military forces of their country; or, more widely, compulsory
military service in any form. For a discussion of the military
features of conscription and of other forms of recruiting see
Army, §§ 40 ff. The present article deals with the economic and
social aspects of compulsory military service, for which, generally
and non-technically, the word “conscription” is used more
commonly than any other. The word occurs for the first time
in France in the law of the 19th Fructidor (1798), which prescribes
the liability of les défenseurs conscrits to serve if required
from their twentieth to twenty-fifth year of age.
There is perhaps no law on the statute-books of any nation which has exercised and is destined in the future to exercise a more far-reaching influence on the future of humanity than this little-known French act of 1798, introduced by General Jourdan to the Council of the Five Hundred, for it was the power thus conferred upon the French government which alone rendered the Napoleonic policy of conquest possible. “I can afford to expend thirty thousand men a month”; this boast of Napoleon’s, made to Metternich at Schönbrunn in 1805, has determined the trend of events from that day forward, not only on the battlefield, but also in the workshops, and forms even at the present day the chief guarantee for peace, stability and economic development upon the continent of Europe.
The idea in itself was not new. The principle that every able-bodied male is liable to be called on for the defence of the state dates from the earliest times. The essential importance of the event lies in this, that at a critical moment this law passed by an obscure body of men—absolutely in defiance of the opinion of the greatest reformer that France at that moment had discovered, Carnot, and of the feelings of a very large proportion of the whole community—became permanent by the action of causes set in motion by Napoleon, which ultimately compelled all Europe to adopt similar legislation.
To understand its full significance we must trace the line of evolution of the then existing armies of Europe.
In almost any state, in proportion as the central executive power prevailed over internal disturbance, the able-bodied males of each country ceased to have opportunities and incentives for training themselves to arms. Trade became more profitable than plunder, and men began to specialize in various directions. Wealth began to accumulate and fortresses sprang into existence for its protection, but the new fortifications required specialists for their reduction, and above all things an abundance of time. Militia forces (corresponding to the former feudal levies) neither could find the specialized labour nor would afford the time—hence the necessity arose of enlisting men who had made the use of arms their special study and were content to abide by the rules of conduct their maintenance as organized bodies imposed. But wherever Europe happened to enjoy a few years of peace, the supply of men who had trained themselves to arms naturally decreased, and the state itself was compelled to assume the task of training its recruits. This, with the exceedingly complicated nature of the weapons in use, was a very long process, and though even in the 16th century the idea of universal service was put forward by such statesmen as Machiavelli and Maurice of Nassau, practically it could not be put into force, because in the time the male population could economically give to their training, satisfactory results could not be obtained.
As Motley has pointed out in his Rise of the Dutch Republic, in the time of Alva 5000 disciplined Spaniards were a match for 20,000 and more burghers, though the latter were fighting with the courage of desperation, and were of necessity more or less inured to the horrors of warfare. But with every improvement in the nature of hand firearms this ratio of superiority of the trained soldiers tended to disappear, whilst as campaigns became fewer and shorter the difficulty of obtaining war-trained soldiers, accustomed to fighting as the Spaniards had been, always increased.
Moreover, after the peace of Westphalia—the close of the great era of religious wars—wars were made for dynastic reasons and primarily for the acquisition of territory; and since the territory was of no use without inhabitants to pay revenue, the “principle of moderation was introduced into the conduct of hostilities, altogether foreign to their nature” (Clausewitz). Men were no longer allowed to live at free quarters or to pillage towns. On the contrary, even in an enemy’s country, they had to submit to the severest restraints, and thus soldiering, being no longer remunerative, ceased to attract the more daring spirits.
Thus in the decade preceding the French Revolution soldiering had reached the very nadir of degradation all over Europe, and, though the Prussians, for instance, still retained a great relative superiority when fighting in closed bodies under the eyes of their leaders, the spirit which had led them to victory when fighting in and for their own country had entirely disappeared from their ranks when they had to face the French in their great struggle for existence.
Amongst the earliest problems of the French Revolution was the question of army reform, and compulsory service was at once proposed, and though for the time the opposition of most of the principal soldiers prevailed, ultimately a proposal was accepted by which voluntary enlistment was retained for the line, all unmarried citizens between eighteen and forty years of age constituted the militia, and the rest of the men the national guards for home defence.
The latter proved so popular that over 2,571,000 names were obtained. At once the militia was given up, and reliance was placed upon the national guard, which was called upon to furnish 169 battalions of volunteers. The result was disappointing. Only 60 incomplete battalions were furnished, and these (except for the few hundreds of enthusiasts amongst them from whom came many of the marshals, generals and colonels of the empire) were recruited from the least trustworthy sections of the community. These were the celebrated Volontaires and proved a positive scourge wherever they were quartered. It was clear that they could not meet the invaders, and the assembly decreed on the 11th of July 1792 “La patrie en danger,” and ordered every able-bodied man to consider himself liable for active service, but left it to the communes and districts to select representatives to proceed to the front. These men were called Fédérés, and seem to have been principally those whom the communes desired to get rid of.
But, though the idea of compulsion was present, the means of enforcing the law at the time were so imperfect that the result of this effort was only 60,000 men, of whom not more than half ever reached the field armies. Further, the law had announced that the liability extended only for the duration of the particular campaign, which in accordance with the prevalent idea of war was considered to terminate when winter quarters were taken up. In December, therefore, most of the men raised during the year took their discharge, and with the new year the work had to begin all over again. To fill the gaps caused by this sudden defection, and in view of the addition of Great Britain to the list of their enemies, the Convention decreed on the 20th of February 1793 a fresh compulsory levy of 500,000 men. Quotas were assigned to each department and commune, and three days’ grace was allowed to each to find their contingents by volunteering; failing this recourse was had to compulsion, all unmarried national guards between the ages of eighteen and forty being held liable. Thereupon thousands fled from their homes, and Vendée (q.v.) rose in open revolt.
Then on the 18th of March came the disaster of Neerwinden, and again the danger of invasion loomed near. In this emergency the Committee of Public Safety replaced the existing recruiting agents by special commissioners with unlimited power, and these ruthlessly hunted down those who attempted to evade their liability. Still the result was inadequate to meet the danger arising from the fall of Valenciennes and Condé. The Jacobins appeared before the Convention on the 12th of August and demanded the Levée en masse, and, using the popular outcry as a fulcrum, Carnot at length succeeded in introducing a workable scheme of compulsion, which limited the liability to service to all able-bodied men between eighteen and twenty-five, but within these limits allowed no exemptions. This became law on the 23rd of August, and it at once began to operate satis-
