upon which Chamberlain was able to give the lead not only to his adopted city but to England at large. He became mayor of Birmingham in 1873, and was re-elected in 1874 and 1875. If he was a radical, he maintained it was because political means were necessary to deal effectually with the evils standing in the way of social reform. Ignorance, and the existence of insanitary and disgraceful housing, were the two main evils. But, whilst free education could only be secured by act of parliament, the improvement of sanitary conditions lay with the municipalities themselves; and here there can be no question of the results achieved by Chamberlain. They included the purchase by the Birmingham corporation of the gas-works, water-works, and sewage farm, the destruction of the slums in the heart of the city, and the provision of artisans’ dwellings. He worked for the extension of free libraries and art galleries, and sought in every way to make Birmingham a place in which its inhabitants should take a civic pride. Nor were his interests confined to Birmingham. At the close of 1874 he arranged a conference of municipal authorities and others interested in the sanitation of large towns, in order to create a sound public opinion on the subject. It took place in January 1875 and was a starting-point in the development of municipal social reform.
Holding the view that legislation was needed for effecting improvements, it was natural that Chamberlain should seek a yet wider field for his activities. In 1874 he stood for parliament unsuccessfully at Sheffield; but, at a by-election in 1876, he became the colleague of Bright in the representation of Birmingham. From this time till the final split over Home Rule, Chamberlain was closely associated with (Sir) Charles Dilke [q.v.]. Forming a close offensive and defensive alliance, they agreed that neither should accept office unless the other was also satisfied. In 1877 Chamberlain reorganized the liberal party in the constituencies by forming large local associations on a representative basis, and federating these in a central organization. He thus became the Carnot of the liberal victory of 1880. But Mr. Gladstone did not at first intend to admit either Dilke or Chamberlain to the Cabinet, his personal sympathies being with the more moderate type of liberal. His hand was forced, however, by Dilke, who refused to join the ministry unless either Chamberlain or he became a Cabinet minister. Queen Victoria raised strong objections to Dilke, because of the line which he had taken on grants to the royal family; and thus Chamberlain, though in his earlier years he had seemed to coquette with republican views, and though at the time his parliamentary reputation was less than Dilke’s, became president of the Board of Trade, whilst Dilke was put off with the subordinate office of under-secretary of state for foreign affairs. When, at the end of 1882, room was at last found for Dilke in the Cabinet, there was at first some question of Chamberlain taking the vacant office of chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, so that Dilke should go to the Board of Trade. The Queen was unwilling to have Dilke as chancellor of the duchy, and, indeed, afterwards showed some reluctance to accept Chamberlain. The difficulty was met by Mr. J. G. Dodson (afterwards Lord Monk-Bretton) exchanging the Local Government Board for the duchy, so that Dilke might fill his place. The episode, however, enabled Chamberlain to show the staunchness of his friendship. ‘Your letter’, he wrote to Dilke on 13 December, ‘has spoilt my breakfast. The change would be loathsome to me for more than one reason and will give rise to all sorts of disagreeable commentaries. But if it is the only way out of the difficulty, I will do what I am sure you would have done in my place and accept the transfer.’
The intimate letters of Chamberlain to Dilke reveal the absence of sympathy between Chamberlain and most of his colleagues in the ministry of 1880-1885. In any case, in the words of Dilke, ‘the holding of strongly patriotic and national opinions in foreign affairs, combined with extreme radical opinions upon internal matters, made it difficult to act with anybody for long without being attacked by some section with which it was necessary to act at other times, and made it difficult to form a solid party’. But the special circumstances regarding Ireland and foreign and colonial questions made the situation still more difficult. As to Ireland, Chamberlain distrusted and disliked a policy of coercion. He had an uneasy conscience at having accepted it in 1880; at the same time he was at a loss for an alternative. He recognized in October 1881 that Parnell had now got beyond the radicals. The Irish leader was demanding ‘no rent’ and ‘separation’; and Chamberlain was not prepared to say that the refusal of such terms as these constituted an Irish grievance. His own inclination was to stand aside and let the coercionists and Parnell fight out their quarrel; but this was now impossible.
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