Averroes85255The Philosophy and Theology of Averroes — Part 21921Mohammad Jamil ur Rehman


II

AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS
CONCERNING THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH, AND
A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS
AND MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN
INTERPRETATIONS.


AN EXPOSITION OF THE METHODS OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING

THE BELIEFS OF THE FAITH

AND

A DETERMINATION OF UNCERTAIN DOUBTS

AND

MISLEADING INNOVATIONS IN INTERPRETATIONS.[1]

And after—Praise be to God, who sets apart anyone whom He will for His knowledge, rendering him fit for understanding His Law and following His path, informing him of the hidden recesses of His knowledge, the real meaning of His inspiration, and the purpose of sending the Apostle to creatures, in spite of what has become clear about the doubt of the doubters among the Prophet's own followers, and changes of meanings introduced by the false among his own people. He has disclosed to him that there are interpretations which God and His Apostle have not ordered. May there be the most perfect blessings upon the Trusty of His inspiration, and the Seal of His prophets, and upon his family and relations.

We have already described in the foregoing tractate the conformity of philosophy with the Law, and its other relations. We have said there that the Law is of two kinds: exoteric and esoteric. The duty of the common people is to follow the exoteric law; while the duty of learned men is to follow the esoteric one. So the duty of the common people is to follow the meanings of the Law in their literal sense, leaving aside every interpretation of it. The learned men are not permitted to expose their interpretations to the common people, as Ali, (upon whom be peace) has said, "Tell the people what they can understand. Do you wish to give the lie to God and His Apostle?" So I thought that in the present book I should examine the exoteric meanings which the Law intends the common people to follow, and in those, search the real purpose of the Law-giver, (on whom be peace) according to my ability and knowledge. For the people of His Law have been extremely disturbed, so much so that many misguided sects and different divisions, have been produced, every one of winch thinks that it is following the best Law, and that he who disagrees is either an innovator or an infidel whose life and property is at stake. All this is directly opposed to the purpose of the Law-giver. Its cause lies in the misleading things about the Law which have been put forward.

In our own times, there are four of these sects which are famous. In the first place, there is the sect of the Asharites, and these are the people who are commonly taken to be men of Sunna. Then there are Mutazilites, the sects of the Batinites, (Esoteric), and the sect of the Bombasts. Every one of these sects has its own peculiar beliefs about God, and has turned many an exoteric word of the Law to interpretations, which they have applied to those beliefs. They think that theirs was the original Law which all the people are asked to follow, and he who deviates from it is either an innovator or an infidel. But when you look into all their views and then examine the purpose of the Law, it would appear that a great part of them are recent opinions and innovating interpretations. Of them I will mention here those indispensable beliefs in the Law, without which Faith does not become complete, and will search, in every one of them, the real purpose of the Lawgiver, (peace be upon him,) beyond that which has been made the basis of the Law, and its beliefs before the coming into use of incorrect interpretations. I will begin by explaining the intention of the Law-giver as to the beliefs which should be held by the common people about God, and the methods which Ho adopted towards them. All this is contained in the Divine Book. We will begin by an exposition of the methods which leads to the knowledge of the existence of the Creator, for this is the first thing which a student ought to know. But before this, it is necessary that we should mention the opinions of the well-known sects.

The Bombasts hold that the method of obtaining knowledge of the existence of the Creator is by hearing and not by reason, that is, the belief in His existence, the verification of which is incumbent upon all men, is enough to be taught by the Law-giver, and believed as an article of Faith, as is the case with his teachings about the condition of the Day of Judgment, and others with which our reason has no power to deal. This is obviously a misleading sect, for it Falls short of the purpose of the Law, as regards the method adopted towards all the people, leading them to the knowledge of the existence of God, and calling them to the confession of His belief. It is quite evident from many verses of the Divine Book, that in it the people have been called to verify the existence of the Creator by arguments of reason which are mentioned in it. For instance, there are the following verses of the Quran, " O men of Mecca, serve your Lord who has created you and those before you,"[2] and " Is there any doubt concerning God, the Creator of heaven and earth?"[3] and other verses on the subject found therein. It is not fit for a man to say, that if these arguments had been necessary for believing in God—that is, had his faith been not completed without understanding them—the Prophet would not have invited anybody to Islam without presenting to him all these arguments, for the Arabs already knew the existence of the Creator, so that God has said, "If thou asketh them who has created the heavens and the earth, they will surely answer, God,"[4] and hence there was no use giving arguments. It is impossible to find a man so stupid and dull, that he cannot understand the argument* advanced by Law tor the common people, through the Prophet. This is to say the least. If there be found such a man, then it is his duty to believe in God by hearing alone. So much- for the ideas of the Bombasts about the exoterics of the Law.

The Asharites are of opinion that the verification of the existence of God cannot be attained but by reason. But about this they have adopted a method, which is not among the methods adopted by Law, and is not mentioned in the Quran, nor the people invited through it to believe. Their well-known method is founded upon the fact that the universe is a created thing, which is itself based upon the theory of the composition of atoms, and that the atom is a created thing, and that other bodies are created out of it. The method which they adopt for the exposition of the creation of an atom, which they call al-Jauharat u'l Faridah (sole Essence), is a misleading one even for man}' religious men in the business of controversy, not to speak of the common people. And despite this it is a method devoid of philosophy, and does not lead to a belief in the existence of the Creator. For if we suppose the universe is a created thing, it becomes necessary, as they say, that its Creator must also be a "Created" object. But a doubt presents itself about the existence of this created thing, which is not in the power of scholastic theology to solve. And that is this, that we can take this thing to be neither eternal nor created. For if we take it as created, then it must require another created thing; and this another, and so on to infinity. This is impossible. On the other hand, if we take Him as eternal, then it is necessary that his action in connection with the result must also be eternal. In this way the results also become eternal. It is necessary for a created thing that its existence be dependent upon a created action. Their hypothesis can only be proved if they admit that a created action can be performed by an eternal agent. For the result of the action might be dependent on the action of the agent. But they do not admit it, for according to their principles what is coeval with created things is itself created . Moreover, if the agent sometimes acts and at other times remains inactive, it is necessary, that there be a condition better applicable in one state of things than in the other. Then about this condition the same question will rise, and so it will go on till infinity. And what the Mutakallimun say in answer to this objection that the created action is the result of eternal intention, does not relieve us of our doubt or satisfy our mind. For intention without action is dependent upon the act, and if the act is a created thing, then it is necessary that the intention in connection with it must also be a created thing. It makes no difference whether we take the intention as eternal or created, rising before the action or with it. So we may take it as we like. All the same it is necessary for them to admit either of the three things about the universe—either a created action, with a created intention or a created action and air eternal intention, or an eternal action with an eternal intention. But a created thing is impossible from an eternal action without any expedient, even if we admit for their sake, that it comes into existence by eternal action; and putting intention itself or the action, connected with the act is a thing which cannot be understood. This is supposing an act without an agent, with a result, without any intention. Intention is a condition of the action and not the action itself. Also it is necessary that this eternal intention, should be connected with non-existence of a created thing, for a period of time which is indefinite. So if a created thing be nonexistence for an unknown period of time, then it does not become connected with the intention at the time of its creation, except after the completion of a time of which there is no limit, and that which has no limit has no end. So it becomes necessary that the intention should never take the form of action, or a time without limit should come to an end, which is impossible. This is the argument of the Mutakallimun, on which they rely in proving that the revolutions of the heavens are created. Moreover, it is necessary that to the intention which precedes the object, and is connected with it, at a certain time, there should be created in it at the time of creation of the object a determination for doing so. For the determination for the creation of an object cannot bo found before that time, because if at the time of action there be found no additional quality in the agent, than that he had at the time of intention, then action from him at that time would not be quite as necessary from him as inactivity. We may go on in this way, finding all the obscure and intricate doubts, from which, not to speak of the common people, even clever men, learned in scholastic theology, in philosophy, cannot escape. So if the common people be burdened with a knowledge of these things, it would be an unbearable problem for them.

Then again the methods adopted by the Asharites in proving the creation of the universe are defective for all classes of men. The common people, by their very nature, cannot understand them, and they are at the same time in no way reasonable. So they are neither fit for the learned, nor for the masses. We warn our readers of them and say: The methods which they adopt are of two kinds. One of them, the more famous of the two and upon which a majority of them relies, is based upon three premises, from which they derive the proof for the creation of the universe. They are: (1) that essences cannot be separated from accidents, that is, they cannot be devoid of them; (2) that the accidents are created things: (3) that that which cannot be separated from a created thing is itself created, that is, that which cannot be severed from the created thing is itself created. Now, if by the first premise which says that the essences cannot be separated from the accidents, they mean the bodies which stand by themselves, then the premise is correct. But if by essence they mean the particle which cannot be divided, which they call Sole Essence, then there is doubt about it,, which is not easy to solve. For the existence of an indivisible essence is not well established in itself, and about it there are many opposite and highly contradictory opinions, and it is not in the power, of plastic theology to bring truth out of them. That is the business of philosophers who are very few in number. The arguments which Asharites use are for the most part exhortative. For their famous argument on this is that they say that our first knowledge about a thing is, for instance, that an elephant is bigger than an ant, for it is accepted that the former has more particles in it than the latter. If it be so, then it is made up of particles and is not a compact whole in itself. So when the body is destroyed it changes into particles, and when composed it is composed of them. But this is wrong. For they have taken a divisible quantity as a continuous one, and then thought that that which is applicable to the divisible is also applicable to the continuous. This is true about numbers, that is, we say that a certain number is more than the other, by its containing more particles in it, that is, more units. But it cannot be true of a continuous quantiPage:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/99 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/100 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/101 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/102 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/103 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/104 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/105 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/106 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/107 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/108 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/109 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/110 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/111 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/112 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/113 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/114 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/115 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/116 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/117 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/118 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/119 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/120 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/121 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/122 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/123 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/124 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/125 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/126 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/127 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/128 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/129 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/130 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/131 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/132 all to chance alone, and that they come into being by themselves.

