SCIENCE
600
SCIENCE
ber of truths, such as the existence of God, the possi-
bihty of miracles, and others. In fact, one science
borrows its presuppositions from the results of other
sciences, a division of labour which is necessitated by
the limitations of everj-thing human. Hence, the
cry for "science without presuppositions" is doubly
illogical, unless by presupposition is meant an hypoth-
esis that can be proved to be false or foreign to the
particular science in question. The freedom of sci-
ence therefore has its hmitations from the point of
view of logic
(b) From the physical point of view science re- quires material means. Buildings, endowments, and libraries are necessary to all branches of science, in re- search as well as in "teaching. Medical and natural sciences require e.vtraordinary means, such as labora- tories, museums, and instruments. jNIaterial require- ments have always imposed hmitations upon scien- tific research and teaching. On the other hand, the appeals of science for freedom from the burden have been generously answered. Between the twelfth and the fourteenth "centuries about forty universities were founded in Europe, partly by private initiative, partlv bv princes or popes, in most cases by the com- bined efforts of both together with the members of the university. Among the self-originating universi- ties may be mentioned Bologna, Paris, O.xford, and Cambridge. With the help of princes, universities were erected at Palencia, Naples, Salamanca, Seville, and Siena. Of the universities founded by popes we mention only Rome, Pisa, Ferrara, Toulouse, Valla- dohd, Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt. Most of the old universities, hke Coimbra, Florence, Prague, Vi- enna, Cracow, Alcala, Upsala, Louvain, Leipzig, Ros- tock, Tubingen, and many others, owe then- origin to the combined efforts of princes and popes. The foundations consisted mainly of charters giving civil rights and authorizing scientific degrees, in most cases also of material contributions and endowments. To many of the professors' chairs, ecclesiastical benefices were" apphed by the popes without other obligation than that of teaching science. Naturally the found- ers retained a certain authority and influence over the schools. On the whole, the old universities enjoyed everywhere the same freedom which they have in England up to this day. After the Reformation the governments of continental Europe made the univer- sities of their owti territories State institutions, pay- ing the profes.sors as Government employees, some- times prescribing textbooks, methods of teaching, and even doctrines. Although in the nineteenth cen- tury, governments were obliged to relax their super- vision, they still keep the monopoly of establishing universities and of appointing the professors. Their influence on the progress of science is unmistakable; how far this may benefit science, need not be decided in this place. With the growing influence of the State that of the Church has been diminished, in most universities to total extinction. In the few European universities in which the faculty of Catholic theology is still allowed to exist, the supervision of the Church over her own science is almost reduced to a mere veto. The necessity of exempting the profes.sors from the oath against the Modernistic heresy is an illustration of the case. Owing to the freedom of teaching in the United States of America there are, besides the public universities of the different states, a number of insti- tutions founded by private endowment. In the face of the strong aid which anti-Christian and atheistic tendencies receive through the influence of universi- ties, private endowments of schools that maintain the truth of Revelation cannot be too much recom- mended.
(c) The limitations of science from the ethical point of view are twofold. The direct action of sci- ence on ethics is readily understood; the reaction of ethics upon science is just-as certain. And both^ftc-
tion and reaction create limitations for science. The
activity of man is guided by two spiritual faculties,
understanding and will. From the understanding it
derives light, from the will firmness. Naturally the
understanding precedes the will, and hence the influ-
ence of science upon ethics. This influence becomes
an important factor in the welfare of the human race
for the reason that it is not confined to the scientist
in his own researches, but reaches the masses through
the various forms of teaching by word and wTiting.
If one is to judge aright in this matter, two general
principles must be kept in view. First, ethics is more
important for mankind than science. Those who be-
Ueve in revelation, know that the Commandments
are the criteria by which men will be judged (Matt.,
XXV, 35-46) ; and those who see only as far as the light
of natural reason enables them to see know from his-
tory that the happiness of peoples and nations con-
sists rather in moral rectitude than in scientific pro-
gress. The conclusion is that if there should ever be a
conflict between science and ethics, ethics should pre-
vail. Now, there can be no such conflict except in
two cases: when scientific research leads into error,
and when the teaching of science, even if true, is
applied against sound educational maxims. To see
that these exceptions are not imaginary, one need
only glance at the points of contact between science
and faith, under A. All of them indicate actual con-
flicts. Unpedagogical teaching is sadly illustrated
by the recent movement in Germany towards prema-
ture and even pubhc instruction on sexual relations,
which provoked a reaction on the part of the civil
authorities.
So much about the direct action of science on ethics. The case ought not to be reversible, in other words, ethics should not influence science, except in the way of stimulating research and teaching. How- ever, not only individuals but whole schools of sci- entists have been subject to that human frailty ex- pressed in the adage: Stat pro ratione voluntas. As Cicero expresses it: "Man judges much more fre- quently influenced by hatred or love or cupidity . . or some mental agitation, than by the truth, or a command, or the law" (De oratore, II, xhi). If Cicero is correct, then the freedom of knowledge, so highly praised and so loudly demanded, is perverted by men in a double sense. First, they carry the freedom of the will into the judgment. Love, hatred, desires, are passions or acts of the will, while judgments are formed by the understanding, a faculty entirely de- void of free choice. Secondly, they deprive the un- derstanding of the necessary indifference and equilib- rium, and force it to one side, whether the side of truth or that of falsehood. If the men of science, who clamour for freedom, belong to the class de- scribed by Cicero, then their idea of freedom is en- tirely confused and perverted. It may be answered that Cicero's statement applied to daily affairs rather than to the pursuits of science. This is perfectly true as far as exact sciences are concerned, and it is probably true also in regard to the formal object of every science. Yet when we consider the very first postulates that the sciences take from philosophy, we come very near to daily life. Men of science hear of Christ and know of the magna carta of His king- dom, proclaimed on the mountain (Luke, vi). It cuts very sharply into daily life. It could be dis- carded, if that same Christ had not claimed all po\yer in heaven and on earth, and if He had not prophesied His second coming, to judge the living and the dead.
Here it is that Cicero's love and hatred come in. It is quite safe to say: there is no place in the civil- ized world where Christ is not loved and hated. Those who are willing to take the steep and narrow
Eath towards His kingdom accept the testimonies to [is Divine mission with impartiality; others who pre- fer an easier ^nd broader way of hfe try to persuade
