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Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States/Funding

SECTION THE FOURTH.

FUNDING.

In a former part of this essay, a promise was made to consider the effects of funding and banking, in relation to the principles and policy of the United States; that promise shall now be complied with.

No form of civil government can be more fraudulent, expensive and complicated, than one which distributes wealth and consequently power, by the act of the govern- ment itself. A few men wish to gratify their own avarice and ambition. They cannot effect this without accomplices, and they gain them by corrupting the legislature. Still the faction is too feeble to oppress a nation. Vice looks for defence, because it expects punishment. The legislature must corrupt a party in the nation, and this is effected by the modern invention called a paper system, with a degree of plausibility and dispatch, infinitely exceeding any ancient contrivance. Executive patronage corrupts individuals; legislative, factions ; the first by office and salary; the second by law charter and seperate interest. Fear and avarice combine to secure implicit obedience from these purchased engines of power, and an inexorable fulfilment of the corruptor's purpose. Accordingly, a paper system will cling to a government, as closely as an army to a general, or a hierarchy to a pope.

An executive power to bestow offices and contracts up- on members of a legislature, resembles the idea of procuring talents, and rewarding merit ; but a legislative power to buy a faction b^ loans and charters, cannot crouch behind this subterfuge ; it literally displays, and openly practise the same "ippeies of coprui)tion, which executive patronage enileavours to hide.

A pajiei" svsfem heloni^s to the species ol* patronage yliich we have ea!!^d lej^islativt*. It is inti-oduced upon various pi-eiexls; liiit its true ends are simple. These aro to enrich iiidividuuis. a»!d at the national expense, to cor- ruo< a faciion, wiiich will udliere to a .«;overninent a,&;ai!ssta naiion. Such a svsteni inav subsist in union with election, but tlie icin i'iles oi'our policy cannot subsist in union with such a systeni. Its pi'dcJicahility in union with election is ascertained in Eiij^lund. and by widrnint; the distance between indivi(hrals in weallli, it has detached the mass of talents from the ser- vice of t!ie puhlick. to the service of a fa<'tion ; and chang- e<l election from a shield for !il)erty, into a keen and i-'olibli- ed instrumeat for her dest!'iH*tion. This abuse is a refine- mt'nt u5)on a late quotation emphatically proving;, that the system of balanciug or checking monarciiy in England, is capable of pi'oducing more tyranny and oppression, lljan simple or pure mouarciiy would dare to attempt. A mo- narch, shielded by acoriu,>t parliament, may adventure up- on measures, which he would otherwise shrink from. And a legislature, shic'dcd by a paper faction, may adventure upon measures which they wouhl otherwise shrink fioni. Election is made t!se instrument of legislative patronage, and a nation seems to be the author of its own ruin, whilst that ruin pi-o«'eeds frojn the operation of a paper system, corrupting talents, enriching a faction, and impoverishing the mass of the nation ; yet the people will he kept paiient

by election itself, from an erroneous opinion, that tlic government is administered according to their Avill. Against this species of tyranny there is no remedy, except that of preventing its cause, as the people have no mode of discovering the individuals corrupted by legislative patronage; other forms of tyranny are seen in the persons of kings, nobles and priests; executive sinecure and patronage, are visible; and a visible enemy may be subdued ; but an invisible enemy cannot ever be assailed.

ThP pos»iT)ilit'y of that species of fyi^anny, atisirt^ ffo^nk an union between an elective leg;islatiii'e, and an interest diffei'ent from the national interest, was eontemplated by all our constitntions ; and the whole funrfof foresight theii existing brought to hear against it. For tins precise enrf, innumerable precautions were used, to snhject law-makers to the national will; to prevent them from g(*;ttiffg wealth from the nation Iry their own laws ; anrf to exj>ose them equally with other citizens, to oppressive laws. But all these precautions are destroyed by the legal inventions of funding, banking and Charter, more effectually than the liberty of the press was destroyed by a sedition law. The reader will not require a catalogue of cases, to prove how deeply laws can wound constitutions, after this reference has awakened his recollection. Admitting that the power of creating debt, nmist neces» aarily reside in a government, yet, next to the power of raising armies, it is the most dangerous with which it can^ be invested. Mankind may be govci'ned by money or arms. Both these powers admit of checks, and i-eqi*i;ed them, as being more dangerous than any others. An armed nation would have been a check upon the one ; and an effrctual exclusion from the legislature, of any pari ie-ipaJ ion in the profits of debt, created by funding or banking, would have been a cheek upon the other. But a borrowing power itself is rendered questionable, by considering its origin and effects. We possess a cor- rect history of two paper systems ortly ; those of England and America. The first was produced by the personal ha- tred of William of Orange for Lewis the 14th, the rapacity of Marlborough and Eugene, and the need of a disputed ti- tle to a crown, for partisans. The second also followed a revolution, >vithout having contributed towards it ; compen- sated publick services by the tax of appreciation, after they had paid that of depreciation ; and transferred miich of the reward for which an army bled in defence of their country, io those who had shed that blood. To gratify a king'^ hatred, enrich rapacious generals, and transfer a crown frem one ftimily to auotlier, were ends of tiie English fund- ing svstem, not mucli more just or useful, thiin those expe- l>ie(ieed her«. This system or policy, therefore, has very lit- tle to boast of for its exploits in those two eminent cases. But there is a theory in favour of funding systems, art- i'ujly suggested to co>er their practical evils. Kations are persuaded that thry can anticipiite the riches of fxosterily and hoqueath it their misfortunes; seduced by this glitter- ing temptation, they have forborne to look tlirough its gild- ing;, in order to discover what it conceals. Could one genei'alion thus have plundered wealth and leisure from another, each would have preferred certain vic- tories costing neither blood nor money, to muiderous, pre- carious, and expensive w^rs; and though the wisdom and justice of the Deity miglit Itave been rendered questiona- ble, by the subjection of unborn innocence to the tyranny of ex,istiag viae, yet the crime would have been perpetrated is security, and the magnitude of the acquisition >vould have varnished oy«r its il^gitiousness, in the eyes of the perpe-

trators.

The propens.ity of nations to molest their contempora- ries for the sake of wealth, is recorded in innumerable ex- amples; and as tiie same passion would with additional strength have incited them to invade the rights of the un- born, an existing geneiation would have wanted motives for self- molestation, if these motives could have been appeased by calling forward into their own pockets the inexhaustible wealth of time to come. It is therefore probable that such an operation is physically impossiWe, because the treasures of anticipation have not suspended for a moment the dispo- sition of existing nations to pluiider and oppress each other, or of existing governments to plimder and oppress the people- But an opinion that it is possible, for the present gene- ration to seize and use the property of future generations, has produced to both the parties concerned, elTects of the same complexion with the usual fruits of national evrour. The present age is eajol^fl to tax and enslave itself, by the ervo'.ir orbi^lievinc: tliat it taxes and pusl»v«'s funiir ajjjes to enrh<i itself,* and fn^ire ai;;es siihmit to <axation :!nd slave- ry, by bcin^; sediieed info art erroneous oi>inion, tbat tlie pre- sent a;^*' bave a ri£»h( to inflic! iinon Ibem tbrs** fahunities.

It is to SMi'-i national erron"*«, j'v.it nmnlincl bave been indebli'd for most of tbeir niiseiies, anf' nsr baviMi-; fallen a prey to avarice an«l an»b:<ion in all aj^ps of lite v«'r!('. hlol- atry was ooiieealeil b^'liintl an erroneous veneratiim foV those o fed upon its victims. IMimarcbv and aristocracy are slvi'fnlly fenced round by t]»e insidious and cr» oncitus a»acu- nients of the mass of talents, interestrj^ in tbeir cause. Cru- sades, in ('ie o«)inion oP several generations, led tlic way to Heaven, wliilst (lie monks used (bem to acquire wealth. And the er?*onrof an opinion, tbat one asfc can seize upon the wealt'i of another liy aiiti'i"at*M>r, is no less ruinous to nations, an e'>ri<;i;ip.^ to individirals and orders or seperate interests, t'lai the errou^s- wbl'di bave supported idolatry, monarcby. aristocracy and cmsades.