OF THE UNITY OF GOD

Now then if this is the method adopted by the Law, it may be asked: What is the way of proving the unity of God by means of the Law; that is, the knowledge of the religious formula that "there is no god, but God." The negation contained in it is an addition to the affirmative, which the formula contains, while the affirmative has already been proved. What is the purpose of this negation? We would say that the method, adopted by the Law, of denying divinity to all but God is according to the ordinance of God in the Quran, contained in the following three verses. First, "If there were either in heaven or on earth gods beside God, verily both would be corrupted."[5] Secondly, "God has not begotten issue; neither is there any other God with him; otherwise every other God would surely take away that which he has created; and some of them had enabled themselves over the others. Far be it that from God, which they affirm of Him."[6] Thirdly, "Say, unto the idolators, if there were gods with Him, as ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the possessor of the Throne."[7] The argument contained in the first verse is implanted in our dispositions by our very nature. For it is well known that if there be two kings, and the orders of the one be as effectual as those of the other, it is not possible to have even a single city under their guidance. It is impossible to have one action of a single kind from two actors. So it is necessary that, if both of them begin work at the same time, the city would be ruined, except in the case that one should work and the other remain inactive. This is against our conception of divinity. For when the two actions of the same kind are gathered upon a single object, then that object must necessarily be destroyed. This is the meaning of the verse, "If there were either in the heaven or on earth gods besides God, both would be corrupted." The verse, "Every god has surely taken away that which he had created." has been revealed in refutation of the argument of those who believe in many gods, entrusted with different works. For in this case it becomes incumbent that the gods doing different works be independent of one another, and that they should not be existent at one and the same time. But as the world is one it is necessary that there be not in it gods with different duties. The third verse, Say unto the idolaters if there were gods with him, as ye say, they would surely seek an occasion of making some attempt against the Possessor of the Throne, " is like the first, an argument to prove the impossibility of the existence of two gods, whose duties are the same. This verse means that had there been in the world any other god, but the present one, able to create the world and those in it, so that his relation to it be that of a creator, then he must live with God on the Throne. Thus there would be found two existent things of the same kind in a single place. But this is impossible. For when the relation is one, the related must also be one, that is, they cannot be gathered in a single place as they cannot live in it. The relation of God to the Throne is just its opposite: the Throne exists for Him, and not He for the Throne. That is what God has said, " His Throne is extended over heaven and earth, and the preservation of them is no burden unto him."[8] This is the argument by nature or by Law for proving the unity of God. The difference between the learned and the masses is that the learned know more about the creation of the world, and the purpose of its different parts, like a single body, than the common people. It is to this that the latter part of the verse refers, "God forbid! and far, very far, be that which they utter! The seven heavens praise him, and the earth, and all who are therein: neither is there anything which doth not celebrate His praise; but ye understand not their celebration thereof: He is gracious and merciful."[9] The argument which the Asharites deduce from this verse, calling it the "argument of impossibility," is neither in accordance with natural nor legal arguments. It is not in accordance with nature, because what they say is without any proof at all; while it is insufficient by Law, because the common people cannot understand it, not to speak of their being satisfied with it. They say, that if there be two gods, then it is more probable that they would differ. If this were to happen, then there would be one of the following three cases, there being no fourth alternative. Either the desire of both of them would be accomplished, or the desire of neither would not. They say that it is impossible that the desire of neither of them be accomplished, but if it be so then the universe would neither be existent nor non-existent. If the desire of both of them be accomplished, then the universe would be both existent and nonexistent at the same time. So there remains no alternative but that the desire of one be accomplished, the other's remaining unfulfilled. So one whose desire remains unfulfilled is helpless, and the helpless cannot be a God. The weakness of this argument is that as it is possible to suppose that they differ, it is just as possible to presume that they agree, a fact more becoming to the gods than difference of opinion. If they agree about the creation of the world, they would be like two craftsmen agreed upon making something. If it be so then it must be said that their actions help them to work and live in a single place, except that some one may say, that perhaps one would do one thing and the other quite another thing, or perhaps they would work by turns. But this is an objection which cannot be advanced by the masses. But if any sceptic controvertialist were to advance it, he may be told that one who has power to create one thing has power to create the whole. So now again it comes to the same thing, whether they agree or not, and how can they help each other in work? As to working by turn, it would be a defect in both of them. It is more probable that if there be two gods, there must be two universes. But as the universe is one, its Maker must also be one, for a single work can only be done by one maker. So it is not necessary that we should understand the verse of God, " and some of them had enabled themselves over the other, " as pointing to disagreement alone, but it may be taken as true even in the case of argument, for this also leads to the same result as disagreement would do. Here lies the difference between us and the Mutakallimun, about the meaning of this verse, though Abul Maali has said something almost expressing our own views. By the foregoing you would understand that the argument which the Mutakallimun have deduced from this verse is not the one which it really contains. The impossibility to which their argument leads is not one which should be deduced from the verse in question. The impossibility which is deduced from the argument which they think is contained in the verse, is more than one impossibility, by their dividing it into three parts, while there is no division in the verse itself. So the argument which they use is the one which is known to the logicians as disjunctive syllogism, and is known in their science as definition and division. But the argument contained in the verse is one which is known m logic as hypothetical syllogism, which is quite different from disjunctive syllogism. Anyone who would look most cursorily into this science would know the difference between the two. Then, again, the impossibility which their argument points out is not that to which the argument of the Book leads. They say that universe will either be neither existent nor non-existent, or it will be existent and non-existent at the same time, or its god would be a helpless and weak god. These are impossible forever, b ecause of the impossibility of more than one. The impossibility which the verse refers to, is not so for ever, for in it it depends upon a certain period of time, that is when the universe is found corrupted at the time of its existence. For he says "If there be any other god but God," the universe would be found corrupted. Then he has made an exception that it is not corrupted, and hence there must not be more than one God. So now it has become quite clear that this is the method by which God has invited the people to believe in His existence, and negate the divinity of all but Him. These are the two propositions which are contained in the article of Faith, "There are no gods but He." So one who thinks over these two propositions, and believes in them by the method which we have pointed out, is a Muslim in reality, with a belief which is truly Islamic. But he whose belief is not based upon these arguments, though he confesses the article, he is a Muslim with the other Muslims, only on account of the similarity of names.

ON DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

The attributes which the Divine Book has assigned to the Creator and Maker of the universe, are only the perfect forms of those which are found in man, and these are seven in number: Knowledge, life, power, volition, hearing, seeing and talking.

Now as to knowledge, God in his Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/143 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/144 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/145 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/146 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/147 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/148 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/149 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/150 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/151 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/152 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/153 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/154 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/155 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/156 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/157 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/158

OF DIVINE PERFECTION

We have already described the way which the Law pursues in teaching the common people the existence of God, the denial of His having any associates, and thereby the knowledge of His attributes, and the extent to which they have been explained in details in it, one after another. It is really an addition to, and deduction from, and change and interpretation of this very limit and extent which has not been productive of good to any and all the people. Now it remains for us to know the method which the Law has adopted in explaining to the common people the perfection of God and freedom from all defects, and the length to which it has gone in detailing it, and the cause of restricting its knowledge to them. Then we should mention the methods which it adopts in teaching the people the knowledge of His actions, and the latitude which it has allowed in this respect. Having Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/160 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/161 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/162 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/163 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/164 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/165 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/166 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/167 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/168 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/169 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/170 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/171 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/172 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/173 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/174 and of our knowledge of them. This is also the quality of the light in showing colours, and of our seeing them. So God has very fittingly named himself Light. When it is said that He is Light then there remains no doubt as to His Vision on the Day of Judgment. From these it must have become clear to you what the primary belief of the Law was about this attribute, and what are the innovations which rose in it afterwards. The Law is silent about it because there is not found in the universe anything unseen without a body, except that which is found by arguments among things seen as existent with this quality, and that is the soul. As the belief of the soul was impossible for the masses, it was also impossible for them to understand the existence of a Being who exists without a body. Hence they cannot understand it about God.

OF DIRECTION

This is a quality which all the people learned in Law have tried to prove, Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/176 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/177 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/178 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/179 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/180 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/181 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/182 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/183 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/184 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/185 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/186 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/187 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/188 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/189 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/190 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/191 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/192 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/193 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/194 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/195 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/196 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/197 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/198 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/199 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/200 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/201 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/202 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/203 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/204 Page:The philosophy and theology of Averroes.djvu/205 adopts a method other than that laid down by the Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together. For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is that the Prophet has said, "We, the prophets, have been commanded to adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them according to their intelligence."

He who tries to instruct all the people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against apparent laws and reason.

From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God's purity, and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our purpose in writing this tractate will be over.

OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD

In this section we will take up five questions, around which all others in this connection revolve. In the first place a proof of the creation of the universe; secondly, the advent of the prophets; thirdly, predestination and fate; fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; and fifthly, the Day of Judgment.

