approaches to, as far as its nature allows, the nature of
confirmation. Again, it argues nothing against the
opinion held in the article that concordats are some-
times expressly designated bilateral agreements or
contracts (perhaps once: to wit, in the letter of Leo
XIII, dated 16 Feb., 1892, to the bishops and faithful
of France), since in such cases it is evident that the
pope wished only to observe all the conventionalities
of concordats—in so far at least as duty permitted.
It was not the pope's intention to define and deter-
mine the exact essence of a concordat, but rather to manifest his mind on the matter in question, and give
assurance that he, on his part, would not violate the
articles agreed upon. Relative to this matter Wernz
says: "Pius X praised Bonald because he brought to his notice the nature and peculiar characteristic of these agreements or indults." Then, too, Leo XIII
earnestly recommended that the question of concordats be seriously and thoroughly looked into. Surely
the praise of Pius and the recommendation of Leo
would have been utterly foolish if the theory of bilateral contracts had been evidently and unquestionably
adopted by the Apostolic See.
Of less value is the argument drawn from individual phrases occurring occasionally in diplomatic correspondence. For, apart from the fact that never, perhaps, in these diplomatic notes is a concordat said to be identical with a bilateral contract, it must also be granted, and that without evasion, that the weakest kind of argument is that drawn from one or another phrase used by some Cardinal Secretary of State, or some Apostolic Nuncio in a single diplomatic note. For the admission is not forced upon us that these phrases are the best that underthe circumstances could be chosen. It is also false that the treaty theory is more commonly held by theologians and canonists. For neither is this true of the modern canonists, while it is absolutely false of those of earlier date, very many of whom (as Baldi clearly proves in his erudite commentary on concordats already cited) held the opinion advanced in this paper. This opinion, it must be noted, is based on two principles: first, that ecclesiastical and civil society are not co-ordinate; secondly, that the power of the Roman Pontiff can be neither alienated nor diminished. On this point Wernz wisely remarks: "If the co-ordination of Church and State be urged as an argument, then the treaty theory is founded either on an error, or on a pure fiction lacking all objective reality." (Cf. Siigraiiller, "Lehrbuch des kath. Kirchenrechts", 89 sqq.) Hence it follows that it is utterly impossible to call a concordat an international treaty in the real and true sense of the word (cf. a pamphlet anonymously edited in Rome, 1872, under the title: "Delia Natura e carattere essenziale dei Concordati", whose author was Cardinal Cagiano de Azevedo). Neither can the concordat be classed with international treaties, since the latter are entered upon by two societies each perfect in itself and both equal. The Church, on the other hand, is neither subordinate to, nor equal to, the State, but is in a true sense its superior. Hence, also, it follows that concordats are not bilateral contracts ; since for such a contract three things are essentially required: (a) the consent of two parties to the same thing; (b) which imposes upon each an obligation of commutative justice; (c) so that the obligation of one party is the cause of a right in the other, and one obligation is to the other as effect to cause. But a strict right arising from conmiutative justice is altogether independent not only of the other contracting party, but also, generally speaking, of public authority. Hence, no one can lawfully or validly take such a "right away from me against my will. 'Moreover, it cannot be said that concordats impose on the pontiff an obligation which is the cause of a right in the other party, and of such a right as can be neither lawfully nor validly recalled. For certainly, in this hypothesis, a
succeeding pontiff could not do as much as his predecessor; he would receive a lessened power, not that
which Peter received from Christ to be transmitted to
his successors for the government of the church. And
this surely cannot be, since each succeeding pontiff
receives his power not from his dead predecessor, but
from God himself, who always gives the selfsame, as
he has said once for all to Peter and his successors:
"Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build ray
church . . . Feed my lambs ... I will give to thee
the keys". Therefore a succeeding pontiff is not
bound by the compacts of his predecessor as by a bilateral contract giving such a strict right of commutative justice that if he violate the agreement without
cause his act is invalid. And neither is the pontiff
who has made such compacts so bound by them, for
he is not the master of that fullness of power which is
the primacy, but only its administrator, so that he
cannot alienate or lessen it. Nor can you argue that
by concordats, which are bilateral contracts, not the
power of the supreme pontiff, but only its exercise, is
diminished. For what is that power which can never
be exercised, or which, if exercised, remains without
effect? And such would be the case, for even if the
pontiff wished he could not act validly, and therefore
his power would be lessened. And hence the Roman
pontiff must retain the fullness of power and jurisdiction over those questions which are settled in a concordat. This is what Cardinal Antonelli, Secretary of
State, maintained in his diplomatic correspondence,
when the Kingdom of Portugal complained that the pontiff had violated the concordat.
Does the pontiff then contract no obligation in concordats? Assuredly he contracts an obligation; and they do an injury to Cardinal Tarquini who think that he held the opposite. For, although he does not mention this obligation in his definition of concordats, he certainly admits it when explaining his meaning. But this obligation is one of fidelity, not of justice, an obligation which makes a violation of the concordat without just cause an unlawful act, but not an invalid act. His Eminence Cardinal Francis Satolli explains with his usual depth and clearness the nature of the obligation which a pontiff is under of observing a concordat. His little work, of great authority, bears the title, "Prima principiade Concordatis". The learned author begins his investigation with the following reasoning from St. Thomas, I, xxi, 1, ad 3. The Angelic Doctor, asking whether justice exists in God, puts this objection to himself: The act of justice consists in the payment of a debt; but God is a debtor to no one, therefore it would seem that justice does not exist in God. To solve this difficulty the Holy Doctor first lays down the principle: to every one is due what is his own. He then inquires what one may call his own, and establishes that one's own is that which is for him, as a slave is his master's, precisely because, inasmuch as he is a slave, he is for his master. In the name debt, therefore, concludes the .\ngelic Doctor, is simplified a relation of exigency or necessity in a thing referring it to that for which it exists. Considering this relation more thoroughly, you will see that it is twofold: a relation by which a creature is for another creature and all creatures for God. Since this relation is twofold, there is also a twofold debt in the Divine plan; one by which a thing is due to God, the other by which a thing is due to the creature, and in both ways, says St. Thomas, God can make payment. For it is due to God that what the wisdom of his will has decreed should be fulfilled in creatures, as it is due to the creature that what has been ortlained for it it should possess. Thus it is due to man that other animals should supply his needs. But this second debt depends on the first, since a thing is due to creatures because it is ordained for them through the relations established by the Divine wisdom. Wherefore, since God pays a debt to his creatures in this way only, he
