which in part continue and supplement and in part oppose Hume.
Adam Smith (1723-1790), a professor at Glasgow and a friend of Hume, elaborated his ethical theory more fully. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments(1759) he describes the moral sense in its evolution from the mere instinct of sympathy. A spontaneous impulse of imitation causes us to put ourselves in the place of others, and our feelings and judgments are therefore primarily determined by environment. But, on the other hand, if the feelings and judgments of others are not of the same kind and intensity as those which arise in our own minds in their stead, or would naturally arise, we then experience a feeling of disapprobation. Again, we approve their feelings and their judgments (as well as their conduct) whenever, according to our own experience, they seem to stand in a fitting relation to the causes which give rise to them,— and whenever our sympathy for them, for the objects of their judgments and conduct, is not abnormal. To illustrate, we cease to approve of acts of revenge whenever the revenge seems to be too cruel for the circumstances and the subject. A standard is thus gradually evolved which is wholly free from any reference to utility. And we likewise apply this standard to ourselves. We discover that we are criticized by others and not only criticizing others ourselves. We divide ourselves, so to speak, into two persons, of whom the one criticizes the other in the capacity of an impartial witness. We unconsciously idealize this witness; that is we ascribe to him a far more comprehensive knowledge than it is possible for man to attain.
It has frequently been observed that Smith's ethics radically contradicts his famous work in economics,
