ávalos pocketed large sums for the concession. Id., Journal, 385. Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. 317-18, distorts the case somewhat, in order to charge Arista with complicity in the smuggling. Others accused him of sharing the profits of Ávalos.
  24. ↑ Méx., Col. Ley Dec. y Órd., 1850-1, 406-7. Carbajal issued a counterdecree against goods introduced by the government party.
  25. ↑ Domenech ridicules the method of fighting. Fully 600 cannon-shots and 30,000 musket-bullets were exchanged with hardly any injury, save to buildings, for the combatants on both sides remained carefully under cover. Ávalos was wounded in the leg by a spent ball, 'ct courut se cacher.' Hist. du Mex., ii. 235; Id., Miss. Adven., 330-5. Carbajal had 300 U. S. riflemen and 600 Mexicans. Constitucional, Nov. 1851, passim; Pinart Coll. Congress conferred the title of 'leal' on the heroic city, and granted medals to its defenders. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 134-6; Sonorense, Aug. 6, 1852. A steamer arrived during the conflict with troops from Tampico, but thought it prudent to turn. The commander was arraigned. Méx., Mem. Min. Guer., 1852, 25-6.
  26. ↑ The Mexicans claimed to have killed 48 men and captured 143 rifles and the solitary field-piece, while acknowledging 6 killed and 9 wounded. The battle took place Feb. 21st near the Rio San Juan. Carbajal retreated during the night. The old tariff was restored three months later. Comments in Méx., Discurso, 4-11; Sistema Prohib., Represent. á favor, 1-16; Pap. Var., cxcix. pt 5; ccxxiv. pt 10. See also Universal, Siglo XIX., and Español, during the months in question. Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 248-53, etc.
  27. ↑ Carbajal was arrested at Brownsville during the spring of 1852, but was released on a comparatively insignificant bail. Zamacois, Hist. Mej., xiii. 488, 530-1, joins in bitterly condemning such farcical interference.
  28. ↑ See Hist. North Mex. States, ii., and Hist. Ariz. and New Mex., this series. The raiders penetrated even into Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosí, and Zacatecas, as I have shown, and almost every number of the Universal, Siglo XIX., Monitor Rep., etc., for these years, especially during the summer months, contains allusions to ravages, generally copied from the Diario Oficial of the respective states.
  29. ↑ The press had been imbittered, partly by the grant of subsidy to the Monitor Rep., which was claimed to be really in payment for official notices, as the government did not care to establish a special organ. The press restriction was issued on Sept. 21st, with penalties of from $200 to $500, and 4 to 6 months' imprisonment. The following day the leading journals came out with blank columns, which spoke stronger than the fiercest article could have done. The editor of Eco del Comercio was exiled.
  30. ↑ On Oct 13th. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1832, 302, 341.
  31. ↑ Considering many of the demands reasonable, Arista ordered the government of Vera Cruz to give them attention, and advised leniency, but met with insolent disregard. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 395-6; Id., Hist. Jalapa, iv. 286 et seq. Correspondence hereon, in Vera Cruz, Sucesos, 1852, 1-36; Pap. Var., cxcix. pt 7.
  32. ↑ As will be related in Hist. North Mex. States, ii., this series.
  33. ↑ Without professed religious faith, at whose inauguration pronounced anti-clerical mottoes were displayed by his party.
  34. ↑ These changes had to be carried out within six months. Blancarte's proclamation painted Portillo's administration in the blackest hues. In breaking into the building the mob killed the government secretary and the major in command.
  35. ↑ The plan, containing 11 articles, was formally issued on Sept. 15th, by Blancarte, as provisional governor, owing to the resignation of Dávila. Text in Jal., Doc. Rev., 6-7, which appears to be Blancarte's production. Correspondence between the two, and decrees of the former, are annexed.
  36. ↑ Suarez y Navarro, who acted as secretary to Blancarte, claims to have been the chief agent of the Santanist party, actuated by a belief in Santa Anna's ability to save the union. In 1856 he issued a little volume, El General Santa-Anna Burlándose de la Nacion, 16°, 1-291, giving documents in the case and seeking to prove that he was deceived by this schemer. Suarez y Navarro gained promotion by his agency and signs as a general. See pp. 2191, therein, concerning the manœuvres in question.
