Nemesius, an eminent public man, shewing him the errors of paganism, and urging him to accept Christianity. These poetic epistles are of considerable length, and shew the varied interests and practical wisdom of the writer. There are 129 epitaphs and 94 epigrams, most of which are short poems, with little in them of the modern epigram, though some shew (e.g. 10–14, Εἰς Ἀγαπετούς) that the pen of Gregory could, when occasion required, be pointed with adamant. No less than 64 (31–94), belonging probably to the writer's youth, are upon the spoilers of tombs. If the statement of Jerome and Suidas, that Gregory wrote 30,000 verses, is to be understood literally, more than a third of them are now unknown.
In forming an estimate of Gregory's literary position, we have to consider (1) his poems, (2) his letters, and (3) his orations. Of each kind of writing there are abundant materials to form a judgment. (1) Two criticisms of the poems from very different standpoints may help us to arrive at the true mean. To Dr. Ullmann (Gregorius, ss. 200–202) they are "inferior to the letters, the product of old age, whereas the true vein of poetry must have shewn itself in earlier life; cramped by their subject-matters, which did not admit of originality; prosaic thoughts wrapped in poetic forms; involved and diffusive"; though he admits that some of the short pieces are poetry of a high order, and that the didactic aim of Gregory is to be taken into account. "Still they could never be more than a poor substitute for the older poetry of Greece." Villemain considers the poems the finest of all Gregory's works. He instances one especially (de Humanâ naturâ), "the severe charm of which seems to have anticipated the finest inspirations of our melancholy age, while it preserves the impress of a faith still fresh and honest, even in its trouble. . . . His funeral eulogies are hymns; his invectives against Julian have something of the malediction of the prophets. He has been called the 'Theologian of the East.' He ought to have been called rather 'the Poet of Eastern Christendom'" (Tableau de l᾿éloquence chrétienne au 4me siècle, p. 133). (2) Gregory's extant letters, though upon very various subjects, and often written under the pressure of immediate necessity, are almost invariably finished compositions. (3) A higher place has been claimed in this article for Gregory's orations than for his poems. He is now held to be greater than Basil, or even Chrysostom, and to have combined "the invincible logic of Bourdaloue; the unction, colour, and harmony of Massillon; the flexibility, poetic grace, and vivacity of Fénelon; the force, grandeur, and sublimity of Bossuet. . . . The Eagle of Meaux has been especially inspired by him in his funeral orations; the Swan of Cambrai has followed him in his treatise on The Existence of God" (Benoît, p. 721). He was an orator by training and profession. For this he studied at Caesarea, Alexandria, and Athens, and was the acknowledged chief in the schools of the rhetoricians. The oratory of the Christian pulpit was the creation of Gregory and Basil. It was based on the ancient models, and was akin, therefore, to the speeches of Demosthenes and Cicero, rather than to the modern sermon. It has been charged against the sermons of Gregory that they are not expositions of Scripture. As compared with the homilies of Chrysostom, for example, they certainly are not (except one:Orat. xxxvii. Op. i. 644–660); the nature of the case made it impossible that they should be. But the margin of every page abounds with references to Scripture, and no reader can fail to see with Bossuet that "Gregory's whole discourse is nothing but a judicious weaving of Scripture, and that he manifests everywhere a profound acquaintance with it " (Défense de la tradition, etc., iv. 2; Benoît, p. 723).
Great as was the position of Gregory as a writer, he left his chief mark upon history as a theologian. He alone beyond the apostolic circle has been thought worthy to bear the name "Theologus" which had been appropriated to St. John. Ullmann (Gregorius, etc., ss. 209–352), following Clemencet (Op. i. xlix.-lxxviii.), has arranged under their separate headings his views on the articles of faith. Within our present limits we can only refer to them as contained in the five famous theological discourses at Constantinople (Orat. xxvii.-xxxi. Op. i. 487–579).
(1) The first, Κατὰ Εὐνομιάνων, urges that "to discourse about God is a task of the greatest difficulty, not fitted for all times or all persons, nor to be undertaken in the presence of all persons. . . . The teacher of theology ought first to practise virtue. There is abundant scope for work to refute the older teaching of the pagan philosophers, or to discuss simpler questions of science and theology; but as to the nature of God our words should be few, for we can know but little in this life."
(2) Περὶ θεολογίας. Gregory reasserts here his favourite position, that "it is the pure mind only that can know God. . . . The theologian beholds part of God, but the divine nature he can neither express in words nor comprehend in thought. The higher intelligence of angels even cannot know Him as He is. That there is a creating and preserving cause, we can know, as the sound of an instrument bears witness to its maker and player; that God is, we know, but what He is, and of what nature He is, and where He is, and where He was before the foundation of the world, we cannot know. The Infinite cannot be defined. We can only predicate negative attributes, for the nature of the divine essence is beyond all human conception."
(3) Περὶ Υἱοῦ. The two previous discourses were introductory. He now passes to the next subject. "The three earliest opinions concerning God were anarchia, polyarchia, and monarchia. The two former could not stand, as leading to confusion rather than the order of the universe. We hold that there is a monarchia, but that God is not limited to one person. If unity is divided, it becomes plurality. But if there is equal dignity of nature, and agreement of will, and identity of movement, and convergence to unity of those things which are of unity (and this cannot be the case in created things), there may be distinction in number without by any means involving distinction in essence and nature.
