GOD
GU
GOD
solute necessity and would be infinite in every kind of
perfection; but of nothing are we more certain than
that the world as we know it, in its totality as well as
in its parts, realizes only finite degrees of perfection.
It is a mere contradiction in terms, however much one
may try to cover up and conceal the contradiction by
an ambiguous and confusing use of language, to pred-
icate infinity of matter or of the human mind, and
one or the other or both must be held by the Pantheist
to be infinite. In other words the distinction between
the finite and the infinite must be abolished and
the principle of contradiction denied. This criticism
applies to every variety of Pantheism strictly so called,
while crude, materialistic Pantheism involves so many
additional and more obvious absurdities that hardly
any philosopher deserving of the name will be found
to maintain it in our day. On the other hand, as re-
gards idealistic Pantheism, which enjoys a consider-
able vogue in our day, it is to be observed in the first
place that in many cases this is a tendency rather than
a formal doctrine, that it is in fact nothing more than a
confused and perverted form of Theism, based es-
pecially upon an exaggerated and one-sided view of
Divine immanence (see below, iii). And this con-
fusion works to the advantage of Pantheism by en-
abling it to make a specious appeal to the very argu-
ments which justify Theism. Indeed the whole
strength of the pantheistic position as against Atheism
lies in what it holds in common with Theism; while,
on the other hand, its weakness as a world theory be-
comes evident as soon as it diverges from or contra-
dicts Theism. Whereas Theism, for example, safe-
guards such primary truths as the reality of human
personality, freedom, and moral responsibility. Pan-
theism is obliged to sacrifice all these, to deny the
existence of evil, whether physical or moral, to destroy
the rational basis of religion, and, under pretence of
making man his own God, to rob him of nearly all his
plain, common-sense convictions and of all his highest
incentives to good conduct. The philosophy which
leads to such results cannot but be radicall.y unsound,
(ii) The special argument based on the existence of
order or design in the imiverse (also called the telco-
lofjical argument) proves immediately the existence of
a supramundane mind of vast intelligence, and ulti-
mately the existence of God. This argument is
capable of being developed at great length, but it must
be stated here very briefly. It has always been a
favourite argument both with philosophers and with
popular apologists of Theism; and though, during the
earlier excesses of enthusiasm for or against Darwin-
ianism, it was often asserted or admitted that the
evolutionary hypothesis had overthrown the teleo-
logical argiunent, it is now recognized that the very
opposite is true, and that the evidences of design which
the univeree exhibits are not less but more impressive
when viewed from the evolutionary standpoint. To
begin with particular examples of adaptation which
may be appealed to in countless number — the eye, for
instance, as an organ of sight is a conspicuous em-
bodiment of intelligent purpose — and not less but
more so when viewed as the product of an evolution-
ary process rather than the immediate handiwork of
the Creator. There is no option in such cases be-
tween the hypothesis of a directing intelligence and
tliat of blind chance, and the absurdity of supposing
that the eye. originated suddenly by a single blind
chance is augmented a thousand-fold by suggesting
that it may be the product of a progressive series of
such chances. "Natural selection", "survival of the
fittest", and similar terms merely describe certain
phases in the supposed process of evolution without
helping in the least to explain it ; and as opposed to
teleology they mean nothing more than blind chance.
The eye is only one of the countless examples of
adaptation to particular ends discernible in every
part of the universe, inorganic as well as organic;
for the atom as well as the cell contributes to the
evidence available. Nor is the argument weakened
by our inability in many cases to explain the partic-
ular purpose of certain structures or organisms. Our
knowledge of nature is too limited to be made the
measure of nature's entire design, while as against
our ignorance of some particular purposes we are en-
titled to maintain the presumption that if intelligence
is anywhere apparent it is dominant everywhere. More-
over, in our search for particular instances of design
we must not overlook the evidence supplied by the
harmonious unity of nature as a whole. The universe
as we know it is a cosmos, a vastly complex system of
correlated and interdependent parts, each subject to
particular laws, and all together subject to a common
law or a combination of laws, as the result of which the
pursuit of particular ends is made to contribute in a
marvellous way to the attainment of a common pur-
pose; and it is simply inconceivable that this cosmic
unity should be the product of chance or accident. If
it be objected that there is another side to the picture,
that the universe abounds in imperfections — mal-
adjustments, failures, seemingly purposeless waste —
the reply is not far to seek. For it is not maintained
that the existing world is the best possible, and it is
only on the supposition of its being so that the imper-
fections referred to would be excluded. Admitting
without exaggerating their reality — admitting, that is,
the existence of physical evil — there still remains a
large balance on the side of order and harmony, and to
account for this there is required not only an intelli-
gent mind but one that is good and benevolent, though
so far as this special argument goes this mind might
conceivably be finite. To prove the infinity of the
world's Designer it is necessary to fall back on the
general argument already explained and on the de-
ductive argument to be explained below by which
infinity is inferred from self-existence. Finally, by
way of direct reply to the problem suggested by the
objection, it is to be observed that, to appreciate fully
the evidence for design, we must, in addition to partic-
ular instances of adaptation and to the cosmic unity
observable in the world of to-day, consider the histori-
cal continuity of nature throughout indefinite ages in
the past and indefinite ages to come. We do not and
cannot comprehend the full scope of nature's design,
for it is not a static universe we have to study but a
universe that is progressively unfolding itself and
moving towards the fulfilment of an ultimate purpose
under the guidance of a master mind. And towards
that purpose the imperfect as well as the perfect —
apparent evil and discord as well as obvious good
order — may contribute in ways which we can but
dimly discern. The well-balanced philosopher, who
realizes his own limitations in the presence of nature's
Designer, so far from claiming that every detail of that
Designer's purpose should at present be plain to his
inferior intelligence, will be content to await the final
solution of enigmas which the hereafter promises to
furnish.
(iii) To Newman and others the argument from conscience, or the sense of moral responsibility, has seemed the most intimately persuasive of all the argu- ments for God's existence, while to it alone Kant allowed an absolute value. But this is not an inde- pendent argument, although, properly imderstood, it serves to emphasize a point in the general a posteri- ori proof which is calculated to appeal with particular force to many minds. It is not that conscience, as such, contains .a direct revelation or intuition of God as the author of the moral law, but that, taking man's sense of moral responsibility as a phenomenon to be explained, no ultimate explanation can be given except by supposing the existence of a Superior and Law- giver whom man is bound to obey. And just as the argument from design brings out prominently the attribute of intelligence, so the argument from con-