It is bowever tbe most recent, tbe most VansiVe. the most selucinj;. and tlte most dangerous invention, to which self interest and eunninsj has ever resorted, for monl<man into coin ; atid will probably kee]» its jj^ound. urtil such calajuties as bave exnl(»d<'<1 other errours, shall disclose to an existinjx sjeneration tbat it was born free. tnith, which they will then clenrly discern to have been revealed to man. in withlioldin'^ from the dead a power to govern the living, and from the living, a power to govern tbe dead. It will then be seen, that moral rectitude does not impose upon a living nation the duty of submitting to tyranny and oppression, because a nation, which is dead, chose to gratify the hatred of one king against another, or the rapacity of generals or to corrupt a party to support or produce a revolution in the government. Evils, controlled by sai'h an opinion and encouraged by one, that posterity ought to suffer ther effects, rather tituu the generatiot which caused them. It woiild be superfluous to prove that unborn generations are injured by anticipation; it is taxation, by persons, not elected by the payers, nor participating in the tax, but en- riched by it. If the laws of nature are so partial and un- just, as to allow one generation to rob another with impuni- ty, the crime will be perpetrated. It will only be prevent- ed by a conviction that punishment follows vice, in this as in other cases; and that the malice of the attempt regular- ly receives its due vengeance, without a possibility of ob- taining a benefit ,• or by the same disregard of the living to the mandates of the dead, as to the happiness and liberty of the unborn. Let us consider how anticipation bestows wealth. It does not conjure into real existence, the commercial, agri- cultural or manufactural products of futurity. It does not add to the <*orn or to the coin. It only conjures the wealth ov existing people out of some hands into others; and the cre- dit with which to buy property of the living given by the certificate, constitutes all the solid wealth gained by antici- pation. It is a pretext for taxation, and a mode of chang- ing property among individuals, but produces nothing for nations. War is among the most plausible means used to delude a nation into the errour of anticipation. Yet it cannot bring up from futurity a gun, a soldier, a ration, or a cartridge. The present generation suffers every hardsliip and cost of war, although anticipation pretends that it is siiffered by future generations. And this delusion is used to involve na- tions in wars, which they would never commence, if they knew that all the expense would fall upon themselves. It is twice suffered; by the living, who supply all the ex- penses of war; and by the unborn, who supply an equiva- lent sum, to take up certificates of the expenses paid by the living. No item of the expense of war is more transferable from the livinir to the unborn, than the blood it sheds. Money buys this blood and every other expense of war; but it is S3 jieitliep blood nor bread, and only a collector of theuur- Tliese realities, not the signs or tokens, supply the war j and after they are expended, their shadows are made by anticipation, to consume the same amount of realities which the war devoured, even that of human life, if death by op- pression is equivalent to death by the sword. Thus one Avar is converted into two. and every period of natural, be- gets an equal period of artiiieial war. The same ingenious contrivance, by the help of compound anticipation, converts ahout fourteen years of war, into a perpetual >ar. If a Eiillion annually comprises or represents the utmost efforts ill realities, which a nation can make in war; and the re- alities represented are expended annually, leaving behind them annually the million of stock or certificates at com- pound interest, produced by the anticipating mode of calling these realities into use ; then a war of about fourteen years continuunce. place's the nation in a state equivalent to per- petual war ; because the stock or certificates will devour in Jjcaee, precisely the same amount of the realities repres^ent- ed by money, v,hith the war did. Nor can this nation be ever relieved from a stale equivalent to perpetual war, whilst the stock preserves its value, and the national re- sources are the same. If there are fourteen intervals be- tween the fourteen years of war, the same result will ulti- mately occur ; whence it has happened, that peace has been seldom able to repair the errour in a mode of making war, so calamitous as to double the duration of short ones, and to proiluce a perpetuity of its evils in the space of fourteen years. A vnaniac, whose income in kind is just suifieient to support him, takes it into his head to give his bonds to sundry people annually for its value, whilst he is consuming it. At the end of fourteen years his whole in- come is goiic, though he has only expended its annual amount. Such is anticipation to nations. But those who use it to deceive, plunder and enslave them, artfully liken it to the eases of a man who buys an estate on credit, or v/bo gives bonds to himself. One would think that the -impossibility of finding any such estate thus ohtirnicd hy na- tions; and the possibility of finding; the tuxes, the puveity, the splendour, and the political innovations it produces, would detect the falsehood of these pretended resemblances; and sufficiently convince nations that they are Jiot one homo- geneous mass of matter, but capable of a thorough divisi- bility into individuals, and into a multitude of separate in- terests (such as payers and receivers, masters and slaves, impostors and dupes) to disclose to them the folly of trans- forming tliemselves into the resemblance of the maniac. But the fact is, tlssit nations are seldom allowed to look at their interest except as it is relleeted by living political mirrors, such as kinfjs, ministers, demagogues or stockjob- bers, so contrived as to make deforujity exhibit beauty, and po^'erty w^ealth, to the infatuated people, for (he sake of ad- vancing their own views and proji'cts. Jlad the represen- tations of tiiesc false isiiriors been true, all nations would have enjoyed the highest prosperity. The United States are tempted to plunge into anticipation by the funds of back lands and groAing population; the first pronounced by twenty years experience, to be iuaufficient for the suste- nance of a single Ba'.itjg;* and the second unable to pro- tect the existing generation for a single year, against the drafts froiM their liberty and property which the system in- evitably produces. If we are thus seduced into the snare, in which the ambitious and mercenary of the present age involve their prey, our popwlalion and lands, are destined to feed the two most insatiable and uorst passions which af- flict mankiml, and our vacant territory will only be a fund for enslaving our children. Anticipation is at best a mode of putting the energies of present time in motion, without any powers of calling up a single energy of future time. Other modes have operated more powerfully, v^ithout being considered as blessings to the age which felt them. Those by which Xerxes, Alex- ander, Csesar, Peter the hermit, Tamerlane, Cromwell and

    • A rich English stockjobber.

Bonaparte were enabled to lead millions to victoi'y or de- feat, were more successful in arousing the military ener» gies of the present time, than the anticipating mode. Nothing exposed the American and French revolutions to greater danger, than the attempts to use this delusion. Anticipation was tried, it taxed the existing generations by depreciation, it superseded the cultivation of other modes of putting existing energies in motion, it failed, the failure al- most obliterated the memory and suspended the use, of the real means of war, and a dangerous crisis in both cases was produced. The errour in these instances was surmounted by the good sense which necessity so often teaches. Political and religious opinion, and a love of country, are stronger excitements of existing warlike energies, than anticipation. They cannot be stolen or lioarded; but war carried on by paper, is starved by peculation, and produces the utmost degree of publick expense, with (he least degree of publick spirit. An excitement of the nnlitia of the United States by arms, tiaining, equipments and eulogy, would probably have created a stronger military force, at an inferior expense, than all tl»e efforts of anticipation!»ave been able to produce. Can the most expensive, the least successful, and the most corrupt mode of exciting the ener gies of war, be the best? If anticipation cannot create, but only excite, it follows, that there is a deception in the idea, that it can postpone the expense of war to a future time. The expense of wiir real- ly consists of men, food, raiment, arms and ammunition, and not in a juggle of signs; anticipation therefore is a phan- tom, incapable of alleviating the miseries of war, whilst it is a harpy, able to devour the blessings of peace. The Romans carried on long and expensive wars with- out the aid of anticipation, and it failed before the end of our short and cheap revolutionary war. Yet the whole of the paper money was paid, or sunk by depreciation whilst the war was going on; a mode of taxation so excessively unequal, as to ascertaiu, both the ability an<l necessity of every existing nation to bear the expense of its own war; for if war could be maintained by a tax excessively unequal, it follows, that the energies of war, are within the reach of an equal tax.

After this unequal tax was paid by the United States, and the war had been finished successfully by patriot isui and bravery, anticipation, which had fled disgracefully from the contest, returned to reap the best fruits of the victory; and though a traitor, found means to supplant and plunder the heroes who had won it. This success was more won- derful, from the reason which caused it, than in itself. 1 hat a few people should be willing to enrich themselves at the expense of a multifude, is far less wonderful, than that they shouM succeed by persuading this multitude, that an- ticipation, which had recently deserted them, was a better defender of nations, than patriotism and bravery, which had recently saved them.

National defence, was never the true cause of any fund- ing system; and no funding system ever defended a na< ion. It was invented in England to prop a revolution by corrup- tion; extensively used to sacrifice the nation to German in- terests; and it has been continued to feed avarice, and si- lently to revolutionize the revolution. It was introduced into America, after the nation had been defended, to enrich a few individuals, and also to revolutionize the revolution.

In England, the advancement of the Hanoverian family to the throne, was disagreeable to the landed interest, of which the tory party at that time chiefly consisted. 'I'his compelled George the first to use the whig party. And Sir Robert Walpole, who belonged to it, pushed a paper system to enrich his partisans, and to balance the superior wealth of their political opponents. The artifice complete- ly succeeded; the rich tories were impoverished; a vast change of wealth took place;* an irresistible whig party

  • There is only one title in Eng'land which p^oes with the lands; that of

Arundel. Did lienry the 7th or Walpole's paper system, operate m"st ff- f<?ctiially towards this circumstance? was formed, and gradually transformed by the same papei' system into tories. As a whig party it placed a family on the throne, and then converied itself to toryism with zeal and rapidity, by fraudulent laws to enrich itself.

In America also, a paper system followed the revolution produced by the present form of our general government, and operated upon the landed whigs here, exactly as it had done on the landed tories in England. It taxes them, en- riches a credit or paper faction ; changes property ; forms a party ; and transforms its principles as in England. But the American whigs are blind to the ruin which the English tories saw.

Henry the 7th broke the power of the barons to strength- en the monarchy; Sir Robert Walpole destroyed the power of the landed interest, and compelled it to contribute to the formation of a nionied interest, to establish a disputed title to the throne. The capacity of the latter invention has pro- bably exceeded what "was foreseen. It is found able to seize and to hold the reins of government. It is found able to erect a stupendous fabrickoffaelitious wealth, and to com- pel land and labour or real wealth, to become its humble and obedient subject.

The importance of these truths is not diminished, be- cause the monied interest in England happened to start as whigs, and the landed as tories. They shew that a paper system was not introduced for national defence, and that it can transfer property, transfoi*m parties, and change the nature of governments. Avarice, and a conviction of its power as a political engine, suggested its introduction j and events have proved that this conviction was correct. It is an engine which is able to usurp and hold a government; therefore it will contend for dominion. As it will contend, it must experience defeat or victory. It is also an engine- having no reseml>!anee in interest to land, labour or talents : therefore it cannot be a friend to either.

