history]
CHINA
even bore her a grudge because she had not at an early period stepped in and put a stop to the war. Li Hung-Chang, who had had his honours restored, was personally grateful to Russia for having extricated him from a very awkward position, and cherished the general grudge against England in an unusual degree, a state of mind of which Russia is believed to have taken full advantage during that statesman’s sojourn at the Russian court as special representative of the Chinese emperor at the Tsar’s coronation. Ample evidence was indeed soon forthcoming that Russia and France had not been quite disinterested in rescuing Chinese territory from the Japanese grasp, for each began to claim a reward as evidence of the imperial gratitude. Russia obtained the right to carry the Siberian railway, which, for the past four or five years, she had been pressing on with eagerness, across Chinese territory from Stretensk to Yladivostock, thus avoiding a long detour, besides giving a grasp on northern Manchuria. France obtained, by a convention dated 20th June 1895, a rectification of frontier in the Mekong valley and certain railway and mining rights in Kiangsi and Yunnan. Both Powers obtained concessions of land at Hankow for the purposes of a settlement. Russia was also said to have negotiated a secret treaty, frequently described as the “Cassini Convention,” but more probably signed by Li Hung-Chang at Moscow, giving her the right in certain contingencies to Port Arthur, which was to be refortified with Russian assistance. And by way of further securing her hold, Russia guaranteed a 4 per cent, loan of £15,000,000 issued in Paris to enable China to pay off the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity. The convention between France and China of 20th June 1895 brought China into sharp conflict with Great Britain, and gave rise to important negotiations which must be briefly e , oag noticed. China, having by the Burma convention of p dlsoute to recognize British also sovereignty overa ' Burma,agreed her quondam feudatory, agreed to delimitation of boundaries at the proper time. Effect was given to this last stipulation by a subsequent convention concluded in London (1st March 1894), which traced the boundary line from the Shan states on the west as far as the Mekong river on the east. In the Mekong valley there were two semi-independent native territories over which suzerainty had been claimed in times gone by both by the kings of Ava and by the Chinese emperors. These territories were named Meng Lun and Kiang Hung—the latter lying partly on one side and partly on the other of the Mekong river, south of the point where it issues from Chinese territory. The boundary line was so drawn as to leave both these territories to China, but in consideration of the fact that Great Britain was surrendering to China territory over which she might claim sovereignty as successor to the kings of Ava, and in respect of which sovereign rights had in point of fact been recently exercised, it was stipulated that China should not alienate any portion of these territories to any other Power without the previous consent of Great Britain. The Power contemplated, though not named, was France, who by a treaty with Siam, concluded in 1893, had pushed the boundary of her Annamese possessions up to the left bank of the Mekong, and it was desired to interpose this particular territory as a sort of buffer, so as to avoid any conflict of French and British interests in this remote and difficult region. This object was frustrated by the convention between France and China of 1895. Yielding to French pressure, and regardless of the undertaking she had entered into with Great Britain, China so drew the boundary line as to cede to France that portion of the territory of Kiang Hung which lay on the left bank of the Mekong. Compensation was demanded from China for this breach of faith, and at the same time negotiations were entered into with France for the better determining of the interests of the two countries in Siam and the territories lying between Siam and the Chinese frontier. These resulted in a joint declaration by the Governments of France and Great Britain, dated 15th January 1896, by which it was agreed as regards boundary that the Mekong from the point of its confluence with the Nam Huok northwards as far as the Chinese frontier should be the dividing line between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two Powers. It was also agreed that any commercial privileges obtained by either Power in Yunnan or Szechuen should be open to the subjects of the other. The negotiations with China resulted in a further agreement, dated 4th February 1897, whereby considerable modifications in favour of Great Britain were made in the Burma boundary drawn by the 1894 convention. The net result of these various conventions.is, that from the Gulf of Tongking westwards, as far as the Mekong, the French Annamese possessions are coterminous with the southern frontier of China, and from the Mekong as far as the confines of Assam the British Burmese possessions are coterminous with the south-western frontier. In the middle where the possessions meet, the Mekong, from the frontier of China down to the northern boundary of Siam, is the dividing line. While Russia and France were profiting by what they were
