National Bank v. Johnson
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
This action was brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York by Johnson, to recover of the National Bank of Gloversville penalties alleged to have been incurred by it under sects. 5197 and 5198 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.
These sections are as follows:--
'SECT. 5197. Any association may take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or district where the bank is located, and no more, except that where by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks of issue organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for associations organized or existing in any such State under this title. When no rate is fixed by the laws of the State or Territory or district, the bank may take, receive, reserve, or charge a rate not exceeding seven per centum, and such interest may be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt has to run. And the purchase, discount, or sale of a bona fide bill of exchange, payable at another place than the place of such purchase, discount, or sale, at not more than the current rate of exchange for sight-drafts, in addition to the interest, shall not be considered as taking or receiving a greater rate of interest.
'SECT. 5198. The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by the preceding section, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture of the entire interest which the note, bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal representatives, may recover back, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of the interest thus paid from the association taking or receiving the same; provided such action is, commenced within two years from the time the usurious transaction occurred. That suits, actions, and proceedings against any association under this title may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.'
The facts are undisputed. The defendant, a national banking association, doing business at Gloversville, New York, from Nov. 10, 1874, to Feb. 7, 1876, discounted for the plaintiff, at the rate of twelve per cent per annum, commercial paper and promissory notes amounting to $158,003. The amount of interest thereon which he paid, and received, was $6,564.88, and received, was $6,594.88, being an excess of $2,735.36 beyond the rate of allowed by the general laws of the State. The paper discounted was mostly business paper, that is, negotiable promissory notes, which he held and owned, and on which he could have maintained actions against the prior parties. A small portion was accommodation paper, but not known by the bank to be such, and nothing upon its face indicated that to be its character. All the paper was paid to the bank at maturity, or before the present action was brought. He indorsed all the notes at the times when they were discounted, and the proceeds were entered to his credit in his bank account.
Upon these facts judgment was rendered in his favor for $5,470.72, twice the amount of the interest paid in excess of seven per cent per annum, to reverse which this writ of error is prosecuted by the bank.
Mr. Francis Kernan for the plaintiff in error.
Johnson was not entitled to recover. By the long-settled law of New York it is neither usurious nor unlawful for persons or copartnerships to do precisely what the bank did in regard to this business paper.
The transaction was not a loan of money, but a purchase of the paper, and it is immaterial whether Johnson indorsed it or guaranteed its payment or not. 3 Rev. Stat. N. Y. (5th ed.) p. 72, &c.; Munn v. Commission Company, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 44; Cram v. Hendricks, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 569; Cobb v. Titus, 10 N. Y. 198; Rapelye v. Anderson, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 472.
Corporations organized under the act of Congress of June 3, 1864, c. 106, are upon the same footing as a natural person in the State where they are located, so far as relates to the rate of interest on a loan, and to the amount of discount at which they may become the owners of commercial business paper. Rev. Stat. U.S., sects. 5197, 5198; Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 18 Wall. 409; First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122; Hintermister v. National Bank, 64 N. Y. 212.
A large portion of the banking transactions in that State consists of acquiring business paper at a stipulated rate of discount. It would be contrary to the policy and spirit of the act, and seriously detrimental to those institutions, if they are to be liable to a heavy penalty for taking such paper at the same rate of discount at which it may be lawfully purchased by a natural person. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, supra.
The provisions of the act were intended to prevent national banks from violating the usury laws of the State. In New York, where this transaction took place, it was usurious to loan or advance money to a party upon his own paper, or upon paper made for his accommodation, at a greater rate of interest or discount than seven per cent per annum; but it was not usurious or illegal to acquire, at an agreed discount exceeding that rate, business paper, that is to say, paper valid in his hands and whereon he could, against the prior parties thereto, maintain an action.
Penal provisions should not be extended to a case not clearly within their intent and meaning. Here full effect is given to them by applying the statute only to transactions which are usurious by the laws of New York. If this transaction was not usurious by them, then the bank did not incur any penalty. Rev. Stat. U.S., sect. 5198.
If the bank had not authority to become the owner of commercial paper by purchase, it did not become liable to the plaintiff, nor could he successfully raise the question as to its want of power. National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99.
Mr. Clayton M. Parke, contra.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Notes edit
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).
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