It was necessary to premise a short history of these two paper systems, to introduce the following argument, as to the reality ori?«lusion of an idea usually annexed to antici- pation. If it did not powerfully and instantaneously enrich and impoverish existing people, how could Walpole so sud- denly and effectually have debased a landetl, and exalted a iDfionied faction, by its means ? The capacity of aiititiipa- tion to act suddenly upon an existing age, manifests bolli the delusion of considering it as an engine for drawing up wealth from futurity, and also, that as an engine for pro- ducing an oppressive government, it is no dehision. All paper systems, are in fact, indirect hiws of confiscation, used for the purposes which induced the French revolutionists to transfer more directly, a great mass of landed property from their antagonists to themselves. These purpose^s sim- ply were to enrich themselves and establish their power. It was to enrich, and establish the power of the whigs, at the expense of the tories, that Walpole used a paper system. In America, a paper confiscation system, conferred wealth and power on a monarchical party at the expense of the whigs. In botli countries, those who furnished the riches, lost much of their power and property ; and those who received them, gained it. The French confiscations went boldly t© their object, like a direct tax. The English and American confiscations, secretly and cireuitously effected their design, by the comj>lication of a paper system ; like an indirect tax. One seized and transferred the land itself. The others, mortgaged it j artfully leaving to the owner an appearance of property, whilst he is only a receiver of the profits for. the benefit of the mortgagee. Is one mode of confiscation reprobated, because it is an open robber, which quickly ends^ the pain of its victim ; and the other suffered, because it lies hidden under deceit and complexity, and inflicts slow and lasting tortures ? Or is one reprobated, like a small crimi- nal wlw robs an individual j and the other flattered, like a great one who plunders a nation ? Can violations of pri-- vate property be rendered just or unjust by their modes ? Between the modes we have been comparing, there is one difference. Direct confiscation is always pretended to h^ a punishment of guilt ; indirect, by paper systems, is only Bsed to punish innocence. And yet these indirect confisca- tions talk finely about forieitures, and private pi-operty ; they pretend to protect that which their only effect is to transfer; they pretend to reprobate that which is their own quality; just as a tyrant, in the midst of spoil and carnage, will boast of his justice and clemency.

The appearance of anticipating the resources of future af^es, is artfully extracted from the siusple idea of borrow- in,"- upon interest, to raise up for paper systems a sufficient degree of popularity to support the craft. If the interest, which is the price paid for a loan, is adequate to the value of its use, that use is sold and bought, and not loaned. And such must be the case, as the interest or price is taken op refused at the option of the lender. A nominal borrower is therefore a real purchaser of this use at value, which value he must pay as long as he holds the purchase ; nor does he by the purchase of money for interest, differ from a tenant who purchases land for rent, in point of being able to an- ticipate the wealth of futurity. A new tenant or a new- generation may succeed the old, and each nmy continue to pay the same rent for the land or money, but their predeces- sors paid it also, without getting any thing out of time to come. This observation applies with still more particular accuracy to funding systems, in that branch of their policy, never to redeem the principal, but to receive a perpetual rent for it.

An individual who borrows money, like one who rents land, does not bring forward for his own use, the least portion of the wealth of time to come. Could he do this, borrowing would make an existing individual wealthier ; but as it generally makes him poorer, it seems evident, that he pays himself the value of the use of the money be borrows. If A, having land worth ten thousand pounds, borrows that sum of B, A does not become worth twenty thousand pounds at the expense of his posterity. He has only sold his land to B, and turned his fortune into money ; but B indulges A tvitli cultivating the land, and paj ins^ its rent under the name of interest. So if a nation, whose lands are worth one hun- dred millions, borrows and funds that sum, it has only sold or mortgaged its lands to stockholders up to their value, who receive the rent in the name also of interest or divi- dends. It has not added to its wealth, or drawn any thing from futurity, but only turned its land into money. And between the nation and a private debtor is tliis dliforence ; that an individual who sells his estate, receives and uses the purchase money ; but a nation which turns its estaie or any portion of it into money by borrowing, loses both the money and estate. But the evil is not terminated with this loss. If an age is supposed to consist of twenty years, and it borrows at five per centum, it loses the principal, first by its perversion from publick use to the gratification of private avarice or ambition ; secondly, by its entire repayment during the bor- rowing age ; and moreover all individuals who exist above twenty years, pay their proportion of the principal borrow- ed for each cycle of additional existence. ?vlany will pay, three lumdred per centum for anticipation in this-Vvay brfly, bat few will receive any tiling from it, and all subject their descendants for ever to a repayment of the whole principal for every revolution of the stockjobbing orb, without a pos- sibility of their deriving any benefit from it: To these re- quitals of an exir4ing generation, for attempting the impos- sibility of enriching itself at the expense of i(s jtosterity, a long eataiogne of the same complexion might be iadded ; such as the number and expense of new offices, produced by borrowing, not only to expend the principal, but to collect and pay the interest ; and the oppression inevitably result- ing from dividing a nation into inimical interests. These argnments are bottomed upon the concession of a similitude between renting land and borrowing money, whereas the true similitude from wliich we ought to draw our conclu- sions in regard to funding systembs, would be one Ix'tween paying rent for the picture of land^ and interest for the pic- ture of money. If the borrowing age, far from enriching itself, is a suf- ferer ; a system, by whicli each succeeding age, undergoes the same or greater evils, must be vitally malignant to hu- man ha])pinesse We have been unable to deduce any paper system, from the oria:in of honest intention or national defence : but as such an origin, would not alter its effects upon human hap- piness or liberty, or upon the civil policy of the United States, it is fair to conclude, that as the effects tf funding or anticipation will be evil, though the motives which gave rise to it should be honest, so the system is incurably er- . roneous. even under its most upright application. Of our civil policy, division and responsibility, are tht chief pillars. An accumulation of wealth by law, is the counter pviucijile to that of division. And out of this ac- cumulation will grow an influence over the legislature, which will secretly deprive the people of their influence over it. This principle of division has been applied to the laws of inheritance in every state in the union ; to divide land and accumulate stock, exhibits a political phenomenon, worthy of an attentive consideration ; because its consequences must be new and curious. If an accumulation of landed wealth, by the narrow and limited efforts of talents and in- dustry, is an object of jealousy to our policy : an accumu- lation of paper wealth by the extensive power of law, can- not be an object of its approbation. Land is in some degree a representative of every man's interest, as being the source of human subsistence, and a landed interest cannot tax with- out taxing itself. Out of paper stock nothing grows. It only represents the interest of its holder, and it can tax, without taxing itself. It must do this, because it can only subsist upon the subsistence it can draw from land and la- bour ; and as an imposer of taxes it is strictly analogous to a legislature of olficers receiving legal salaries. Ifa landed fnferest, thoiigli naturally friendly to man, may be cor- rupted by moulding it into a separate order ; and rendered malignant and oppressive in a considerable degree ; it is ex- tremely improbable, that a paper, stock, or taxation inte- rest, can be changed from a foe into a fiiend, by the means which convert a friend into a foe. The English have paid some regard to their principles of cheeks and balances, by leaving primogeniture, or an hereditary landed political or- der or faction, standing, as an offset against their monied faction ^ the American legislatures have paid no regard to their principles of division and responsibility, and more en- tirely partial to a monied faction, o!' their own architecture, have destroyed this offset, alone capable of holding a monied faction in some state of responsibility ; and secured agri- cultural subjection to their offspring, by charters for accu- mulating one, and laws for dividing the other. It is a plausible consideration against this conclusion^ that the laws of distribution reach and scatter paper wealth, as laws of in!ieritanee do ianded. The following fact, set- tled by exptiience, is a conclusive answer to the objection. The English laws of distribution, by which paper wealth is divided upon principles sinsilar to our laws of distribution, have been unable to prevent the existence of a separate, stock, paper, or taxation interest, or the ruinous effects of that existence. Such is the fact ; let us search for its cause. It pre- sents itself in the consideration, that corporations, or fscti- tious separate interests, neither live-nor die naturall;* ; th.^y anly live or die by law. An established church for instance, is ft factitious separate interest, not of natural, but of legal origin, and by law only can its existence be terminated. ^y increasing the number of priests, and dividing the in- come of this separate interest among more members, the interest itself is not divided ; and iiistead of being weaken- ed, it is strengthened. So in a separate, stock, paper or taxationinterest of any kind established by law. It is an interest one and indivi&ibk ;; and though tiie laws of dibtrl bution ma/ occasionally add to the numbers benefitted by it* these additions are recruits siiuilar to new levies added tp an army, or new priests added to an established church. In all three of these eases, an interest, created by law, and sub- sisting upon a nation, becomes stronger, by multiplying the individuals united to it with a participation in its income ; ^nd weaker, by diminishing the number of these individuals. Such interests are incapable, as will presently be proved, of including the majority of a nation, or of a general division ^mong its members ; the cement of fear, excited by a per- petual danger of the stroke of death, from their creator, law; and a consciousness of physical imbecility, distinguish Jhem from the object of their apprehensions. ^oue of these causes will prevent a landed interest from being weakened by a division of lands. Land is not created by law : therefore it is under no apprehension of its death stroke froui law. It does not subsist upon other interests 5 therefore it is not beset by an host of enemies, w hose ven- geance it is conscious of deserving. By tiie operation of laws adveise to its monopoly, it quickly adjusts itself to the interest of a majority of a nation ; thenceforward it is in- capalde of the avarice and injustice of a factitious legal in- tnjrest, because no temptation to seduce it into either, ex- ists. To this point of improvement, a landed interest will invariably be brought, by laws for dividing lands ; nor can it be corrupted, except by laws which confine lands to a minority. Then it becomes in a degree a factitious legal monopoly, capable of being favoured by law, and infected with a portion of that malignity, which constitutes the entire essence of a minor separate interest purelv factitious. A paper, a military, or an established church interest, cannot, it has been asserted, include a majority of a nation, as may a landed : because a majority cannot live upon a minority, but a uiajority may live upon land. Let us take a paper interest of any kind to illustrate this assertion. It is simply debt, in all its forms. If I give a bond to myself, it does not add to my wealth, or create a new interest. If a nation should preate any portion Qftlebt, and sustain it in asitateof equiil distribution anions all il8 is-enjuers, no se- parate intvifst >vould thence arise. Creditor and debtor are characters essential to the existence of a paper pvo|)erty or interest ; if these charaetets are united, the quality of •value flees from paper. Iinaj^ine a nation eonsistinjj; of one smillittiit having paper stw?k of one inUli< n, eaih per son hold- ing one share, and equally taxed to redeem this stoek. Thfe principle ofdlviaioa obviously annihilates in this stock, the quality of vahie or pro|>erty. But give ten shares each, to one hundred thousand of the san«e nation, antl these q^nali- ties are instantly annexed to the stock. But land neither loses its value by division, nor is that value enhanced by tm- cuinuiatinn. It is therefore capable of escaping the infec- tion of monopoly, whilst a paper interest cannot exist with- out it ; of this interest, monopoly bein.^ the vital principle, . the laws of distribution cannot destroy it, without putting an end to the system itself. The gradual progress of the laws of distribution, must aggravate the evil of a paper monopoly, until the very mo- ment at which they ukight be made to produce its destruc- tion. As a paper interest draws its subsistence from the re- sidue of a nation, an increase of the number to be subsisted, will add to the burden of furnishing this subsistence; just as an increase of soldiers or priests, will add to the burdens of the nation which maintains tliem. So long as the in- crrase of an army or priesthood is attended with national ability to maintain them, the effect of bringing more sol- diers or more piiests to share in a religious or military mo- nopoly, is an aggravation of national oppression | but the Tei'y instant adistributiou of a religious or military monopo- ly is extended to a majority of the nation, by making then4 soldiers or priests (as in the case of a national militia) the ability in the residue to maintain it would cease, and ith it, the oppression would cease also^ In like manner, the laws of distribution are only capable of affeating a paper interest ia two modes. ^ Byaggravutiogits micehieA or producing its destruction. And they must of necessity operate in the first way, until they terminate in the second. Their first effect is certain, and must continue for a long space, to pro- duce a chance for the second ; and it is after all highly im- probable, that the second will ever happen. The laws of distribution therefore aggravate the evils of a paper monopoly, w hereas those for dividing lands diminish the evils of a landed monopoly. The fact in England and the United States, exactly corresponds with these argu- ments. The distribution of a paper interest to greater numbers, has strengthened the paper monopoly in both countries. A landed monopoly in England, though sup- ported by the law of primogeniture and a legislative order, i^ hardly felt as a political principle. There, the mere right of alienation has produced a division of lands, suffi- cient to destroy a landed aristocracy, and enfeeble a landed interest ; and laws for dividing or distributing paper stock, have created and strengthened a paper aristocracy. The latter have the same eff etas laws for multiplying offices, in order to cure the ill eifects of patronage ; or for increas- ing a nobility or clergy for the purpose of abolishing an or- der. Having proved that laws of division or distribution, will counteract landed and aid paper combinations for usurping a government ; we w ill proceed to suI>join a few of the ef- fects which will result from the destruction of a landed, and the creation of a paper monopoly. As landed possessions are divided, the leisure and in- come of the proprietors will be diminished ; and as paper property is accumulated, the leisure and income of the holders will be increased. The weiglit of talents will fol- low leisure and wealth ; and these will gradually acquire a locality, concsponding to the abodes of the receivers of stock taxation. This superiority of talents and wealth will invest individuals, and the cities in which they will chiefly reside, with an influence, well calculated to acquire an as- cendant over the landed interest, gradually impoverished by ilivisinn. And though this landed interest may not sudden- ly sink into an ignorant, scattered, disunited peasantry, taxed by paper operations, to enrieh. instruct and elevate a aew species of Feudal capitalists, yet the tendency of the system is exnetly to that point, and the arrival of an unob- structed tendency, is inevitable.

