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serious quarrel whether the alleged “ outrage ” be great or small. A similar criticism may be passed on the phrase “ territorial integrity.” Every boundary dispute is a dispute about territory, and nothing is easier than for a state to declare that the tract of land it covets forms, or—like the angulus Me of Horace—ought to form, an integral part of its dominions. Yet, as we have seen, this class of dispute is just that which has been most frequently arbitrated on, and in nearly every case successfully. Weighing, then, each of these exceptions in the balance, and finding them all wanting in precision, we prefer to discard them altogether and to cast about for a fresh classification. M. Despagnet has suggested one in his work on Public International Law (Paris, 1894) which is both convenient and complete. All state differences, this writer points out, may be classed, as regards their subject matter, under one of two heads—(1) those which have a legal character, (2) those which have a political character. Under “legal differences” may be ranged as many as are capable of being decided, when once the facts are ascertained, by settled, x-ecognized rules, or by rules not settled nor recognized but (as in the Alabama case) taken to be such for the purpose in hand. Boundary cases and cases of indemnity for losses sustained by non-combatants in time of war, of which we have already mentioned several instances, belong to this class. To it also belong those cases in which arbitrators have to adapt the provisions of an old treaty to new and altered circumstances, somewhat in the way in which English courts of justice apply the doctrine of cy-pres. Of these last the Newfoundland fishery case is an illustration. “ Political differences,” on the other hand, are such as affect states in their external relations or in relation to their subjects or dependants who may be in revolt against them. Some of these differences may be slight, whilst others may be vital, or (which amounts to the same thing) may seem to the parties to be so. All differences falling under the first of these two general heads appear to be suitable for international arbitration. Differences falling under the second general head are for the most part unsuitable, and may only be adjusted (if at all) through the mediation of a friendly power. The interesting problem of the future is, Are we to regard this condition of things as permanent or as transitory ? The answer depends on several considerations which can only be glanced at here. It may be that, just as the usages of civilized nations have slowly crystallized into international law, so there may come a time when the political principles that govern states in relation to each other will be so clearly defined and so generally accepted as to acquire something of a legal or quasi-legal character. If they do, they will pass the line which at present separates arbitrable from non-arbitrable matter. This is the juridical aspect of the problem. But there is also an economic side to it by reason of the conditions of modern warfare. As M. de Bloch has explained at some length in his monumental treatise on the subject, war has become much more terrible now than formerly, in consequence of the increase of armaments and the greater
perfection of weapons of destruction. Already the nations are groaning under the burdens of militarism, and are for ever diverting energies that might be employed in the furtherance of useful productive work to purposes of an opposite character. The interruption of maritime intercourse, the stagnation of industry and trade, the rise in the price of the necessaries of life, the impossibility of adequately providing for the families of those—call them reservists, landivehr, or what you will—who are torn away from their daily toil to serve in the tented field, —these are considerations that may well make us pause before we abandon a peaceful solution and appeal to brute force. Lastly, there is the moral aspect of the problem. In order that international arbitration may do its perfect work, it is not enough to set up a standing tribunal, whether at the Hague or elsewhere, and to equip it with elaborate rules of procedure. Tribunals and rules are, after all, only machinery. If this machinery is to act smoothly we must improve our motive power, the source of which is human passion and ^ sentiment. Although religious animosities between Christian nations have died out, although dynasties may now rise and fall without rousing half Europe to arms, the springs of warlike enterprise are still to be found in commercial jealousies, in imperialistic ambitions, and in the doctrine of the survival of the fittest which lends scientific support to both. These must one and all be cleared off the world’s stage before we can enter on that era of universal peace towards the attainment of which the Tsar declared, in his famous circular of 1898, the efforts of all governments should be directed.
Arboretum.—That part of a botanical garden which is reserved for the growth and display of trees is technically called an Arboretum. The term, .in this restricted sense, was seemingly first so employed in 1838 by J. C. Loudon, in his book upon arboreta and fruit trees. Professor Bayley Balfour, F.R.S., the Regius Keeper of the Royal Botanic Garden in Edinburgh, has
described an arboretum as a living collection of species and varieties of trees and shrubs arranged after some definite method—it may be properties, or uses, or some other principle,—but usually after that of natural likeness. The plants are intended to be specimens showing the habit of the tree or shrub, and the collection is essentially an educational one. According to another point of view>
Authorities.—Amongst special treatises are—Kamarowsky, Le tribunal international (traduit par Serge de Westman), Paris, 1887 ; Rouard de Card, Les destinies de Varbitrage international, depuis la sentence rcndue par le tribunal de Geneve, Paris, 1892 ; Michel Re von, L' arbitrage international, Paris, 1892 ; Alessandro Corsi (Marchese), Arbitrati Internazionali, Pisa, 1894 ; Ferdinand Dreyfus, L'arbitrage international, Paris, 1894 (where the earlier authorities are collected); A. Merignhac, Traiti de Varbitrage international, Paris, 1895 ; Le Chevalier Descamps, Essai sur' Vorganisation de Varbitrage international, Bruxelles, 1896 ; Feraud-Giraud, “ Des traites d’arbitrage international general et permanent,” Revue de droit international, Bruxelles, 1897. Of similar works in English there is a singular dearth. The most important is by an American, J. B. Moore, History of the Interna tional Arbitrations to which the United States has been a Party, Washington, 1898. The Appendices to this work (which is in six volumes) contain, with much other matter of great value, full historical notes of arbitrations between other powers. Arbitration and Mediation will be found briefly noticed in Phillimore’s International Law; in Sir Henry Maine’s Lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1887 ; in W. E. Halls International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford) ; and more at length in an interesting paper contributed by Mr John Westlake to the International Journal of Ethics, Oct. 1896, which its author has reprinted privately. A London journal, The Herald of Peace and International Arbitration, issued some years ago a list of instances in which arbitration or mediation had been successfully resorted to during the 19th century. The late Mr Dudley Field, of New York, subsequently enlarged this list which has been revised down to 1899 by Dr W. Evans Darby, and is published, along with the texts of several projects for unlimited arbitration, at the offices of the Peace Society, 47 New Broad Street, London. A History of the Hague Conference, 1899, has been published by the International Arbitration Association, 40 Outer Temple, London. (m. h. c.)