First Problem: the Creation of the Universe:—The Law teaches that the universe was invented and created by God, and that it did not come into being by chance or by itself. The method adopted by the Law for proving this is not the one upon which the Asharites have depended. For we have already shown that those methods are not specially certain for the learned, nor common enough to satisfy all the classes of men. The methods which are really serviceable are those which have a very few premises, and the results of which fall very near to the commonly known ideas. But in instructing the common people the Law does not favour statements composed of long and complete reasonings, based upon different problems. So everyone who, in teaching them, adopts a different course, and interprets the Law according to it, has lost sight of its purpose and gone astray from the true path. And so also, the Law in giving illustrations for its reasonings uses only those which are present before us. Whatever has been thought necessary for the common people to know, has been explained to them by the nearest available examples, as in the case of the day of Judgment. But whatever was unnecessary for them to know, they have been told that it was beyond their knowledge, as the words of God about the Soul.[10] Now that we have established this, it is necessary that the method adopted by the Law for teaching the creation of the universe to the common people be such as would be acknowledged by all. It is also necessary that since there cannot be found anything present to illustrate the creation of the universe the Law must have used the examples of the creation of things in the visible world.

So the method adopted by Law is that the universe was made by God. If we look intently into the verse pertaining to this subject we shall see that the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, which we know to be one of those which prove the existence of God. When a man sees a thing made in a certain shape, proportion and fashion, for a particular advantage is derived from it, and purpose which is to be attained, so that it becomes clear to him, that had it not been found in that shape, and proportion, then that advantage would have been wanting in it, he comes to know for certain that there is a maker of that thing, and that he had made it in that shape and proportion, for a set purpose. For it is not possible that all those qualities serving that purpose be collected in that thing by chance alone. For instance, if a man sees a stone on the ground in a shape fit for sitting, and finds its proportions and fashion of the same kind, then he would come to know that it was made by a maker, and that he had made it and placed it there. But when he sees nothing in it, which may have made it fit for sitting then he becomes certain that its existence in the place was by chance only, without its being fashioned by any maker. Such is also the case with the whole of the universe. For when a man sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, which are the cause of the four seasons, of days and nights, of rain, water and winds, of the inhabitation of the parts of the earth, of the existence of man, and of the being of all the animals and the plants and of the earth being fit for the habitation of a man, and other animals living in it; and the water fit for the animals living in it; and the air fit for birds, and if there be anything amiss in this creation and edifice, the whole world would come to confusion and disorder, then he would come to know with certainty that it is not possible that this harmony in it for the different members of the universe—man, animals, and plants—be found by chance only. He will know that there is one who determined it, and so one who made it by intention, and that is God, exalted and magnified may He be. He would know with certainty that the universe is a created thing, for he would necessarily think that it is not possible that in it should be found all this harmony, if it be not made by some one, and had come into existence by chance alone. This kind of argument is quite definite and at the same time clear, and some have mentioned it here. It is based upon two principles which are acknowledged by all. One of them being, that the universe, with all its component parts, is found fit for the existence of man and things; secondly, that which is found suitable in all its parts, for a single purpose, leading to a single goal, is necessarily a created thing. So those two principles lead us naturally to admit that the universe is a created thing, and that there is a maker of it. Hence "the argument of analogy" leads to two things at one and the same time, and that is why it is the best argument for proving the existence of God. This kind of reasoning is also found in the Quran in many verses in which the creation of the universe is mentioned. For instance, "Have We not made the earth a bed, and the mountains for shelter to fix the same? And have We not created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep for rest and made the night a garment to cover you, and destined the day to a gaining of a livelihood; and built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp? And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance, that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees."[11] If we ponder over this verse it would be found that our attention has been called to the suitability of the different parts of the universe for the existence of man. In the very beginning we are informed of a fact well-known to all—and that is that the earth has been created in a way which has made it suitable for our existence. Had it been unstable, or of any other shape, or in any other place, or not of the present proportion, it would not have been possible to be here, or at all created on it. All this is included in the words, "Have We not made the earth a bed for you"? for in a bed are collected together all the qualities of shape, tranquility, and peace, to which may be added those of smoothness and softness. So how strange is this wonderful work and how excellent this blessedness, and how wonderful this collection of all the qualities! This is so because in the word mihad (bed) are brought together all those qualities, which are found in the earth, rendering it suitable for the existence of man. It is a thing which becomes clear to the learned after much learning and a long time, "But God will appropriate His mercy unto whom He pleaseth."[12] Then as to the divine words, "And the mountains for stakes,"—they tell us of the advantage to be found in the tranquility of the earth on account of the mountains. For had the earth been created smaller than it is now, that is, without mountains it would have been quivered by the motion of other elements, the water and the air, and would have been shaken and thus displaced. This would naturally have been the cause of the destruction of the animal world. So when its tranquility is in harmony with those living on it, it did not come into being by chance alone, but was made by some one's intention, and determination. Certainly it was made by One who intended it, and determined it, for the sake of those living on it. Then He calls our attention to the suitability of the existence of night and day for animals. He says "And made the night a garment to cover you; and destined the day to a gaining of your livelihood." He means to say that He has made the night like a covering and clothing for all the things, from the heat of the sun. For had there been no setting of the sun at night, all the things, whose life has been made dependent upon the sun, would have perished—that is, the animals and the plants. As clothing protects the people from the heat of the sun, in addition to its being a covering, so God likened the night to it. This is one of the most beautiful of the metaphors. There is also another advantage in the night for the animals: their sleep in it is very deep, after the setting of the sun, which keeps faculties in motion, that is, wide awake. So God has said, "And appointed your sleep for rest," on account of the darkness of the night. Then He says, "And built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp." Here by the word building He means their creation, and their harmony with the created things, and their arrangement and system. By strength He means that power of revolution and motion which is never slackened, and never overtaken by fatigue; and they never fall like other roofs and high edifices. To this refer the words of God, "And made the heaven a roof well-supported."[13] By all this He shows their fitness in number, shape, fashion, and movement, for the existence of those who live on the earth round it. Were one of the heavenly bodies, not to speak of all, to stop for a moment all would be chaos on the face of the earth. Some people think the blast of the last trumpet, which will be the cause of the thunderbolt, will be nothing but a stop in the revolution of the heavenly bodies. Then He tells us of the advantage of the sun for those living on the earth and says, "And placed therein a burning lamp." He calls it a lamp because in reality it is all darkness, and light covers the darkness of the night, and if there be no lamp, man can get no advantage out of his sense of sight at nighttime; and in the same way if there were no sun the animals can have no benefit of their sense of seeing. He calls our attention to this advantage of the sun, ignoring others because it is the noblest of all the advantages and the most apparent of all. Then He tells us of His kindness in sending down rain, for the sake of the plants and the animals. The coming down of rain in an appointed proportion, and at an appointed season, for the cultivated fields cannot be by chance alone, but is the result of divine solicitude for us all. So He says, "And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees." There are many verses of the Quran on this subject. For instance, He says, "Do ye not see how God hath created the seven heavens, one above another, and hath placed the moon therein for a light, and hath appointed the sun for a taper? God hath also provided and caused you to bring forth corn from the earth."[14] If we were to count all such verses and comment upon them showing the kindness of the Creator for the created, it would take too many volumes. We do not intend to do it in this book. If God should grant us life and leisure we shall write a book to show the kindness of God to which He has called our attention.

It should be known that this kind of argument is just contrary to that which the Asharites think leads to the knowledge of God. They think that the creation does not lead us to the knowledge of God through any of His goodness, but through possibility, that is, the possibility which is found in all things, which we can understand to be of his shape or of quite a contrary one. But if this possibility be found alike in both the cases, then there is no wisdom in the creation of the universe, and there is found no harmony between man and the parts of it. For, as they think, if it is possible for the things to have any other form than they have now, then there can exist no harmony between man and other existent things by the creation of which God has obliged man and commanded him to be thankful to Him. This opinion, by which the creation of man, as a part of the universe, is just as possible, for instance, as his creation in the void, is like the opinion of those who say that man exists but he could have been created in quite a different shape, and yet could perform actions like a man. According to them it is also possible that he may have formed the part of another universe quite different from the existing one. In that case the blessing of the universe can have no obligation for man, for they are not necessary for his purpose. Hence man is quite careless of them and they of him. So their existence is no blessing to him. This is all against the nature of man.

On the whole, a man who denies the existence of the effects arranged according to the causes in the question of arts, or whose wisdom cannot understand it, then he has no knowledge of the art of its Maker. So also a man who denies the existence of an order of effects in accordance with causes in this universe, denies the existence of the Creator altogether. Their saying that God is above these causes, and that they cannot have any bearing on the effects by His command, is very far from the true nature of philosophy, nay, it is a destroyer of it. For if it is possible to have the same effects with other than the prescribed causes just in the same degree as by them, then where is the greatness in producing the effects from the known Causes? It is so because the effects from the causes have one of the following three reasons. Either the existence of the causes will be in place of the effects by compulsion, as a man's taking his food; or their being more perfect that is, the effect becoming better and more perfect through them, as a man's having two eyes, or they may have neither a better nor a more compulsive effect. In this case the existence of the effect and the cause would be by chance, without any intention at all; and, hence, there would be no greatness found in it. For instance, if the shape of human hand, the number of the fingers, and their length be neither necessary nor adding any perfection in its work in seizing things of different kind, then the actions of the hand from this shape, and number of parts, would be by chance alone. If it be so, then it makes no difference whether a man is given a hand or a hoof, or something else, like the different animals, for their particular actions. On the whole, if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains nothing to refute the arguments of those who believe in the creation of the universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no Creator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is the result of material causes. For taking one of the two alternatives it is not more possible that it may have happened by chance, than done by an independent Actor. So when the Asharites say that the existence of one or more possibilities shows that there is a particular Maker of these things, they can answer and say that the existence of things by one of these possibilities was by chance alone, for intention works as one of the causes, and that which happens without any means or cause is by chance. We see that many things come into being in this way. For example, the elements mix together by chance, and then by this unintentional mixing there is produced a new thing. They mix again, and this quite unintentionally produces quite a new thing. In this way every kind of creation may be said to have come into existence by chance.

