NSC-68

by National Security Council staff, under the direction of Paul H. Nitze

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

(April 14, 1950)

A Report to the President
Pursuant to the President's Directive
of January 31, 1950

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] April 7, 1950

Contents

Terms of Reference

Analysis

I. Background of the Present World Crisis

II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States

III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin

IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design

A. Nature of the Conflict
B. Objectives
C. Means

V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential

A. Political and Psychological
B. Economic
C. Military

VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential

A. Political and Psychological
B. Economic
C. Military

VII. Present Risks

A. General
B. Specific

VIII. Atomic Armaments

A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities
B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons
C. International Control of Atomic Energy

IX. Possible Courses of Action

Introduction
The Role of Negotiation
A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying Out These Projects
B. The Second Course--Isolation
C. The Third Course--War
D. The Remaining Course of Action--A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions
Recommendations