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CONDITION OF THE SOUTH.
91

Duty to my government compels me to report the following well-authenticated facts:

1. Nineteen-twentieths of the planters have no disposition to pay the negro well or treat him well.

2. In the same proportion the planting aristocracy proffers obedience to the government, and at the same time do all in their power to make trouble.

3. The planters evince a disposition to throw all the helpless and infirm freedmen upon the hands of the government possible, in order to embarrass us and compel us to return them to slavery again.

4. A majority of the planters desire to prevent the success of the free-labor system, that they may force Congress to revive slavery, or, what is more, a system of peonage.

5. The belief is general among the planters that without some means of “controlling" the persons of the laborers they cannot succeed; and for this reason they desire to have the military force removed, and the privilege of enacting such laws as will enable them to retain this power.

6. To defraud, oppress, and maltreat the freedmen seems to be the principle governing the action of more than half of those who make contracts with them.

7. The lives of the freedmen are frequently threatened, and murders are not of uncommon occurrence.

8. The life of a northern man who is true to his country and the spirit and genius of its institutions, and frankly enunciates his principles, is not secure where there is not a military force to protect him.

About the 15th of July Corporal J.M. Wallace, of company B, forty-seventh Indiana Veteran volunteer infantry, was on duty with this bureau, and engaged in making contracts upon Red river, in the parish of Caddo. He visited Mr. Daniel's plantation, and, as it is stated, started for Mr. White's place, but never reached it. Being absent unaccountably, a sergeant and a detail of four men were sent to look him up, but could find no trace of him. Without doubt he was murdered. He was a young man of unexceptionable habits and character, and was highly esteemed by the officers of his regiment. The circumstances of the case are such as to lead to the belief that the planters in the vicinity connived at his death. Captain Hoke, another agent of the bureau, was stopped by a highwayman within eight miles of Shreveport. One of my assistants reports as follows: “In the northern part of this parish (Cuddo) there are men armed and banded to resist the law.” These facts prove that the presence of a military force is needed in every parish. Instead of the present system of districts, I would recommend that the officer for each parish report direct to headquarters at New Orleans for instructions, and that each officer be furnished with at least twenty men, ten of whom should be mounted. I apprehend that at the commencement of the next year the planters will endeavor to load us down with the aged and infirm, and those with large families. To meet this and other difficulties that may arise, I recommend that at least five thousand acres of land be confiscated in every parish, and an opportunity given the freedmen to rent or purchase the land, and that every facility be afforded planters in the lower part of the State to obtain laborers from western Louisiana. Another remedy has been suggested, and as it meets with my approval I quote the recommendations of the officer in his own words: “Let the white troops on duty in this department be mustered out; they are greatly dissatisfied with remaining in the service after the close of the war; let black troops be mustered in their stead. In urging this matter, I suggest that the government has the first right to the services of the freedmen, and he needs the discipline of the army to develop his manhood and self-reliance. Such a course of recruiting black soldiers will act as a powerful restraint upon the abuses practiced by the planters on the freedmen, and will also compel the payment of better wages. If the planter wishes the services of a shrewd, enterprising freedman, he must out-bid the government. Lastly, the country needs the soldiers. Politicians may say what they may; western Louisiana is no more loyal now than when the State adopted the ordinance of secession.”

The statistics given at the commencement prove that we have experienced less difficulty with the freedmen than could have been expected. At times it has been necessary to adopt stringent measures to stem the tide of freedmen that seemed to be setting in toward Shreveport, and many of them have such vague ideas of the moral obligations of a contract that it has been necessary to strengthen them by imprisonment and hard labor; but the great and insuperable difficulty which meets us at every step is, that the planters and the freedmen have no confidence in and respect for each other. The planters inform us that they are the best friends of the negro, but the freedmen fail to see the matter in that light. I am well assured that as a general rule the old planters and overseers can never succeed with the freedmen; that there must be an entire change in either laborers or proprietors before the country will again be prosperous. The plan of renting lands to the freedmen, as proposed by a few planters, I am of the opinion will prove very profitable to both parties. While, as a general rule, there is constant difficulty between the freedmen and their old masters and overseers, my agents and northern men have no trouble with them; and should the planters employ practical farmers from the north as business managers, it seems to be well demonstrated that the free-labor system, as it now is, with but slight modifications, would be a grand success. In this connexion I cannot refrain from noticing the assertion of a southern politician to the effect