We say that it is necessary that there be found order and arrangement, the more perfect and finished than what can be imagined. This mixing together of elements is limited and pre-arranged, and things produced by them are sure to happen, and no disorder has ever happened in them. But all this could not happen by chance alone, for that which happens in this way by chance is of the least value. It is to this that God refers, "It is the work of the Lord, who has rightly disposed all things."[15] I would like to know what completeness can be found in things made by chance, for such things are by no means better than their opposites. To this God refers in the following words, "Thou canst not see in the Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness or disproportion. Lift thy eyes again to heaven, and look whether thou seest any flaw."[16]. But what defect can be greater than that all the things can be found with any other quality than they really possess. For the non-existent quality may be better than the existing one. In this way, if one thinks that were the Eastern movement to become Western and vice versa, there would be no difference in the universe, then he has destroyed philosophy altogether. He is like a man who thinks that were the right side of the animals to become left, and vice versa, there would be no difference at all for one of the two alternatives is there. For as it is possible to say that it is made according to one alternative by an independent Maker, so it is possible to assert that it was all made by chance alone. For we see so many things coming into being by themselves.

It is quite clear to you that all the people see that lower kinds of creation could have been made in a different way from that in which they really are and as they see this lower degree in many things they think that they must have been made by chance. But in the higher creation they know that it is impossible to have been made in a more perfect and excellent form than that given to it by the Creator. So this opinion, which is one of the opinions of the Mutakallimun is both against the Law and philosophy. What we say is that the opinion of possibility in creation is closer to a complete denial of God, than leading us nearer to Him. At the same time it falsifies philosophy. For if we do not understand that there is a mean between the beginnings and ends of the creation, upon which is based the ends of things, then there can neither be any order nor any method in it. And if they be wanting then there can be no proof of the existence of an intelligent and knowing Maker; for taking them together with cause and effect we are led to the fact that they must have been created by wisdom and knowledge. But on the other hand the existence of either of two possibilities shows that they may have been performed by a not-knowing Maker and by chance alone. Just as a stone falling on the earth may fall in any place, on any side, and in any form. It will show the want of the existence either of a creator at all or at least of a wise and knowing Creator. The thing which has compelled the Mutakallimun of the Asharites to adopt this opinion is a denial of the action of those natural forces which God has put in all things, as He has endowed them with life, power and so forth. They avoided the opinion that there was any other creator but God, and God forbid that there be any other, for he is the only creator of the causes and they are made effective by His command only. We will talk of this in detail when discoursing on Fate and Predestination. They were also afraid that by admitting the natural causes they might be accused of saying that the universe came into being by chance only. They would have known that a denial of it means a denial of a great part of the arguments, which can be advanced for a proof of the existence of God. One who denies any part of God's creation denies His work which falls very near to a denial of a part of His attributes. On the whole as their opinion is based upon hasty conclusions, which come to the mind of a man by superficial thought and as apparently it appears that the word "intention" can be applied to one who has power to do bad or otherwise, they saw that if they did not admit that all the creation is possible, they would not be able to say that it came into existence by the action of an intending creator. So they say that all the creation is possible so that they may prove that the creator is an intelligent one. They never thought of the order which is necessary in things made, and with that their coming from an intelligent creator. These people have also ignored the blame they will have to bear in thus denying wisdom to the creator; or maintaining that chance should be found governing creation. They know, as we have said, that it is necessary, on account of the order existent in nature, that it must have been brought into being by some knowing creator, otherwise the order found in it would be by chance. When they were compelled to deny the natural forces, they had to deny with them a large number of those forces which God has made subservient to His command for the creation and preservation of things. For God has created some things from causes which He has produced from outside, these are the heavenly bodies; there are other things which He has made by causes placed in the things themselves, that is, the soul, and other natural forces, by which he preserves those things. So how wicked is the man who destroyeth philosophy, and "invented a lie about God."[17]

This is only a part of the change which has taken place in the Law, in this and other respects, which we have already mentioned, and will mention hereafter. From all this it must have become clear to you that the method which God had adopted for teaching His creatures that the universe is made and created by Him is the method of kindness and wisdom, towards all His creatures and especially towards man. It is a method which bears the same relation to our intellect, as the sun bears to our senses. The method which it has adopted towards the common people about this problem is that of illustration from things observed. But as there was nothing which could be given as an illustration, and as the common people cannot understand a thing, an illustration of which they cannot see, God tells us that the universe was created in a certain time out of a certain thing, which He made. He tells us his condition before the creation of the universe, "His throne was above the waters."[18] He also says, "Verily your Lord is God who created the heavens and the earth in six days,"[19] and "Then He set His mind to the creation of the heavens, and it was smoke."[20] In addition to these there are other verses of the Book, pertaining to this subject. So it is incumbent that nothing out of them should be interpreted for the common people, and nothing should be presented to them in explaining it but this illustration. For one who changes it, makes the wisdom of the Law useless. If it be said that the Law teaches about the universe that it is created, and made out of nothing and in no time, then it is a thing which even the learned cannot understand, not to speak of the common people. So we should not deviate in this matter of the Law, from the method laid down in it for instructing the common people, and should not tell them except this regarding the creation of the universe, which is found alike in the Quran, the Bible, and other revealed books. The wonder is that the example in the Quran is quite in accordance with the creation of the things in the visible world. But the Law does not say so, which is a warning to the learned people that the creation of the universe is not like the creation of all other things. He has used the words creation and flaw, because they connote two things,—Conception of the things that can be seen, and the creation of the things which the learned prove in the invisible world. So the use of the words creation (Huduth) and eternal is an innovation in religion, and the cause of great doubt and corruption of the belief of the common people, especially of the argumentative among them. This has greatly perplexed the Mutakallimun of the Asharites, and has proved them in great doubt. For if they explain that God intends doing things by an eternal intention—which, as we said, is an innovation—they have put it down that the universe is created. Then they are asked how can a created thing come from an eternal intention. They answer that the eternal intention became connected with the action at the time of the creation especially, and that is the time in which the universe was made. Then they may be asked, that if the relation of the intending Creator towards the created thing at the time of its nonexistence be the same as at the time of its creation, then that created thing is by no means better than the other thing, when at the time of its making, the action which was not found in its non-existence is not connected with it. If the relation be different then there must necessarily be a created intention otherwise the created result of an action would come from an eternal action, for what is necessary of it in action, is necessary also in intention. If it be said that when the time of its making comes it is found done; it may be asked: is it so by an eternal or a created action? If they say by an eternal action, they admit the existence of a created thing by an eternal action; and if they say by a created action, then there must be a created intention also. They may say that intention is the action itself, but this is impossible. For intention is the only cause oi the action in the intender. If an intender, intending to do an act in a certain time, finds that act quite another than that which he intended, then that act would have come into being without any intender at all. At the same time, if it is thought that from a created intention there can only be a created thing, then as a rule an eternal intention should give an eternal thing, otherwise the result of a created or eternal intention would be the same, which is impossible. All these doubts are found in Islam only through the Mutakallimun, by their explaining things in Law, which God had forbidden them to do. For in the Quran it is not said whether intention is created or eternal. So they neither adhere to the exoteric meanings of the Law, which may have given them beatitude and salvation, nor did they attain the degree of certain and exact knowledge, so that they may have had this blessing. Hence they are neither to be counted among the learned nor among the masses, who believe and have strong faith. They are the people "whose hearts are perverse"[21] and "whose hearts are diseased."[22] They say things by their tongues which are quite contrary to those which they believe in their hearts, a cause of which is their tenacity, and love of upholding their opinions at any cost. By a repetition of attitudes like these they become quite devoid of all philosophy, as we see the case of those who are completely accustomed to the Asharite school of thought, and are well pleased with it, even to the degree of love. They are certainly veiled on account of their habit and environment.

What we have said about this question is enough for our purpose. Now we would take up the second problem.

Problem Second: Prophetic Mission:—There are two points which are to be discussed in this problem. First, the proof of the coming of the prophets; and secondly an explanation of the fact that the man claiming to be a prophet is really so and does not lie. Many people are desirous of proving the existence of the prophets by analogy—and such are the Mutakallimun. They say that it is proved that God speaks and intends, and is the master of His creatures. It is quite consistent for such a being in the visible world to send a messenger to his dependent people. Hence such a thing is also possible in the unseen world. They have thought of making this valid for proving the advent of the prophets, by absurd and far-fetched arguments which only Brahmins should use. They say that it is possible both in the observed and unseen world. In the observed world it is quite evident, that when a man stands up before a king and says, "O ye men, I am the messenger of the king towards you" and produces credentials for his claim, it is necessary to acknowledge him to be true. They say that in the case of the prophets, the credentials are the miracles which they perform. For certain reasons this method is quite fit and satisfactory for the common people, but when investigated there appear many flaws in the principle. Our acknowledgement of a man who claims to be the messenger of a king is not true unless we know that the symbols which he has are those of the royal messenger, which can only happen, if a king tells his subjects that whenever they happen to see such and such symbols with a man, which are particularly his, they should take him as his messenger. When this is so, one can object, from where does it appear that performance of miracles is the special sign of the prophets? This can be proved neither by law nor by reason. To prove it by religion is still more impossible; it does not admit it. Reason alone cannot affirm that they are the special symbols of prophecy, except that in many cases they were found in people who claimed to be prophets and in none other. So in this case a proof of anyone's prophecy is based upon two premises. First, the man who claims to be a prophet has performed a miracle, and secondly, everyone who performs a miracle is a prophet.