  37. ↑ The 14 articles of the plan were first discussed and adopted by a purely civilian meeting, and subsequently by the militia. Text and signatures in Mex., Col. Ley. Fund., 300-7; also in Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose, 83-9; Español, Oct. 30, 1852, and other journals. By art. 3 the appointment of a provisional president was not consigned to any one. The national guard was to be relieved in several respects. The congress had to sit not over a year, and issue a general political amnesty. Till the finance system could be organized, half the state revenue must be yielded for general purposes, except from the northern border provinces. Capitation taxes and exemption purchase from the militia should cease at once. States might reorganize at any time under this plan. The decree of April 20, 1847, was revived. As soon as the provisional government of art. 3 was established, Santa Anna should be invited to return whenever he desired.
  38. ↑ So declare both Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose, 60-76, 92-112, and Ledo, governor of Guanajuato; the latter, in his Esposicion, 1-84, with appendix, of the following year, seeks to show his commendable foresight in resisting this and cognate movements which aimed to set aside the federal system and impose a dictator on the country. He shows on pp. 37, 58, that Uraga failed because his troops could not be relied on to support him against the loyal legislature. The government called him to Mexico, but he pretended sickness, and soon departed for Guadalajara by way of Michoacan. His letter, accepting the Jalisco plan, is dated Oct. 25th. Mex., Col. Ley. Fund., 306-7.
  39. ↑ For relations, justice, treasury, and war, respectively. Robles had retired from the war department already in June. Yañez tried in May to manage the treasury, without success, and took the present office Oct. 23d, his colleagues having entered Sept. 3d, 14th, and 22d, respectively. See also provisional occupants, in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 152-3, 241-2, 293-301, 351-5, 375-81; Arch. Mex., Actas, i. 105, etc.; Calend., Man. y Guia, 1852, 52-621, passim. Charges and comments in Ramirez, Dimision, 1-12; Universal, Sept.-Oct. 1852, and other journals. Aguirre was arraigned for his press-restriction decree, and resigned Oct. 26th, Ponciano Arriaga succeeding. Riva Palacio and Ledo had been summoned, but declined. Ledo, Espos., 6-9.
  40. ↑ Only eight of them published the late press decree, six in the south and north, and two in the central provinces, among these Ocampo of Michoacan, against whom the people were in revolt. Rivera, Gob. de Méx., ii. 400.
  41. ↑ Of Dec. 21st. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 386. In August the government had been allowed to dispose of 4,000 militia in states adjoining rebellious districts. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., vi. 237.
  42. ↑ This appeal was made on Dec. 16th.
  43. ↑ Concerning the progress of the futile discussion on relief projects, see Universal, Siglo XIX., Monitor Rep., for Sept.-Dec. 1852, all freely criticising the chambers, and the former two also the government. Arch. Mex., Actas, i. 3-4, 80-91, etc.; Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1832, 75, 319-25, 363-4.
  44. ↑ The well-known leader Guzman upheld Arista in the inaccessible south of the state, while Zitácuaro rose for tolerance and seized church property. Bahamonde's proclamation and plan of Maravatío, etc., in Universal, Oct. 13-27, and Español, Sept. 22, 1832.
  45. ↑ Cárdenas, R. Prieto, and Garza, holding the title under different claims.
  46. ↑ For Ávalos had retired into Matamoros and defended it well. In April 1853 the U. S. authorities were induced to secure the arrest of Carbajal, who was now restrained by heavier bonds.
  47. ↑ For this as well as the later interesting phases of Raousset's expedition, see Hist. North Mex. States, ii., this series.
  48. ↑ Names of participating leaders in Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iv. 324-7; Vera Cruz, Sucesos, 1-36. Tuxpan lost no time in joining. Gen. Woll was sent for from Habana. J. Arrillaga was proclaimed governor. The government issued a futile degree closing the gulf ports. Other government measures in Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1852, 328 et seq. For details of movements, see the journals already quoted, also Siglo XIX., Monitor Rep., Sonorense, etc., for Sept.-Dec. 1852; Méx., Discurso, 4-7; Pap. Var., cxcix. pts 6, 9; Cent. Amer. Pap., ii.
