MARBIAQl
712
BKABBIAQI
validity, as it deems necessary for the public weal.
This practical conclusion was drawn especially by
llarcus Actonius de Dominis, Bishop of Spoleto, after-
wards an apostate, in his work De republica ecclesi-
astica" (V, xi, 22), and by Launoy in his work " Regia
in matrimonio potestas '* (I, ix sqq.) . In the middle of
the last centuiy Nepomuk Nuytz, professor at the
University of Turin, defended this opinion with re-
newed vigour in order to supply a juridical basis for
civil legis&tion regarding marriage . Nu^tz 's work was
thereupon expressly condemned by Pius IX in the
Apostolical Letter of 22 Aug., 1851, in which the pope
declared as false especially the following propositions:
The sacrament of marriage is only something which is
added to the contract of marriage and which can be
separated from it; the sacrament consists only in the
blessing of the marriage. These propositions are in-
cluded in the "Syllabus" of 8 December, 1864, and
must be rejected by all Catholics. In like manner Leo
XIII expresses himself in the Encyclical "Arcanum"
c^uoted above. He says: " It is certain that in Chris-
tian marriage the contract is inseparable from the
sacrament; and that, for this reason, the contract
cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacra-
ment as well. For Christ our Lord added to marriage
the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the con-
tract itself, whenever that contract is lawfully made.
. . . Hence it is clear that among Christians every
true marriage is, in itself and by itself, a sacrament;
and that nothing can be farther from the truth than
to say that the sacrament is a certain added ornament,
or external adjunct, which can be separated and torn
away from the contract at the caprice of man."
As it is certain, therefore, from the point of view of the Church that marriage as a sacrament is fulfilled only through the mutual consent of the contracting parties, it is a matter of secondary consideration, how and in what sense the matter and form of this sacra- ment are to be taken. The view that most correctly explains this is perhaps the one that is generally prev- alent to-day; in every contract two elements are to be distinguished, the oftering of a right and the accept- ance of it; the former is the foundation, the latter is the juridical completion. The same holds true of the sacramental contract of marriage; in so far, therefore, as an offering of the marriage right is contained in the mutual declaration of consent, we have the matter of the sacraments, and, in so far as a mutual acceptance is contained therein, we have the form.
To complete our inquiry concerning the essence of the Sacrament of Marriage, its matter and form, and its minister, we have still to mention a theory that was defended by a few jurists of the Middle Ages and has been revived by Dr. Jos. Freisen ("Geschichte des canonischen Eherechts". Tubingen, 1888). Accord- ing to this marriage in the strict sense, and therefore marriage as a sacrament, is not accomplished until consummation of the marriage is added to the consent. It is the consummation, therefore, that constitutes the matter or the form. But as Freisen retracted this opinion which could not be harmonized with the Cnurch's definitions, it is no longer of actual interest. This view was derived from the fact that marria^, according to Christ's command, is absolutely indis- soluble. On the other hand, it is undeniably the teach- ing and practice of the Church that, in spite of mutual consent, marriage can be dissolved by religious profes- sion or by the declaration of the pope; hence the con- clusion seemed to be that there was no real marriage previous to the consummation, since admittedly nei- ther religious profession nor papal declaration can afterwards effect a dissolution. The error lies in tak- ing indissolubility in a sense that the Church has never held. In one case, it is true, according to earlier eccle- siastical law, the previous relation of mere espousal between man and woman became a lawful marriage (knd thcTX'foro tJie Sacrament of Marriage), namely
when a valid betrothal was followed by CMnsuinnia-
tion. It was a legal presumption that in tJbis case the
betrothed parties wished to lessen the sinf ulneas of
their action as much as possible, and therefore per-
formed it with the intention of marriage and not of
fornication. The efficient cause of the marriage con-
tract, as well as of the sacrament, was even in this case
the mutual intention of marriage, although expression
was not given to it in the regular wav. This legal pre-
sumption ceased on 5 Feb., 1892, by Decree of Leo
XIIl, as it had grown obsolete among the faithful and
was no longer adapted to actual conditions.
IV. Difference Between the Sacbament of Mabriaoe and the other Sacraments. — 'Fnxa all that has been said, it is clear that while marriage, inasmuch as it is an outward sign of grace and also produces interior grace^ has the nature comm(Hi to all the sacraments, stiljL viewed as an external sign, it is unique and very different from the other sacraments. The external sign is a contract; hence marriage, even as an effective sign or sacrament, has precisely the nature and quality of a contract, its vahdity depend- ing on the rules for the validity of contracts. And, as we can distinguish between a contract in its origin and a contract in its continuance, so we can distinguish between the sacrament of marriage in fieri and in facto esse. The sacrament in fieri is the above-mentioned mutual declaration of consent; the sacrament in /octo esse is the Divine bond which unites the married per- sons for life. In most of the other sacraments also there is this distinction between sacrament infi/eri and in facto esse; but the continuance of the other sacra- ments is based mostly on the inamissible character which they impress upon the soul of the recipient. Not so with marriage; m the soul of the recipient there is a question of no new physioGd being or mode of be- ing, but of a legal relationship which can as a rule be broken only by death, although in individual cases it may otherwise be rendered void, provided the mar- riage has not been consummated. In this respect, therefore, marriage, especiallj^ as a sacrament, differs from other contracts, smce it is not subject to the free will of the individuals. Of course, the choice of a partner and especially the contracting or non-con- tracting of marriage are subject to the free will of the individuals; but any revocation or essential altering of the terms is beyond the power of the contracting
girties; the essence of the contractual sacrament is ivinely regulated.
Of still greater importance is the contract aspect of the sacrament in fieri. In the other sacraments^ the conditional administration is admissible only within narrow limits. There can only be questions of condi- tions of the present or past^ which, according as they are verified or not verined m fact, there and then ad- mit or prevent the vahd administration of the sacra- ment. But generally even these conditions have no influence on the validity; they are made for the sake of greater reverence, so as to avoid even the appear- ance of regarding the sacramental procedure as useless. The Sacrament of Marriage, on the contrary, follows the nature of a contract in all these matters. It ad- mits conditions not only of the past and present, but also future conditions which delay the production of the sacrament until the conditions are fulfilled. At the moment these are fulfilled the sacrament and its conferring of grace take place in virtue of the mutual consent previously expressed and still continuing. Onlv diriment conditions are opposed to the essence of the Sacrament of Marriage, beokuse it consists in an indissoluble contract. Any such conditions, as well aa all others that are opposed to the intrinsic nature of marriage, have as a result the invalidity of both the contract and the sacrament.
A further quality of the Sacrament of Marriage, not possessed by the other sacraments, is that it can be effected without the personal presence of the mutual
