176 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
For instance, the English laws for the protection of labor had their origin at first partly in the mere spite of the Tories against the Liberal manufacturers, and in the same way competition for popularity has produced very many ostensibly philanthropic actions. Strange as it is, it is a peculiarly petty and malicious temper which, for the sake of afflicting a second, confers a ben- efit upon a third. That indifference to the self-serving effects of philanthropy which is proper to altruism cannot more sharply appear than through such an exploiting of it. Moreover, it is doubly characteristic that one may reach the end of irritating the opponent both through the favors which one shows to his friend and through those conferred upon his enemy.
The formations of this type which are more essential at this point, result when the third party, for reasons of prudence respecting his own interests, adopts an attitude of practical support toward the one party (that is, not merely by way of intellectual decision, as in the case of the arbitrator) and from this attitude derives his mediate or immediate gain. Within this form there are two chief variations ; namely, two parties are hostile to each other, and for that reason compete for the favor of a third ; or two parties compete for the favor of a third, and are for that reason hostile to each other. This difference has specially important bearings upon the further development of the constellation. If an already existing hostility makes in the direction of an attempt by each party to get the favor of the third, the decision of this competition, that is, the attachment of the third to the one party, will really mean the beginning of the conflict. On the other hand, in case the two elements inde- pendent of each other seek the favor of a third, and this constitutes the ground of their hostility, of their partisanship, the final assignment of this favor, which is in this case end, not means, of the strife, will terminate the same. The decision is reached, and further hostility is therewith made meaningless. In both cases the advantage of nonpartisanship, with which the tertius originally stood in antithesis with the other two, consists in the fact that he can set his own conditions for the decision. Where, for any reason, this assignment of conditions is denied