Now as to the premise that the claimant for prophecy has performed miracles we can say that it pertains to our senses after we have admitted that there are actions performed by men, which can neither be made by wondrous workmanship or by some particular forces, but are beyond our conception. The second premise can only be true when we admit the existence of the prophets, and that the miracles are only performed by those who are the true claimants for prophetic mission. We would say that this premise is not true but for those who believe the existence of the prophets and the miracles. For instance if it has become clear to man, that the universe is created, then he certainly knows that the world exists and the Creator too. This being so, a man can object and say how can we say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet, when the prophetic mission itself remains unproved? Even after we admit the existence of miracle in the manner in which it may seem quite impossible, it is necessary that the two sides of the premise be admitted first and then the one can be applied to the other. One cannot say that the existence of the prophets can be proved by reason, because of its possibility. For the possibility to which they refer is in fact really ignorance, and is not found in the nature of things. For instance, if we say that it is possible that it will rain or not, then the possibility is found in the nature of things, that is, it is felt that a thing may sometimes be, and at others not be, as in the case of rain. Here, reason can exactly decide the possibility of a thing by its nature. The necessary (wajib) is quite contrary to it; that is, it is a thing the existence of which is always found. In this case reason can always decide without a mistake, because its nature cannot be changed or transformed. So when one party admits the existence of a prophet, at a certain time it appears that the prophetic mission is a thing whose existence is possible and the other party says that it cannot feel it, then that possibility becomes mere ignorance in its case. Now we believe in the existence of this possibility because we have known the prophets. We say that a knowledge of the messengers from man, leads us to a belief in the existence of messengers from God, as the existence of a messenger from Anir, leads us to the conclusion of there being a messenger from Zaid also. This requires a similarity in the natural dispositions of both men and it is here where the difficulty lies. If we suppose this possibility by itself even in the future, it will only be by the means of the known fact and not by our knowledge and reason. Now one of the premises of this possibility has come into existence. For the possibility is in our knowledge, and the fact in itself is an established one, by one of the two alternatives, that is, whether he sent a messenger or did not. So we have nothing in this case but sheer ignorance, as is the doubt whether Anir sent any messengers in the past or did not, which is quite different from our doubting, whether or not he will send any in future. So when we do not know about Zaid, for instance, whether he has or has not sent any messenger in the past, it is not correct for us to suppose anybody to be his messenger, if he happens to have his symbols upon him. We can admit his claim only after we know that Zaid did send a messenger. So when we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, and the miracles, then how can it be correct for us to say that one who performs the miracles is a prophet. We cannot believe in this by hearing only, for this faculty is not the thing by which such things can be proved. At the same time we cannot claim this premise to be true by experience and habit, except that the miracles performed by the prophets can be seen by one who believes in their mission, and has never seen them to have been performed by anybody else, so that they may be taken as a convincing sign for distinguishing a prophet of God, from one who is not, that is a distinction between one whose claim is right, and one whose claim is wrong.

By these things it is seen that the Mutakallimun have missed the whole purpose of the argument from miracles because they have put possibility in the place of real existence, possibility which is in reality ignorance. Then they have believed in the premise that every one who performs miracles is a prophet, which cannot be true except when the miracles prove the prophetic mission itself, and the sender of messengers. It is not by reason that we can believe in these marvelous things, which happen again and again, and are divine, as a conclusive proof of the existence of prophetic mission, except that one who can do such things is an excellent person, and that such persons cannot lie. But it can prove the prophetic mission of a person only when we admit that the mission does exist, and that such marvelous things cannot be performed by any person, however good he may be, except by one who is a aprophet. The miracles cannot prove the prophetic mission of a person, because there is no connection between them and reason, except that we admit that the miracles are one of the works of the prophets, just as curing is the work of the physicians, so that one who can cure is certainly a physician. This is one of the fallacies of the argument. Moreover, if we admit the existence of the prophetic mission, by putting the idea of possibility, which is in fact ignorance, in place of certainty, and make miracles a proof of the truth of man who claims to be a prophet it becomes necessary that they should not be used by a person, who says that they can be performed by others than prophets, as the Mutakallimun do. They think that the miracles can be performed by the magicians and saints. The condition which they attach with them is that miracles prove a man to be a prophet, when he at the same time claims to be so, for the true prophet can perform them as opposed to the false ones. This is an argument without any proof, for it can be understood either by hearing or reason. That is, it is said that one whose claims to prophecy are wrong, cannot perform miracles, but as we have already said, when they cannot be performed by a liar, then they can only be done by the good people, whom God has meant for this purpose. These people, if they speak a lie, are not good, and hence cannot perform the miracles. But this does not satisfy the people who think miracles to be possible from the magicians, for they certainly are not good men. It is here that the weakness of the argument lies. Hence some people have thought that the best thing is to believe that they cannot be performed but by the prophets and hence magic is only imagination, and not a change of essence. Among these are also men who deny all sorts of marvelous things from the saints.

