KULTURKAMPF
709
KULTURKAMPF
cism had long since disappeared; since 1875 he no
longer feared an anti-German coalition of Catholic
powers or a war with Russia. In the meantime those
closer relations with Austria had begun which in 1879
terminated in the actual Triple Alliance. His new
foreign policy brought with it a frequent rapproche-
ment with the Catholics. In the German Parliament
he could no longer act quite independently of them,
and this was another factor in the future reconciliation.
The National Liberals in the Reichstag had ceased to
be his unconditional supporters in the grave questions
of internal reform (politico-economical, social, and
financial) that now claimed all his attention. The
continued opposition of so large a party as the Centre
was henceforth an element of grave danger for all
his plans. Conservative Protestants, meanwhile, re-
belled against the Liberalism of Falk, which under the
circumstances was far more offensive to them than
to Catholics. Moreover, Emperor Wilhelm inclined
daily more in their direction. Indeed, the position of
Falk had become practically untenable.
C. ISrS-Sl.—The death of Pius IX and the election of Leo XIII (Feb., 1878) made possible the restoration of peace in the much troubled Fatherland. At once, and again during that year, Leo XIII wrote in a con- ciliating way to Kaiser Wilhelm urging the abolition of the May Laws. His request was refused; at the same time Berlin expressed a desire for reconciliation. In July, 1878, Bismarck had a personal interview with the papal nuncio, Masella, at Kissingen (in Bavaria). However, a full decade was yet to intervene before the May Laws quite disappeared. The proposed basis of negotiations was not calculated at this juncture to bring about the much desired peace. Bismarck in- sisted that the May Laws should not be abolished by any formal act; he was willing, however, to modify their application, obtain gradually from the Landtag temporary discretionary authority in regard to the laws, remove certain odious points, etc., all this on condition of a yielding attitude on the side of the Cath- olics. The latter, indeed, were in this respect praise- worthy. Bismarck further desired that in all meas- ures of relief the Government should appear to take the initiative — of course after proper diplomatic nego- tiations with Rome. In return he demanded from the Curia an assurance that the Centre party would support the policies of the Government; otherwise the latter could have no interest in a reconciliation.
As a proof of goodwill he dismissed Herr Falk in 1879 and replaced the author of the odious May Laws by Herr Puttkamer, whose ecclesiastico-political attitude was more conciliatory than that of his predecessor. Under him the Church began to regain its former influ- ence over the schools. He obtained from the Landtag on three occasions (1880-83) discretionary authority to modify the May Laws ; thereby he provided for a res- toration of orderly diocesan administration, and the filling of the vacant sees. The vacant parishes, it is true, remained yet without pastors; it was allowed however, to administer them from neighbouring parishes. After 1883 the Sperrgeselz, or suspension of ecclesiastical salaries, was not enforced. In 1882 Prussia established an embassy at the Vatican. Bis- marck in the meantime held firmly to one point : the obligation of the bishop to make known to the Gov- ernment all ecclesiastical appointments, and the Gov- ernment's right of veto. This much Rome was not disinclined to allow, but demanded a previous formal abolition of at least certain portions of the May Laws. Leo XIII was very anxious to re-establish peace and harmony with Germany, and for that reason chose for his secretary of state, in 1881, Lodovico Jacobini, who hat! Ix-en nuncio at Vienna since 1879, and had conducted the preliminary negotiations. During the negotiations that followed, the principal defect of the papal diplomacy consisted in the excessive stress it laid on the purely politico-ecclesiastical elements
of the problem (those which affected the general
European situation of the Church), not sufficiently
taking into account the fundamental source of the
conflict, i. e., the violation of the constitutional law of
Prussia. From this point of \'iew it did not seek to
co-operate with the tactics of the Centre in that party's
dealings with Bismarck; it rather complied in several
ways with the wishes of the latter, and sought to influ-
ence the Centre (in substantially political matters) in
favour of the Government. On the other hand, while
Windthorst did not perhaps give quite sufficient con-
sideration to the general European situation, he was
all the more earnest in his resolution to give perma-
nency to the exertions of his party, to again anchor
the rights of the Church in the Prussian Constitution,
and to make the latter document guarantee once again
the independence of.the Church. During these years of
more or less fruitful negotiations between Rome and
Berlin, the political power of the Centre in the Reichs-
tag grew notably; the Government was no longer able
to count on a majority against it. By this time the
Conservatives had again obtained the upper hand in
the Landtag, and soon made evident their intention to
abolish completely the Falk system of interference
with the disciplinary and pastoral life of the Catho-
lic Church (Conservative Resolution, 25 April, 1882).
When Bismarck saw that it was impossible to make
the Centre a government party (spring of 1884), the
negotiations on his side were temporarily dropped.
To the Conservatives, now urgent, he replied that he
was ready to proceed to a revision of the May Laws as
soon as he knew that Rome would accept tlie Anzci-
gepflic.ht, or obligation of making known to the Gov-
ernment all ecclesiastical appointments, with the
corresponding ci\'il right of veto. He believed, ap-
parently, that the Kidturkampf agitation would grad-
ually die out, and the Catholic people grow weary of
their struggle for "a constitutional and legal inde-
pendence of the Church", now that the most burden-
some of the May Laws had been withdrawn and a
somewhat orderly ecclesiastical life was again possible.
In the meantime the Centre party and its press
kept alive a strong Catholic feeling. On the other
hand, the foreign situation soon brought up the ques-
tion of the final abolition of the May Laws. Bismarck
was again anxious in regard to Russia, and this time
feared an alliance of that nation with France; the re-
cent awakening of Pansla\asm added to his solicitude
on this point. He was concerned lest the Vatican
should favour the Franco-Russian alliance. On the
other hand he now sought to rally all forces at the dis-
posal of the Government for the suppression of the
Polish movement that had by this time taken on large
proportions ; owing to his Kidturkampf policy, all
classes of the Polish people had been deeply stirred
during the previous decade, and their attitude now
caused the chancellor great anxiety. He hoped, also,
that a decisive ending of the ecclesiastical conflict
would seriously affect the hitherto intact solidarity of
the Centre and weaken notably the popular attach-
ment to the party, whereby its influence, even yet the
source of his gravest political difficulties, woukl finally
diminish. Leo XIII saw clearly that Bismarck was
now earnestly desirous of peace ; Rome, therefore, it
seemed, need no longer be over-timid in the matter of
concessions based on suitable guarantees. The pope
also hoped that Bismarck would in turn be helpful to
him in respect of the German imperial policy towards
Italy. It was of considerable im])ortance that at this
juncture the most statesmanlike member of the Prus-
sian hierarchy, Bishop Kopp of Hildcsheim (now
Cardinal, and Prince-Bishop of Breslau), was made a
member of the Prussian House of Lords (Herrcnhaus).
Bismarck still held with tenacity to the former govern-
ment claims. In the matter of the AnzeigcpfUcht,
the nominations of parish priests at least should not
take place without the Government's approval. Nor