If the division of landed property has a tend'^ncy to in- crease the ignorance of the numerous and valuuble poition of society which cultivate it, a defect of the American j)0- licy in not providing some remedy to meet this evil, is dis- closed. From preventing an accumulation of landed wealth, and providing for a monied or stock monopoly of know- ledge, a reason arises for placing the best educations witliin the reach of that great mass of p<u)ple, called the landed in- terest ; instead of which its inability to purchase knowledge is studiously increased, by a division of inheritances, and by the annual draughts upon it for tbe interest and dividends of deht and hank stock. The ignorance of land holders will thus in time he brought to a standard exactly sufficient to render them tame, and subservient to the interest of a stock aristocracy ; an event wliich may even be accelerated, by taxing them for the purpose of diffusing a knowledge of the vulgar tongue, and vulgar arithmetick. These laws for di- viding landed property, and levelling landed knowledge, form a striking contrast with those for accumulating stock wealth, and of course stock knowledge. Are both consistent with the principles of our governments ? If I wished to level a field, merely preserving that degree of inequality, necessary to prevent the effects of stagnation, ought I to rear a mountain in the midst of it ? Is an accumulation of wealth and knowledge by law in a few hands, to be found in any recipe for making a free republiek ?

The errour of landed w ealth. in favouring a paper aris- tocracy, because it is friendly to a landed one, rises into view at this moment. It does not perceive that even in England, a landed aristocracy has been vanquished and h governed by a paper or stock aristocracy. It does not pev ceive that alaiuled aristocracy cannot exist, imf^er our 1aws> the extent of our country, anfl the mnltitudo oC pi oprietors; Tijio.Jority i'* not a quality ol" avistocraey. Ami it will not jwjpeeive that the lamled intcM'Cst is uwler our cirfvi instances, irrptrlf'vahly repuhlitan. Boi?»<;. so. the preservation of principles a la:>ted to its nafMrc. or a sale or inort^aiije of itseiC, for the snaiutenance-of a stoclv aristocracy,, is evi- dently its solitary alternative. Our landed interest is inca- pa'd** oTformins: the aristocracy required Ivy Mr. Adams's system of iimitcd monarchy. In Enj^land, the, aristocratical iPO'Wer vvjaieh.now props the throne, is compounded of arms, paper and patronaj^e: not of tiie landed interest. With a paper system, which has dcstj-oyed the power of a latided interest inEnj^Iand,. revive it here? Has a landed ai:i>rtoeraey existed, or can it exist, in community with a])jina{Jon^s, commercek the division of inheritances, and the aiiseytce lof, perpetuities?

Perhaps an imaginary apprelieni>»ion may have sug.s;ested tleid(a, that the mode hy which Walpole fixed a tottering throne, was necessary for the estahlishment of our union. T^^t such an idea is a traitor to that union. Principles can never bo established by their contrai'ics. Monarchy may corrupt a faction to support itself, consistently with its principles: but national will cannot corrupt a faction to guide national will, without perisliiag at the instant of success. Had the proposal been made, it would have been reprobated by every individual friendly to the union. Is the attempt. leas to be reprobated, than the proposal?

The English have been made to pay hundreds of mil- lions for the Hanover family; hut why should the Ameri- cans buy the union at the same price, of any party, whether whig or tory? No one has a claim to it, as Stuart had to the throne of England, therefore we can keep it as our own undisputed right. It may be retained by virtue, moderate government, and easy taxes; but it dies under the influence ofpa'ier sto^k. And out of this dissolution the resurrection of Mr Adam»> theory of three ordors cannot arise. There can he but two imdei* the system of paper, namely, creditor and debtor, patiit- ians and plebeians, or masters and slaves. We agree with Mr. Adams that two orders will render a nation miserable, thou^^h we have denied that three, or even a miuiher equal to the casts of India, will restore it to liap- piness.

The orders of creditor and debtor, make the system of Spartans and Helots. One will live in idleness npon the labour of the other. But the luxury of th^ present a;^e, and the effeminacy of modern Spartans, doubly a^^gruvale the malij^nity of the theory in our imitation. Inunifely more income is required for the paper Spartans, an;] labour from the free Helots, without the retribution of national defence. IJu( if our modern Spartans are not heroes, they have dis- closed an iiiimitable portion of dexterity, in prevailing upon the order of Helots to buy heroes to knock their fetters on and not off; and to defend, not the nation, but the income df the Spartan order.

It is believed hy the intelligent writer of the life of General Washington, that the United States were divided into two parties and hrought to the brink of ruin, soon after the peace with Enghind, by the struggles of creditors and debtor's. Ifhe is right, it cannot be just or wise to create by legal urtifice the two characters to an extent, beyond that wiiich then threatened them with ruin. Paper stock forces every individual into one of these parties, without leaving in the nation a single disinterested umpire, to as- suage the passions inspired by a belief, that we have a right to receive what the law gives, and a right to withhold what it uajustly transfers. These wiil not be the parties of pri- vate contract, restrained by the voice of conscience, aiul moderated by the decrees of impartiality; but of fluctuating interested faitioa, legislating to get or to keep wealth, and looking only into its own law for justice and judgement.

Paper stock, patronage, and sinecure, profess an affec- tion for commerce, because she is a convenient cord or <ackle, to dr.nw out of land and labour, the mojjey which. . bestows on them wealtlj and power. For this purpose haB Enj^lish commerce been used, by paper stock, patronage and sineeupe, and the maritime force necessary to sustain, is an evider»ee of their lalent hostility towards it.

Dazzled by the splendour of Enj^lish commerce; shall we forsfet that we cannot conquer and keep both the Indies, nor compel the woi Id to obey a navii^ation act for laying it under eontribnfion, by the prowess of stock? Force, con- quest, and colonization, furnish the food to English com- merce, which it disgorges to be again swallowed by paper stock. Should our coinuierce mistake this devourer for nourishment, unpossessed of the power of forcing its liver to grow as it is eaten, it will soon cease to excite the jealousy of English commerce. The prosperity which has awak- ened that jealousy, was produced by its freedom; and the vigorous health hence derived, will speedily be exchanged for the hypochondi'iacal, and convulsive fluctuations of law, war, and stockjobbing, if it is placed under the patronage of paper stock.

