tionate to his increased forces and to the lengthened distance from the front to the base, some 500 miles of a narrow, winding river, varying at different seasons from very shallow water to extensive floods, and flanked by hostile or treacherous tribes. The former of these requirements was to be met by sending out two Indian divisions from France; the latter received unaccountably little attention. The doubts of the commander-in-chief in India, submitted to the viceroy for transmission to the secretary of state—‘whether in the present state of the river combined with our present insufficient number of light-draught steamers, we could adequately supply our troops’—were omitted from the viceroy's telegram to London [Report, Mesopotamia Commission, pp. 22–3.]
Only to a very limited extent had it been found possible to meet from India and Burma Nixon's earlier demands for water transport, and that commander was aware that the large supply of tugs, barges, &c., which had been ordered from England in August could not arrive for many months. Moreover, the medical equipment of the expedition was already insufficient; the reserves in India of personnel and stores were greatly depleted, and medical stores were almost unobtainable from England. These conditions rendered a deadlock probable, unless the new advance should be exceptionally lucky and successful, and casualties few. Vague reports of Turkish reinforcements moving from Anatolia towards Bagdad had been received, but it was thought that they would not arrive for some months.
Such were the circumstances when, on 23 October 1915, the secretary of state telegraphed to India that Nixon might advance on Bagdad if satisfied as to the sufficiency of his forces, and that two divisions would be sent from France as soon as possible. Nixon, not sharing Townshend's views as to the insufficiency of his force, did not report them to India or to England, and ordered the advance. Townshend, deferring to the judgement of his superior, occupied some weeks in preparations for attacking the Turks in their entrenched position astride the Tigris near the ancient arch of Ctesiphon. He attacked on the morning of 22 November what he supposed to be a force somewhat greater in numbers than his own. But large reinforcements had arrived or were just arriving. The Turks were driven from their first entrenchments, but their increasing numbers gradually prevailed. The battle was lost by nightfall, and after standing on the defensive for some days and repelling heavy counter-attacks, Townshend, with the concurrence of Nixon, who had been present during the fighting, decided to retreat before the overwhelming Turkish force, which now consisted of several divisions. Keeping the enemy at bay, striking back effectively, and taking with him not only his wounded but 1,350 prisoners, he reached Kut without the loss of a gun. Here, with the approval of Nixon and of the Indian government, he decided to stand fast. He was closely besieged from 6 December till 29 April, when, though all assaults had been repelled, the imminent starvation of his force compelled unconditional surrender.
After the battle of Ctesiphon reinforcements of infantry and artillery were sent to Mesopotamia from India; but the two divisions from France and another ordered from Egypt had not begun to arrive, when, on 19 January 1916, Nixon, through ill-health, relinquished his command, after the first efforts of all available troops to relieve Kut had failed. The sufferings of the sick and wounded from Townshend's retreating division and from the troops under Nixon who first attempted his relief were primarily due to the inadequacy of the river transport, the disastrous results of which culminated in still worse conditions during later operations from January to April.
Nixon was summoned to England, with many other witnesses, to appear before the Mesopotamia commission of inquiry appointed in August 1916, the report of which (but not the evidence taken) was published in the following summer. The commissioners placed Nixon first in a graded list of officials, military and civil, declared to be chiefly responsible for the shortcomings of the expedition. ‘The weightiest share of responsibility’, they said, ‘lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confident optimism was the main cause of the decision to advance’ [Report, p. 111]. One of the commissioners, who recorded a separate report because he thought the commission's findings generally too lenient, dissociated himself from the censure of Nixon [Report, p. 121]. The government proposed to set up a special court to inquire further into the accusations against the incriminated officials, civil and military; but withdrew this proposal in deference to objections raised on various grounds in parliament, and decided that in respect of civilians no further inquiry should be held, but that
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