COSMOLOGY
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COSMOLOGY
postulating a God to explain the origin of the cosmos
and its manifestation of purpose. Because of the ad-
vance the natural sciences were then making, Wolff
omitted from his philosophic study of nature the
purely scientific portion which till then had been
closely allied with it. The cosmology of the ancients
and especially of Aristotle was simply a branch of
physics. The "Physics" of Aristotle treats of cor-
poreal beings in as far as they are subject to motion.
The work is divided into two parts: (1) General phys-
ics, which embraces the general principles governing
corporeal being. It treats of local motion and its
various kinds; the origin of substantial compounds;
changes in quality; changes in quantity by increase
and decrease; and changes arising from motion in
place, on which Aristotle hinges our notions of the in-
finite, of time, and of space. (2) Special physics
which deals with the various classes of beings: terres-
trial bodies, celestial bodies, and man. It is the first
part of this work that comes nearest to what we mean
by cosmology. The Schoolmen of the Middle Ages,
as a rule, follow the path marked out for them by
Aristotle. Cosmological subjects, properly so called,
have no reserved place in philosophical study, and are
generally treated as a part of physics. In our own
time, philosophers employ the words "cosmology"
and "philosophy of nature" to designate the philo-
sophic study of the corporeal world.
Method. — Cosmology is the natural complement of the special sciences. It begins where they leave off, and its domain is quite distinct from theirs. The sci- entist detennines the immediate cause of the phenom- ena observed in the mineral or the organic world: he formulates their laws, and builds these into a syn- thesis with the help of certain general theories, such as those of light, of heat, and of electricity. The cos- mologist, on the other h.ind, seeks the ultimate causes, not of this or that class of beings or of phenomena, but of the whole material universe. He inquires into the constituent nature of corporeal beings, their destiny, and their first cause. It is clear that these larger problems are quite beyond the range and purpose of the various sciences, each of which is by its method confined to its own particular subject. Nevertheless, cosmology must borrow, and borrow largely, from the data of science, since the causes which it studies are not directly perceptible; they can be known only through phenomena which arc their more or less faithful manifestations. It is on these that cosmol- ogy must rest in order to pass upward from cause to cause till the ultimate cause is reached. Since, then, it is the role of the natural sciences to analyse and classify the properties and phenomena of nature, cos- mology is obliged to draw very freely upon those sci- ences and to neglect none of their definitive results. In a word, the cosmological method is essentially a posteriori. Descartes and his school followed a differ- ent, even an oijposite, course. Being a mathemati- cian above all else, he applies to cosmology the prin- ciples of mathematics, and as mathematics sets out from the simplest propositions and travels along the road of deduction to the most complex tniths, so Descartes, starting from extension as the primordial and universal property of matter, in fact its very es- sence, ends by ascribing to all bodies in nature what- ever extension implies and by eliminating from them whatever it excludes. This a priori method, being es- sentially dediictive is anti-scientific; and is li.ised, moreover, on a false supposition, since extension is only one of the many propi-rties of matter, not its es- sence. As Leibniz pointed out, extension ])resupposes something extended, just as a repetition presupjioses something to be repeated. Philosophers, therefore, have almost entirely abandoned this method; with the exception perhaps of the Idealistic Pantheists of whom we shall speak presently.
Pivjsjoff Of CosMOLouy. — Cosmology, as most
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philosophers understand it, has a threefold problem to
solve: Whence this corporeal world? What is it?
Why is it? Hence its three parts, concerned respec-
tively with (1) the primordial efficient cause of the
cosmos; (2) its actual constituent causes; (3) its final
cause.
The first cause of the material universe. — Geology, go back as it may and as far as it may in the scientific history of the earth, must ever remain face to face with a fact that calls for explanation, viz. the exist- ence of matter itself. Even if it could decisively prove Laplace's hypothesis, according to which all ' ie>" portions of this universe, earth, sun, and the whole stellar system, originally made up a single nebular ma.ss, there would still remain the very reasonable noi^i question, whence came this mass and what was its j (wM origin? Now this is precisely the question cosmology fo asks; and in seeking the answer it has given rise to many systems which can always be brought imder one of the following headings: (a) Monism; (b)the theory of Transitive Emanation; (c) Creationism. (a) The Monist theory is that all beings in the world are but one and the same necessary and eternal substance having w-ithin itself the sufficient reason of its exist- ence; while the seeming diversity of things and their attributes, are but the various manifestations and evolutions of this single substance. Pantheism iden- tifies the world with the Divine Being. This Being is ceaselessly in process of evolution; which, however, in no w'ise disturbs the universal identity of things. The Pantheist is either an Idealist or a Realist according to the view he takes of the nature and character of the original substance. If that substance is real he is styled a Realist, and such were Erigena, Amalric, David of Dinant, Giordano Bruno, and Spinoza. But if the original substance is something ideal, e. g. the Ego, the Absolute, the Concept, he is styled an Ideal- ist, and such were Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte. Kraus and Tiberghien support the Pantheistic view: God is in the world and the world is in God, although they are not identical. Schopenhauer devised a form of Pantheism which is known as Panthelism. Ac- cording to his view the motive force of the whole uni- verse is a single blind will. Ilartmann goes a step farther and says the world is but the constant evolu- Jotrilu tion of the unconscious: hence the name Panhylisra. iidion Modern Materialists, such as Biichner, Hiickel, Ba- ruch, as well as the old Greek .\tomists, Leucippus, Wiiisl Democritus, and Epicurus, consider all the activities of the universe as so many purely material phenomena arising from one necessary and eternal substance, iiims, Lastly, according to the supporters of the Immanent <id«I Emanation theorj-, the Divine Being develops within Jsartk itself so that it is continually identifying itself with the beings it evolves, or that come forth from it, just as the grub maintains its substantial identity throughout its transformation into chrj'salis and butterfly. It is clear that such a thcorj' hardly differs from Pantheism.
(b) In the Transitive Emanation theorj' all beings issue from the Divine Substance much in the same ■n'.ay as new fruits appear on the parent tree without changing its substance and without diminishing its productive power, (c) Creationism is the view held by the generality of spiritualistic philosophers. The imiverse through its endless transformations reveals its contingency: that is to say, its existence is not a necessity: therefore it must have received its exist- ence from some other being. This first cause nnist be a necessary and independent one, imless we a<lmit an infinite series of dependent causes and so leave un- solved the problem of the world's existence. God has, therefore, drawn all things from nothingness by the free act of His Almighty Will; in a word. He has made them out of nothing, since any other explanation, e. g. Emanationism, which implies a real intrinsic change in God. is incompatible with the ininuitability, necessity, and absolute perfection of the Divine Beiu^
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