Charter, monopoly and aristocracy in their several forms (those of funding and banking excepted) have been consid- ered by commerce as her foes. She will not even own for her friends, monopolies bestowed on merchants; and al^ though, under the delusion of containing within herself qualities for constituting separate orders or interests, she has sometimes obtained them, yet she has universally upon trial found them unnatural to her constitution.

Adverse to this idea is the paradoxical opinion, that eo'nmerce may he made to flourish, by a paper capital, lo- cal, fictitious, and oppressive to land and labour. An opinion, contradicted by the commerce of Carthage, under a defec- tive navigation; and by the inability of English commerce to meet its rivals with the advantages of the greatest stock capital in the world, a superiority of manufactures, geo- graphical advantages, and an irresistible navy. She doffs the habiliments of a peaceable ti-ader, cases herself in armour, and kills or maims her relations, to support that life anil rivalry with foreign nations, to which her stock regiiiaea readers lier unequal.

W these reasons are insufficient to prove, that paper stock is iaiiaical to coiuiuerce, the next question is, whelher it is able to bt^stow upon her ueneiits, whicli will eoiiiiter- poise the advantages she derives tVoin a free goveinment? Upon this question she will still iind her interest united to her old friends, land iind labour. Jf paper sto{!k will des- troy the souad principles of governmeuts, by corrupting their administrators, will it compensate land, labour and commerce, for enslaving all three ? Agriculture, manufac- tures and commerce, are indigenous, as it were, to human comfort and happiness ; paper stock is a foreign invader, whose object is to subdue these close friends and natural allies, by instilling an opinion, that one of them will be benefitted by desertiirgto the common enemy.

An association of casualties, frequently hegets very Ayhimsical associations of ideas. The rare casualty of des- potism and national piospeiity, existing togeiJier, has begot- ten an opiiiion, that despotism would make a nation pros- per. And the commerce of England, made up of a eompli«  cation of circumstances, lias begotten an opinion, tiiat the system of pa{>er stock was fiivoarable to commerce. That the opinion flows from tliis source, is undeniable, and that it is a source producing only a medley of errour, is equally so. It would be as correct, to pick out of this compliiation, any oilier circumstance, and to ascribe to it the state of the British commerce, as to paper stock ; and many might pre- tend to such a distinction wilii far greater plausibiiity.

Commerce, monarchy, paper stock, legishilive corrup- tion, privileged orders, charters of exclusive conin^erce. and hierarchy, exist together in England. Is theie an affinity also between paper stock and monarchy, legislatire cor- ruption, privileged orders, exclusive cliarters for commerce, and hierarchy, because all exist w ith it ; the reason sup- posed to prove the affinity between this stock and coni- luerce ; or is the simultaneous reason sound in one case an<t unsound in all the otliers ? Or if the combination of paper stock »vith CO siinerce, monarchy, legislative corruption, ex- clusive charters and liierardiy, proves its affinity to all., would it be best to lake all for the sake of commerce, or te reject all for the sake oi* liberty ? The dilemma is avoided, by exploding the errour of con- sidering paj)er stock as favourable to conimercc, because they exist together in England. That one is the bane of the other, we have already inferred fi-om the necessity of Eng- land to resort to war and conquest to culJivate her com- merce. That one could acquire opulence without the other, is proved in the experience of Cartilage. And the early dissnay with which England beheld a commercial competition with America before her introduction of paper stock, is a modern concurrence with ancient experience. The commerce of the United States comnionced its operations unconnected with papei* money. an«l advanced for nrany years without acknowledging its aid; it was of)ligcd to travel from one hcmisi)here to anotlicr, before it couhl enter info competition with its rivals; it vtas unpro- tected hy {'.eets ,• it traded on the funds of four isiillions only of people, cultivating a soil, poor in compaiison with many countries to be rivalled ; and it possessed no foreign domin- ions to fleece. Yet it suddenly aroused tiic jealousy of ihe most extensive commerce in the world, by outstripping all othei-s. These effects appeared cither before it was possi- ble for it to owe any obligations to paper money, or whilst such obligations must have been inconsiderable. But our commerce was free. Will it not ai;t precipitately, in de- serting a career so happily commenced under the auspices of freedom, to enlist under tliose of paper stock, from an opinion that its rival derived opulence from that source ? jt may by the experiment enslave itself without enslaving India: it may oppress its land an.l labour associates by a fleet, without acquiring the empire of the sea; it may guide cronds of ])eople by monopoly, into a willingness to cx- chanse a moderate clitimte and fertile soil, for torrid and fH<ri(li zones ; and to snap all the tics of the human lirart, in an ea.j't'rness lo llee IVom the (liret't and inditect taxufinti of paper stock ; willioiit possesbitii^ a Botany Bav to hide the crimes, whieh oppression wili beget; and having iit lengtli lost its original >ital }>iincip]e, it may in its last ii.to- nies deplore the infatnatioii, which dazzled it viih the nnat- tainahle and transitoiy expedients of English force and monopoly.

Paper money is precisely as unahle to draw up out of fnturity, the commodities of commerce, as thf energies of war. The sto<-k in trade of an individual may consist of si,!i:ns or repiesentatives, but tlie stock of cojnmerce consists of the thina;s themselves ; namely, the products of the earth, and numufaetuj-es. Specie cannot draw forward any of these thinj^s fiom the next century into the present ; it can only draw them from one country into another; even this cannot be effi cted by local paper money; its office is to, tPilnsfer real wealth from man to man, not by commerce, but by a ju£;si;le in le^al and local si.i^ns of {)ropcrty. This is effected by monopolies for ulterinij;, and lepiilutijig the quafjtity of paper money. It !ias been a general opinion that monopoly was a principle, unfavouralde to eomniercial prosperity. Commerce struj^gled to destroy perpetuities, and monopoly to prevent alienations. In the disti ihution of wealth, commerce is active, unwearied and useful ; devoted to its !uonopoly, she becomes speculative, voluptuous and pernicious ; under the hitter employment she sickens ; unnatural as it is to her, it is the essential quality of paper systems. Whilst the office of one is to distribute and of the oiher to monopolize, a natuial enmity is strongly lo be apprcheuiied.

That paper stock will have the effect of aceuiiitilaling vvealtii in the hands of individuals, is admitted by its IViends and foes, and confirmed by experience. This eiicct is (lie exact reason felt in its d'^efence. It can only be produced by thievishly takin. ej from some to enrich others; or by miraculously drawing up out of futurity the comuioditk s of commerce, as it pretends to do the energies of war ; or by propelling and exciting human industry : it remains to con- sider, whether, in this last character, it acts as a goad or ^ reward ; and whether any more effectual, permanent, anil upright mode of excitement is practicable. Several ideas occurring here, will be postponed until the subject of banking is considered. At present, however, it is necessary to remark, that stock, created for war or fjouimerce, will equally excite either as a goad or a reward, and that if it acts as a goad, it behooves us to consider whe- ther industry, like bravery, may not be excited in some blot- ter mode. Any species of paper stock, wliich is a debt upon national industry, is taxation. Taxation is not a reward. It be- longs to the tyrannical class of excitements. If such ex- «itements have a stronger influence over the human mind, than those arising from the principles of social liberty, the sovernments of the United States are founded in anerronie- ous policy. They have all conceived that industry would be better excited by jvistice, than by taxation; tiiat com- merce to flourish, needed only to be free ; and that by free- dom, t]ie supplies of land and labour would be increased. By free and moderate government, our constitutions have expected to excite a military spirit to defend, an industrious s{)vt to improve, and a commercial spirit to enrieh our country. Neither the monopolies of standing armies, he- reditary perpetuities, or chartered currencies, were con- sidered as the best excitements for defending, cultivating* or enriching it. A feudal or landed monopoly starved commerce, because it tended to discourage industry, by which commerce is sup- plied. This effect flowed from the injustice of emiching by legal monopoly without industry. A monopoly for the re- giiliition of a paper currency, far more unexceptionable, en- riches by law without industry; and in producing the same effeet, di.«.eloses that it is the same principle. If this mo- nopoly was guided by a noble order, unconnected with comuieree, she would Exclaim against it ; and piided by hef, she is able to use it to oppress agriculture and labour, just as the feudal monopoly was used to oppress labour and eoin- mefce. That she would diminish her own prosperity, is an insufficient secuiity against the abuse of such a mo- nopoly. The landed interest diminished its own prosperity, by the oppression of commerce and labour. By justice, as to all three, a nation will prosper ; by enabling eitlier to draw wealth from the otiier two, by law, without induslry,, the common good or general interest is invariably v ouniled.

Equally remediless is the evil of corporate bodies for re- gulating commercial currency, by the expedient of forming th^m with land holders, merchants, and manufacturers. That a land holder will not oppress a landed interest, is a stale and exploded idea. If he receives the tax or the office in which the oppression consists, although he contributes towards it from his land, the security vanishes. The whole catalogue of tyrants have been land holders. If a bank cur- rency is a tax upon land labour, and commerce, as will here- after be demonstrated, stock holders, even couiposed of land holders, merchants and manufacturers, will for ever remain willing to receive the whole tax, though they may colitri- bute a proportion of it. Nor will it follow, that bank or fend- ed stock is beneficial to the landed, commei cial or manufac- turing interest, because we see several land holders, mer- chants and manufacturers enriched byit^ any more than that sineeure offices would be beneficial to these interests, were we to see several land holders, merchants and manu- facturers enriched by them. It is the income drawn from land and labour, and not any benefit rendered to commerce by stock, which causes its wealth. And this fact is ttie true reason, why stock transplants men from the natural interests of society, into the artificial interest of paper and patronage.

