institutions, or societary elements, is, itself, a static fact; it has a structure of its own, which is capable of statical formulation." The reply is obviously just, but it does not affect the case. The question in point is not whether a given social fact is a statical factor, or a product of statical factors, but whether in a given mental process it is contemplated in statical relations.
In other words, the distinction between static and dynamic phenomena upon which Professor Ward insists is one which I consider no less important than he, but I think he is wrong in assuming that social or other phenomena must always be represented in consciousness either as static or as dynamic.
Representing a fact as part of a static condition, or of a dynamic process is a procedure much more complex than mere perception of the fact; it is interpretation of the fact in relation to other facts. We neither do nor can nor should so summarily interpret all social facts that immediately following perception we refer them to the category "static" or "dynamic." On the contrary, we keep them for longer or shorter periods under observation, without necessarily committing ourselves to interpretation. During this time they are objectively either static or dynamic factors to be sure, but to our thought they are neither. There is then a raw material of social science, not yet worked into statical or dynamic interpretation; and I find no better term for the sociological process while the material is in this state than "descriptive sociology."
Thus thousands of phenomena occur daily in society which the people who observe them do not know how to explain. They do not know whether to interpret them as incidents in the natural order of society, or as impulses making a different order, or as accidental and exceptional happenings. The most astute social philosophers are frequently in similar doubt. These considerations do not tend to show that the distinction between static and dynamic facts is impractical or insignificant, but simply that the two categories are not sufficient to cover all our ways of contemplating facts. We actually use facts that at the moment are considered neither as static nor as dynamic.