  49. ↑ Gen. Miñon, who had succeeded Vasquez in the command, being wounded. The representations of the revolutionists had doubtless some effect. See correspondence in Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose, 100 et seq.
  50. ↑ They had already compelled the removed governor to retreat into Guanajuato, whither they followed to coerce the still loyal or neutral authorities of this state. They took possession of its capital, but were soon driven forth; yet the country districts were gradually joining them, the agitator Liceaga having risen successfully in their behalf. Guan., Mem., 42-7. Lerdo explains his efforts to prevent disorder. Espos., 59-63; Pap. Var., cxcix. pt 9.
  51. ↑ Deputy Franquiz urged the unconditional concession of a million 'sin pensar, sin leer, sin discurrir,' only to excite derision.
  52. ↑ Méx., Col. Ley., Dec. y Órd., 1853, 4-5. Minister Yañez had left already on Dec. 10th, urging Arista to follow his example. Español, Jan. 5, 8, 1853. His protest, etc., in Universal, May 31, 1853.
  53. ↑ Of an ulcer, for which he was about to seek relief at Paris. He died after embarking on board the steamer Tagus, August 7th. He was also 4, etc.; Revere, Keel and Saddle, 232-5, gives some account of the Michoacan campaign, in which he shared. Siendo Liberales, 1851, 1-3:2, discusses the religious question in Michoacan on behalf of the clergy. Bib. Mex., Amen., i. 17. Comments of Ex-minister Robles, in Pap. Var., cxcix. pt viii. 3-5; Gerard, Excurs., 162-7, 184-8. The Tampico revolution and measures against it are noticed in Arch. Mex., Actas, i. 367-72. Text of this pronunciamiento and capture of Gov. Cárdenas in Universal, Nov. 28, Dec. 26, 1852. Gonzalez, Hist. Aguasc., 183-98, gives details concerning movements in this little state. Echeverria and subsequently Solano held sway here and in Zacatecas. San Luis Potosí also felt the stir. The chief leader in Puebla at the time was named Victoria. The legislature authorized the levy of 6,000 men to maintain order. Español, Sept. 25, Nov. 3, 1852. Mexico was disturbed at several points. Report in Madrid, Manif., 1-23; Pape Var., ccii. pt 8. Rebolledo Îhad already declared for Santa Anna. Suarez y Navarro, Santa-Anna Burlándose, 125-6. For conditions in Oajaca, Oaj., Mem., 1851, 1-19; 1852, 1-34. troubled by the hallucination that Santa Anna's agents were seeking to assassinate him, 'habia perdido el juicio.' Arrangoiz, Méj., ii. ap. 21. The body was deposited in the legation tomb at Lisbon, the heart being taken by F. Ramirez to Mexico, whither Comonfort also ordered in 1856 that his remains should follow. He was a tall, imposing personage, with an English stamp. Official correspondence regarding his remains in Méx., Corresp. Diplom., ii. 643-722.
  54. ↑ 54 By decree of Sept. 25, 1856, which also admitted his remains into the Metropolitan church. Comonfort believed his government would have proved a blessing with due coöperation from the states and congress. Méx., Legisl. Mej., 1853, 402-5. His resignation has been hastily commended as voluntary, 'para no servir ni aun de pretexto á una revolucion;' but press restriction, arrest of prominent men on mere suspicion, and the despatch of an army against Jalisco show no purely unselfish attitude. The army proved unreliable. Rivera also defends him: La Nacion toda. . . . . .olvida las muchas debilidades del hombre para admirar las grandes virtudes del ilustre ciudadano.' Gob. de Méx., ii. 406; and Zamacois blames the congress for his failures. Both Santa Anna and Suarez y Navarro raved against him as a criminal worthy of the gibbet, but dared only to exile him. See letters in Domenech, Hist. du Mex., ii. 250. The conservative share in his overthrow is considered in Méx., Partido Conserv., 6-7.
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