It is clear to you from the life of the prophet, peace be upon him, that he never invited any man or community to believe in his prophecy, and that which he has brought with him from God, by means of the performance of any miracles, in support of his claim, such as changing one element into another. Whatever miracles did appear from him were only performed in the natural course of things, without on his part any intention of contention or competition. The following words of the Quran will make this clear; "And they say: We will by no means believe in thee, until thou cause a spring of water to gush forth for us out of the earth, and thou have a garden of palm-trees and vines, and thou cause rivers to spring forth from the midst there-of in abundance; or thou cause the heaven to fall down in pieces upon us, as thou hast given out, or thou bring down God and the angels to vouch for thee; or thou have a house of gold, or thou ascend by a ladder to heaven; neither will we believe thy ascending thither alone, until thou cause a book to descend unto us, bearing witness of thee which we may read. Answer: My Lord be praised, Am I other than a man sent as an apostle?"[23] Then again, "Nothing hindered us from sending you with miracles, except that the former nations have charged them with imposture."[24] The thing by which we invited the people to believe in him, and with which he vied with them is the Quran. For says God, "Say, verily, if men and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like unto it, although the one of them assigned the other."[25] Then further he says, "will they say, He hath forged the Quran? Answer, bring therefore ten chapters like unto it forged by yourself."[26] This being the case the miracle of the Prophet with which he vied with the people and which he advanced as an argument for the truth of his claim to the prophetic mission, was the Quran. If it be said, that this is quite clear, but how does it appear that the Quran is a miracle, and that it proves his prophecy, while just now we have proved the weakness of the proof of prophecy by means of miracles without any exceptions in the case of any prophet. Besides, the people have differed in taking the Quran to be a miracle at all. For in their opinion one of the conditions of a miracle is that it should be quite different from any act which may have become habitual. But the Quran is of this sort, because it is only word, though it excels all created words. So it becomes a miracle by its superiority only, that is, the impossibility for people bringing anything like it, on account of its being highly eloquent. This being the case, it differs from the habitual, not in genus but in details only, and that which differs in this way is of the same genus. Some people say that it is a miracle by itself, and not by its superiority. They do not lay it down as a condition for miracles that they should be quite different from the habitual, but think that it should be such a habitual act, as men may fall short of accomplishing. We would reply that it is as the objectors say, but the thing about it is not as they have thought. That the Quran is an evidence of his prophecy, is based, we believe, upon two principles, which are found in the Book itself. The first being that the existence of the class of men called prophets and apostles is well-known. They are the men who lay down laws for the people by divine revelation, and not by human education. Their existence can be denied only by the people who deny repeated action, as the existence of all things which we have not seen—the lives of the famous thinkers and so forth. All the philosophers, and other men are agreed, except those who pay no regard to their words, (and they are the Materialists), that there are men to whom have been revealed many commandments for the people, to perform certain good actions, by which their beatitude may be perfected; and to make them give up certain wrong beliefs and vicious actions. This is the business of divine apostles. The second principle is, that everyone who does this work, that is, lays down laws by revelation, is a prophet. This principle is also quite in accordance with human nature. For as it is known that the business of medicine is to cure a disease, and one who can cure is a physician, so it is also known that the business of the prophets is to give law to the people by divine revelation, and one who does so is a prophet. The Book mentions the first principle in the following:—"Verily We have revealed Our will unto thee, as We have revealed it unto Noah, and the prophets who succeeded him, and We have revealed it unto Abraham, and Ishmael, and Isaac and Jacob, and the tribes, and unto Jesus, and Job, and Jonas, and Aaron and Solomon; and we have given you the Quran as We gave the Psalms unto David; some apostles have We sent, whom We have mentioned unto thee, and God spake unto Moses discoursing with him,"[27] and again: "Say, I am not alone among the apostles"[28] The second principle is that Mohammed, peace be upon him, has done the work of a prophet, that is, has given Law to the people by divine revelation. This also can be known from the Quran, where God mentions it. He says, "O men, now is an evident proof come unto you from your Lord, and We have sent down unto you manifest light."[29] By manifest light is meant the Quran. Again He says, "O men, now is the apostle come unto you from your Lord; believe, therefore, it will be better for you,"[30] and again, "But those among them who are well-grounded in knowledge, and faithful, who believe in that which hath been sent down unto thee, and that which hath been sent down unto the prophets before thee;"[31] and again "God is the witness of the revelation which He hath sent down unto thee; He sent it down with his special knowledge; the angels are also witness thereof; but God is a sufficient witness."[32] If it be said, how can the first principle be known, that is, that there is a class of men who give the Law to teh people by divine revelation; and so also, how to know the second principle, that is, that which the Quran contains, about beliefs and actions, is of divine origin? We would answer that the first principle can be known by the information which these men give about the existence of things, which were not found before, but come into existence after they have informed the people about them, and in a specified time; and by their command for doing certain things, and teaching certain precepts which do not resemble the common things and actions, which can be taught by human agency. This is so because if the miracles be of the kind of laying down Laws, proving that they cannot be laid down by human education, but only through divine revelation, then it is prophecy. But the miracles which do not take the form of laws, as the dividing of the sea, etc, do not necessarily prove the prophecy of anyone. But they can only be used as supplements to the former, if they fall very near to it. But standing alone they cannot prove it, and so by themselves alone they do not lead to a cognizance of the prophets, if the other kind of miracles, which are its conclusive proofs, be not found in them. So according to this principle must be understood the proofs of prophecy afforded by miracles, that is, the miracles of knowledge and deeds are its conclusive proofs while others only make it strong, and can be used as witnesses. So now it has become clear to you that men of this kind do exist, and bow can men be sure of them, except by their repeated appearence; as is the case with physicians and other kinds of men. If it be asked: How can it be proved that the Quran is a conclusive proof that is a miracle which is the business of the prophets to perform, as curing is the business of a physician, we would say that this can be known in many ways:First, the precepts which it contains about knowledge and deeds, cannot be acquired by learning, but only by divine revelation; secondly, by the information which it gives about hidden things; and thirdly, by its poetry, which is quite different from that which can be achieved by imagination or repetition of verses, that is, it is known that it is of quite a different kind from the poetry of Arabic speaking people, whether the language be acquired and learned, as is the case with non-Arabs, or it be the mother-tongue, as it is with the Arabs themselves. The first reason is the most weighty one. If it be asked how can it be known that the laws which contain both knowledge and precepts about deeds are of divine origin, so much so that they deserve the name of the word of God, we would say also that this also can be known in many ways. First, a knowledge of the laws cannot be acquired except after a knowledge of God, and of human happiness and misery; and the acts by which this happiness can be acquired, as charity and goodness and the works which divert men from happiness and produce eternal misery, such as evil and wickedness. Again the knowledge of human happiness and misery requires a knowledge of the soul and its substance, and whether it has eternal happiness or not If it be so, then what is the quantity of this happiness, or misery; and also what amount of good would be the cause of happiness. For the case of goodness and evil is just the same as with food, which does not give health, if taken in any quantity and at any time; but must be used in a specified quantity and at an appointed time. For this reason we find these limited in the religious laws. All this, or a greater part of it, cannot be known but by divine revelation, or at least a knowledge through it would be better. Again a perfect knowledge of God requires a knowledge of existent things. Then a law-giver must know the quantity of this knowledge which would be good to be imparted to the common people, and the method to be adopted in teaching them. All this, or at least a greater part of it, cannot be acquired by education, learning or philosophy. This can be clearly known from imparting learning, and especially the giving of laws, making regulations, and giving information about the conditions of the Day of Judgement. When all this is found in the Quran in the most perfect form, there can be no doubt that it is a divine revelation and His word, given through the agency of His prophet. So God has said, informing the people about it, "Say, verily if man and genii were purposely assembled, that they might produce a book like this Quran, they could not produce one like it." This idea is further strengthened, nay, comes near exact surety and certainty, when it is known that the prophet was an unlettered man, and lived among a people, uneducated, wild, and nomadic by habit, who had never tried to investigate the universe, as was the case with the Greeks, and other nations, among whom philosophy was perfected in long periods of time. To this very fact refer the words of God, "Thou couldst not read any book before this; neither couldst thou write it with thy right hand, then had gainsayers justly doubted of the divine origin thereof."[33] Hence God has repeatedly told the people this quality of His prophet. "It is He who hath raised up among the illiterate Arabians an apostle from among themselves,"[34] and, "Those who shall follow the Apostle the illiterate Prophet."[35] This matter can also be known by another method—that of comparison of this Law with the others. For, if the business of the prophets be the giving of laws by divine revelation, as has been acknowledged by all who believe in the existence of the prophets, then if you look into the teachings of useful knowledge and actions leading to happiness, which are contained in the Quran, and compare them with other divine books and religious systems, you will find it excelling all the others in an unlimited degree. On the whole, if there are books worthy to be called the words of God, on account of their wondrous nature, and separation from the genius of human words and their peculiarity by what they contain in regard to knowledge and deeds, then it is clear that the Quran is much more worth thy, and many times fitter, than they are to be called the words of God. This would be still clearer to you if you could know the past books—the Old and New Testaments. But that is not possible because they have been changed to a great extent. Were we to describe the superiority of one Law over another, and the superiority of the teachings given to us about the knowledge of God, and the Day of Judgment to the laws given to the Jews and the Christians, it would require many volumes with a confession of our own short-comings in dealing with the subject. For this very reason, the Law of ours has been called the last of the divine dispensations. The Prophet, peace be on him, has said, "Had Moses lived in my time, he could not have helped following me," and the Prophet was right, on account of the universal nature of the teachings of the Quran, and its regulations. That is it is able to satisfy the needs of all, being meant for the whole of the human race. So God has said, "say, "O men, Verily I am the messenger of God unto you all[36] The Prophet has said, "I have been sent both to the white and the black nations."

The case of religions is just the same as that of God. There are some foods which agree with all, or most of tha people. Such is the case with religions also. So the dispensations before our own were meant for some particular peoples, ignoring all others, but our religion was meant for the whole of the human race. This being the case, our Prophet excels all the other Prophets, to him comes the divine revelation, which makes a man fit to be called a prophet. So the Prophet has said informing us of his superiority over other prophets, "There is no prophet to whom has not been given a sign by which all the men would have believed. I have been given divine revelation, and I hope that my followers would be in the majority on the Day of Judgment."

All that we have said must have made it clear to you that the proof of the prophecy of the prophet from the Quran is not of the same kind as that of turning a staff into a serpent for the proof of the prophecy of Moses, or of giving life to the dead, and curing the blind and leprous for the prophecy of Jesus. For these, although never performed by any but the prophets, and sufficient to satisfy the common people, are not by any means conclusive proofs of prophecy, when taken by themselves,— they not being acts which make a prophet.

Now as to the Quran, its case is just like curing by medicine. For instance, suppose two men were to claim to be physicians, and one were to say that he could walk on water, and the other were to assert that he could cure a disease, and so one walked on the water, and the other cured a sick man. In this case, our verification for medicine would be only for one who has cured a sick man, but in the case of the other, it would be outward satisfaction alone, The first is far better. The only reason by which the common people can be satisfied in this respect is, that one who can walk on water, which is against the nature of men, can certainly cure a disease, which is what men can do. This also is one of the reasons of the connection between miracle, which is not one of the conditions of prophecy, and the sign which makes a man deserve the name of a prophet: divine revelation. Of this quality is also the fact, that there comes nothing to the mind of such a man except that which God has ordained for this unique work, and specialised him for it, among all his fellow-men. So it is not inconsistent if he were to claim that God distingished him with his revelations.

On the whole, when once it is laid down that the prophets do exist, and that the miracles cannot be performed except by them, they can become a prophecy, that is the miracles which are not in any way fit to be received as a proof for it. This is the method to be adopted with regard to the common people. For the doubts and objections which we have described about unnatural miracles are not perceived by the masses. But if you look intently you will find that the Law depends upon suitable and natural miracles, and not upon unnatural ones. What we have said about this problem is enough for our purpose and for the sake of truth.

Problem Third: Of Fate and Predestination. This is one of the most intricate problems of religion. For if you look into the traditional arguments about this problem you will find them contradictory; such also being the case with arguments of reason. The contradiction in the arguments of the first kind is found in the Quran and the Traditions. There are many verses of the Quran, which by their universal nature teach that all the things are predestined, and that man is compelled to do his acts; then there are verses which say that man is free in his acts and not compelled in performing them. The following verses tell us that all the things are by compulsion, and are predestined, " Everything have We created bound by a fixed degree;"[37] again, "With Him everything is regulated according to a determined measure."[38] Further, He says, "No accident happened in the earth, nor in your persons, but the same was entered in the Book verily it is easy with God."[39] There may be quoted many other verses on this subject. Now, as to the verses which say that man can acquire deeds by free will, and that things are only possible and not necessary, the following may be quoted: "Or He destroys them (by ship-wreck), because of that which their crew have merited; though He pardons many things."[40] And again, "Whatever misfortune befalleth you is sent you by God, for that which your hands have deserved."[41] Further, He says, "But they who commit evil, equal thereunto."[42] Again, He says, "It shall have the good which it gaineth, and it shall have the evil which it gaineth,"[43] and, "And as to Thamud, We directed them, but they loved blindness better than the true directions."[44] Sometimes contradiction appears even in a single verse of the Quran. For instance, He says, "After a misfortune hath befallen you (you had already attained two equal advantages), do you say, whence cometh this? Answer, This is from yourselves."[45] In the next verse, He says, "And what happenth unto you, on the day whereon the two armies met, was certainly by permission of the Lord."[46] Of this kind also is the verse, "Whatever good befalleth thee, O man, it is from God; and whatever evil befalleth thee, it is from thyself;"[47] while the preceding verse says, "All is from God."[48]

Such is also the case with the Traditions. The Prophet says, "Every child is born in the true religion; his parents afterwards turn him into a Jew or a Christian." On another occasion he said, "The following people have been created for hell, and do the deeds of those who are fit for it. These have been created for heaven, and do deeds fit for it." The first Tradition says that the cause of disbelief is one's own environments; while faith and belief are natural to man. The other Tradition says that wickedness and disbelief are created by God, and man is compelled to follow them.

This condition of things has led Muslims to be divided into two groups. The one believed that man's wickedness or virtue is his own acquirement, and that according to these he will be either punished or rewarded. These are the Mutazilites. The belief of the other party is quite opposed to this. They say that man is compelled to do his deeds. They are the Jabarites. The Asharites have tried to adopt a mean between these two extreme views. They say that man can do action, but the deeds done, and the power of doing it, are both created by God. But this is quite meaningless. For if the deed and the power of doing it be both created by God, then man is necessarily compelled to do the act. This is one of the reasons of the difference of opinion about this problem.

