with local warlords can provide short-term security gains, but what is the long-term impact? I hope the administration's December review will address this issue.
Question No. 2: What is the state of the reconciliation process with the Taliban? I have expressed serious concerns about the impact of negotiations with the Taliban on women and other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan. My concern grew—and I know others' concern as well—our concern grew in reading the poll numbers from Afghanistan recently. There was a 13-percent jump from last year among respondents who say women's rights are suffering.
The December review should address the current state of play with respect to these negotiations. The recent Afghan poll showed that nearly three-quarters of Afghans now believe their government should pursue negotiations with the Taliban, with almost two-thirds willing to accept a deal allowing Taliban leaders to hold political office.
Ultimately, there must be a political solution to end the war in Afghanistan. I am not suggesting we are close at this time to that result, but we need to know the degree to which the administration and the Karzai government are coordinated and headed down the same path. International engagement on any negotiation process will be essential to long-term success. Pakistan has a role to play and is a necessary element to any long-lasting peace agreement.
The next area, security. U.S. operations in southern Afghanistan appear to be having a positive impact on Afghan public opinion. Sixty-seven percent of the people in the Province of Helmand describe their security as good, a 14-percent jump from December 2009. Nearly two-thirds of Helmand residents state that Afghanistan is on the right track.
This is an indication that positive momentum has been built in Afghanistan's most sensitive region. But such gains can be short-lived, and in order to facilitate a sustainable security, we must take a long-term approach to ensure that the Afghan Government can provide for its own security.
The training of the Afghan National Security Forces is a key threshold question. We cannot allow Afghanistan to once again become a haven for al-Qaida or other extremist groups to launch attacks against the United States. ISAF forces have denied al-Qaida this haven since 2001. However, we cannot provide this security in perpetuity. The Afghans have to assume more responsibility for their own security, and we must do all we can to prepare the Afghan National Security Forces for that day.
So where do we stand at this point? I would have to say the view is decidedly mixed. For years, the international community exercised what can be characterized as gross neglect in building Afghan security forces, and only recently have we begun to take on this task.
First, some positive news on this issue. We do not hear enough about this.
Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Caldwell, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, the so-called NTM-A, has been a source of real progress. The Afghan National Army and Police are exceeding—exceeding—their recruitment goals. As of August of this year, the Afghan National Army's total strength had grown to 138,164, exceeding the goal for October 2010 by more than 8,000 troops. As of August, the Afghan National Police had an end strength of 119,639, exceeding the 2010 goal of 109,000. These recruitment numbers are an important sign of progress, but serious concerns remain related to the quality of the force, the retention rate, and the low rate of literacy.
The Afghan National Army has significant shortages in officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. Effective junior leaders are essential to a professional force since they control immediate on-the-ground situations.
The Ministry of Defense and the training mission in Afghanistan are working to overcome a shortfall of more than 4,500 Afghan National Army officers. There are more Officer Candidate School units, twice as many seats in the Integration Mujahedeen Course, and larger classes at the National Military Academy.
As for noncommissioned officers, the Afghan National Army faces a shortage of more than 10,500. Similar expansions in training capacity and direct entry programs are underway to address this deficiency. According to a recent Pentagon report, the gap will not be closed until the end of 2012.
The Pentagon also reports we face a shortfall of more than 900 international trainers in Afghanistan. I hope our allies in ISAF can help to address this very important training need. Many European countries have a proud history of developing elite paramilitary forces. This valued expertise is needed right now in Afghanistan.
While expanding capacity is critical to growing the force, I hope the December review by the administration will address not just the efforts to grow more leaders but also describe how these leaders are laying the foundation for professionalizing the Afghan national security forces.
Retention and attrition rates. For years, the Afghan national security force's attrition rate has been an issue. Facilitating rapid growth while increasing quality requires that retention rates remain high.
In January 2010, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board approved the goal of developing a force of 305,600 personnel by October 2011. Recruiting efforts compared with increased retention have allowed the force to grow ahead of schedule so far. Moving forward, projections remain uncertain. The Defense Department reports the police have met attrition and retention goals. However, the Afghan National Army still has issues with attrition that may impact its ability to maintain its impressive growth in numbers. This month's review by the administration should clarify projections and detail efforts to boost retention.
Literacy is a big problem. The literacy rates are very low in the Afghan Security Force and this must be addressed. Consider this story from Lieutenant General Caldwell. He visited a base in northern Afghanistan where 90 percent of the troops claimed they had been unpaid for months. To limit corruption, the government has been paying the troops by electronic funds transfer instead of cash. The troops had no idea, however, since they could not read their bank statements.
Think about weapons security. How can a soldier be sure he has been assigned a weapon if he cannot read the serial number? Illiteracy is widespread in the force: Only 11 percent of enlisted personnel can read, write, or do simple math. This creates significant challenges in professionalizing the security force. In response, a huge literacy program has grown around the fielding of the Afghan security forces. So we have much to do on that.
I will move to the last part of our concerns, and that is on development. A qualified Afghan soldier is much cheaper to train and equip on the field than an American, so the overall cost to U.S. taxpayers would certainly diminish as the U.S. forces draw down. But by investing in this large force, there are long-term implications. Do we expect to pay for the Afghan security forces 10 years from now, 20 years from now? At what point will the Afghan Government be able to collect its own revenue to fund its security as well as other priorities?
That is, again, why responsible Afghan governance is essential. While the international community will shoulder much of the humanitarian and security burden in the short term, the Afghan Government needs to take steps to increase its domestic revenue collection, as well as put into place a sound legislative framework to encourage investment. They need to develop a minerals framework law, and they also need to put in place changes to bring about a stronger infrastructure.
Let me close with a reflection upon our troops. We have the obligation here in the Senate to ask and have answers to very critical questions, whether they relate to development or governance or security, and especially on the question of security. We also have an obligation to remember and keep in mind the human toll.
SSG SEAN FLANNERY
In the State of Pennsylvania, as in a lot of States, we have lost a lot of soldiers. To date, we have lost 60 servic-members since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. In Iraq, we got to the number of about 196—just below 200. Let me share one story as I conclude. Two weeks ago, Pennsylvania