To buy cheap, and to sell dear, is admitted to be the object of commerce. The English mode of effecting these objects, is to compel labour to sell, and foreign nations to Luy, at the prices wlileh pHper monopoly shall settle. If the coile of jjillaj^e contai'is a law, a!lovin.i; one naCion to pilfei" another, that of social jiistieecoiituins none, Uy which the idea, of enabling an ai-(iik'ial inlerest, direilly or intli- rectly, to foi'ce down or r'^nlate the prices of the natural interests in the same comminiily, can he defended. No henejit arises to a nation from such an operation. It merely creates a rich order, l)y creating a poor order. '1 lie "Weak;! obtained Troin the ibicign nation by the reduclioits imposed upon the price of labour al home, is only taken by force or fraud f om that lahour, and given t</ stoclc eapilal- ists. This is precisely the species of excitement produced by the English, and all other paper systems. JS'ath)nal, social and mora! law unite in pronouncing ii t<» be unjust. And however it may enrich a few, it idijtoverishes and oppresses a multitude, and changes commerce into a na- tional curse. It becomes a blessing, whenever one nation can undersell another; not when an order or several mer- chants, aj-e enabled to undersell foreign merchants, at the expense of fellow-citizen manufacturers. It is no benefit to the plundered, that the r.rbber can undersell a fair pur- chaser. The rival modes for enalding one nation to undersell another, are, the English, composed of force, fraud and paper, and calculated to render labour subservient to ava- rice, by bestowing on the latter the power of regulating wages; and that, which acquires the same advantage from the moderation, freedom and cheapness of the government. By this system tiie United States have successfully rivalled Europe, and obtained a degree of prosperity not embittered by the reflection of having killed and plundered foreign na- tions, and oppressed fellow-citizens, for the sake of coni- Dierce. - If paper systems are in their nature suitable to legisla- tive corruption, aristocracy and monarchy; and if the mo- mentum they bestow upon commerce, will enrich a few and rtijpoverish a multitude of the same nation j yet, it is still said, that paper stock or national debt is an an.a;mcntation ef national property, in addition to its retributing a nation for the taxes it inflicts, by the industry it excites.

The 5th chapter of Sterne's posthumous works, gives an account of a pamphlet written by himself in def«nce of Sir Robert Walpole, and contains the origin of this docirine. He proved, says he, " that the accumulation of taxes, like « the rising of rents, was the surest token of a nation's « thriving ; that the dearness of markets, witii these new im- «« posts of government, necessarily doubled industry ; and « that an increase of this natural kind of manufacture, was « adding to the capital stock of the commonwealth.*' lie subjoins, ** that his book had been the codex, or ars polilica « of all the ministerial sycophants ever since that jera ; and « that he had scarcely met with a paragraph in any of the « state hireling writers, for many years past, that he could « not trace fairly back to his own code."

If American commerce, dazzled with the glare of the English, produced by consuming great masses ofdomestiek and foreign happiness, is insensible totlic prophelick satiie of Sterne, and the catastrophe hovering over her rival, we must intreat her to have recourse to her own skill in calcu- lation, and to estimate political consequences, with only half the attention she would devote to a trading voyage.

Mr. Adams has told her, that three orders, two of them hereditary, are necessary to create a limited monarchy, a monarchical republick, or the English form of government. We remind her, that orders appear in every monarchy, limited ordespotick. The nobility of Germany, France and Spain, the Mandarins of China, the Nabobs of India, the Bashaws of Turkey, and the military order in every form, are proofs, that monarchy, mixed or pure, can only be supported by orders.

If we have proved, that paper systems lead to the establishment of orders; and if those which are guilty of oppression, or those which suffer it, are naturally driven to monarchy for defence or protection; orders or separate and inimical interests, are universally to be considered as tfie pielu(5e to monarchy. And whether they vill terminate in a liinited »i' ahsolute monarchy are the events to be calcu- lated. The probability of either is only to be inferred from experience. And the evidence of experience is found, by countinj; t!ie cases wherein orders or separate legal inter- ests, have resulted in absolute despotism oi* limited monar- chy. The catalogue of the first class, is almost coequal ^vith the number of governments, which have ever existed ; and one case exists, or in its purity has existed, according to Mr. Adams, of the other.

This is the adventure, ujwn which American commerce is embarking her freedom and prosperity. By favouring the English paper system, she endeavours to introduce se- parate and inimical interests ; these will beget monarchy ; there is a thousand to one, that this monarchy will be abso- lute, even supposi'ig that one case does exist, wherein or- ders have protected liberty by checking monarchy. If no such case exists, she exchanges her freedom and prosperity for slavery; if it does, she takes the chance of one against a thousand, of exchanging it for limited monarchy, in pre- ference to a free republick.

But commerce will exclaim that she is an enemy to or- ders or separate interests, that she is a republican, and in favour of equal rights and privileges. We shall believe her if she unites in the expulsion of a separate interest ', but if she craftily turns her eyes from the quarter, on which it is advancing, however vociferously she may call our attention to a feint, she will be suspected of a confederacy ^vith the enemy.

Nobility and hierarchy are not the only modes of constituting orders, proper for fomenting national discontent, and introducing monarchy. If it is true, as Mr. Adams asserts, and as all mankind allow, "that wealth, is the great machine for governing the world." Hence wealth, like suffrage, must be considerably distributed, to sustain a democratick republick ; and hence, whatever draws a conside rable proportion of either into a few hands, Avill destroy it. As power follows wealth, the majority must have wealth or lose power. If wealth is accumulated in the hands of a few, either by a feudal or a stock monopoly, it carries the pow- er also ; and a government becomes as certainly aristociatical by a monopoly of wealth, as by a monopoly of arms. A minority, obtaining a majority of wealth or arms in any mode, becomes the government. *

Nobility and hierarcliy cannot acquire in the United States the article of wealth, necessary to constitute a sepa- rate order or interest, and therefore they can only be used as feints to cover the real attack. It cannot be forgotten, that aristocracy is a Proteus, capable of assuming various forms, and that to make tiiese forms appear in that natural hideousness common to the features of the family, it is neces- sary to toucli it with some test, an accumulation of wealth by law without industry, is this test. In our situation and tempe:- it can only be effected by patronage and paper, which ijow bestow monarchy and groans upon England. Title without wealth is the shadow; an accumulaiion of wealth by lavv, is the substance. We have only to deter- mine wliieh is the feint, and which is the foe.

We hear indeed of the aristocracy of the first and second ages, from the lepinings not the efluits of hierarchy and ti- tle; whilst paper systems and patronage, the aristocracy of the third, are using force, faith and ciedit, as the two others did religion and feudality ; and these new artifices cloak themselves under the smoke produced by the explosion of the old.

Against one shadow of aristocracy, the general consti- tution provides in these words, no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States." Suppose, as a provision against the other, some member of the convention had proposed, " that the reinstatement of Jupiter, and the convocation of Olympus should be prohibited :" Ought he not to have been seconded by the inventor of the security against aristocracy, contained in the prohibition of title? ? The people of England were taught to believe, that they had nothing to fear except froiu the pope and the pretender, by the ministers who mortgaged them irredeemably to op- pression.

Imaginary Gods and empty titles, are in the United States equally to be dreaded, and are equally able to erect the aristocracies of superstition or feudality. A pecuniai-y interest, quartered on nations by law, is here the eiigine of power and oppi'ession. Unnecessary office, sinecure income, stockjobbing by the lawmaker, a legislative patronage of separate interests or factions, and a concentrated power to tax, to incorporate, to borrow and to receive, make up the convolutions of a serpent, which is silently and insidiously entwining liberty ; and to divert our attention from the ope- ration, we are terrified by the dead skeletons of the two an- tient aristocratieal mamoths.

Superstition has received its death blow from know- ledge ; a landed aristocracy, from commerce, alienation and the division of inheritances. Against the dead, liberty is safe; from the living aristocracy of paper and patronage iilone, she can receive a deadly wound.

A man, being informed that three assassins had deter- jaiiicd upon his death, but that two of them had suffered the punishment due to other crimes, solemnly anathematizes the dead bodies, and takes into his bosom the living mur- derer, liiberly is the man; superstition and title her dead enemies; and the system of paper and patronage her living foe.

But we are blinded by names. Ilierareliy concealed its . malignity, by usurping the name of religion. The new sys- tem of oppression conceals itself, by calling patronage, necessary office ; a funding system, faith and credit; and a banking system, an encouragement of eomm'M'ce. Mankind have discovered the difference between religion and hierarchy ; they must also discover that between useful and pernicious offices, between genuine and spurious faith and credit, and between commerce and monopoly, before they can maintain moderate and free governments. The system of paper monopoly deceives no less by rejecting, than by assuming names. It renounces titles, that it may be thought to have renounced aristocracy. And it renounces disorderly government, that it may be thought to have a regard for private property. But titles are inconsistent with its species of aristocracy, and property is more securely and permanently invaded and transferred, by a re- gular and orderly system, than by occasional and disorderly violations.

This love of property is artfully seized by the system of paper and patronage, as a handle with which to guide hu- man nature. Whilst superstition was its strongest passion, that was the handle used for the same purpose. But this system, discovering that a love of superstition has given place to a love of property, and concluding that mankind are fated for ever to be traitors to their reason and dupes to their passions, moulds them to its purposes by the same means which superstition used successfully for ages.

