fuse life into the administration by "circles," and on his attempt to form alliances among the princes with the ultimate aim of bringing about a general confederation of the estates. Schönborn desired, by means of such a general confederation, to make Germany under his own leadership independent of the favour of the great powers. Although this confederation was to be peaceful in character and could consequently only become a second grade power, he even hoped to make of it a means of establishing a balance of power in Europe between France and Austria, such as some Italians had sought to make of their country in the preceding century. Schönborn's policy was most successful in 1657-58, when Ferdinand III died without leaving an heir who had attained his majority and had been elected King of the Romans, thus giving France an opportunity to attempt to dictate the succession to the imperial crown. Schönborn, however, secured its bestowal upon another Hapsburg, Leopold I (1658-1705); at the same time he united a large number of princes in the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund), which looked for support to France.
Still more powerful but not more advantageous for Germany was the influence exercised on the course of events by another reigning prince, Frederick William of Brandenburg, the Great Elector. His contemporaries looked upon him only as the most turbulent of the rulers in the empire. His chief object was the aggrandizement of Brandenburg to the eastward of the Elbe, but in the Peace of Westphalia he had been compensated by new territories in western Germany. Dissatisfied with this arrangement he openly avowed that as the greater part of his dominion bordered on eastern Europe, he, like Austria and even more unscrupulously, did not consider the interests of Germany as identical with those of Brandenburg. When Sweden declared war on Poland in 1655 he took part on the side of the former country with all his resources. In 1658 the new emperor joined forces with him to drive Sweden out of Germany. In order to be more certain of the aid of the imperial troops Frederick William, at the election of the emperor, brought it about that Austria was required to renew its pledges not to support Spain, at which France was preparing to strike the final blow. This threatened Germany once more with serious danger, for France, after forcing Spain into concluding the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, in 1660 dictated peace on the Baltic at Oliva and Copenhagen on such terms that Sweden was protected against any diminution of its territories. Then when the Turks, after a long truce, renewed their advance on Vienna in 1662 France forced auxiliaries on Austria as soon as the latter began to offer a sturdy defence. Consequently, after the first victories, Leopold preferred to come to a secret understanding with the Turks at Vasvár (1664). France interfered in every quarrel among the states of the empire.
Aided by the personal charm of its young king Louis XIV, who had assumed the government in 1661, France appeared to have obtained a dominant influence in Germany such as Charles V had formerly held in Italy. What it had vainly striven to gain by war France now acquired during ten years of peace. Apparently in all parts of the empire, including Austria, there was a continually growing need of peace. The subsidies that Louis poured into the exchequers of the impecunious princes, who were just beginning to devise a rational system of taxation, were intended to fetter them. The upper classes in Germany surrendered themselves completely to the influence of French culture and customs. Moreover, French statecraft, economic policy, and military system, which presented to the princes an example of effective administrative organisation, all promised to place Germany more and more under the spell of its western neighbour. The Houses of Guelph and Wittelsbach and the rulers of Saxony allowed themselves to be won over by France. In 1667-68 Louis was able to place a check upon the Elector of Brandenburg, and also upon Austria, the dynastic line of which was now reduced to one person, and threatened to become extinct like that of Spain. Although the Peace of Westphalia led the Germans to take France as a model, yet in many unseen ways it prepared the emancipation of Germany. The national consciousness became quickened in proportion as intellectual life reawakened, and the national spirit once more found a voice. The princes gradually drew back from France, and its friendship was only seriously sought by the House of Wittelsbach. When de Lionne, Louis's adviser in foreign affairs, warned him not to carry out his purpose of attacking the Netherlands until he was sure of the sympathy of the more important German princes, all the efforts of the able French diplomats did not avail to obtain this assurance. Louis, nevertheless, advanced against the Dutch, and a storm of popular indignation broke out in Germany which carried along with it the German princes, with the exception of the Wittelsbach line. In 1674 the empire declared war against France.
(3) 1674-1713.—This was the signal for a war of forty years duration, which was divided into three periods. In the first the advantages of efficient generals, well-trained troops, and abundant means were all on the side of France. The contingents of the German princes formed a motley body; in 1675 the Elector of Brandenburg withdrew, and marched into Pomerania against the Swedes. In addition, the allies of the emperor, the Netherlands and Spain, proved inefficient. Only a few isolated exploits, such as the battle of Fehrbellin (1675), revived the fame of German military prowess. In 1679 peace was made between the empire and France at Nimwegen. Louis, however, overestimated his success. On the one hand he calculated on detaching the Elector of Brandenburg permanently from the German cause by compelling him in 1660, to restore all the territory won from the Swedes and then to enter into an alliance with France that would reduce him almost to feudatory dependence. On the other hand, after peace had been signed, France seized various strips of territory on the western frontier of Germany (called the "Reunions"), this unwarranted procedure culminating in the occupation of Strasburg (1781). Such conduct, however, only stimulated the patriotic indignation of the small western states (Alliance of Laxenburg, 1682), while at the same time the rising generation in the larger principalities, including the territories of the Wittelsbach line, was rallying enthusiastically around the emperor for the Turkish war. The repulse of the Turks at the siege of Vienna (1683), followed by the glorious recovery of Hungary, gave a new, impulse to Austria's political power. With the increase of French interference in German affairs (succession to the Palatinate, 1685; election of the Bishop of Cologne, 1688), German resistance to Louis, in which Brandenburg joined, became unanimous. Louis retorted by renewing war. Although Austria was still engaged in the struggle with the Turks, the military forces of the two sides were almost even. The Margrave Louis William of Baden organized the troops of the small south-western states of Germany in an efficient manner. Austria found in Eugene of Savoy a general and statesman who, in a position similar to Wallenstein's, far surpassed the latter in genius and character. Moreover, the emperor found in England a far more efficient ally than the Netherlands had been. Both sides brought larger and larger armies into the field, until each of them maintained 400,000 men. By the Peace of Ryswick (1697) Louis restored part of the territory of which he had robbed the empire. Austria, by the brilliant victory of Zenta (1697), drove the Turks completely out of Hungary and Transylvania (Treaty of Carlowitz, 1699). The death of the last Spanish Hapsburg (1700) caused a fresh outbreak of
