possesses a variety of attributes! And the concept of the ego, which Fichte endeavored to make the basis of the speculative philosophy, contains both contradictions: the ego develops and is nevertheless supposed to remain identical with itself, and the ego is supposed to be a unity, but it nevertheless possesses a manifold content!—The correction of contradictory experience should however adhere to experience as closely as possible; for we are obliged to maintain the principle: every phenomenon contains its proportionate implication of reality! (Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik, 1808). The contradictions vanish whenever we assume a manifold of existing entities (realities): when a thing changes it must be explained from the fact that it is being observed in relation to different things (different realities) than before; when a thing possesses a number of attributes it must be explained from the fact that is being observed in relation to different things (realities). Thus experience is corrected by "the method of relations." But the relations do not pertain to things as such; they are wholly contingent, and the method of relations can therefore likewise be called "the method of contingent views." Each particular Real constitutes an absolute position, independent from all other Reals.—The peculiarity of the Herbartian philosophy is expressed in two propositions: 1. In the realm of being there are no events. 2. Every continuum is excluded from reality (Allgemeine Metaphysik, 1828).
What then do we know about the Reals? Herbart, in opposition to metaphysical idealism, holds that, if it is possible to form an idea of the Real, the experiences in the realm of spiritual nature have no prerogatives above the experiences in the realm of material nature. But when he calls the identity of a Real "self-preservation" notwith-