Had the system of paper and patronage, proposed to give property in Heaven for property on earth, the count- less profit of the exchange might have reasonably attracted the passion of avarice, and in some measure varnished over the imposture ; but when it imposes on a love of property, by pretending to revere and protect, that which its only em- ployment is to violate and transfer, we cannot forbear to ex- claim, that avarice is a greater fool than superstition ; we are dismayed at discovering that a stronger engine for manufacturing tyranny exists, than superstition itself; the mind startles at its own imbecility, and shudders at its visible love of imposture.

A love of property, under which the system of paper and patronage crouches, is the very passion by which it ought to be assailed. All frauds pretend to be founded upon ihe principles, which apply most forcibly against them ; just as superstition pi-etended to be religion. So this system uses the passion of avarice in others, to gratify its own. By pretending to protect property, it arquire? properly. It ini»f"»»ously persuades ns, that it can effect the first object, without possessinfjj a sins;le quality adequate to it ; ami that it does not effect the other, with qualities coDijietent to no other end. And it gravely and loudly proclaims its love of good order, hut conceals that its motive for sucdi ap^iarent integrity, is the perpetuation and secui'ily of its own unjust acquisitions.

A love of good order, is a publick virtue. It is more useful the wider it is diffused. Is it good policy to bribe a minority into a profession of this virtue, by suffering it to pillage a majority ? Is good order secured by rendering the mass of a nation discontented, to content a few ? Let us inquire whether such a policy is wise. No one will assert that it is just. The love of property is now the second basis of civil government. The question is, how a M'isc statesman should avail himself of this passion. If he forcibly or fraudulent- ly takes wealth from a multitude, and gives it to a few, these few, it is confessed, will support all his projects, bad or good ; and call his government orderly, and a protector of private property. But if he forbears to take directly or iadirectly from the multitude, in order to corrnpt a faction, he af-quires the affection and support of this multitude. The diiference between the acquisitions is this. TJie corrupted faction) will adhere to the vicious as well as just measures of our statesman ; the majority, treated justly, will condemn his vices, and only applaud his virtues. That government or party therefore which designs to do wrong, will resort to one policy; and that which designs to do right, to the other.

It is a falsehood, that the policy of enriching a minority at the publick expense, is ever resorted to, for the purpose of protecting property j or that it is capable of any such effect. The idea of hiring a minority in civil government, to protect the property of a majority, is visildy absurd. Both frojn its physical inability, and also because all minor interests invested with political power, have universally violated property. That they shall necessarily do so, is therefore a settled moral law.

Our poliey and consfitutions rip;idly distinguish bt-t^Tcon good and evil moral principles, upon this subject. The love and protection of property was one of those good moral principles which caused the war with England. In a gor- ernment, it is only a virtue, so long as this love and pro- tection shall be impartially extended to every member of the society. Of this virtue, avarice is the correspondent tice. It loves and pilfeis the ptoporty of otheis, and pro- tects what it gets. Does the system of j-aper and patronage correspond witli the virtue or the vice?

The force of this reasoning is sometimes eluded, by charging it with assailing the propriety of taxing, for the support of civil government. This is an artifice to hide the hiiquity of taxing for the benefit of the aristocracy of paper and patronage, under the justice of taxing for the eonnnon good. To infer that we are inimical to needful taxes, from our endeavouring to display the principles and effects of the aristocracy of the thiid age, is only a repetition of the artifice, which induced the aristocracy of the first age, to accuse a man of irreligion, whenever he reasoned against superstition.

Despotick power strives to blend itself with legitimate government, as paper stock does with private property f both endeavouring to sanction the evils they dispense, by the blessings which flow from the resemblances they falsely assume; and private property, the earning of labour, the reward of merit, the almoner of age, and the soul of civilization, is transformed by stock into a political monster, as hideous as government transformed by tyranny. It becomes the right of fraud, the scourge of industry, and the instrument of despotism. Stock private property, can condemn the seventh part of the most industrious and ingenious nation in the Avorld, to poverty and vice, or to hospitals and prisons. When freedom and tyranny are both called government, and rightful acquisitions and ^aper stock both called private property, it can only be, to say the most for such denominations, as Gabriel and the Devil are both called angels.

Mankind have suffered nearly as mueh from confound- ing natural with fictitious property, as from confounding legitimate with spurious power. If the acquisitions of use- ful qualities are genuine private property, can the crafty pilferings from useful qualities under fraudulent laws, to gratify bad qualities, be genuine private property also? If the fruit of labour is private property, can stealing this fruit from labour, also make private property?

By calling the artillery property, which is playing on property, the battery is masked. Tythes and stock, invent- ed to take away private property, are as correctly called private property, as a guillotine could be called a head. The system of Mr. Adams and Lord Skaftsbury, is founded upon the principle of applying the guillotine of law, to pro- perty instead of heads, to keep wealth, to which they both correctly annex power, balanced among three orders; the stock system is founded in the same principle, with this difference, that it takes away the entire property or its pro- fit from majorities, whereas the sjstem of orders is content with two thirds of it.

There are two modes of invading private property; the first, by which the poor plunder the rich, is sudden and vio- lent; the second, by which the rich plunder the poor, slow and legal. One begets ferocity and barbarism, the other vice and penury, and both impair the national prosperity and happiness, inevitably flowing from the correct and honest principle of private property.

When it is proposed to tax stock or tythes for the sup port of civil government, they claim the stipendiary character to procure an exemption from taxation; but when it is proposed to abolish them, because the services under which this stipendiary character its claimed, have become useless or pernicious, they as loudly claim the character and the rights of private property. Feudality, hierarchy, and paper stock, have each successfully resorter' to these subterfuges (o keep justice at bay; and liail the English House of Couunons heen ooen to the clergy, as all the departments of the American government are to stockjobbers, the former would probaitly have still maintained the same invaluable exclusive privi- lege, which the latter now enjoy.

The American constitutions are equally opposed to inva- sions of property by fraudulent and swindlinj^- laws; or by impracticable, dishonest and ruinous equalising reveries of political enthusiasts. They pursue the idea of securing to talents and industry their earnings, and not of transferring these earnings to others. Therefore they have rejected aa equality of property, standing armies, hierarchies and pii- vileged orders ; and had they foreseen, that their principle in relation to property, was capable of being undermined by paper magick, that also would have been specifically guarded against.

Accumulations and divisions of property by law, simple ®r complicated, are equally adverse to our policy, and to moral rectitude. IJoth will excite hatred, discourage indus- try, and infuse knavery into the national character, by di- viding it into factions, perpetually striving to pillage each other. Whether the law shall gradually transfer the pro- perty of the many to the few, or insurrection shall rapidly divide the property of the few among the many, it is equally an invasion of private property, and equally contrary to our constitutions.

If equalising and accumulating laws are the same in principle, it is inconceivable how the same mind should be able to detest the one, and approve the other. Integrity is compelled to reject both, and spurning at doctrines, calculated to incite the few to plunder the many, or the many to plunder the few, leaves every man under the strongest excitement to labour for his own and the national prosperity, from a conviction, that the laws are a mantle of justice, and not an intricate net to fish for his earnings. Our policy is founded upon the idea, that it is both wise and just, to leave the distribution oi property to industry and talents ,• that what they acquire is all their own, except what they owe to society ; that they owe nothing to society except a contribution equivalent to the necessities of gov- ernment ; that they owe nothing to monopoly or exclusive pii- vilege in any form ; and that whether they are despoiled by the rage of a mob, or the laws of a separate interest, the genuine sanction of private property is equally violated. Are these the principles of our policy ? Do paper systems correspond with these principles ? If legislative patronage enriches a portion of society, that portion is necessarily converted into an order, posses- sing the qualities of an aristocracy. It is placed between the government and the nation. It receives wealth from the one, and takes it from the other. This ties it to the gov- ernment by the passion of avarice, and separates it from the nation by the passion of fear. And these two passions, an- nexed to any separate interest, have unexeeptionably con- verted it into a political order, and forced it into the ranks of despotism. AVaj', in former times, enriched and aggrandized by eon- quest ; in modern, by loaning. Titled orders, in the first case, usurped and monopolized what the nations they be- longed to, conquered from their enemies ; and by means of this usurped wealth, enslaved the conquerors. Paper or- ders acquire Avealth in modern wars by loaning, although nothing is obtained by conquest. Now, a nation, by war without conquest, is made to furnish the means for its own subjection. The enemies of the Roman people, supplied the ineans for enslaving the Roman people. The English pay for tiieir slavery tliemselves. An interest enriched by war, successful or unfortunate, must be separate and aristo- cratical. Nations have effected an improvement in universal law, or the law of nations, without <leriving from it the greatest advantage it is calculated to produce. Conquest respects private property ; hence a nation can no lonjo-er eonqiier for itself. Formei'Iy, every indiviiliuil of a conquering army, got some share of the plun(h*r; if his officer ohtaiiicd a palace, the soldier got a cottage ; if his ofilcer obtiUiicd an house, the soldier got a cow. Then, one nation niiglit l(e said to conquer another, although the spoil was unequally divided. But now the expression has become inacrui ate, because there is precisely that degree of protection allowed by conquest to private propefty, necessary to the interest of the modern aristoeiacy of paper and patronage. As theie- fore, under the modern law of nations, no nation can giaii any share of the booty, or conquer another nation, it is strange that nations should still go to war, when they can only conquer theinselves ; and that this propensity appa- rently increases. In the solution of this enigma lies a proof, tliat paper stock is a separate aristocratical interest. Titled orders fonieated war, as in the case of the Roman patricians, he- .eause they obtained the best share of the spoil. The no- bility in Englan«i no lo^iger foment Avar, because they are not aggrandized by it. And war has been still more ar- dently fomented in that country than ever, because their system of paper and patronage gain spoil by it in any event. Conquest furnishes it with funds on which to bottom more Stocic, and the war wliich made the conquest, with a pretext for quartering more patronage and paper on its own nation. Is not that a separate aristocratical interest which gains more by war and conquest, than orders of titled nobility formerly did ? Tliose got most, this gets a51. T!ie Roman aristocracy engaged the nation in Avar to aggrandize ilself ; but it entertained the people with shows, feasts and triumphs, and allowed them some small share of the booty. The English aristocracy of paper and patron- age, engages the nation in war for the same purpose ; ri'i I entertains the people with heavy taxes, bard labour, penal laws and Botany Bay. Ancient and modern wars between civilized nafio)i>», have chiefly originuted in the avarice and ambiliun of indi- viduals, orders, or factions. A propensity for war, is evi- dent I3' a separate interest inimical to a nation; and if this interest is contrived to derive vast accessions of wealth and power from every war, fortunate or unfortunate, from vic- tory or defeat, it must he driven into a propensity for war, by an influence, exceeding in power, that which was suffi- cient to drive feudal barons into war, for their own advan- tage, and the oppression of mankind.

