ETHICS
565
ETHICS
monarchy; the aristocracy; the democracy. The
monarchy is hereditary or elective, according as suc-
cession to supreme power follows the right of primo-
geniture of a family (djTiasty) or is subject to suf-
frage. At the present day the only existing kind of
monarchy is the liereditary, the elective monarchies,
such as Poland and the old German Sovereigntj', having long since disappeared. Those States in which the
sovereign power resides in the body of the people, are
called polycracies, or more commonly, republics, and
are divided into aristocracies and democracies. In
republics the sovereigntj' is vested in the people. The
latter elect from their number representatives who
frame their laws and administer the affairs of govern-
ment in their name. The almost imiversally prevailing form of government in Europe, fashioned upon the
model created by England, is the constitutional mon-
archy, a mixture of the monarchical, aristocratic, and
democratic forms. The law-making power is vested
in the king and two chambers. The members of one
chamber represent the aristocratic and conservative
element, while the other chamber, elected from the
body of citizens, represents the democratic element.
The monarch himself is responsible to no one, yet his
governmental acts require the counter-signature of
the ministers, who in turn are responsible to the
chamber.
With regard to its appointed functions the govern- ment of the State is divided into the legislative, judi- ciary, and executive powers. It is of primary impor- tance that the State enact general and stable laws governing the activities of its subjects, as far as this is required for the good order and well-bemg of the whole body. For this purpose it must possess the right to legislate; it must, moreover, carry out these laws and provide, by means of the administrative, or rather executive, power for what is needful to the general good of the community; finally, it has to punish in- fractions of the laws and authoritatively settle legal disputes, and for this purpose it has need of the judi- ciary power (in civil and criminal courts). This right of the State to impose penalties is founded on the necessity of preserving good order and of providing for the security of the whole body politic. In a com- munity there are always found those who can in no other way be effectually forced to observe the laws and respect the rights of others than by the infliction of punishment. Hence the State mvist have the right to enact penal statutes, calculated to deter its subjects from violating the laws, and the right, moreover, to actually inflict punishment after the violation has occurred. Among the legitimate modes of pimish- ment is capital punishment. It is considered, and rightly so, a step forward in civilization, that nowa- days a milder practice has been adopted in this regard, and that capital pimishment is more rarely inflicted, and then only for such heinous crimes as murder and high treason. Nevertheless, humanitarian sentimen- tal ism has no doubt been carried to an exaggerated degree, so much so that many would on principle do away with capital punishment altogether. And yet, this is the only sanction sufficiently effective to deter some men from committing the gravest crimes.
When it is asserted, with Aristotle, that the State is a society sufficient for itself, this is to be considered true in the sense that the State needs no further devel- opment to complete its organization, but not in the sense that it is independent in every respect. The greater the advance of mankind in progress and civili- zation, the more necessary and frequent the commu- nication between nations becomes. Hence the ques- tion arises as to what rights and duties mutually exist between nation and nation. That portion of ethics which treats this question from a philosophical stand- point is called the theory of international law, or of the law of nations. Of course, many writers of the present day deny the propriety of a philosophical
treatment of international law. According to them
the only international rights and duties are those
which have been established by some positive measure
either implicitly or explicitly agreed upon. This, in-
deed, is the position that must be taken by all who
reject the natural law. On the other hand, this posi-
tion precludes the possibility of any positive inter-
national law whatever, for lasting and binding com-
pacts between various States are possible only when
the primarj- principle of right is recognized — that it is
just and obligatory to stand by lawful agreements.
Now this is a principle of natural law; hence, those
who deny the existence of the natvual law (e. g. E. von
Hartmann) must consequently reject any interna-
tional law properly so called. In their opinion inter-
national agreements are mere conventions, which each
one observes as long as he finds it necessary or advan-
tageous. And so we are eventually led back to the
principles of ancient paganism, which, in the inter-
course between nations, too often identified right with
might. But Christianity brought the nations into a
closer union and broke down the barriers of narrow-
minded policy. It proclaimed, moreover, the duties of
love and just ice as binding on all nations, thus restoring
and perfecting the natural law. The fimdamental
principles: "Give each one his due", "Do injury to
no man", " Do not to others what you would not have
them do to you", etc., have an absolute and imiversal
value, and hence must obtain also in the intercourse
between nations. Purely natural duties and rights are
common to all nations; the acquired or positive ones
may vary considerably. Various, too, are the rights
and duties of nations in peace and in war. Since,
however, there are, under this head, many details of a
doubtful and changeable character, the codification of
international law is a most urgent desideratum. Be-
sides this an international court should be established
to attend to the execution of the various measures
promulgated bj' the law and to arbitrate in case of
dispute. The foimdations of such an international
court of arbitration have been laid at The Hague; un-
fortunately, its competence has been hitherto very
much restricted, and besides, it exercises its functions
only when the Powers at variance appeal to it of their
own accord. In the codification of international law
no one would be more competent to lend effective co-
operation and to maintain the principles of justice and
love which should exist between nations in their inter-
course with one another, than the pope. No one can
offer sounder guarantees for the righteousness of the
principles to be laid down, and no one can exert
greater moral influence towards carrying them into
effect. This is even recognized by unprejudiced
Protestants. At the Vatican Council not only the
many Catholic bishops present, but the Protestant
David Urquhart appealed to the pope to draw up a
schedule of the more important principles of interna-
tional law, which were to be binding on all Christian
nations. Religious prejudice, however, places many
difficulties in the way of realizing this plan.
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