Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 1.djvu/730

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656

APPEALS


656


APPROBATION


Appeals in the African Church. See Apiarius.

Appellants. See J.vnsenism.

Appetite (ad. to + pctere, to seek), a tendency, an inclination, or direction. As it is used by modern writers, the word appetite has a psychological mean- ing. It denotes "an organic need represented in consciousness by certain sensations. . . . The appe- tites generally recognized are those of hunger, thirst, and sex; yet the need of air, the need of exercise, and the needof sleep come under the definition." The term appetence or appetency applies not only to organic needs, but also in a general manner to "conations which find satisfaction in some positive state or result "; to " conative tendencies of all sorts ". (Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, s. V. Appetite, Appetence.) For the schoolmen, a/>- petitus had a far more general signification, which we shall briefly explain. (References are to St. Thomas's works.) Appetite includes all forms of _ internal inchnation (Summa Theol., I-II, Q. viii, a. 1; Quaest. disputatae, De veritate, Q. x.xii, a. 1). It is found in all beings, even in those that are un- conscious. The inclination to what is good and suitable, and consequently the aversion to what is evil — for the avoidance of evil is a good — are in- cluded in it. It may be directed towards an object that is absent or towards one that is actually present. Finally, in conscious beings, it is not restricted to organic needs or lower tendencies, but extends to the highest and noblest aspirations. Two main kinds of appetite are recognized by the scholastics; one unconscious, or naturalis; the other conscious, or elicilus, subdivided into sensitive and rational. From their very nature, all beings have certain tendencies, affinities, and forms of activity. The term natural appetite includes all these. It means the inclination of a thing to that which is in accord with its nature, without any knowledge of the reason why such a thing is appetible. This tendency originates imme- diately in the nature of each being, and remotely in God, the author of that nature (Qutest. disp., De veritate, Q. xxv, art. 1). The appctitus elicitus follows knowledge. Knowledge is the possession by the mind of an object in its ideal form, whereas appetite is the tendency towards the thing thus known, but considered in its objective reality (Qua?st. disp., De veritate, Q. xxii, a. 10). But as knowl- edge is of two specifically different kinds, so also is the appetite (Summa Theol., I, Q. Ixxx, a. 2). The appetitus sensitivus, also called animalis, fol- lows sense-cognition. It is an essentially organic faculty; its functions are not functions of the soul alone, but of the body also. It tends primarily "to a concrete object which is useful or pleasurable ", not to "the reason itself of its appetibility ". The appetitus ralionalis, or will, is a faculty of the spiritual soul, following intellectual knowledge, tending to the good as such and not primarily to concrete olajects. It tends to these in so far as they are known to participate in the abstract and perfect goodness con- ceived by the intellect (Qua-st. disp., De veritate, Q. xxv, a. 1). In the natural and the sensitive appetites there is no freedom. One is necessitated by the laws of nature itself, the other by the sense- apprehension of a concrete thing as pleasant and useful. The will, on the contrary, is not necessitated by any concrete good, because no concrete good fully realizes the concept of perfect goodness which alone can necessarily draw the will. In this is to be found the fundamental reason of the freedom of the will (cf. Qua-st. (lisp., De veritate, Q. xxv, a. 1). The .sensitive appetite is divided into appetitus con- cupuicibilix and appetitux irri.icihilis, according as its object is a]>preh('n<led simply as good, useful, or pleasurable, or as lj(>ing obtainable only with diffi- culty and by the overcoming of obstacles (Summa Theol., I, Q. Ixxxi, a. 5; q. Ixxxii, a. .'5; I-II,


Q. xxiii, a. 1; Quicst. disp., De veritate, Q. xxv, a. 2). AU the manifestations of the sensitive appetite are called passions. In the scholastic terminology this word has not the limited significa- tion in which it is commonly used to-day. There are six pa.ssions for the concupiscible appetite: love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness; and five for the irascible appetite: hope and despair, courage, fear, and anger (bumma Theol., I-II, Q. xxiii, a. 4).

In man are found the natural, the sensitive, and the rational appetites. Certain of man's natural tendencies have in view his own personal interest, e. g. conservation of fife, health, physical and mental welfare and perfection. Some of them regard the interest of other men, and some relate to God. Such inclinations, however, although springing immediately from human nature, become conscious and deliberate in many of their determinations (Summa Theol., I, Q. Ix, a. 3, 4, 5). The tendency of the various faculties to perform their appropriate functions is also a natural appetite, but not a distinct faculty (Summa Theol., I, Q. Ixxx, art. 1, ad 3; Q. Ixxviii, art. 1, ad 3°"'). The sensitive appetite in man is under the control of the will and can be strengthened or checked by the will's determination. This con- trol, however, is not absolute, for the sensitive appetite depends on organic conditions, which are not regulated by reason. Frequently, also, owing to its suddenness or intensity, the outburst of passion cannot be repressed (Summa Theol., I, Q. Ixxxi, a. 3; I-II, Q. xvii, a. 7; Qusst. disp., De veritat«. Q. xxv, a. 4). On the other hand, the sensitive appetite exerts a strong influence on the will, both because the passions modify organic conditions and thus influence all cognitive faculties, and because their intensity may prevent the mind from applying itself to the higher operations of intellect and will (Summa Theol., I-II, Q. ix, a. 2; Q. x, a. 3; Q. Ixxvii, a. 1). The theory of appetite has various applications in theologj'. It affects the solution of such problems as man's desire for God, the conse- quences of original sin, and the perfection of Christ's humanity. It is of importance also in questions concerning the natural moral law, responsibility, virtue, and vice, the influence of passion as a de- terminant of human action. Among the medieval theologians, St. Thomas held that intelligent ('rea- tures desire naturally to behold the essence of God. The knowledge which they have of Him through His effects serves only to quicken their desire for imme- diate vision. Scotus, while admitting this desire as a natural tendency in man, claimed that it could not be realized without the assistance of grace. The discussion of the problem was continued by the commentators of St. Thomas, and it has been re- vived by modern theologians. Cf. Sestili, "De natural! intelligentis animae appetitu intuciidi divinam essentiam" (Rome, 1896).

Mahkr, Psychology (4th ed., London, 1900): Mercier. Psychologie (6th ed.. Louvain, 1903); Gardaiu, I^s passions et la volonli (Paris, 1892); cf. also Gardeu. in Dicl. de thiol, calh., s. V. Appitit.

C. A. DUBBAY.

Appianus, Saint. See Aphi.\n.

Approbation, an act by which a bishop or other lcgi(imate superior grants to an ecclesiastic the actual exercise of his ministry. The plenitude of ecclesiastical power given by Christ to Ilis .Vpostles resides solely in the bisliojis. From the bishop, as the centre of the Christian community, depend the government and care of souls, namely, the dis-

Censing of doctrine and of the sacraments. The elpers with whose aid the bishop exercises his pas- toral ministry are the parish priests, their vicars and co-workers. These possess the power by virtue of the episcopal delegation, transmitted by means


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