KULTUREAMPF
705
KULTURKAMPP
source of Hegelianism, that had accompHshed the
unity of Germany. Most Liberals, on the otlier hand,
wliilo they rejoiced over the settlement of the "(!er-
man question" by Prussia, continued to hold the na-
tional unity as incomplete so long as the Germans
were divitled in religion and in the aforesaid funda-
mental philosophic views. They maintained that a
permanent |iolitical unity of Germany depended abso-
lutely on unity of religion, language, and education.
On this groimd they proclahned the Catholic minority
a foreign element in the new empire; it must be either
assimilated or exterminated. The deep-rooted reli-
gious difTerences of Germany, thus brought again to the
front in connexion with the nation's future, were
freshly aroused, though such new occasion was scarcely
necessary. Even while the Liberals yet hesitated to
evoke them, they had, of themselves as it were, and by
their own nature, taken on a new life.
As early as 1848, an important "Catholic Move- ment" sprang up in Germany. During the eigh- teenth century the German Catholics had been quite outmancBuvred by the Protestants, and in the early decades of the nineteenth century foimd themselves politically powerless. Economically they had fallen into the background, nor could they exercise socially an equal influence. In general education they were also backward, in comparison with their rivals. Their Catholic consciousness was therefore much weakened; no longer proud of their religion, they ceased to profess it openly and freely. But about the middle of the nineteenth century a change come over the Catholics of Germany, and they awoke to a fresh sense of the power and beauty of their religion. Simultaneously ('atholic life took on a new development throughout the entire West, especially during the pontificate of Pius IX. This pope had a wonderful influence over the Catholic masses, whom he filled with a remarkable confidence and zeal, especially as to their public life. In the Syllabus of 1867 he condemned with great ear- nestness that Liberalism which was then everywhere proclaimed as the heir expectant of Catholicism. Thereupon, he convened an CECumenical council, the first in 300 years. At this turning-point the Gennan Catholics, so long eliminated from the political, eco- nomic and educational life of their nation, rallied to the defence of their faith against Liberalism. Under papal leadership they devoted themselves to the defence of Christian teaching and life, violently attacked by a multitude of infidel writers, and undertook to with- stand the combined hosts of Protestantism and Liber- alism. The Liberals, on the other hand, resented bit- terly both Syllabus and Papal Infallibility; in some places ( Mannheim, Berlin ) Catholics suffered from the violence of mobs. At the very time when the dogma of Papal Infallibility was being proclaimed, ( ierrnany was winning her great victories over France ; to the Liberals (some of whom were thus minded in the Prussian war of 1866 against Austria) it seemed as if the time had come for the final conflict between the empire and papacy, the last decisive battle of the Ref- ormation against enslavement of religious thought and subjection to ecclesiastical authority. Graduafly and almost unconsciously, under the mfluence of the aforesaid political and ecclesiastical events, a situation that in the Liberal mind originally contemplated only a more or less comprehensive legislation, both as to the schools and the relations of Church and State, de- veloped into one of the most passionate conflicts of principles ever fought out within the limits of a great nationality. This was the state of affairs when, in the fall of 1870, the Prussian Catholics, not satisfied with their widespread system of popular associations (Vereinswesen) undertook the creation of a new polit- ical party, the Centre (Zentrum); on the other hand, in the Reichstag elections of the Spring of 1871 the ,Lil)eraJls overthrew the Conservatives and took up the reins of power. In April, 1871, the mutterings of the VIII.— 45 ^
tempest were already heard in the opening debates of
the Reichstag, especially in the debate on the Address
to the Throne, when the Liberals insisted very point-
edly on a flat and final rejection of any proposition
looking towards the restoration of the Temporal
Power, characterizing any such steps as an interfer-
ence with the domestic afi'airs of a foreign people. As
yet, however, no one had the courage to let loose the
turbulent passions that filled men's breasts, nor as late
as the end of 1871 (Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe)
were the Liberal leaders ready to open the campaign.
The Centre remained on the defensive, occupied
chiefly in outlining its parliamentary status. At this
juncture Bismarck appeared on the scene.
(3) He was then under strong nervous tension, ow- ing to the extraordinary exertions and emotions of the "high stakes" policy of his previous eight years. He was dominated by the fear that new and more exhaus- tive wars would soon be necessary in order to defend the unity of Germany then barely won. In this tem- per he was deeply concerned lest within the empire itself the foreign enemy should find aid and succour from particularist or anti-Prussian elements, whose importance he easily over-estimated. At this stage of his diplomacy he was bent on preventing the recur- rence of any situation similar to that of 1863-66, when he foimd himself helpless in the presence of a powerful parliamentary opposition. He was at all times nat- urally inclined to resent as unnecessary, and therefore unjustifiable, any kind of parliamentary opposition. Quite indifferent to theories of home government and the division of political authority within the State, he was ecjually eager for a solid centralization and thor- ough reinforcement of all national resources, in view always of the foreign enemy. In this spirit he had once fought the Liberals, and compelled his former op- ponents to become the ardent supporters of his foreign policy. Now, on his return from France, he found be- fore him a party, on the one hand more powerful in a parliamentary sense than the Liberal opposition of the sixties, while on the other it seemed to hmi gravely perilous in case of a foreign war. He was suspicious of one deputy, Ludwig Windthorst, in whom he at once recognized the real leader of the Centre.
While Bismarck was fully aware of the high abilities of Windthorst, he knew also that he was a former sub- ject of the House of Hanover and was still in close touch with that dynasty, that he had never approved the exclusion of Austria from the German unity as ac- complished by Bismarck, and that he vigorously dis- approved the excessive favour shown by Bismarck to the Liberals, both in Prussian and in imperial affairs. He had already suffered a notable defeat at Wind- thorst's hands in the Tariff Parliament of 1868, on which occasion Bismarck tried in vain to obtain from the assembly anything more than the politico-econom- ical services for which it had been called (i. e. he failed then to secure the peaceful union of the South German States with the North German Confederation) . Wind- thorst at that time bad no strong parliamentary fol- lowing, yet his political strategy had proved success- ful. But now a strong party was at his back, and, as its acknowledged leader, he lost no occasion to increase its influence. On the one hand he appealed to certain Conservatives, superior to Protestant prejudices, and unalterably opposed to the National Liberals as ene- mies of Christianity and the traditional German views of the State ; on the other he was always ready to com- bine with those Liberals who had not yet gone over unconditionally to Bismarck. This welcoming of recalcitrant Liberals was always Bismarck's chief cause of complaint. He had also persuaded himself from the beginning that the Centre entertained for- eign relations inimical to the new German Empire. After the Franco-Prussian War the chancellor seems to have feared a conflict with Russia as champion of the new Panslavism. He had in large measure the
