we have written,See Book I. ch. 7. sect. 2, 3. he must plainly see that the stress of our Argument is not laid upon this Notion of Innate Ideas, but upon that confessed Truth, That there are some things so plain, that however the Soul came to the knowledge of them, she cannot but assent to them, and acknowledge them to be undeniably true.
2. Now the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect being such, that it must needs be acknowledged according to the light of Nature to be indeed the true Idea of such a Being, call it Innate or not, it is all one, the Demonstration will as inevitably follow as if it were acknowledged an Innate Idea; as we shall more plainly discern if we instance in other Ideas; as for example, in the Idea of a Triangle, of a regular Geometrical body, and of a round Solid. For the nature of these Ideas is such, that the Mind of man cannot possibly deny but that they are such and such distinct Ideas, and that such and such affections belong unto them. As for example, That every Triangle is either Isopleuron, Isosceles, or Scalenum; so that there are just Three kinds of them in reference to their sides, and no more: That there are [w:Platonic solid|Five regular Bodies]] in Geometry, neither more nor less, viz., the Cube, the Tetraedrum, the Octaedrum, the Dodecaedrum and the Eicosaedrum: That there is one onely kind of round Solid, viz. the Sphere or Globe. And so contemplating the Idea of a Being absolutely Perfect (be the Idea innate or not innate, it is all one) we cannot but conclude that there can be but one onely such in number, and that That one also cannot fail to be, as we have demonstrated at large.
3. But however, though we need no such Principle for the carrying on of our Demonstration as this of Innate Ideas, yet because I thought it true, and of concernment to animate the Reader to attend the Notions of his own Mind, and relish the excellency of that Judge we are to appeal to, I held it not unfit to insist something upon it: And I am ready now to make it good, that this Principle is true, notwithstanding any thing that I find alledged against it.
4. For what I contend for in the sixth Chapter of this first Book, That the exact Idea of a Circle or a Triangle is rather hinted to us from those describ'd in Matter then taught us by them, is still true notwithstanding that Objection, that they seem exist to our outward Senses carelessly perusing them, though they be not so. For we plainly afterward correct our selves, not onely by occasion of the figure, which we may ever discern imperfect, but by our Innate knowledge, which tells us that the outward Senses cannot see an exact Triangle, because that an Indivisible point, in which the Angles are to be terminated, is to the outward Sense utterly invisible.
Besides, it is to be considered, that though we should admit that a Triangle could be so drawn that to our outward Sense, look on it as narrowly as we could, even through Microscopes, it would ever seem exact; yet they that never saw or took notice of any such accurate delineation, do of themselves upon the intimation of ruder draughts frame to themselves the exact Idea of a Triangle, which they having not learned from any outward Object, must needs be the inward representation of their own Minds.
