DOGMATIC
92
DOGMATIC
Dogmatic Facts. — (1) Definition. — By a dogmatic
fact, in wider sense, is meant any fact connected with
a dogma and on which the appHcation of the dogma to
a particular case depends. The following questions
involve dogmatic facts in the wider sense: Is Pius X,
for instance, really and truly Roman pontiff, duly
elected and recognized by the Universal Church?
This is connected with dogma, for it is a dogma of
faith that every pontiff duly elected and recognized by
the Uni^•ersal Church is a successor of Peter. Again
Was this or that council oecimienical? This, too, is
connected with dogma, for every oecumenical council
is endowed with infallibility and jurisdiction over the
Universal Church. The question also whether canon-
ized saints really died in the odour of sanctity is con-
nected with dogma, for everj' one who dies in the
odour of sanctity is saved. In the stricter sense the
term dogmatic fact is confined to books and spoken
discourses, and its meaning will be explained by a
reference to the condemnation by Innocent X of five
propositions taken from the posthumous book of Jan-
.senius, entitled " Augustinus". It might be asked,
for example, whether the pope could define that Jan-
senius was really the author of the book entitled" Au-
gustinus". It is conceded that he could not. He
may speak of it as the work of Jansenius, because, in
general repute, at least, it was regarded as the work of
Jansenius. The precise authorship of a book is called
a personal fact. The question turned on the doctrine
of the book. The Jansenists admitted that the doc-
trine enunciated in the condemned propositions was
heretical; but they maintained that the condemned
doctrine was not taught in the "Augustinus". This
brings us to what are called "particular facts of doc-
trine". Thus it is a fact that God exists, and that
there are three Persons in God ; here the same thing is
fact and dogma. The Jansenists admitted that the
pope is competent to deal with particular facts of doc-
trine, but not to determine the meaning of a book.
The controversy was then carried to the meaning of
the book. Now it is conceded that the pope cannot
define the purely internal, subjective, perhaps singu-
lar meaning, which an author might attach to his
words. But the pope, in certain cases, can determine
the meaning of a book judged by the general laws of
interpretation. And when a book or propositions
from a book are condemned, " in the sense of the au-
thor", they are condemned in the sense in which the
book or propositions would be understood when inter-
preted according to the ordinary laws of language.
The same formula may be condemned in one author
and not in another, because, interpreted by the con-
text and general argument of the author, it may be
unorthodox in one case and not in the other. In the
strict sense, therefore, a dogmatic fact may be defined
as "the orthodox or heterodox meaning of a book or
proposition"; or as a "fact that is so connected with
dogma that a knowledge of the fact is necessary for
teaching and conserving sound doctrine". When we
say that a book contains unorthodox doctrine, we con-
vey that a certain doctrine is contained in the book
and that the doctrine is unorthodox; here we have
close connexion between fact and dogma.
(2) The Church and Dogmatic Facts. — Jansenists distinguished between "fact" and "dogma". They held that the Church is infallible in defining revealed truth and in condemning errors opposed to revealed truth ; but that the Church is not infallible in defining facts which are not contained in Divine revelation, and consequently that the Church w-as not infallible in declaring that a particular doctrine, in a particular .sense, was found in the "Augustinus" of Jansenius. This would confine the infallible teaching of the Church to mere abstract doctrines, a view that cannot be accepted. Theologians are \manimous in teaching that the Church, or the pope, is infallible, not only in defining what is formally contained in Divine revela-
tion, but also in defining virtually revealed truths, or
generally in all definitions and condemnations which
are necessary for safe-guarding the body of revealed
truth. Whether it is to be regarded as a defined doc-
trine, as a doctrine de fide, that the Church is infallible
in definitions about dogmatic facts, is disputed among
theologians. The reason of this difference of opinion
will appear below (3). The Church, in all ages, has
exercised the right of pronouncing with authority on
dogmatic facts ; and this right is essential to her teach-
ing office. She has always claimed the right of defin-
ing that the doctrine of heretics, in the sense in which
it is contained in their books, or in their discourses, is
heretical; that the doctrine of an orthodox writer, in
the sense in which it is contained in his writings, is
orthodox. We can scarcely imagine a theory like
that of the Jansenists advanced within the sphere of
the civil authority. We can scarcely conceive it to be
held that a judge and a jury may pronoimce on an
abstract proposition of libel, but cannot find that a
particular paragraph in a book or newspaper is libel-
lous in the sense in which it is written. If the Church
could not define the orthodo.x or imorthodox sense of
books, sermons, conferences, and discourses generally,
she might still be infallible in regard to abstract doc-
trine, but she could not fulfil her task as practical
teacher of humanity, nor protect her children from
actual concrete dangers to their faith and morals.
(3) Faith and Dogmatic Factf:. — The more extreme Jansenists, distinguishing between dogma and fact, taught that the dogma is the proper object of faith but that to the definition of fact only respectful silence is due. They refused to subscribe the formula of the condemnation of Jansenism, or would subscribe only with .a qualification, on the ground that subscription implied internal assent and acquiescence The less ex- treme party, though limiting the Church's infallibil- it}' to the question of dogma, thought that the formula might be signed absolutely and without qualifica- tion, on the groimd that, by general usage, subscrip- tion to such a formula implied as.sent to the dogma, but, in relation to the fact, only external reverence. But the definitions of dogmatic facts demand real in- ternal assent ; though about the nature of the assent and its relation to faith theologians are not unanim- ous. Some theologians hold that definitions of dog- matic facts, and especially of dogmatic facts in the wider acceptation of the term, are believed by Divine faith. For instance, the proposition, "every pope duly elected is the successor of Peter", is formally revealed. Then, say these theologians, the proposi- tion, "Pius X has been duly elected pope", only shows that Pius X is included in the general revealed proposition that "everj- pope duly elected is the suc- cessor of Peter". And they conclude that the propo- sition, "Pius X is successor to Peter", is a formally revealed proposition; that it is believed by Divine faith; that it is a doctrine of faith, dc fide; that the Church, or the pope, is infallible in defining svich doc- trines. Other theologians hold that the definitions of dogmatic facts, in the wider and stricter acceptation, are received, not by Divine faith, but by ecclesiastical faith, which some call mediate Divine faith. They hold that in such syllogisms as this: "Every duly elected pontiff is Peter's successor; but Pius X, for example, is a duly elected pontiff; therefore he is a successor of Peter", the conclusion is not formally revealed by God, but is inferred from a revealed and an imrevealed proposition, and that con.sequontly it is believed, not by Divine, but by ecclesiastical faith. It would then also be held that it has not been for- mally defined de fide that the Church is infallil>le in the definition of dogmatic facts. It would be said tech- nically to be theologically certain that the Church is infallible in these definitions; and this infallibility cannot lawfully be questioned. That all are boimd to give internal assent to Church definitions of dogmatic
