palatinate, while the commons wished the war to be mainly a sea war against Spain. It may be argued that the commons misunderstood the conditions of European politics, and that they underestimated the power of the empire and the league, while they overestimated the power of the king of Spain. On the other hand England had neither a disciplined and well-organised army on foot nor the habit of bearing the taxation needed for its support, while the Spanish treasure-ships offered a tempting bait, and the memory of the Elizabethan privateers was a strong incitement to follow their example. Little as Buckingham knew it, the crisis of his fate had come. Shouting for war would no longer suffice for a leader. He had to resolve in what way and with what enemies the war was to be made. He resolved characteristically to fight as many enemies as possible, and to fling to the wind all considerations of difficulty and expense.
Nor was this all. The wider the conflagration the more need there was of allies, even though the allies were not exclusively protestant. He failed to learn the lesson of the Spanish fiasco, and aroused the resentment, as yet muffled, of the commons by forwarding a scheme for marrying the prince to Henrietta Maria, the youngest sister of Louis XIII; and this scheme he urged in the old headstrong way which had led to his failure in the Spanish negotiation. At first it was intended that there should be no binding agreement with France in the matter of the English catholics, and Charles had given a personal engagement to that effect. After parliament had been prorogued the French government insisted that an agreement to that effect should be made, and it was Buckingham who, having first overcome the scruples of Charles, carried the prince with him to overcome the scruples of James. When the marriage had been settled on these terms, it was hopeless for Buckingham to advise a speedy meeting of parliament, lest it should advise that the marriage negotiations should be broken off while there was yet time.
If parliament was not to meet in the autumn, the financial difficulties would be very great. The money voted in the preceding session had been allocated to certain definite objects, and was almost all spent. In the meanwhile Buckingham had projected the sending of Count Mansfeld to the palatinate with twelve thousand English foot soldiers. When they were at last got away, in January 1625, there was no money left to support them, and they dwindled away, starved and sickening, never getting beyond the frontier of the Dutch republic. It was Buckingham's first gigantic failure—a failure clearly traceable to his determination to initiate an independent policy of his own, without consultation with those who held the purse-strings. Yet the scheme of Mansfeld's expedition formed but a part of the vast but incoherent plan which dangled before his eyes. He meant also to assist the armies of the Dutch republic, to send money to Christian IV of Denmark to enable him to invade Germany, to fit out a fleet which would assail Spain on its own coasts, and support the French in an enterprise against Genoa, a city entirely devoted to the interests of Spain.
All this while Charles had meekly followed in Buckingham's wake, and on 27 March 1625 he ascended the throne on his father's death. For the next three years or more Buckingham was, to all intents and purposes, king of England. It was this that, more than anything else, cast a shadow on the new reign. It was not in any real sense a change of sovereigns. Buckingham continued to direct the government of England as he had done before.
With a view to the coming war, Buckingham had in the course of 1624 purchased from Lord Zouch the wardenship of the Cinque ports (Agreement between Buckingham and Zouch, 17 July 1624, State Papers, Dom. clxx. 16), thereby overcoming the difficulties of divided maritime jurisdiction. Later on the cautious Williams incurred his displeasure by advising him to resign the admiralty to avoid risk. Under his orders the fleet was rapidly got ready for sea, and ten thousand soldiers were raised to serve on board. It was arranged that, as war had not been declared against Spain, Buckingham, who was to command in person, should carry a commission from Frederick. The exact destination of the fleet was not as yet determined on, and early in June Buckingham thought of employing it in an attack on the Flemish ports.
The keystone of Buckingham's vast enterprises lay in the alliance with France, and Richelieu, now the true ruler of the country, was the last man to follow Charles's meteoric favourite. Richelieu, indeed, while James was still alive, had through Buckingham's influence obtained the loan of an English warship, and permission to hire seven English merchantmen to help him to crush the Huguenots of Rochelle; but in May, when the ships were ordered to cross the Channel, Pennington, their commander, was directed to take no part against French protestants. By that time Buckingham had