As we have said there is another cause of difference of opinion about this problem, than the traditional one. This consists of the contradictory arguments advanced. For if we say that man is the creator of his own deeds, it would be necessary to admit that there are things which are not done according to the will of God, or His authority. So there would be another creator besides God, while the Muslims are agreed that there is no creator but He. If, on the other hand, we were to suppose that man cannot act freely, we admit thus he is compelled to do certain acts, for there is no mean between compulsion and freedom. Again, if man is compelled to do certain deeds, then on him has been imposed a task which he cannot bear; and when he is made to bear a burden, there is no difference between his work and the work of inorganic matter. For inorganic matter has no power, neither has the man the power for that which he cannot bear. Hence all people have made capability one of the conditions for the imposition of a task, such as wisdom we find Abul Maali, saying in his Nizamiyyah, that man is free in his own deeds and has the capability of doing them. He has established it upon the impossibility of imposing a task which one cannot bear, in order to avoid the principle formerly disproved by the Mutazilites, on account of its being unfit by reason. The succeeding Asharites have opposed them. Moreover, if man had no power in doing a deed, then it will be only by chance that he may escape from evil, and that is meaningless. Such also would be the case with acquiring goodness. In this way all those arts which lead to happiness, as agriculture etc, would become useless. So also would become useless all those arts the purpose of which is protection from, and repulsion of danger as the sciences of war, navigation, medicine etc. such a condition is quite contrary to all that is intelligible to man.

Now it may be asked that if the case is so, how is this contradiction which is to be found both in tradition and reason to be reconciled we would say, that apparently the purpose of religion in this problem is not to divide it into two separate beliefs, but to reconcile them by means of a middle course, which is the right method. It is evident that God has created in us power by which we can perform deeds which are contradictory in their nature. But as this cannot be complete except by the cause which God has furnished for us, from outside, and the removal of difficulties from them, the deeds done are only completed by the conjunction of both these things at the same time. This being so the deeds attributed to use are done by our intention, and by the fitness of the causes which are called the Predestination of God, which He has furnished for us from outside. They neither complete the works which we intend nor hinder them, but certainly become the cause of our intending them—one of the two things. For intention is produced in us by our imagination, or for the verification of a thing, which in itself is not in our power, but comes into being by causes outside us. For instance, if we see a good thing, we like it, without intention, and move towards acquiring it. So also, if we happen to come to a thing which it is better to shun, we leave it without intention. Hence our intentions are bound and attached to causes lying outside ourselves.

To this the following words of God, refer "Each of them hath angels, mutually succeeding each other, before him and behind him; they watch him by the command of God."[49] As these outside causes take this course according to a well defined order and arrangement, and never go astray from the path which their Creator hath appointed for them, and our own intentions can neither be compelled, nor ever found, on the whole, but by their fitness, so it is necessary that actions too should also be within well-defined limits, that is, they be found in a given period of time and in a given quantity. This is necessary because our deeds are only the effects of causes, lying outside us; and all the effects which result from limited and prearranged causes are themselves limited, and are found in a given quantity only. This relation does not exist only between our actions and outside causes, but also between them and the causes which God has created in our body, and the well-defined order existing between the inner and outer causes. This is what is meant by Fate and predestination, which is found mentioned in the Quran and is incumbent upon man. This is also the "Preserved Tablet. [50] God's knowledge of these causes, and that which pertains to them, is the cause of their existence. So no one can have a full knowledge of these things except God, and hence He is the only Knower of secrets, which is quite true; as God has said, "Say, None either in heaven or earth, knoweth that which is hidden besides God"[51]. A knowledge of causes is a knowledge of secret things, because the secret is a knowledge of the existence of a thing, before it comes into being, And as the arrangement and order of causes bring a thing into existence or not at a certain time, there must be a knowledge of the existence or non-existence of a thing at a certain time. A knowledge of the causes as a whole, is the knowledge of what things would be found or not found at a certain moment of time. Praised be He, Who has a complete knowledge of creation and all of its causes. This is what is meant by the "keys of the secret," in the following words of God, "with Him are the keys of secret things; none knoweth them besides Himself."[52]

All that we have said being true, it must have become evident how we can acquire our deeds, and how far they are governed by predestination and fate. This very reconciliation is the real purpose of religion by those verses and Tradition which are apparently contradictory. When their universal nature be limited in this manner, those contradictions should vanish by themselves, and all the doubts which were raised before, about the contradictory nature of reason, would disappear. The existent things from our volition are completed by two things our intention and the other causes. But when the deeds are referred to only by one of these agencies, doubts would rise. It may be said is a good answer, and here reason is in perfect agreement with religion, but it is based upon the principles that these are agreed that there are creative causes bringing into existence other things; while the Muslims are agreed that there is no Creator but God. We would say that whatever they have agreed upon is quite right, but the objection can be answered in two ways. One of them is that this objection itself can be understood in two ways; one of them being that there is no Creator but God, and all those causes which He has created, cannot be called creators, except speaking figuratively. Their existence also depends upon Him. He alone has made them to be causes, nay, He only preserves their existence as creative agents, and protects their effects after their actions. He again, produces their essences at the moment when causes come together. He alone preserves them as a whole. Had there been no divine protection they could not have existed for the least moment of time. Abu Hamid (Al-Ghazzali) has said that a man who makes any of the causes to be co-existent with God is like a man who makes the pen share the work of a scribe in writing; that is, he says that the pen is a scribe and the man is a scribe too. He means that writing is a word which may be applied to both, but in reality they have no resemblance in anything but word, for otherwise there is no difference between them. Such is also the case with the word Creator, when applied to God and the Causes. We say that in this illustration there are doubts. It should have been clearly shown, whether the scribe was the Creator of the essence (Jawhar) of pen, a preserver of it, as long as it remains a pen, and again a preserver of the writing after it is written, a Creator of it after it has come in touch with the pen, as we have just explained that God is the Creator of the essences (Jawahir) of everything which comes into contact with its causes, which are so called only by the usage. This is the reason why there is no creator but God—a reason which agrees with our feelings, reason and religion. Our feelings and reason see that there are things which produce others. The order found in the universe is of two kinds: that which God has put in the nature and disposition of things; and that which surround the universe from outside. This is quite clear in the movement of the heavenly bodies. For it is evident that the sun and the moon, the day and night, and all other stars are obedient to us; and it is on this arrangement and order which God has put in their movements that our existence and that of all other things depends. So even if we imagine the least possible confusion in them, with them in any other position, size and rapidity of movement which God has made for them, all the existent things upon the earth would be destroyed. This is so because of the nature in which God has made them and the nature of the things which are effected by them. This is very clear in the effects of the sun and the moon upon things of this world; such also being the case with the rains, winds, seas and other tangible things. But the greater effect is produced upon plants, and upon a greater number, or all, on the animals. Moreover, it is apparent that had there not been those faculties which God has put in our bodies, as regulating them that could not exist even for a single moment after birth. But we say, had there not been the faculties found in all the bodies of the animals, and plants and those found in the world by the movement of the heavenly bodies, then they would not have existed at all, not even for a twinkling of the eye. So praised be the "Sagacious, the Knowing."[53] God has called our attention to this fact in His book, "And He hath subjected the night and the day to your service; and the sun and the moon and the stars, which are compelled to serve by His Command;"[54] again, "Say, what think ye, if God should cover you with perpetual night, until the day of Resurrection;"[55] and again, "Of His mercy, He hath made you night and the day, that ye may rest in the one, and may seek to obtain provision for yourselves of His abundance, by your industry; in the other;"[56] and, "And He obligeth whatever is in heaven or on earth to serve you."[57] Further He says, "He likewise compelleth the sun and the moon, which diligently perform their courses, to serve you; and hath subjected the day and night to your service."[58] There may be[59] quoted many other verses on the subject. Had there been any wisdom in their existence by which God has favoured us, and there would not have been those blessings for which we are to be grateful to Him.

The second answer to the objection is, that we say that the things produced out of it are of two kinds: essences and substances; and movements, hardness, coldness and all other accidents. The essences and substances are not created by any but God. Their causes effect the accidents of those essences, and not the essences themselves. For instance, man and woman are only the agents, while God is the real creator of the child, and the life in it. Such is also the case with agriculture. The earth is prepared and made ready for it, and the seed scattered in it. But it is God who produces the ear of the corn. So there is no creator but God, while created things are but essences. To this refer the words of God. "O men, a parable is propounded unto you, therefore, hearken unto it. Verily the idols which you invoke, besides God, can never create a single fly, although they may all assemble for the purpose; and if the fly snatch anything from them they cannot turn the same from it. Weak is the petitioner and the petitioned."[60] This is where the unbeliever wanted to mislead Abraham, when he said, "I give life and kill."[61] When Abraham saw that he could understand it, he at once turned to the conclusive argument and said, "Verily, God brings the sun from the east; do you bring it from the west."

On the whole, if the matter about the creator and the doer be understood on this wise, there would be no contradiction, either in Tradition or in reason. So we say that the word Creator does not apply to the created things by any near or far-fetched metaphor, for the meaning of the creator is the inventor of the essences. So God has said, "God created you, and that which ye know."[61] It should be known that one who denies the effect of the causes on the results of them, also denies philosophy and all the sciences. For science is the knowledge of the things by their causes, and philosophy is the knowledge of hidden causes. To deny the causes altogether is a thing which is unintelligible to human reason. It is to deny the Creator, not seen by us. For the unseen in this matter must always be understood by a reference to the seen.

