Tokyo's Despatch No. 806,
November 19, 1949.
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It would seem naturally to be in the American interest to avoid initiative or too close identification with those elements of the treaty which must be drab and uninspiring, or even gratuitously wounding, merely in the hope of making the document acceptable to other powers which have so much less at stake and have contributed virtually nothing to the remaking of Japan. We fail to see any gain in allowing the onus of vindictive or punitive provisions of the draft to fall principally upon the United States by virtue of our publicly known position of draftor and initiator. We would not wish to have Japanese gratitude deflected from us to other Allied and Associated Powers who might find it tactically advantageous to propose a milder and less technically worded document, notwithstanding our political and economic influence and our achievements through the Occupation.
One aspect of the draft treaty of peace which has given me some concern is that it seems to me that the United States is left little or no bargaining power vis-à-vis the other Allies. While it is, of course, necessary to anticipate the sensibilities and desires of the Allied and Associated Powers, I question whether it is wholly prudent to attempt to satisfy all of those sensibilities and desires in the initial draft. In as much as other powers are most likely to bring forward unduly severe or impractical stipulations which we will be bound to reject as incompatible with fundamental American objectives, it might be strategically desirable to leave room for the acceptance of certain other provisions which we can now anticipate but need not necessarily include in the original draft.
It seems important to determine in advance whether the draft treaty may contain any provocation to the Japanese to seek to play off the Soviet Union against the Western Powers, including the United States. Soviet policy toward a Japanese peace settlement will presumably be directed toward securing provisions and advancing demands best calculated to promote communism and to draw Japan into the Soviet-dominated Far Eastern orbit. There are some indications that the Soviet Union may be prepared to offer Japan a more advantageous settlement on some points than is envisaged in the November 2 draft; fishing concessions may be offered to the Japanese and possibly even a return of part of the Kuril Islands or the Habomai-Shikotan group, in consequence of which the Soviet Union would be likely to seek favorable commercial and "cultural" arrangements with Japan. The Japanese communists are already contending that the Soviet Union will grant the Japanese fishing concessions and that the peace treaty should return to Japan all outlying islands which have "historically and ethnically" belonged to Japan. It is unlikely that the Japanese Communists are putting forth such significant views simply as Japanese patriots or as representing the independent opinion of the Japan Communist Party.
Any draft treaty which does not fully recognize conditions in the Far East as they exist today, and which fails determinedly to discard the psychology and concepts which prevailed before and at the time of Japan's surrender, will fall short of our basic needs. The Far Eastern situation has undergone a vast change during the past four years, largely to American disadvantage (with the single
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