vows
513
vows
Lominum continentia, 1. 4, controv. 7, c. xxx^'iii), V.
De Buck (De solemnitate votorura epistola), Nilles
(De juridica votorum solemnitate), ami Palmier!
(Opus theol., II, pp. 445, 446) respects the ordinary
juridical signification of the solemn act. The juridical
Bolemnitie.s are formalities to be observed in order to
give to the act either its legal value or at least the
more or less valuable guarantee of perfect authent icitj'.
This very simple explanation accounts for the histori-
cal changes, both those which have reference to the
number and conditions of vows, and those which con-
cern their effects. It is natural that there should be
greater difficult}' in obtaining a dispensation from a
solemn vow, and also that the Church should attach
certain disabiUties to such a vow. But these effects
of solemn vows cannot constitute the essence of such
vows. However this may be, canon law at the pres-
ent day does not recognize anj' vow as solemn except
the vow of chastity, solemnized by religious profes-
sion in an order strictly so called. The vows taken in
religious congregations, like the simple vows which in
religious orders precede the solemn profession, and
also the complementary simple vows which follow the
profession in some institutes, and lastly the final sim-
ple vows taken in certain religious orders in place of
solemn profession, are, strictly speaking, private; but
they derive a certain authenticity from the approval
of the Church and the circumstances in which they are
taken.
C. Obligation of the Heir. — In itself the vow creates a personal obligation, which does not arise from the virtue of justice and which would seem to cease at the death of the person taking the vow. It is admitted, nevertheless, that heirs are bound to fulfil the vows called real, because they imply a promise to make over certain property or money; the origin of this obhga- tion is the Roman law "De pollicitionibus", accepted as canon law. .^s to its nature, it is an obUgation of religion, if the person making the vow has not made a bequest of the property by will. In this supposition the obhgation would be of justice; but in the other cases, seeing that the law mentions no specific title, but simply declares that the obligation of the vow de- volves on the heirs, we infer it devolves talis qvalis, that is as a rehgious obligation. The obligation of the vow is cancelled not only by the performance of the work promised, but also by the effective substitution of a better work, and by any circumstance which would have prevented the obligation from arising; as, for instance, if the work became useless, or unneces- sary, or impossible. The obligation of the vow may also be annulled by lawful authority. We shall first sum up the generally accepted doctrine, and then en- deavour to exi)lain it briefly.
We must distinguish between the power to annul a vow and the power to dispense from the obligation to fulfil it. A vow may be annulled directly or indi- rectly. No vow can be made to the prejudice of an obligation already existing. If a penson entitled to benefit under a previous obligation asserts a claim which is incompatible with the fulfilment of a vow, the fulfilment is prevented, and the obligation is ipso facto at least temporarily removed. Thus, a master may require the performance of ser\-ices promised by the contract of hiring, without reference to any vow subsequently made; a husband may also require his wife to fulfil a conjugal duty. This is indirect annul- ment, which presents no difficulty. But besides this, certain persons, in virtue of a general power over the acts of others, may directly and finally annul all vows made by their s\ibjects, or may prevent them gener- ally from taking vows in the future. Thispowerbe- longs to the father or guardian in the case of a minor, to the regular prelate, and even to the superior of re- ligious congregations, in the case of professed re- ligious; and, according to many authorities, to the husband, in the case of the married woman; and the XV.— 33
person exercising this power of annulment is not re-
quired to prove the existence of just cause.
The power of dispensing, on the contrary, requires a just cause, less, however, than that which would suffice by itself to exempt from a vow. A still less reason is enough to commute the vow into another good work, especially if the latter is almost equivalent to the work promised. According to canon law, all vows made before solemn profession cease to bind by the fact of that profession, due regard being shown to the rights of third persons; and it is always per- missible for a person to commute vows previously made into those of his or her religious profession, even when this is not solemn. When a vow is commuted by ecclesiastical authority, although the person who has taken the vow may always fulfil his obhgation jjy doing the work originally promised, he is not in any case bound to do so, even if the substituted work becomes impossible. The power of disjjensing and commuting belongs to those who have ordinary juris- diction (besides the pope, the bishop and the regular prelate) over all vows not reserved to the pope and vows the dispensation from which does not prejudice the rights of third persons. Without the consent of the latter these rights cannot be prejudiced by a dis- pensation from the vow, except by the exercise of a supreme power over those rights, such as is possessed by the pope over the rights of rehgious congregations. Moreover, the power of dispensation may be delegated either in special cases or even generally." thus the con- fessors of the regular orders may grant dispensation from vows to their penitents — that is to persons whose confessions they are authorized to receive.
Dispensation from a vow is ordinarily justified by great difficulty in its fulfilment or by the fact that it was taken without due deliberation, or bj' the prob- ability of some greater good either to the person taking it or to others, as, for instance, to a family, the State, or the Church. In dispensing from vows, the ecclesiastical superior does not dispense from any Divine law, but he exercises the power of the keys, the power of binding and loosing, in order to remit the debt contracted to God: and this power appears so useful to society, that, even if it had not been for- mally conferred by Christ, we might contend that it would always have belonged to the authority respon- sible for the public interests of religion. (See Suarez, "De rcligione", VI, Q. x-\-iii.) The direct annulment of vows is more difficult of explanation; for no one can have a power extending so far as to interfere with the interior acts of another person. A son not yet arrived at the age of puberty may, even without the consent of his parents, make a promise of marriage; why does he appear to be unable, by reason of his tender age, to bind himself by any vow to God? We may observe that the distinction" between direct and indirect annulment is not found in St. Thomas, or in Cajetan, but dates from a later period. With Lehmkuhl, we cannot explain this power without the intervention of ecclesiastical authority: in our opinion, the Church, in consideration of the weakness of minors and the condition of religious and married women, gives them a general conditional dispensation, that is to say a dispensation at the discretion of the father, the superior, or the husband. The power to commute vows does not give the power to dispense from them; but the power over vows may, according to a probable opinion, extend also to oaths, and even to vows confirmed by oaths.
E. Reserved Vows. — No person may, in \'irtue of ordinary powers, dispense from vows which the sovereign pontiff has reser%-ed to himself. These vows are, first, all such as form part of a religious profession, at least in an institute approved by Rome, and this reser\-ation applies also tn vows taken by women belonging to orders, entitled to make solemn vows, but who in some countries fake only