So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for every action there is in actor. It being so, the agreement of the Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, if we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the visible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His command and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds, and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the middle course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling and the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling of hand and voluntary movement, which thay would call acquired. So their is no difference between them, except in their names, which never effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.

Fourth Problem:—Divine Justice and Injusitce. The Asharites have expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and religion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions. so when a man's action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust, He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad. So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied injustice to himself. He says "God hath borne witness that there is no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom profess the same, who executeth righteousness;"[62] and "Your God is not unjust towards His servants;" and again, "Verily, God will not deal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their own souls[63] "It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many a verse of the Quran, "That He leads as well as misleads the people?"[64] He says, "God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom He pleaseth;"[65] and, "If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction."[66] We would say that these verses cannot be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently contradict them—the verses in which God denies injustice to himself. For instance, He says, "H eliketh not ingratitude (Kufr) in His servant."[67] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. that God has not misled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you from the following verses: "Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy face towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath created man kindly disposed;"[68] and, "when thy Lord drew forth their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam."[69] A Tradition of the Prophet says, "Every child is born according to the divine constitution."

These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, "Verily, God will cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth." refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes. The meaning of the verse, "If We had pleased, We have given unto every soul its direction,"[70] is that He thought of not creating people ready to err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have done so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which speak of misleading the people. For instance, "He will thereby mislead many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby except the transgressors";[71] and, "We have appointed the vision which We showed thee,[72] and also the tree cursed in the Quran, and the verses about the number of angels of hell. "Thus does God cause to err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth."[73] It means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few, to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or there had -been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones, is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little evil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man, "When God said to the angels, I am going to place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know not."[74] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction of the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be attributed to Him, in-spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes of direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictary verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations, which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Crertor of both. As misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary that it should be attributd to Him, like the creation of evil. But this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good on account of their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not have existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its existence is better than non-existence, that is, good. Now the verse of the Quran "No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do; but an account shall be demanded of them," means that He does nothing because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need doing a thing. If it be to, God needs that thing for His own existence, because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being-and God is free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be evident, that He is nob just in the same way as man is just. But it is not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same way as man is, it becomes} necessary to admit there is some defect in him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.

It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the common people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal verses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is impossible (Mustahil) and they think that God has power over it, and then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is weak. A.s the existence of things free from evil was possible according to the masses, God has said, "If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell with genii and men, altogether."[75] This verse means one thing to the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to mean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought we could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with the fifth question.

Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:—The Day of Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ about its condition, but about the visible things by which they should explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are some religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon principles, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category. God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the created things. He says in the Quran, "We have created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion of the unbelievers.[76] Again, He says, describing and praising the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of this existence, "Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee therefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire."[77] The ultimate purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran. He says, "Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye should not be brought again before us,"[78] and, "Doth man think, that he shall be left at full liberty, without control"![79] and further on He says, "I have not created genii and men for any other end, but that they should serve me."[80] that is the genius out of all creation which could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance of knowing God, "What reason have I that I should not worship him who hath created me? for unto him shall ye return."[81] Now it being clear that man has been created tor a certain work, it is evident that the work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none other; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary that the real purpose of man's creation be those deeds which are found in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational powers As there are two portions of the rational powers, practical and theoretical- it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded of him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people, both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught them the theoratical knowledge of things, which all the people should know, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of goodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts which would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is especially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with other religions, it is found that it is absolutely the best religion. Hence it was the last of divine dispensations.

Now divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the soul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have established the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after death. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from desires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity, for they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and their regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before their separation from the body, for this purification is not possible without it. It is to this that following verse refers:—A soul would say, "Alas, for that have been negligent in my duties towards God: Verily I have been one of the scorners".[82] All the religions agree about this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery. This being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything which may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its description in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean to say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of the good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not given any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and bad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions there would be only spiritual # and pleasures angelic. Others have given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the examples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world, after deducting the trouble borne-in acquiring them, and in the same way, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery here, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the people of these religions received from God revelations which those did not receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that illustrations from things visible are best understood by the common people and that they are best led so or checked from an action through them. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their respective bodies, and the best possible ease—in paradise. The bad souls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst possible mirsery, which they call hell-fire.

This is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions of the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain arguments as to the possiblities of the conditions of that world, which can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot apprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is common to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence of the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into being. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the existence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, "And He propoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation."[83] In these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the beginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of those is refuted who differentiate between the real and return of the same thing. He says, "He giveth you fire out of a green tree[84]". The doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the return will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact that God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create the like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of the little from the great. For example, God says, "Is not He who has created the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like unto them? yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator".[85] These verses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same time refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the verses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all of them are of the kind we have mentioned.

So, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there is a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in illustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to the common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is the most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at the same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the advantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary purpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting to the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they would have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical illustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most exciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal only to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are always very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been divded into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the Day of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like our present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they think that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and termination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The other party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is again subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence with our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as physical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would be useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is physical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will be different from our present body. This is only transient, that will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that even Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he said, "There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names." It seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another, i.e., one and the same matter is found in many people and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for their matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then our aforesaid view cannot be true.

The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would say that it is found in the Quran itself God says, "God taketh unto himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which die not He also taketh in their sleep."[86] In this verse sleep and death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.

This is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our religion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion in which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed, then who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we would finish our discourse.

The things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the first place there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant but is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies, which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former: they can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing of which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are farfetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite—that which can be understood on both the sides—is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet; "The black stone is God's action on Earth," etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.

The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book, Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga. It should be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls by the name of essential (Zati); sensual (Hissi); rational (Agli); imaginative (Khayali); and doubtful (Shilbhi). So at the time of doubt it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called essential than an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also included the following traditions of the Prophet, "Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven and hell," "Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise;" and "The earth will eat up the whole of a man except the extremity of the tail." All these, it can easily be known are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about the occasion when both the sides of the question—the illustration and the illustrated—be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the Mutazilites.

The fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when disclosed are denied by the common people. Such has been the case with the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.

From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.

The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took it up because we thought that it was the most important of all purposes—connected with God and the Law.


  1. A translation of Al-Kashf'an Manhij i'l Adillah fi Aqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i'l Ta'wil min Shubhi'l Muzighah wa Bid'ill Mudillah.
  2. Quran ii, 19.
  3. Quran xiv, 11.
  4. Quran xxxix, 39.
  5. Quran xxi, 22.
  6. Quran xxiii, 93.
  7. Quran xvii, 44.
  8. Quran 11, 256.
  9. Quran xvii, 45, 46.
  10. They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The Soul was created at the command of my Lord: but ye have no knowledge given unto you, except a little,—(Quran xxii, 85.)
  11. Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.
  12. Quran ii, 99.
  13. Quran xxi, 33.
  14. Quran lxxi, 14-16.
  15. Quran xxvii, 90.
  16. Quran lxvii, 3.
  17. Quran iii, 88.
  18. Quran xi, 9.
  19. Quran vii, 52.
  20. Quran xli, 10.
  21. Quran iii, 5.
  22. Quran ii, 8.
  23. Quran XVII, 92-95.
  24. Quran XVII, 61.
  25. Quran XVII 90.
  26. Quran XI, 16.
  27. Quran IV, 161, 162.
  28. Quran XLVI, 8.
  29. Quran IV, 173.
  30. Quran IV, 168.
  31. Quran IV, 160.
  32. Quran IV, 164.
  33. Quran XXIX, 47.
  34. Quran LXII, 2.
  35. Quran VII, 156.
  36. Quran, VII. 156.
  37. Quran LIVI 49.
  38. Quran XIII, 9.
  39. Quran LVII, 22.
  40. Quran XLII, 32.
  41. Quran XLII, 32.
  42. Quran X, 28.
  43. Quran II, 278.
  44. Quran XLI, 16.
  45. Quarn III, 159.
  46. Quran III, 160.
  47. Quran IV, 81.
  48. Quran IV, 80.
  49. Quran XIII, 12.
  50. Quran LXXXV, 22.
  51. Quran YXVII, 67.
  52. Quran VI, 59.
  53. Quran LXVII, 14.
  54. Quran LXVII, 14.
  55. Quran XVI, 12.
  56. Quran XXVIII, 71.
  57. Quran XVIII, 73.
  58. Quran XLV, 12.
  59. Quran XIV, 37.
  60. Quran, XXII, 72.
  61. 61.0 61.1 "Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill. Abraham said, verily God bringeth the sun from the east do thou bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was confounded; for God directeth not the ungodly people.' Quran, II; 260
  62. ​ Quran, III, 16
  63. ​ Quran, XLI, 46
  64. ​ Quran, X, 45
  65. Quran, XIV, 4
  66. Quran XXXII, 11
  67. Quran, XXXIX, 9
  68. Quran, XXX, 29.
  69. Quaan, VII, 171
  70. Quran, XXXV, 9
  71. Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who believe will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers will say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc. Quran, II, 24)
  72. Quran, XVII; 62. By the vision may be meant the Prophet's night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his visions about the Omayyeds.
  73. Quran, LXXIV, 34
  74. ​ Quran, II, 28
  75. Quran, XXX, 14.
  76. Quran, XXXVIII; 26.
  77. Quran. III, 188
  78. Quran, XXIII: 17
  79. Quran, LXXV, 36
  80. Quran, LI; 56
  81. Quran, XXXVI: 21
  82. Quran, XXXIX; 57
  83. Quran, XXXVI, 78
  84. Quran, XXXVI; 80.
  85. Quran, XXXXVI; 81.
  86. Quran, XXXIX: 43.