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CHIN A-J A P A N being raised forthwith to an effective 5 per cent, basis ; (2) on the revenues of the “ native ” customs in the treaty ports ; (3) on the total revenues of the salt gabelle. Finally, after more than sixty plenary conferences and innumerable meetings of sub-committees had been held by the diplomatists in Peking, the peace protocol was drawn up in a form which satisfied all the Powers as well as the Chinese court. The formal signature was, however, delayed at the last moment by a fresh difficulty concerning Prince Chun’s penitential mission to Berlin. The prince, an amiable and enlightened youth, half-brother to the emperor, had reached Basel towards the end of August on his way to Germany, when he was suddenly informed that he and his suite would be expected to perform kotow before the German emperor. The prince resented this unexpected demand, and referred home for instructions. The Chinese court appear to have remained obdurate, and the German Government perceived the mistake that had been made in exacting from the Chinese prince a form of homage which Western diplomacy had for more than a century refused to yield to the Son of Heaven, on the ground that it was barbarous and degrading. The point was waived, and Prince Chun was received in solemn audience by the Emperor William at Potsdam on 4th September. Three days later, on 7th September, the peace protocol was signed at Peking by the two Chinese plenipotentiaries and the representatives of Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the United States, Japan, Austria-Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. Article 1 recorded the satisfaction to be given to Germany for the murder of Baron von Ketteler. Article 2 recited the punishments inflicted on the guilty officials and the posthumous honours rendered to the three mandarins who had been executed during the siege for their endeavours to stem the anti-foreign movement. It also placed on record the suspension of official examinations in all cities where anti-foreign outrages of an aggravated character had been perpetrated. Article 3 recorded the satisfaction to be given to Japan for the murder of M. Sugiyama. Article 4 provided for the erection by the Chinese of expiatory monuments. Article 5 dealt with the prohibition of the importation of arms and warlike material. Article (5 set forth the amount and mode of payment of the indemnity. Articles 7, 8, and 9 defined the area of the new legation quarter at Peking, and dealt with its protection and with that of the railway and the whole line of communication between Peking and the sea. Article 10 recorded the measures taken by the Chinese Government to prevent the recurrence of anti-foreign agitation or troubles. Article 11 provided for the amendment of existing treaties of commerce and navigation, and for river conservancy measures at Tientsin and Shanghai. Article 12 dealt with the reorganization of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and modifications of court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign representatives. The British Government at once appointed a Special Commission, with Sir J. Mackay, member of the Council of India, as chief commissioner, to proceed to Shanghai to carry on the commercial negotiations, provided for in article 11, with the commissioners appointed by China. These negotiations were also to deal with the removal of existing obstacles to foreign trade, such as likin, &c., and with regulations for facilitating steamer navigation on inland waters. In accordance with the terms of the protocol, all the foreign troops, with the exception of the legation guards, were withdrawn from Peking on 17th September, and from the rest of Chih-li, with the exception of the garrisons at the different points specified along the line of communications, by 22nd September. On 7 th October it was announced that the Chinese court had left Si-nghanfu on its way back to the northern capital. A month later (7th November) the death of Li Hung-Chang at Peking removed, if not the greatest of Chinese statesmen, at any rate the one who had enjoyed a larger share of the empress-dowager’s confidence and figured in the eyes of the outside world more prominently than any other during that long chapter of wasted opportunities which had opened for the Chinese empire after the suppression of the great Taiping rebellion, and was brought to a close by the Boxer movement, the international occupation of Peking, and the peace protocol of 1901. With this settlement a new era opens. What it will produce none can venture to foretell. On the one hand, the Powers have been induced to display great leniency with regard to the punishment of the court and the high officials implicated in the antiforeign outrages of 1900 ; and on the other, the pecuniary compensation they Have exacted is calculated to weigh heavily on the Chinese people, and on the innocent not less than on the guilty. In the north of China the excesses committed by some of the

