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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.

grasp eagerly at a theory which shall save their religious systems in a manner which seems consistent with the maintenance of modern culture.

If reason can only be induced to make a voluntary cession of a certain sphere of territory to religion—give a rational sanction to religion to be irrational—then all is achieved. Mr. Kidd is by no means the first to essay this task, but he is one of the boldest, for he does not hesitate to say that religion is wholly without rational sanction.

The element of truth which Mr. Kidd has brought into prominence is the fact that an ethical motive does not derive its force from the intellect, and that ethical progress in an individual or a race is not necessarily correspondent with intellectual progress. What he assumes, but does not prove, is that ethical motives can only operate through definite religious systems, and that the recognition of the value of the "fund of altruism" gives validity to religious forms which are animated by some portion of the ethical spirit.

Mr. Kidd has powerfully emphasized the "irrationality" (in his sense) of the altruistic forces. But he has neglected to recognize that all other motive forces are equally "irrational," and that those which incite a man to selfish conduct are just as irrational as any other. Our likes and dislikes, our estimate of pleasures and pains, that aggregate valuation of vital forces which forms the active character of a man or a race, are irrational in the sense that the intellect (Mr. Kidd's reason) only enables one to see correctly the results which attend the pursuit of likes and dislikes. Moral force can never be directly generated by intellectual machinery.

Once let us realize that it is the real interest of the individual to act in harmony with the total well-being of the society to which he belongs, and that it is the true interest of this generation to care for succeeding generations—that human nature contains desires making for the realization of this wider self which it would be painful to thwart—ethical conduct is at once justified, and the false antagonism of individual and social welfare disappears.

London, England