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30 It is therefore necessary to go to s 9(3) of that Act which I have set out above.
31 It will be recalled that in Re Wakim (above), s 9(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth) was held invalid as an attempt to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court that was not found in s 75 or s 76 of the Constitution.
32 Earlier, in GPAO (above) a majority of the High Court had held that s 76(ii) of the Constitution, in conjunction with s 77(i) of the Constitution, permitted the conferral of jurisdiction on federal courts in matters arising under laws made under s 122 of the Constitution: see GPAO (above) at [91], [132] and [254]. The federal court in that case was the Family Court of Australia and the law made under s 122 of the Constitution was s 69ZG of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), providing that Pt VII of that Act applied in and in relation to the Northern Territory so that a parenting order could be made by the Family Court in respect of a child that was not the child of a marriage.
33 Section 122 provides:
122 The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms which it thinks fit.
34 In Spinks v Prentice (above), decided at the same time as Re Wakim (above), orders for examination were made by the Federal Court under the Corporations Law (ACT). The High Court held that s 51(1) of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) validly conferred jurisdiction on the Federal Court under the Corporations Law (ACT). By s 51(1), jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Court "with respect to civil matters arising under the Corporations Law of the Capital Territory". The High Court gave the answers "yes" to the questions whether s 51(1) was a law defining the jurisdiction of a federal court other than the High Court within s 77(i) and with respect to a matter arising under a law made by the Parliament within s 76(ii): see especially (1999) 198 CLR 511 at [172] and [175] and also at [25] per Gleeson CJ, [27] and [30] per Gaudron J and [82] per McHugh J. The High Court followed the then recent decision in GPAO (above), on the assumption that s 122 of the Constitution was the sole source of power to make the Corporations Law (ACT).
