Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 8.djvu/738

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7 1 8 THE AMERICAN JO URNAL OF SOCIOL OG Y

What is Religion ? "The first step toward a clear understanding of religion is to distinguish carefully between religion and religions. Religion is the root, the source, the parent of religions. It bears about the same relation to the various reli- gions as a genus to its species. A definition which applies only to one religion is no more a definition of religion than the definition of a particular person is a definition of the genus homo."

Theologians and certain ethnologists have defined religion in terms of belief. We may readily admit that belief is an element in religion, as a more or less specific belief is an element in all religions; but when we define religion as a specific belief for instance, the belief in God, in immortality, or in spiritual beings we not only recognize an intellectual element, belief, but we make religion synonomous with a particular form of belief. Others, among whom are Professor Ward and Mr. Henry Rutgers Marshall, make restraint an element in religion. This point is well taken, but, judged from its origin and function, religion cannot be correctly defined as a particular form of restraint any more than it can be correctly defined as a particular form of belief. Religion and morality are two genetically distinct phenomena. Morality implies not merely restraint, but social and conventional restraint, and may be based upon public opinion and social conventions as well as upon religious beliefs. A definition of religion in terms of a special form of action or conduct is as erroneous as a definition in terms of belief, and yet we must admit that action, like belief, is an element in religion.

The feeling of impatience which the human mind experiences before the forces of nature, and out of which all religious ideas, however complex, are derived, has been fixed upon by some writers as the essence of, or the essential element in, religion. But such persons do not contend that religion is identical with feeling. In every religious act the whole personality is present. Why, then, should we define religion in terms of feeling, when feeling, like belief and action, is merely an element in religion ?

The result of the discussion thus far may be summed up in the following proposi- tion : " Religion manifests itself in belief, feeling, and action, and these three ele- ments are present whether we consider it ethnographically as a social device or psychologically as a phenomenon of the individual consciousness. A correct defini- tion of religion must then depend upon the relation and relative importance of these three elements." Now, the relation in the individual consciousness, and the relative importance of perception, feeling, and the conative impulse, are questions of psychol- ogy. It is to this science, and not to theology or ethnology, therefore, that we must look for a final definition of religion. But when we turn to psychology it seems to estop us from identifying religion with the perceptive, the affective, or the conative element, and to demand a form of definition which will include them all. Such a demand may be met, perhaps, by defining religion in terms of desire, or, better, effect- ive desire. But desire for what ? Given the perception of a power manifesting itself in the world and a feeling of dependence upon it, an inevitable result will be the desire of the individual to be in right or personally advantageous relations to that power. Conscious religious activity is always in obedience to this desire. We may suggest, then, as a tentative definition of religion, the following : " Religion is (he effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe"

If the definition here given is approximately correct, it is of tactical advantage to those who argue that religion is a permanent reality. For, though science may attack and destroy particular forms of belief, religion is unassailable ; the roots of religion, imbedded in the soil of man's nature, will not be touched, and new beliefs will spring up to take the place of the old. Again, accepting the above definition of religion, we must regard more people as religious than are usually so regarded. Any man who recognizes, and desires to be in right relations to, " an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed," without claiming to know the ultimate nature of that energy, is religious. It does not follow, however, that all men are religious. It is conceivable that the recognition of a mysterious power in the world, apparently outside of ourselves, may not be followed by an effective desire to be in right relations with that power.

" Finally, if religion has been correctly defined, it is not something which has been revealed to one people and withheld from another. It springs up naturally as