These barons were in some measure cheeked by the fear of danger. Their lives were risked in battle, and their possessions lost by defeat. But bank or debt slock shed no blood in war. To them it is a sure game. Hazarding nothing, a chance for vinning of their foes, and a certainty of winning of their frientis, must inspire them witli principles more inimical to friends and foes, than even those of the separate feudal interest.

This system exhibits a new mode of enslaving nations in- finitely more powerful than any heretofore invented. It can conquer a nation, whilst that nation is in a career of victory. Marlborough's victories created more debt, and of course destroyed more liberty in England, than any previous war. It places governments beyond the influence or scrutiny of the people. Two governments may engage in war for the purpose of obtaining power and wealth, each from its own nation. The cause of quarrel, the battles, the sieges and the peace, might be all amicably arranged before the declaration of war; and a cojnplete victory infallibly secured to both the governments, without the transfer of an acre of territory. 'i'he system of paper and patronage would be the key to such a war, as it is to the history of England for the last century.

This evident propensity for war, arising from the strong- est conceivable excitement, of itself suffices unquestionably to establish the enmity of paper systenjs to our polie;^, if our policy is friendly to liberty. To that, every species of war is dangerous ; and one, ted by paper systems, lalaL TUe princes learned ajiainst France, though beaten in the field, obtained a victory at home by paner and i-ationage, and by the etfc cts of war, destroyed republican opinions in France. war, in this one operation, has, before our eyes, diminished the liberty of about twenty European nations.

Not the (iiies of orders, but a separate interest from the rest of a community, has induced them to harrass the human race with war. Are the privileged titles of England, able to govern or control its system of paper and patronage ? If not, these titles have long ceased to be the cause of her wars. They have neither motive nor power to produce them. But the system of paper and patronage has power to proiluce war or peace, and war is produced. This hun- gry calculaton does not go to war out of chivalry, but from interest. Its propensity is proved in this evidence 5 its enmity to all majoiities in society is a consequence of this propensity ; and its arisiocralical spirit, of that enmity.

A perpetual increase of taxes, is a constant effect of paper systems. Being essential to their existence, the consequences only are to be considered. IMankind have talked a-id written for ages al)oi5t liberty, and yet the world is as far from agreeing in a definition of it, as Europe is from settling a balance of power. It is because liberty is made to consist in metaphysical dogma. As a thing of real substance and use. taxation, unmetaphysical taxation, is able to supply us with a correct idea of it. Heavy taxes in peace are unexceptionably political slavery. Liberty and slavery are contrary principles, and therefore liberty does not produce heavy taxes. Suppose, however, a conjuncture can be conceived, of liberty and heavy taxes in union : yet a free form of government cannot last, if heavy taxes continue until the poverty of the payers, and the wealth of the receivers, have separated the nation into two orders far apart. Heavy taxes are both an effect and a cause of tyranny, and cannot therefore be admitted in a substantial definition of liberty ; being an inevitable consequence of paper systems these also must be substantially inimical to liberty, however consistent they may be witU hei* metaphysical deiinitions.

Taxation, director indirect, produced by a paper system in any form, will rob a nation of property, without giving it liberty; and by creating and enriching a separate interest^ will rob it of its libbKy, Avithout giving it property. Taxa- tion, for the maintenance of civil government or national de- fence, will also take away property ; but then it may bestow liberty. The slave, who receives subsistence from a mas- ter, may advantageously eompure situanons with the vassal of the first species of taxation ; he gets something for his liberty and property ; he gets subsistence without care : his compeer loses his libei-ty and property, and only gains an augmentation of the anxieties of life. To the second spe- cies of taxation, mankind arc indebted for social liberty. How have these opjjosite principles been blended and con- founded with each other ? Merely l>y the avarice and am- bition of oi'ders, separate interests or aristocracy. How cautious and circumspect ouglit nations to be, when thef discover, that the most inimical moral principles are hidden in one term ? One species of taxation destroys ,* the other, preserves their liberty.

Barbarism thii'sts for blood ; civilization for wealth. To defend men against these propensities is the legitimate end of civil government. A government, administered so as to expose property hut protect life in a civilized nation, is equivalent to a government, contrived to protect property but to expose life in a savage one ; and the barbarian, whose property was safe, whilst his life was defenceless against the passion of blood-thirstiness, might as justly boast of bis freedom, as the civilized man, whose life was safe, whilst his property was exposed to appease the money- thirstiness of paper and patronage.

If that species of protection to property, afforded by paper systems, operated in an invasion of the principal instead of the profit, it would be universally assailed as a robber. How this is the veil by which we are deceived ? We are content to lose the profit for the sake of the occupation. We forget that the safety of properly consists in the enjoy- ment of its profits; and that the utmost permanent violation of which it is capahle, s consistent with occupation and sub- sistence.

The history of Villanage illustrates this idea. Villains were nominally emancipati^d for the interest of the masters, not of the slaves. With subsistence and the occupation of property as tenants, they were more profitable to the barons than in a state of direct slavery. Paper systems, taking the hint from this history, have artfully placed tlieniselves in the predicament of the feudal lords; and nations, in that of emancipated villains. The profits are taken, the occupation left, and this is called freedom or protection of property.

These systems, being simply compounded of debt and taxation, must divide a nation into annuitants and labourers, engender want and luxury, reduce each individual to the alternative of oppressing or being oppressed, and cultivate avarice and rapaciousness both by the gain they bestow, and the loss they inflict. Divines and philosophers may possibly have erred in omitting hitherto to recommend such principles, as promoters of virtue, religion and national happiness. Whether politicians have found out, that a power in legislators to enrich themselves by stock of their own creation, will perfect the system of election and representation, is hereafter to be considered.

A nation is never conquered by an army, or enslaved by a faction, so long as it is willing to defend itself. The concentration of wealth in a few hands, obliterates this disposition. The disciplined Romans were subdued by raw barbarians, when tjje lands of Italy were held by less than three thousand proprietors. The feudal nations were weak, whilst a few nobles held the property of the nation; and their petty wars were rendered less destructive by this national imbecility. The same consequence resulted from the possession of one third of the property of a nation by the priesthood. And stock in England, which covers and transfers property to its amount, is so well convinced that the mo jve exciting nations to self delVnce is then by iiitpuir- ed, as to resocl to the alfernalive of a staudin^^urinv, ar<' to stake the national existence upon a battle. to l>e Ibught hy mercenaries. The people and armies of the Romnn empire fi'eqtiently preferred a coalition with Scythian invade) s, to the danger of resistance, or the calamily of victory; and twelve millions of -people are apprehending or invoking conquest, on account of an nnaniiuons opinion, that paper stork has incapacitated a great nation for defending itself against a single army.

Oppressive taxation is the effect of standing armies, no- ble orders, hierarchies or paper stock. A similarity in mo- ral etfects. demoBstrafes a similarity in moral causes. All of these have pretended to defend nations at different periods. England possesses all these defenders. Tiie first and the last are the modern champions of nations: if she had pos- sessed neither, she never would have gained sundry victo- ries, but she would have possessed a gallantry which bur- thensome taxes never inspired. And what «onqueror can be more oppressive than two mercenary armies, one of sol- diers, and another of stockjobbers? Besides, funding ne>er fights for a nation in imminent danger; its wars are guided by other calculations, than those of publick safety; and the moment of peril is the moment of its flight.

If posterity could pass a law, for imposing heavy taxes on the present generation, the entire universe of existing progenitors would exclaim, " if you can rob us of property, we can rob you of life. It is better that you should never exist, than that we who do exist, should be the prey of your avarice; than that a series of generations should be sacrificed to one unborn and unsympathising." In the character of sufferers, the parties concur. Progenitorp would destroy posterity, and posterity would destroy progenitors, rather than submit to imlimited. unfeeling and unconsonted to taxation. Funding, by growing too rapidly in the Mississippi and South Sea cases, inconsiderately disclosed its real character; it has since distended itself to a degree of magnitude and mischief in England infinitely exceeding those detestable frauds. An ugly cur, suddenly bursting upon a company of children, inspires them with horrour; and they get a young tiger, caress, feed and rear it, without a suspicion of its furious and bloody nature, until it devours them. But it is not the office of truth, in distinguishing between good and evil moral principles, however the deluded may believe that there is no generical affinity between a pug and a mastiff, to represent the same thing as a vice or a virtue according to its dimension ; and therefore it seems impossible to transplant funding of any size or age from the place in the moral world assigned to it by its own nature, or to expect good moral effects, from a moral cause, fruitful of evil beyond most of its kindred.

Between the two items of paper stock, the similitude is such, that, though this section is here concluded, the reader will discern in the next, many observations applicable to its doctrine.