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foreign contingents unquestionably lowered the reputation of all Western powers collectively, notwithstanding the high standard of discipline maintained by the British, American, and Japanese forces, and by the later French contingent sent out direct from France. It must be noted also that amongst progressive Chinese officials a widespread feeling of disappointment prevailed that the Powers should have failed to avail themselves of the opportunity to insist upon the introduction of administrative reforms into China. The necessity of such reforms had been more widely realized by the Chinese themselves during the recent crisis than at any previous moment in the modern history of China, and several high officials like the Yangtse viceroys, the viceroy of Canton, and the governor of Shantung, Yuen Shih-kai, one of the ablest of the young Chinese mandarins, repeatedly memorialized the Throne in this sense. Imperial edicts were from time to time issued from Si-nghan-fu announcing important reforms, especially in the system of education and qualifications for the public service, but their value remained speculative so long as most of the appointments made by the court continued to be bestowed on members of the old reactionary party. Authorities.—Beresford, Lord Chas. The Break - up of China. London, 1899.—Bishop, Mrs J. F. The Yangtze Valley and Beyond. London, 1899.—Colquhoun, Arch. R. China in Transformation. London, 1898.—Boulger, Hem. C. The History of China. London, 1898.—Baber, E. C. “Travels and Researches in Western China,” R. Geo. Society Supp. Papers, 1882.— Bretschneider, E. History of European Botanical Discoveries in China. London, 1898.—Chirol, Valentine. The Far Eastern Question. London, 1896.—Curzon, The Right Hon. Geo. N. (Lord Curzon). Problems of the Far East. London, 1894.— Douglas, R. K. Society in China. London, 1894.—Du Bose, Hampden C. The Three Religions of China. New York, 1887. —Fields, A. M. A Corner of Cathay. New York, 1894.—Giles, H. A. Chinese Biographical Dictionary. London, 1897.—Gill, Capt. W. E. The River of Golden Sand. London, 1883.— Gundry, R. S. China and Her Neighbours. London, 1893 ; China Present and Past. London, 1895.—Hosie, Alex. Three. Years in Western China. London, 1897.—Little, Arch. J. Through the Yangtze Gorges. London, 1898.—Norman, Henry. The Peoples and Politics of the Far East. London, 1895.—Poole, S. Lane. Life of Sir Harry Parkes. London, 1894.—Richthofen, Ferdinand yon. China. Berlin, 1877-83.—Martin, W. A. P. The Chinese Education, Philosophy, and Letters. New York, 1898.—Williams, F. Wells. A History of China. London, 1897.—Henry, Augustine. “Chinese Names of Plants,” Journal of China Branch of Royal Asiatic Society, vol. xxv.— Mollendorf, 0. F. von. “The Vertebrata of the Province of Chih-li,” Hid. vol. xv. For political affairs see Blue-books on China since 1875. For commercial and statistical information see Consular Reports, Foreign Office, and Reports of Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs. (g. j. ■ y. c.) China-Japan War of1894-95.—Thecauses of the war between China and Japan arose out of the rival claims of the two Powers to assert influence in Korea. It was an old tradition in Japan, dating back to the legendary achievements of the Emperor Jingu, that Korea occupied a position of quasi-vassalage to the empire. At the end of the 16th century an expedition sent by the Emperor Hideyoshi occupied Seoul and Phyong-yang. The Koreans invoked the aid of China, and after a prolonged war the Japanese forces were withdrawn shortly before the death of Hideyoshi. Inadequate sea power, rendering the supply of the Japanese troops precarious, seems to have been the cause of the ultimate failure, although the Chinese were frequently defeated in the field. In 1627, and again in 1637, Korea was invaded from the north by the Manchus, who soon afterwards established their dynasty at Peking. According a purely nominal allegiance to China, the Koreans subsequently maintained their isolation for more than two centuries. After the revolution which ended in 1868—when Japan, adopting Western reforms, started upon a wonderful career of progress—it was natural that her ambitions in regard to Korea should receive a fresh impulse. In 1875 a Japanese force landed on Kang-hwa Island, and after a naval demonstration at Chemulpo a treaty was obtained opening Fusan to Japanese trade. From this time Japan began to play an active part in Korean affairs, and under her influence a progressive party arose in Seoul, which soon found itself in conflict F ' S. III.-6