ATTRIBUTES
64
ATTRIBUTES
duced. Most modern authors fix on aseity (Aseitas;
a=' from " se=" himself "), or self-existence; for the
reason that, while all other existences are derived
from, and depend on. Ciod, He possesses in Himself,
absolutely and independently, the entire reason of
His uncaused, infinite Being. In this, the most pro-
found and comprehensive distinction between the
Divinity and everj'thing else, all other distinctions
are implicitly expressed. Whether, and in what
way, the distinctions between the attributes and the
metaphysical essence, and among the attributes
themselves, have an ontological basis in the Divine
nature itself, was a subject which divided Nominal-
ists and Realists, Thomists and Scotists, in the age
of Scholasticism (cf. Vacant, Diet, de th^ol. cathol.,
I, 2230-34).
VI. Di^isiOM OF AxTRiBrTEs. — Taking as the basis of classification the ways by which the attributes are developed, they are divided into positive and negative. Among the negative attributes are sim- plicity, infinity, immutability. The chief positive attributes are unity, truth, goodness, beauty, omnipotence, omnipresence, intellect and wiU, per- sonality. Some authors divide them into incom- municable and communicable. The former class comprises those which belong to God alone (e. g., all-wise, self-existent, omnipotent) to the latter belong those which are predicable, analogically, of God and creatures; as good, just, intelligent. Again, the divine nature may be considered either as static, or as the source of activity; hence another division into quiescent and active. Finally, some perfections in- volve a relation to things distinct from God, while others do not; and from this standpoint theologians divide the attributes into absolute and relative. The various classifications adopted by modern Protestant theologians are due partly to the results of philosophical speculation and partly to new con- ceptions of the nature of religion. Schleiermacher, e. g., derives the attributes of God from our three- fold conscioiLsness of absolute dependence, of sin, and of grace. Others, with Lipsius, distinguish the meta- physical attributes from the psychological and the ethical. A simpler division groups omnipotence, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, and unity as the metaphysical predicates, justice and goodness as the moral attributes. The fundamental attribute is, according to Ritschl, love; according to Pro- fessor Royce, omniscience. The main difficulty with these writers centres about the idea of God as a per- sonal being.
VII. Revelation. — ^The supernatural knowledge of God given in revelation is apprehended through the medium of conceptions that belong to natural knowledge. Therefore, the same principles of at- tribution that govern the one hold good also for the other.
VIII. Historical Developmext. — In the fourth century Aetius and Eunomius maintained that, because the Divine nature is simple, excluding all composition or multiplicity, the various terms and names applied to God are to be considered synony- mous. Otherwise they would erroneously imply composition in God. This opinion was combated by St. CjTil of Alexandria, St. Basil, and St. Gregorj- of Nyssa (In Eunom., P. G., XLV). The princi- ple of attribution received more precise statement at the hands of St. Augustine, in his investigation of the conditions of intellectual knowledge (De Genesi ad Litteram, IV, 32). In the ninth centurj-. John Scotus Erigena, who was largely influenced by Neo-Platonism, transmitted through the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius, contributed to bring into clearer relief the analogical character of predication (De Divina Natura, Lib. I). The Nominalists revived the views of Eunomius, and the opposition of the Realists was carried to the other extreme bv
Gilbert de la Porr6e, who maintained a real, ontologi-
cal distinction between the Divine Essence and the
attributes. His opinion was condemned by the
Council of Reims (1148). St. Thomas definitively
e.xpressed the doctrine which, after some contro-
versies between Scotists and Thomists upon minor
points and subtleties, and with some divergence of
opinion upon unimportant details, is now the com-
mon teaching of Catholic theologians and philoso-
phers. It may be summarized as follows: The idea
of God is derived from our knowledge of finite beings.
When a term is predicated of the finite and of the
Infinite, it is used, not in a univocal, but in an
analogical sense. The Divine Perfection, one and
invisible, is, in its infinity, the transcendental analogue
of all actual and possible finite perfections. By
means of an accvunulation of analogous predicates,
methodically co-ordinated, we endea\our to form an
approximate conception of the Deity who, because
He is Infinite, cannot be comprehended by finite
intelligence. Modern philosophy presents a re-
markable gradation, from Pantheism, which finds
God in everj-thing. to Agnosticism, which declares
that He is bej'ond the reach of knowledge. Spinoza
conceives God as "a substance consisting of infinite
attributes each of which expresses eternal and
infinite essence ". The two attributes manifested to
us are thought and extension. At the other ex-
treme we find Agnostics of the school of Herbert
Spencer (see Agxosticism) and some foDowers of
Hegel, who hold that the nature of God, or, to use
their favourite term, "the Absolute", is utterly
unknowable, and its existence not determined to
any mode; therefore, to predicate of it various
attributes, expressive of determinations, is idle and
misleading. Between the finite and the Infinite
there is no common ground of predication; hence,
words which signify finite perfections can have no
real meaning when predicated of Ciod; they become
mere empty sjnnbols. All theological attempts to
elaborate an idea of God are vain, and result in
complete absurdity when they conceive God after
man's image and likeness (see Axthropomorphism),
and circumscribe the Infinite in terms borrowed from
human psychology. Criticism of this kind indicates
that its authors have never taken the trouble to
understand the nature of analogical predication, or
to consider fairly the rigorous logical process of
refining to which terms are subjected before being
predicated of God. It often happens, too. that
wTiters. after indulging liberally in eloquent de-
nunciation of theological anthropomorphism, proceed,
on the next page, to apply to the Infinite, presumablj'
in a strictly univocal sense, terms such as " energj' ",
'■ force ", and " law ", which are no less anthropo-
morphic, in an ultimate analysis, than "will" and
'■ intelligence ". The position of the Catholic Church,
declared in the Fourth Lateran Council (121.5). is
again clearly stated in the following pronouncement
of the Vatican Council:
"The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and professes that there is one living and true God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, omnipotent, eternal, inunense, incomprehensible, infinite in intellect and will and in all perfection; Who, being One, singular, absolutely simple and un- changeable spiritual substance, is to be regarded as distinct really and in essence from the world, most blessed in and from Himself, and unspeakably ele- vated above all things that exist, or can be con- ceived, except Himself."
St. Thom.\s, / Sent., dist. ii, Q. I; Summa Theol., !« Q. XIII, a. 12; De PotentiA. Q. VII. a. S: C. Genl. L. I., c. xxxv; WiLHELM AND Sc.vNN'ELL, A Manual of Catholic Theology (New York, 1892); I, v; GR.vrRY. La connaissance de Dieu (Paris. 1856\ Part II; tr. Axger, Guide to the Knouledqe of God (Boston. 1892); Tocssaint in Diet, de thiol. caOi. (Paris, 1903): Flint, Theism (Edinburgh, 1879); Iveracb.