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pleased to call the generosity of China, Germany alone had so far received no reward for her share in compelling the retrocession of Liaotung ; but, in November 1897, she proceeded to help herself by seizing the Bay of Kiaochow in the a c ow province of Shantung. The act was done ostensibly „ ° ’ in order to compel satisfaction for the murder of two Arthur German missionaries, which had been perpetrated a HW-Aa/few weeks before, but it soon was found that she was W£j determined to hold the place in any event. A cession was ultimately made byway of a lease for a term of ninety-nine years —Germany to have full territorial jurisdiction during the continuance of the lease, with liberty to erect fortifications, build docks, and exercise all the rights of sovereignty. In December the Russian fleet was sent to winter in Port Arthur, and though this was at first described as a temporary measure, its object was speedily disclosed by a request made, in January 1898, by the Russian ambassador in London that two British cruisers, then also anchored at Port Arthur, should be withdrawn “in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence.” They left shortly afterwards, and their departure in the circumstances was regarded as a blow to Great Britain’s prestige in the Far East. In March the Russian Government peremptorily demanded a lease of Port Arthur and the adjoining anchorage of Talienwan— a demand which China could not resist without foreign support. After an acrimonious correspondence with the Russian Government Great Britain acquiesced in the fait accompli. The Russian occupation of Port Arthur was immediately followed by a concession to build a line of railway from that point northwards to connect with the Siberian trunk line in north Manchuria. As a counterpoise to the growth of Russian influence in the north, Great Britain obtained a lease of Wei-hai-wei, and formally took possession of it on its evacuation by the Japanese troops in May 1898. After much hesitation the Chinese Government had at last resolved to permit the construction of railways with foreign capital. An influential official named Sheng Hsuan-hwai was appointed director-general of railways, and empowered to enter into negotiations with foreign capitalists for that purpose. A keen competition thereupon ensued between syndicates of different nationalities, and jtheir claims being espoused by their various Governments an equally keen international rivalry was set up. Germany had insisted upon obtaining as part of the Kiaochow settlement certain preferential railway and mining rights in the province of Shantung. France had previously obtained a similar recognition for the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan, and Russia indicated clearly that she considered Manchuria as her particular field of exploitation. Great Britain, though intimating her preference for the “open door)” policy, { meaning equal opportunity for all, yet found herself ‘ 000pe^ compelled to fall in with the general movement toJ’ wards what became known as the “spheres of in. fluence ” policy, and claimed the Yangtse valley as her particular sphere. This she did by the somewhat fjue^ce >> negative method of obtaining from the Chinese Government a declaration that no part of the Yangtse valley should be alienated to any foreign Power. A more formal recognition of the claim, as far as railway enterprise was concerned, was embodied in an agreement (28th April 1899) between Great Britain and Russia, and communicated to the Chinese Government, whereby the Russian Government agreed not to seek for any concessions within the Yangtse valley, including all the provinces bordering on the great river, together with Chekiang and Honan, the British Government entering into a similar undertaking in regard to the Chinese dominions north of the Great Wall. (A supplementary exchange of notes of the same date excepted from the scope of this agreement the Shan-hai-kwanNewchwang extension which had already been conceded to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.) A similar promise of nonalienation in respect of the province of Fuhkien was made to the Japanese Government (April 1898), which thus earmarked that province as the Japanese sphere. As a general partition seemed thus to be in progress the Italian Government stepped in and applied for a lease of a coaling station at Sanmun, on the coast of Chekiang, together with a grant of railway and mining rights in that province. The manner in which the request was put forward gave offence to the Yamen, and a blunt refusal was returned. The incident gave rise to much feeling both in Peking and Rome. The Italian minister was recalled, but his successor fared no better. China, apprehending a repetition of the Kiaochow incident, sent orders to the local troops to resist a landing if such should be attempted on the part of the Italian men-of-war. No landing, however, was attempted, and though negotiations were continued the demand has not been further pressed. In 1899 Talienwan and Kiaochow were respectively thrown open by Russia and Germany to foreign trade, and, encouraged by these measures, the United States Government initiated in September of the same year a correspondence with the great
